The problem of evil is an abject failure. Don't take my word for it. Just ask militant atheist Richard Dawkins:
I have never found the problem of evil very persuasive as an argument against deities. There seems no obvious reason to presume that your God will be good. The question for me is why you think any God, good or evil or indifferent, exists at all. Most of the Greek pantheon sported very human vices, and the 'jealous God' of the Old Testament is surely one of the nastiest, most truly evil characters in all fiction. Tsunamis would be just up his street, and the more misery and mayhem the better. I have always thought the 'Problem of Evil' was a rather trivial problem for theists...
http://old.richarddawkins.net/articles/127-the-theology-of-the-tsunami
Always dangerous to take theology advice from someone as incompetent in the field as Richard Dawkins. Of course, evil is a problem for people like us who believe in a perfect and being.
ReplyDeletehttp://youtu.be/VfVp5yz56e0
No, the question at issue is whether the problem of evil is in tension with Biblical theism. Sure, Dawkins tries to blacken the God of Scripture. But making allowance for his polemical rhetoric, is the existence of Yahweh, or the God of John's Apocalypse, in tension with natural evils?
DeleteBTW, you reject Classical theism/perfect being theology.
No, I embrace perfect being theology. My attitude about "classical" theism is complicated.
DeleteGiven that Yahweh is supposed to be perfect in power, goodness, and knowledge, yes, there is an apparent problem. He could have, but did not, make a cosmos free of any evil. Why? Mind you, I think there are good, if incomplete answers.
Dawkins' quote shows that the doesn't understand the difference between the generic concept of a god, which allows him or her to be evil, and the monotheistic concept, which rules that out. Here's one way of spelling out the distinctions, although now I prefer to use "deity" for the generic concept and "god" for the monotheistic concept.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eFzObFaF2b0
You're not taking Yahweh as your starting-point or standard of comparison. Rather, you're taking your version of perfect being theology as your starting-point and standard of comparison, retrofitting Yahweh accordingly, then saying there's a prima facie conflict between evil and Yahweh's existence.
DeleteThat's not a conflict between evil and Yahweh's existence, but a conflict between evil and your preconceived notion of what God, if there is a God, must be like.
The question is whether the kinds of evils we see are inconsistent with Yahweh's existence, as depicted in Scripture. The very fact that theological liberals take such offense at commands and actions ascribed to Yahweh goes to show that this is not incompatible with Yahweh's existence–just the opposite.
At most, it's at variance, not with Yahweh's existence, but with his "omnibenevolence"–as they define it.
Steve, look at the famous Mackie argument: http://youtu.be/VfVp5yz56e0?t=6m3s
DeleteWhat is your response? Is it: I refuse to discuss this, to even entertain any objection, as my fundamental assumption is that God is the paradigm of goodness and virtue.
Or is it (based on your last sentence): 1 is false (and they think it is true that they are misunderstanding omnibenevolence).
If it is the latter, then even though you want to change the subject to my alleged methodological crimes, it would seem that we (in part) agree about this argument - that it is unsound because 1 is false. (I also think that 2 is false.)
I would humbly suggest that directly addressing the argument may be more apologetically effective than accusing your interlocutor of some sort of irrational assumption - even if they are guilty of such crimes.
Several issues to sort out:
Deletei) Copy/pasting your youtube link didn't work for me, so I can't comment on Mackie's argument. Is it just the logical problem of evil?
ii) Unless God is the paradigm of goodness and virtue, the argument from evil has no standard of comparison. But given that (divine) standard of comparison, the argument from evil is stillborn. So the argument from evil suffers from that intractable dilemma.
It needs God to get started. But having started with God, it can't leave him behind. It must end where it began in that respect. For it needs a moral standard of comparison from start to finish.
iii) I don't begin with a preconception of divine goodness. In principle, God might be malevolent. How could we rule that out a priori?
iv) The question at issue is whether the paradigmatic evils which feed into the argument from evil are inconsistent with Biblical theism. Since Yahweh says and does many things that atheists and religious liberals find morally objectionable, the existence of Yahweh is consistent with a wide range of evils.
One may deny that Biblical theism accurately represents the true character of God, but the immediate question at issue is simply one of consistency. Is the Biblical concept of God at odds with various natural (or moral) evils?
v) I believe that God is benevolent. But my understanding of divine benevolence is qualified by divine revelation. What God is like is a discovery, not a stipulation. Something we find out by revelation or experience, not something we can posit ahead of time.
vi) I reject theological voluntarism. There are things God wouldn't do. But that's hard to predict in a vacuum.
vii) I don't know if you're using "omnibenevolence" as a synonym for benevolence, or for something more. As Catholic philosopher Brandon Watson notes, "omnibenevolence" is a recently theological innovation. Moreover, the term is ambiguous:
"Indeed, it's not even clear what the term means; it could mean 'wanting good for people in everything' or 'wanting what is best for each and every person' or 'wanting what is best overall for everyone' or 'always acting with a view to another's good', or any number of other things."
http://branemrys.blogspot.com/2011/07/omnibenevolence.html
viii) If by "omnibenevolence," you mean does God act in the best interest of every person, then I deny that God is omnibenevolent. That notion of God is incompatible with revelation and history alike.
ix) Paul Helm considers omnibenevolence to be incoherent:
"Can God Love the World"? Kevin Vanhoozer, ed. Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God, chap. 8.
Yes, the so-called logical argument from evil (my analysis of Mackie)
ReplyDelete1. If a being is perfectly good, he prevents evil as much as he is able.
2. If a being is omnipotent and omniscient, he can bring about anything which is possible.
3. Therefore, if a perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient being exists, he prevents evil completely. (1-2)
4. If God exists, then he is perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient.
5. Therefore, if God exists, then he prevents evil completely. (3-4)
6. There is evil.
7. God does not exist. (5-6)
Let's apply that to Yahweh:
DeleteWe could challenge premise #1. Joseph's brothers commit evil by selling him into slavery. Yahweh is able to prevent that.
Yahweh doesn't prevent that, not because he can't, but because the enslavement of Joseph serves a larger purpose–a purpose which would not be served if God short-circuited the process.
Indeed, by not preventing that initial evil, God demonstrates his ability to bring good out of evil (Gen 45:5-8; 50:20).
We could challenge premise #2. That's a true premise, but misleading. Although it's possible for God to prevent the enslavement of Joseph, it's not possible for God to prevent the enslavement of Joseph and achieve the same objective which his enslavement facilitates.
In theory, we could challenge #4. In principle, why couldn't God be malevolent?
Moreover, do we mean by divine goodness what Scripture means, or is that some preconceived notion we bring to the text? Is this an internal or external argument from evil?
"do we mean by divine goodness what Scripture means, or is that some preconceived notion we bring to the text? Is this an internal or external argument from evil?"
ReplyDeleteWell, what you seem to denigrate as a preconceived notion, I would call a moral sense that God has given to all people, which is why they can be held accountable for their actions. We have to employ this ability of ours even to judge that some text is scripture, I think.
About your ii) above: I think you're saying that moral realism implies the existence of God. A controversial statement even among Christians. But we can't rely on that premise in engaging with others, as they'll simply hold (plausibly) that some actions are intrinsically right or wrong.
iii) So, you're not a monotheist? You think of "God" in the Bible as just a god, a deity, who might turn out to be somewhat bad? I take it that the monotheistic concept of God entails that he can't even have a motive to to wrong, or fail to do good. He knows all, and needs nothing, and lacks a body. There's no way evil can, as it were, get a grip on him. I think monotheism entails this whether we take the basic concept to be of an absolutely perfect being, or uncreated creator of all else (though the implication is harder to see here).
iv) "Since Yahweh says and does many things that atheists and religious liberals find morally objectionable, the existence of Yahweh is consistent with a wide range of evils." That seems a non sequitur. Those folk may (and do) find objectionable actions which are in fact not evil. I have an atheist friend who literally thinks that God is to blame for not giving him a higher paying job.
vii) "Omnibenevolence" here, I think, should just mean morally perfect, perfect in moral character. It doesn't entail that he will always have a positive attitude towards everyone. It may be that perfectly good being gets pissed, e.g. at Hitler. I agree that this term needs spelling out - thanks for the links.
"Well, what you seem to denigrate as a preconceived notion, I would call a moral sense that God has given to all people, which is why they can be held accountable for their actions. We have to employ this ability of ours even to judge that some text is scripture, I think."
Deletei) That's circular. You appeal to a God-given sense of morality. But in the next paragraph you deny that moral realism requires God's existence.
ii) I don't deny that humans have a God-given sense of morality. However:
a) Many humans are morally hardened.
b) Our moral intuitions are crude. It's easy to come up with both hypothetical and real-life scenarios which generate conflicting moral intuitions.
c) What seems to be intuitively right or wrong is often contingent on the particular illustration. Change the illustration and the intuition changes accordingly.
"I think you're saying that moral realism implies the existence of God. A controversial statement even among Christians. But we can't rely on that premise in engaging with others, as they'll simply hold (plausibly) that some actions are intrinsically right or wrong."
i) Many secular philosophers admit that atheism implies moral relativism, fictionalism, or nihilism.
ii) If it's true that moral realism requires God's existence, then that's a true premise. Sound arguments require true premises. Are you saying we should substitute a false premise because the true premise is controversial? But that would render the argument unsound.
Arguments need to argue from truth to truth. If moral realism requires God's existence, then we can't eliminate that truth from discussion just because it's controversial. What's the point of philosophical argumentation unless it maps onto reality?
iii) It would beg the question to merely assert that moral realism requires God's existence. But one can argue for the truth of that relation or presupposition.
"So, you're not a monotheist? You think of 'God' in the Bible as just a god, a deity, who might turn out to be somewhat bad?"
At that point I wasn't discussing biblical theism but philosophical theology.
"I take it that the monotheistic concept of God entails that he can't even have a motive to to wrong, or fail to do good."
i) I don't see how you get that out of generic monotheism.
ii) Familiarity with the Bible conditions us to take a certain concept of God for granted. And philosophical theology sometimes tries to retroengineer our concept of God from that revelatory starting-point, as if this is evident or even self-evident apart from revelation.
But Christian conditioning can blind us to the unexpected nature of Biblical theism. Try putting yourself in the shoes of a pagan who's exposed to Biblical theism for the first time. I'm descended from Vikings (on my father's side). That was a vicious, ruthless warrior culture with gods to match.
My Viking ancestors wouldn't share your moral intuitions. In reading (or hearing) the Bible for the first time, they'd find some things very recognizable. They'd nod their heads. But they'd also find sometimes very surprising, countercultural, and counterintuitive.
Some things which offend modern readers would be inoffensive to Vikings. Some things were are inoffensive to modern readers would be offensive to Vikings.
"That seems a non sequitur."
It's not a non sequitur when I'm taking their outlook as the frame of reference.
"Those folk may (and do) find objectionable actions which are in fact not evil."
Agreed. But that misses the point. There's a tension between the argument from evil, what they find evil in biblical theism, and the existence of Yahweh.
Since they think Scripture depicts an evil God, the existence of evil is consistent with the existence of an evil God.
"That's circular. You appeal to a God-given sense of morality. But in the next paragraph you deny that moral realism requires God's existence."
ReplyDeleteNo, there is no circular argument there. It is perfectly consistent to hold that moral truths are necessary and don't depend on God's will, and also that people are able to know right and wrong because God made us that way.
Hardened? Crude? Wavering? Agreed.
"Many secular philosophers admit that atheism implies moral relativism, fictionalism, or nihilism."
You will find that most atheist *philosophers* are moral realists. It is true though that some naturalists think that naturalism entails the falsity or moral realism.
"If it's true that moral realism requires God's existence, then that's a true premise."
Trivially, yes.
I don't grant that realism is true because God exists. If that were so, then there would be no intrinsically wrong actions. But there are. It is wrong to torture innocent babies merely for the fun of it. We can see that this is so no matter what our position on the existence of God is. Steve, this is a mainstream view *in Christian* thought. Intuitionism, natural law theory, Kantian deontological theory- just about any moral realism except divine command theory and consequentialism agrees to this. But those two have, rightly, been unpopular with Christians who theorize about ethics.
"I don't see how you get that out of generic monotheism. "
You must just think that monotheism means that there is one god/deity, in the generic sense of a god/deity. But it never has meant that. It allows for multiple of those, but asserts that there's one such that it is impossible that it has a peer. Can't fully explain in a combox, but see this to get started disentangling the issues: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eFzObFaF2b0
Dale
Delete"No, there is no circular argument there. It is perfectly consistent to hold that moral truths are necessary and don't depend on God's will, and also that people are able to know right and wrong because God made us that way."
i) To begin with, that's a false dichotomy. To say that moral truths are dependent on God's *existence* doesn't entail that they are dependent on God's *will*. Necessary truths can still be dependent on God's existence.
ii) In addition, at least some moral truths can be conditionally necessary truths or contingent truths (in that sense) inasmuch as they are grounded in human nature. And it that respect they are indirectly dependent on God's will inasmuch as God willed us to have a particular nature.
iii) You can assert that people know right and wrong because God made us that way, but how do you evidence that claim?
"I don't grant that realism is true because God exists. If that were so, then there would be no intrinsically wrong actions."
That's a non sequitur. There are various ways in which some actions could be intrinsically wrong even though they depend on God's existence. For instance, some human obligations might be property-instances of God's exemplary nature.
Likewise, as I just mentioned, some actions might be intrinsically wrong *given* human nature. But human nature is not a given. The same actions might not be wrong if a creature has a different nature. Indeed, this isn't just hypothetical. Consider the animal kingdom.
"But there are. It is wrong to torture innocent babies merely for the fun of it. We can see that this is so no matter what our position on the existence of God is."
We can see that from what viewpoint? From the viewpoint of atheism? No, it isn't wrong given atheism.
"Steve, this is a mainstream view *in Christian* thought. Intuitionism, natural law theory, Kantian deontological theory- just about any moral realism except divine command theory and consequentialism agrees to this."
Nature law theory indexes moral obligations to the kind of nature which the Creator endowed us with. Different creatures have different natures, which, in turn, affect moral obligations.
"You must just think that monotheism means that there is one god/deity, in the generic sense of a god/deity. But it never has meant that. It allows for multiple of those, but asserts that there's one such that it is impossible that it has a peer."
How does saying God is without a peer entail that he can't be malevolent?
Indeed, since you regard divine existence and moral realism as separable, it's even harder to see how you can make moral realism a condition or criterion for God's existence or nonexistence (i.e. a malevolent deity).
""I don't grant that realism is true because God exists. If that were so, then there would be no intrinsically wrong actions."
ReplyDeleteThat's a non sequitur. There are various ways in which some actions could be intrinsically wrong even though they depend on God's existence. For instance, some human obligations might be property-instances of God's exemplary nature."
Take my example, and try to spell out what this may mean. The moral, necessary truth would be: it is morally wrong for a rational being (i.e. a being with roughly our intelligence, self-control, and moral knowledge) to intentionally torture an innocent (human) baby merely for the fun out it." That action-type, I suggest, is intrinsically wrong. Note that it doesn't assume the existence of babies, or beings like us. If God freely chooses to never make anything at, it seems that principle will be true nonetheless - any action of that kind, if it were to occur, would be wrong. And God couldn't do or decide anything to make it false or untrue, even though he could easily ensure that no such actions occur. Anyway, please spell out what sort of dependence on God you have in mind, for this moral truth.
Now for me, atheism is a counterpossible - a claim that can't possibly be true (I think it is necessary that God exists). So I wouldn't really say that if atheism were true, then the above principle would be true. I hold that counterpossibles (conditionals with a necessarily false antecedent) are neither true nor false. (But most philosophers count them as trivially true.) But I'll say that an atheist has plenty of reason to accept that principle, and that he's not being inconsistent in so doing. His reason is that when he considers such an action, it'll strongly strike him as wrong. (Unless he's a sociopath, or unless his conscience has been severely damaged, etc.)
"Natural law theory indexes moral obligations to the kind of nature which the Creator endowed us with. Different creatures have different natures, which, in turn, affect moral obligations. "
Exactly so. If God make, e.g. our heads and hands a lot harder, it might not be wrong for a kid to punch his brother in the face. But those species- and circumstance- relative principles will be necessary. So, God chooses what sort of beings to make, but in so doing, makes a whole set of moral principles relevant. The idea here is that moral principles "supervene" on the relevant non-moral circumstances.
About monotheism, any form of it holds that it is a contradiction for there to be more than one being who is divine like that. In the Bible, this is spelled out as: uncreated and sovereign creator of all else. There couldn't be two of those.
That God can't be or do evil I think is entailed by his being a se, and essentially perfect in knowledge and power. Such a being can't even come to have a motive to do evil. Evil can never seem like a good idea to him; he has no pressing needs (existing a se and with omnipotence) and is (being omniscient) always aware of all the reasons there are to do good.
"you regard divine existence and moral realism as separable"
They're epistemically separable - one can know the second without knowing the first. Lots and lots of atheists do.
Dale, it seems to me your argument that God cannot do evil given aseity and perfect knowledge and power overlooks what you pointed out earlier, namely, that our moral reasoning powers are given to us by God. For all we know God has programmed us to regard as good what is actually evil, and visa versa. In this case, it would follow that God cannot do what we regard as evil given aseity and perfect knowledge and power, but not that God cannot do evil given those attributes. In fact, in this case, the truth of the matter would be that God cannot do what we regard as good but can only do what we regard as evil. We would have it all backwards. Of course I am not saying God has programmed us this way and that God really can only do what we regard as evil. My point is only that we cannot know with certainty that this is not the case, and so we cannot know with certainty that God cannot do what we regard as evil. It may be that he can only do what we regard as evil.
Deletei) Dale, you've introduced so many subsequent qualifications that it's unclear what's remains of your original objection.
Deleteii) In addition, you're making this unnecessarily convoluted. My argument is pretty straightforward. Let's begin with a stock formulation of the argument from evil:
1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
5. Evil exists.
6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists, or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil.
7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/#RelConGod
iii) Apropos (ii), that argument fails because Yahweh isn't "good" in the sense that atheists who deploy the argument typically define benevolence (or "moral perfection"). So Yahweh's existence is consistent with kinds of evils which the definition implicitly rules out.
In other words, the argument presumes that an evil God cannot exist. ("Evil" as the argument implicitly defines evil.)
iv) Of course, this doesn't mean Yahweh is evil as OT writers understood good and evil. They affirm the goodness of God. So the argument turns on an equivocal definition of divine benevolence. The atheist isn't defining "good" in the same way that an Bible writer understood "good."
v) This doesn't depend on the actual existence of Yahweh, or the reliability of the Biblical witness. For the argument from evil is dealing with the idea of God. Is the concept of God consistent with the concept of evil?