I. Introduction
In some Calvinist circles there's been a resurgence of interest in Thomism or Reformed Thomism. I don't share their enthusiasm. In this post I'll explain why.
II. Philosophical predilections
When it comes to philosophy and philosophical theology, I find metaphysics more interesting than epistemology. I take an interest in philosophical issues like the nature of time, personal identity, abstract objects (e.g. numbers, possible worlds), and thought-experiments.
I think it's important for Christians to have a considered religious epistemology, of course, but there's an obvious sense in which metaphysics is more fundamental than epistemology. Metaphysics supplies the objects of knowledge.
Because I find metaphysics more interesting than epistemology, I generally find "rationalist" philosophers more interesting than empiricist philosophers. "Rationalist" philosophers are far more inclined to delve into metaphysical questions than empiricist philosophers. That doesn't mean I generally agree with "rationalist" philosophers. But I prefer their orientation.
Because Aristotle is more down-to-earth than Plato, Aquinas is more down-to-earth than Augustine. I think Aquinas's interest in the empirical dimension of reality is a salutary corrective to Augustine. Nevertheless, Aquinas neglects philosophical issues that interest me. The nature world is fascinating, and frequently awesome, beautiful, and enjoyable. However, I also takes an interest in what lies behind the natural world.
As I've also said, developments in math, science, and philosophy have given us conceptual models and analogies that were unavailable to Aquinas.
III. Theological predilections
Unlike Aquinas, I'm not a medieval Catholic. Rather, I'm Protestant. That makes a difference. For instance, I start with the Bible and take that as far as I can. When the Bible doesn't address certain issues, I supplement Scripture with reason and empirical evidence.
IV. Thomistic categories
i) Thomistic metaphysics is based on his categorial scheme. That's carryover from Aristotle's taxonomy, although Aquinas modifies it.
Aquinas's taxonomy comprises the transcendentals (being, truth, goodness, unicity); material, formal, efficient, and final causes; essence, existence; form, matter; potentiality, actuality; substance, accident; privation.
Moreover, some of these categories correspond to each other, viz.
form>actuality
matter>potentiality
ii) I think it makes sense to base metaphysics on categories. Categories are the most fundamental kinds of things. Metaphysics is concerned with what there is. So to that extent I'm sympathetic to Aquinas's program.
ii) There are, however, problems with his choices. There's nothing inherently or distinctively personal about any of his categories. They could all be impersonal entities or kinds of things.
iii) In Plato, there's a clear-cut distinction between form and matter. But in Aristotle and Aquinas, the form tends to dissolve in the concrete object.
iv) There's also the problem of "pure" forms (e.g. God, angels) that are not a form of anything. That's a throwback to Plato's theory. So the classification breaks down.
v) I think sufficient condition better captures the notion of efficient cause.
vi) What's the justification for classifying formal, material, efficient, and final causes as causes? What do they share in common that makes all of them causes? For instance, teleology is an important category, but why claim it's a causal category? Put another way, in what respect are these four very different categories causes?
vii) Thomistic epistemology is naturally related to Thomistic metaphysics. As I understand him, Aquinas doesn't think we have direct knowledge of particulars. Rather, we discern the form in the particular. But what's the justification for that restriction?
V. Deriving categories
i) A deeper problem I have with Aquinas's categorial scheme is how he arrives at that taxonomy. What's his source of information? What makes those categories to be the ultimate categories rather than some other categories? In the history of philosophy, different metaphysicians have drawn up different lists of categories.
How are humans in a position to know what are the ultimate kinds of things? How do we even get started in developing a theory of categories?
ii) From a Christian standpoint, God is the ultimate source of reality. God's nature, existence, and imagination constitute the source of what's actual or possible. Therefore, in developing a theory of categories, it makes sense to begin with God. In particular, to correlate our categories with the communicable and incommunicable attributes of God. To some degree, communicable attributes function like abstract universals.
iii) There are different ways to classify the divine attributes. One way is to use Scriptural terminology. Biblical usage is sometimes redundant. For instance, God's "justice" and God's "righteousness" are synonymous. Those are not two different attributes.
You also have overlapping attributes: Holiness overlaps goodness and transcendence. Wisdom overlaps goodness and knowledge. So a classification of divine attributes needs to consolidate Biblical usage.
iv) Another way to classify divine attributes is to translate Biblical terminology into philosophical nomenclature, viz. aseity, omnipotence, omniscience, impassibility, timelessness, spacelessness. In deriving metaphysical categories from divine attributes, that makes sense.
V. Categories as communicable/incommunicable attributes
Let's list the divine attributes, and correlate them to categories:
1. The Trinity
The Trinity has several properties:
i) Personality
ii) Relation
iii) Resemblance
iv) Variation
v) Number (one, three)
vi) Symmetry (a category that combines ii-iv).
2. Timelessness & spacelessness
i) On the face of it, that seems to be apophatic. Negative theology. What God is not. God is not spatial (physical, material) or temporal.
If is, however, possible to lend positive meaning to timelessness and spacelessness. Consider an actual abstract infinite. That's a given totality. Complete. By contrast, time and space are limits. In that respect, this involves a distinction between finitude and infinitude. God's existence is complete. We might use the word plenity to designate the fullness of God's existence. That stands in contrast to creatures whose existence is subdivided into spatial and/or temporal parts.
3. Aseity
We could designate aseity as a kind of metaphysical necessity. Necessary existence. That stands in contrast to contingent existence. That distinguishes God from creatures and events.
4. Truth and speech
i) Scripture makes truth a divine attribute. Likewise, Scripture ascribes speech to God. Arguably, speech is an economic attribute.
Truth and speech have certain properties:
ii) Meaning
iii) Mentality
iv) Logic
It's arguable that truth is a property of thought or concepts. Truth inheres in minds.
5. Omniscience
i) Knowledge presumes mentality. Knowledge is a property of minds.
ii) Knowledge can include imagination. Conceiving possibilities, including unexemplified possibilities.
6. Omnipotence
This involves causality. Will and power. The ability to exercise power. The ability to convert abstract possibilities into concrete realities. Possible worlds are ground in God's omnipotence and omniscience.
VI. A Christian categorial scheme
1. Based on (V), we can derive the following categories:
i) Mentality
ii) Necessity/contingency
iii) Causality
iv) Symmetry (relation, resemblance, variation)
v) Plenity (actual infinity)/limits (time, space)
vi) Meaning
vii) Goodness
viii) Abstract objects (e.g. number, universals, possible worlds, logic)
2. The point of this exercise is illustrative rather than exhaustive. I'm not attempting to generate a complete categorial scheme, but to present a strategy for how a Christian metaphysician could do so. And I think that has a sounder basis in philosophical theology than Aquinas's rather arbitrary set of categories. I'm not a Thomist, in part because I don't see the value of squeezing or stretching philosophical analysis into his categorial scheme.
There's nothing inherently or distinctively personal about any of his categories. They could all be impersonal entities or kinds of things.
ReplyDeleteBoth personal and impersonal substances can be covered by his categories.
But in Aristotle and Aquinas, the form tends to dissolve in the concrete object.
A material substance (concrete object) is a composite of form and matter. I'm not sure what you mean by saying the form dissolves in the concrete object. It is true that we don't see the form itself for we see the composite substance as a whole.
There's also the problem of "pure" forms (e.g. God, angels) that are not a form of anything. That's a throwback to Plato's theory. So the classification breaks down.
Plato posits a third realm of forms whereas Aquinas says every form is either in a mind or in a substance. A material substance is a composite of form, matter, and an act of existence whereas an immaterial substance is a composite of form and an act of existence.
I think sufficient condition better captures the notion of efficient cause.
In some contexts that may be helpful. However, speaking only of sufficient conditions may blur the distinctions between efficient, formal, and material causes since all three of these causes might be considered sufficient conditions.
What's the justification for classifying formal, material, efficient, and final causes as causes?
I believe it is because they all provide an explanation, in different ways, for a substance. What is it (formal)? What is it made of (material)? Why does it exist (efficient)? What can it do (final)?
What's his source of information?
In short, it's a combination of observation, common sense, and argument. For instance, observation and common sense tell us that some things undergo change. What is necessary for change to occur? According to Aquinas, one answer is act and potency. A thing is actually one way at the moment. This cannot be denied without denying that anything exists. The thing also has the potential to change in some way. If it didn't have such a potential then it could never change. But we do observe change so potency must also be real.
Therefore, in developing a theory of categories, it makes sense to begin with God.
On the other hand, if you start with readily observable phenomenon, such as change, your views will be better accepted outside of Christian circles. Things like an act and potency can be used to argue for the existence of God as first efficient cause.
We could designate aseity as a kind of metaphysical necessity. Necessary existence. That stands in contrast to contingent existence. That distinguishes God from creatures and events.
Aquinas would say that God is not a composite of essence and existence because his essence is existence. All creatures, on the other hand, are composites of essence and existence.
On the other hand, if you start with readily observable phenomenon, such as change, your views will be better accepted outside of Christian circles. Things like an act and potency can be used to argue for the existence of God as first efficient cause.
DeleteAside from the fact that "potency" can devolve into meaningless speculations, there are two reasons to avoid this: Both Aristotle's and Aquinas's "act and potency" lead to the existence of something "called God" that is really something other than God, and second, it fails to challenge the self-sufficiency of those "outside of Christian circles" and really just reinforces them in the false belief that their reason really is a self-sufficient capability (thus undermining your stated intention of "arguing for the existence of God".
Both Aristotle's and Aquinas's "act and potency" lead to the existence of something "called God" that is really something other than God
DeleteHow is the God of Aquinas's natural theology incompatible with the God of Christian revelation?
it fails to challenge the self-sufficiency of those "outside of Christian circles" and really just reinforces them in the false belief that their reason really is a self-sufficient capability
Can you elaborate on this a bit? I don't think Aquinas would say that reason alone is self-sufficient to know God completely. There is still room for revelation.
Jayman: “incompatible” is a weasel word.
DeleteWe don’t live in a world where Aristotelianism is thought of as a valid description of reality. So if you choose to begin with “A/T metaphysics” to begin discussing God, then you short-circuit your witness (if indeed you care about your “witness”) by first having to sell “Aristotelianism”. Feser takes the easy way out. He “simply rejects the entire rationalist/empiricist/Kantian dialectic” (pg 29 of “Scholastic metaphysics”) – doesn’t that strike you as a cowardly way out?
Second, Aquinas’s “proofs” don’t arrive at the God of the Bible. They fall short. And Aristotle came up with a totally different “god” in his system. Consider what Bavinck says: “surely it would be a wretched faith that first has to prove God’s existence before it prayed to him”.
But consider also: We can’t know God, except that he reveals himself to us. So you have two choices: begin with that Revelation, learn everything you can know that God reveals about himself, and then fill in the gaps with “reason”. Or else, learn everything you can about a (so-called) “unknowable” “god”, build your theology out of that, and the fill in the gaps with Revelation.
Which is apt to give you the clearer picture of God as He really is?
Hi Jayman. Always nice to hear from you. Thanks for the intelligent feedback:
Delete"Both personal and impersonal substances can be covered by his categories."
i) Which does nothing to rebut my observation that there's nothing inherently or distinctively personal about any of his categories. They could all be impersonal entities or kinds of things.
ii) Given the fundamental place of personal agency in Christian metaphysics, there should be a separate category for that. Indeed, we can divvy up reality between mental entities and material entities, Moreover, mind enjoys primacy in relation to matter inasmuch as the physical world is the product of God's mind and will.
iii) Furthermore, to subsume rational substance under the more general category of substance suggests that God is a property instance or "species" of that higher universal. Yet that's anathema to Thomism.
"I'm not sure what you mean by saying the form dissolves in the concrete object."
The traditional term ("form") is rather opaque. It might be more helpful to say the "form" of a concrete object is the object's structure. Different concrete objects have different physical structures.
However, a problem with that understanding is that even when dealing with two objects of the same kind, they are similar rather than identical. So they only approximate the universal. If, however, the universal only exists in the concrete object (as an exemplified universal), then every particular, every member of the same kind, embodies a different universal. If the universal is in the particular, then you can't distinguish the universal from the particular.
"whereas an immaterial substance is a composite of form and an act of existence."
An immaterial substance is halfway between Plato's abstract universals and concrete particulars. That's where the classification breaks down.
"since all three of these causes might be considered sufficient conditions."
I don't see how formal and material causes could be individually sufficient conditions.
"I believe it is because they all provide an explanation, in different ways, for a substance. What is it (formal)? What is it made of (material)? Why does it exist (efficient)? What can it do (final)?"
Although a cause has explanatory value, not all explanations are causes.
"observation and common sense tell us that some things undergo change. What is necessary for change to occur? According to Aquinas, one answer is act and potency. A thing is actually one way at the moment. This cannot be denied without denying that anything exists. The thing also has the potential to change in some way. If it didn't have such a potential then it could never change. But we do observe change so potency must also be real."
That seems more like a disguised description than an explanation. Yes, spatial and/or temporal entities undergo change, but there's persistence as well as change. The act/potency distinction, although valid at a certain level, doesn't do much work when it comes to explaining diachronic identity.
Speaking for myself, I'd ground diachronic identity in God's immutable, complete concept of a mutable object.
Cont. "On the other hand, if you start with readily observable phenomenon, such as change, your views will be better accepted outside of Christian circles. Things like an act and potency can be used to argue for the existence of God as first efficient cause."
Deletei) The objective of a categorial scheme is not to be persuasive but to accurately isolate and identify the fundamental kinds of things.
ii) Beginning with observation and common sense underdetermines a categorial scheme inasmuch as different philosophers have drawn up different categorial schemes, viz. Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, Stephan Körner, Reinhardt Grossman, Roderick Chisholm, E. J. Lowe, Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz.
iii) There is, moreover, a degree of circularity in deriving categories from experience inasmuch as we also classify or schematize experience on the basis of categories.
iv) Insofar as this is a distinctively theological categorial scheme, attempting to persuade people outside Christian circles will involve arguing for God's existence as well as the explanatory power of this categorial scheme.
"Aquinas would say that God is not a composite of essence and existence because his essence is existence."
To say that God necessarily exists doesn't imply that God is a compound of essence and existence. Ed Feser's hobbyhorse is to insist that God isn't a being but Being in itself. I think that's an opaque way of saying God is the source of existence, God is the exemplar of existence, rather than God exemplifying existence. If so, I agree. But to say God necessarily exists, or that God is metaphysically necessary, doesn't reduce God to a property instance of existence. Rather, it's impossible for God not to exist.
Steve:
DeleteGiven the fundamental place of personal agency in Christian metaphysics, there should be a separate category for that. Indeed, we can divvy up reality between mental entities and material entities
What makes a person a person is debated. But regardless of how we define the term "person" it's going to deal with formal and final causes. These two categories are more general than personhood and so more fundamental. And we can't sort substances into either a mental or a material bin because humans have both a mental and a material component.
Moreover, mind enjoys primacy in relation to matter inasmuch as the physical world is the product of God's mind and will.
The Thomist believes that the unconscious teleology we see in nature is caused by God's mind.
The traditional term ("form") is rather opaque. It might be more helpful to say the "form" of a concrete object is the object's structure. Different concrete objects have different physical structures.
Substantial form can't be reduced to physical structure.
However, a problem with that understanding is that even when dealing with two objects of the same kind, they are similar rather than identical. So they only approximate the universal.
The individuals share a substantial form but may have different accidental forms.
If, however, the universal only exists in the concrete object (as an exemplified universal), then every particular, every member of the same kind, embodies a different universal.
But the universaal also exists in the mind of God (at least).
An immaterial substance is halfway between Plato's abstract universals and concrete particulars. That's where the classification breaks down.
I fail to see why this is a "break down" of Aquinas's classification.
I don't see how formal and material causes could be individually sufficient conditions.
I mean that the formal, material, and efficient causes together may be viewed as sufficient conditions. This may run the risk of blurring the distinctions between these three causes.
Although a cause has explanatory value, not all explanations are causes.
I suspect 2500 years of evolving language usage across multiple languages may be the root of the confusion here.
Yes, spatial and/or temporal entities undergo change, but there's persistence as well as change. The act/potency distinction, although valid at a certain level, doesn't do much work when it comes to explaining diachronic identity.
Potency is the principle of continuity underlying and determining the limits of change. But the act/potency distinction alone is not intended to explain identity over time.
Speaking for myself, I'd ground diachronic identity in God's immutable, complete concept of a mutable object.
I would add keeping the same substantial form over time is important to identity (the substantial form is both in God's mind and in the substance).
And while I saw the second part of your response I don't have anything to add there.
"What makes a person a person is debated."
DeleteIn context, I'm referring to God as a personal agent. God is the ultimate reality and the exemplar of mundane realities. Therefore, our metaphysical categories should mirror that reality.
"But regardless of how we define the term 'person' it's going to deal with formal and final causes."
I don't see any reason to define personality or mentality in reference to formal causes.
"These two categories are more general than personhood and so more fundamental."
i) To say what's more general is more fundamental is a non sequitur. In many cases, generality is just an abstraction. An abstraction is not a fundamental kind of thing. Take a statistical mean. That's not constitutive of reality.
ii) I notice, though, that you blow past my point about how subsuming God under the general category of substance makes God a property instance of substance, contrary to the Thomistic instance that God's existence and essence are identical.
"And we can't sort substances into either a mental or a material bin because humans have both a mental and a material component."
I didn't suggest those were dichotomies.
"The Thomist believes that the unconscious teleology we see in nature is caused by God's mind."
You have a habit of acting as if I deny things I never denied. I was making a point about the ontological primacy of mind in relation to matter. Given that fact, there ought to be a metaphysical category for mentality.
"Substantial form can't be reduced to physical structure."
I had specific reference to physical substance.
"The individuals share a substantial form but may have different accidental forms."
Take elliptical orbits. No actual orbit of a celestial object is a mathematically perfect ellipse. Rather, it will approximate an abstract ellipse. So in what respect is the universal in the particular?
"But the universal also exists in the mind of God (at least)."
That glues together two different paradigms: Aristotelian realism (universal in particular) and the Philonic/Augustinian reinterpretation of Platonic realism (universals as divine ideas).
"I fail to see why this is a 'break down' of Aquinas's classification."
In the case of an immaterial substance, the universal isn't consistently in the particular (Aristotelian realism) or apart from the particular (Platonic realism).
"I suspect 2500 years of evolving language usage across multiple languages may be the root of the confusion here."
Perhaps, but if you're using "cause" as a synonym for "explanation" or the reason why something is, then it's unclear why the four "causes" are the only reasons why something is. Do the four "causes" exhaust our explanatory repertoire?
"Potency is the principle of continuity underlying and determining the limits of change."
I don't see how potency is a principle of continuity.
Steve:
DeleteI don't see any reason to define personality or mentality in reference to formal causes.
Formal causes are bound up with the definition of things. When you ask "what is a person?" you are implicitly asking about the formal causes of the thing (this goes for all "what is it?" questions).
To say what's more general is more fundamental is a non sequitur. In many cases, generality is just an abstraction.
From the Thomist perspective, every substance has a formal cause but not every substance is a person. You can't be a person without having a formal causes but you can have a formal cause without being a person.
I notice, though, that you blow past my point about how subsuming God under the general category of substance makes God a property instance of substance, contrary to the Thomistic instance that God's existence and essence are identical.
It was not my intent to imply that God was one of many different kinds of being, if that was your understanding. And I did say that God's essence is existence. I'm not sure if there's real disagreement here.
You have a habit of acting as if I deny things I never denied.
I'm merely trying to clarify the Thomist position. To say that the unconscious teleology we see in nature is caused by God's mind is to explain in one sense how God's mind has ontological primacy over matter. We don't need to add a new metaphysical category for the mental to hold that God's mind has ontological primacy over all creation (matter included).
Take elliptical orbits. No actual orbit of a celestial object is a mathematically perfect ellipse. Rather, it will approximate an abstract ellipse. So in what respect is the universal in the particular?
DeleteAn elliptical orbit is not the universal shared across particular celestial bodies. Gravity (among other things) is the universal shared by all particular celestial bodies. The orbits of celestial bodies are accidents and provide one way to differentiate two celestial bodies from each other.
In the case of an immaterial substance, the universal isn't consistently in the particular (Aristotelian realism) or apart from the particular (Platonic realism).
It's consistently both in the substance and in the mind of God.
Do the four "causes" exhaust our explanatory repertoire?
Good question. I would tentatively answer, yes (but add act and potency). Any explanation I can think of off the top of my head just seems to be an instance of act, potency, or the four causes.
Note the implications if yes is the correct answer. If there are any true explanations then something like Thomism must be true. If something like Thomism is true then monotheism is probably true. We can then rule out atheism, agnosticism, deism, pantheism, and polytheism. That obviously doesn't take you to Christianity but it removes a lot of alternatives.
I don't see how potency is a principle of continuity.
I'm not sure I can explain it well in these comments. W. Norris Clarke explains it somewhat in his larger argument for act and potency (The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics, p. 117-118):
"What is the relation between these two co-principles [the principle of continuity and the principle of difference]? The principle of continuity cannot be merely juxtaposed extrinsically to each of the changing modes or actualities of the changing being; it is truly modified, affected in the real order by the process -- it loses something real it had before and acquires something real that it did not have before. Otherwise, it is not a real change. Hence it must have an intrinsic natural aptitude or capacity -- potentiality -- for possessing and being joined in intrinsic unity to each of its different modes of being, not only the original mode it possessed at the beginning and the new mode it has at the end, but also, if it can still change, to every other one of its possible new modes along the whole gamut of change open to it. At any one point it is actualized, informed, by its present mode, but potentially open to receive all the other modes its nature allows: in more technical language, it is in act with respect to its present mode of being, in potency with respect to all its future possibilities for change. At any moment in a process of change the being is a synthesis of act and potency -- of present actuality and potential openness to future acts -- a potency partially actualized by its present act, but still open, in potency, to all further actualizations possible to it according to the nature and limits of its capacity."
"Any explanation I can think of off the top of my head just seems to be an instance of act, potency, or the four causes."
DeleteSeems easy to come up with counterexamples. For instance, some explanations are functional explanations, like the role that ritual plays in cultures. Some explanations are structural, like kinship. (Both examples come from the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)
Or let's take some examples from Bas van Fraassen's, The Scientific Image (Clarendon, 1980):
Consider the question
3. Why did Adam eat the apple?
This same question can be construed in various ways, as is shown by the variants:
3a. Why was it Adam who ate the apple?
3b. Why was it the apple Adam ate?
3c. Why did Adam *eat* the apple?
Yet there are three different explanation requests here.
The difference between these various requests is that they point to different contrasting alternatives. For example, 3b may ask why Adam ate *the apple* rather than some other fruit in the garden, while 3c asks perhaps why Adam *ate* the apple rather than give it back to Eve untouched. So to 3b, ‘because he was hungry’ is not a good answer, whereas to 3c it is (127).
Suppose you ask why I got up at seven o'clock this morning, and I say ‘because I was woken up by the clatter the milkman made’. In that case I have interpreted your question as asking for a sort of reason that at least includes events-leading-up-to my getting out of bed, and my word ‘because’ indicates that the milkman's clatter was that sort of reason, that is, one of the events in what Salmon would call the causal process. Contrast this with the case in which I construe your request as being specifically for a motive. In that case I would have answered ‘No reason, really. I could easily have stayed in bed, for I don't particularly want to do anything today. But the milkman's clatter had woken me up, and I just got up from force of habit I suppose.’ In this case, I do not say ‘because’ for the milkman's clatter does not belong to the relevant range of events, as I understand your question (143-44).
"An elliptical orbit is not the universal shared across particular celestial bodies. Gravity (among other things) is the universal shared by all particular celestial bodies. The orbits of celestial bodies are accidents and provide one way to differentiate two celestial bodies from each other."
DeleteYou and I operate with very different metaphysical paradigms. Mathematical truths are paradigm-cases of abstract objects or abstract universals. Celestial objects with elliptical orbits exemplify the abstract universal of an ellipse.
If several celestial bodies have elliptical orbits, then that's a shared universal. That's one thing they have in common. In you deny that, then in what respect are they all instances of an ellipse?
I don't view gravity as a universal, but a physical force.
"Formal causes are bound up with the definition of things. When you ask 'what is a person?' you are implicitly asking about the formal causes of the thing (this goes for all 'what is it?' questions)."
DeleteYou assert that to be the case, but you give no reason why that's true, or even plausible.
What's a formal cause? What's a form? Let's begin with a definition:
"The divine ideas, Aquinas likes to say, are analogous to the ideas a craftsman has. They are like the pattern the craftsman has in mind before he begins to make anything…The divine ideas are thus exemplars: any thing God creates has the form it has in imitation of the form that is the divine idea representative of that thing." Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (Routledge, 2005), 180.
On that definition, a form corresponds to God's exemplary idea. Either a form (just is* God's exemplary idea or else it *represents* the exemplary idea.
Let's apply that to some examples:
i) Aquinas classifies God as a "pure form". Cf. Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Clarendon, 1993), 54. But God can hardly be an exemplification of his exemplary idea. Exemplary ideas stand in contrast to their exemplifications. The exemplar is ontologically prior to, and distinct from, any exemplifications thereof.
ii) Aquinas says the soul is the form of the body. I take that to mean the soul is a substantial form. Now a human soul can't be God's exemplary idea, for the soul is a creature.
Hence, the soul represents or corresponds to God's exemplary idea of the body. But that entails physicalism. On that definition, human beings are not a composite of body and soul. Humans are not anything over and above their bodies. And that would mean they pass into oblivion at the moment of death.
iii) According to Kenny's exposition, "A soul depends on a body for its original individuation." A. Kenny, Aquinas on Being (Clarendon, 2005), 48.
But how can a substantial form depend on a body for its individuation? If anything, you'd expect the body to depend on the form for its individuation.
Steve:
DeleteI'm not convinced by your explanatory counterexamples. Functional explanations piggyback on final causes and structural explanations piggyback on formal causes. Question 3a about Adam may be answered by appeals to both efficient and final causes. Questions 3b and 3c can be answered by appealing to the desires (final causes) that Adam has. In answering why you wake up at a certain time you appeal to both efficient and final causes.
The Thomist says that different substances of the same kind share the same substantial form. He is not saying that just any and all universals are shared across different substances of the same kind. An elliptical orbit is not part of the essence of a celestial object for we know that a celestial object in an elliptical orbit can be moved into a different trajectory.
Aside: A celestial object such as a planet or moon is not really a substance. I would classify them as aggregates. It makes little difference in this example since all material substances in the universe are effected by gravity and could be put into orbit.
Gravity is a power/force and considered by itself is a universal.
A form is the principle that accounts for a thing being the kind of thing it is. If you ask, "What is a person?", you are asking what makes a thing a person as opposed to, say, a brute animal.
On that definition, a form corresponds to God's exemplary idea. Either a form just is God's exemplary idea or else it represents the exemplary idea
DeleteI think you should replace "represents" with instantiates. When God creates Adam he instantiates the universal (humanity) in a particular (Adam). Humanity exists both in God's mind and in Adam.
Aquinas classifies God as a "pure form". Cf. Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Clarendon, 1993), 54. But God can hardly be an exemplification of his exemplary idea.
That's not even a quote from Davies so I can't comment on it much. Perhaps Davies is saying that God is a pure form in the sense that he is not a composite of form and matter?
Hence, the soul represents or corresponds to God's exemplary idea of the body. But that entails physicalism. On that definition, human beings are not a composite of body and soul. Humans are not anything over and above their bodies. And that would mean they pass into oblivion at the moment of death.
Thomas takes a hylopmorphic dualist position, not a Cartesian dualist position. The human intellect has immaterial powers so he is not a physicalist.
But how can a substantial form depend on a body for its individuation? If anything, you'd expect the body to depend on the form for its individuation.
If you and I both share the same substantial form (humanity) then there must be something else to individuate us.
Your response illustrates a basic problem with Thomism: imposing that extraneous grid onto anything and everything. As I said in a different post, it's like waffle irons: everything comes out the shape of waffles. It treats everything as undifferentiated batter, whose shape is conferred by the waffle iron.
DeleteI'm not discussing whether a moon or planet is a "substance", in relation to which its orbit is an "accident". I'm not discussing what makes a moon or planet the kind of thing it is, and whether elliptical orbits belong to the "essence" of a moon or planet. You're recasting the issue in Thomistic categories, but the accuracy of that categorial scheme is the very question in dispute.
I'm discussing how certain abstract universals (namely: an ellipse) can be exemplified in time and space. If Thomistic metaphysics doesn't have room for that relation, then that's a drastic deficiency in Thomistic metaphysics. As you deploy it, Thomism filters out the relation between abstract objects and concrete particulars. You have no conceptual space to even allow for that relation, as I've discussed it. You're unable to discuss that relation in isolation to your generic categorial scheme, where it has no specific place.
"I think you should replace 'represents' with instantiates."
DeleteI used the word "represents" because that word figured in Stump's definition of Aquinas on the nature of forms.
"That's not even a quote from Davies so I can't comment on it much. Perhaps Davies is saying that God is a pure form in the sense that he is not a composite of form and matter?"
Davis is not the only expositor of Aquinas who talks about the category of pure forms in Aquinas. For instance, Anthony Kenny devotes a fair amount of time to analyzing that in Aquinas on Being.
"Thomas takes a hylopmorphic dualist position, not a Cartesian dualist position. The human intellect has immaterial powers so he is not a physicalist."
Once again, this is your bad habit of attacking something I never said in the first place. I didn't say or suggest that Aquinas is a Cartesian dualist. You need to break that habit. It's an impediment to constructive dialogue.
Moreover, you completely disregard the supporting argument I gave for my conclusion (based on Stump's definition), and instead respond by reasserting Aquinas's position. But a denial is not a disproof. And reasserting Aquinas's position does nothing to refute what I said when the very question at issue is whether his overall position is internally consistent.
"If you and I both share the same substantial form (humanity) then there must be something else to individuate us."
Many things differentiate one human from another. We have different bodies. We were born at different times and different places to different parents. We have different life histories. We have different personalities and memories. Matter alone is not a sufficient principle of individuation.
"It was not my intent to imply that God was one of many different kinds of being, if that was your understanding. And I did say that God's essence is existence. I'm not sure if there's real disagreement here."
DeleteThe question at issue isn't what you intended, but what your position in fact implies, even if that's contrary to what you intend. Once again:
i) You classify God as a rational substance.
ii) A rational substance is a particular kind of substance. That makes it more specific than substance in general. Hence, that makes God a species or property instance of a generic substance or essence or abstract universal (pick your category).
John, I reject the choice you present. I see revelation and natural theology as working together. You learn about God by both revelation and natural theology. I don't need to sell Thomism first because not every argument for the truth of Christianity depends on Thomism being true. The arguments you start with when in a discussion with a skeptic have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
ReplyDeleteJohn, I reject the choice you present. I see revelation and natural theology as working together. You learn about God by both revelation and natural theology. ... The arguments you start with when in a discussion with a skeptic have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
DeleteI didn't say that they don't work together. But your starting point shapes where you'll end up. And if you don't start with the God of the Bible, if you start by accepting such principles as "reason is autonomous", soon you'll be interpreting "religion within the limits of reason alone", and we know where that has gotten some of the various churches.
"It is crucial for the further argument to realize that Martin Luther was reared and trained philosophically at Erfurt. This did not make him an Ockhamist. Just as Ockham had stood on the shoulders of Scotus and outgrew him, so Luther reached beyond Ockham and Biel: for him, philosophy -- which for Aquinas was still the willing handmaiden of theology -- had become the wily whore, when fashioning and faking a liaison between the human mind and God's inner being. The only reliable source for knowning about God's revelation and redemption is the Word of God, which in terms of logical necessities surpasses all understanding"
DeleteFrom the essay "Via Antiqua and Via Moderna" in Heiko Oberman, "The Impact of the Reformation", Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1994, pg 11.
That's just one opinion, but it's not an unimportant one.