A central issue in the trial was whether D.J. is profoundly cognitively impaired, as the prosecution contended and the court seemed to accept, or is competent cognitively but unable to communicate his thoughts without highly skilled assistance, as the defense contended. If we assume that he is profoundly cognitively impaired, we should concede that he cannot understand the normal significance of sexual relations between persons or the meaning and significance of sexual violation. These are, after all, difficult to articulate even for persons of normal cognitive capacity. In that case, he is incapable of giving or withholding informed consent to sexual relations; indeed, he may lack the concept of consent altogether.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/opinion/who-is-the-victim-in-the-anna-stubblefield-case.html
Secular progressives (as well as "progressive Christians") generally treat consent as the sine qua non to distinguish licit sex from illicit sex. They resent it when Christians compare homosexuality to other sexual deviations that lack consent.
But notice how the argument of secular ethicist Peter Singer and his coauthor nullifies the consent criterion in reference to the developmentally disabled. Moreover, the logic of their position would abolish the age of consent on the grounds that young children lack the concept of consent, and so they can't withhold consent. Their position logically turns the rationale for age of consent laws on their head. Inability to consent becomes a justification for nonconsensual sex rather than a bar.
Maybe this is a rabbit-trail, but isn't it also illicit that Singer applies one set of ethical criteria to the accused, and a totally different set of criteria to the alleged victim?
ReplyDeleteWhen it comes to the accused, he seems to endorse an intentionalist ethic:
"Even if she is mistaken in her beliefs about his intelligence and ability to communicate, it is undeniable that these beliefs are sincere and that she was neither reckless nor negligent in forming them. This ought to have been a mitigating, if not wholly exculpating, consideration in the sentencing."
But when it comes to the alleged victim, he flips to a consequentialist ethic:
"If we assume that he is profoundly cognitively impaired, we should concede that he cannot understand the normal significance of sexual relations between persons or the meaning and significance of sexual violation. These are, after all, difficult to articulate even for persons of normal cognitive capacity. In that case, he is incapable of giving or withholding informed consent to sexual relations; indeed, he may lack the concept of consent altogether.
This does not exclude the possibility that he was wronged by Stubblefield, but it makes it less clear what the nature of the wrong might be."
I'm a layman when it comes to philosophy, but aren't double-standards generally frowned upon? I know you can apply different ethical standards to explore hypotheticals, but aren't you supposed to apply the same standard to both parties even when doing that?
Good point!
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