Helping Feser think

Ed Feser is miffed by a post I did:

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/04/corrupting-calvinist-youth.html

Strangely, he spends most of his time faulting me for failing to hit a target I was never aiming at in the first place. 

Another funny thing is how he initially takes umbrage at what I said about him, then in a roundabout way admits that what I said was true. Take this:

Now, he’s right that I’m a critic of ID theory.  But his philosophy-by-power-browsing method has failed him badly if he thinks that my criticisms boil down to: “Well, it isn’t Thomism, ergo…”  First of all, as I have emphasized many times, I have two main problems with ID theory.  First, I hold that it presupposes, even if just for methodological purposes, a seriously problematic philosophy of nature. 

And what, pray tell, is the corrective? Wanna bet it's Thomism?

Second, I hold that it tends to lead to a dangerously anthropomorphic conception of God that is incompatible with classical theism.  

And the version of classical theism he espouses is…Thomism!

Now, to take the second point first, lots of classical theists are not Thomists. 

A red herring, inasmuch as that's the kind of classical theist he is.

And I imagine there are lots of people who might find it worthwhile inquiring whether classical theism and ID theory are compatible whether or not they are classical theists, or Thomists, or ID theorists for that matter. 

Unless you have a vested interest in the truth of Thomism, why would you find it worthwhile to make Thomism the frame of reference in evaluating ID theory? 

To come to my other line of criticism of ID, it is true that my reasons for rejecting the philosophy of nature that underlies ID theory are Aristotelian reasons, and Thomists are Aristotelians.

A backdoor admission conceding my original point.

However, this in no way entails that these reasons should be regarded as “philosophically unenlightening” to those who happen not to be Thomists. 

Once again, unless you have a vested interest in the truth of Thomism, it's philosophically unenlightening to judge ID theory by that yardstick.

For one thing, you don’t need to be a Thomist to find it of interest whether ID theory is compatible with Aristotelianism.  Not all Aristotelians are Thomists -- for example, many contemporary neo-Aristotelian metaphysicians and philosophers of science are not Thomists -- so that if ID theory is incompatible with Aristotelianism, it isn’t just Thomists who will reject ID’s underlying philosophy of nature.

Is "Ed" suggesting that Aquinas didn't modify Aristotelianism? So it's not like we're comparing pure Aristotelianism to ID theory. Aquinas has a very different concept of God than Aristotle. Does "Ed" think one's philosophy of nature is unrelated to one's concept of the Creator?

And as with the relationship between classical theism and ID theory, the relationship between Thomism and ID theory should be of philosophical interest in itself. 

Unless you think Thomism is true, why is that relationship philosophically interesting? Showing us that ID theory isn't Thomism doesn't show us that ID theory is false, unless we assume that Thomism is true. It's understandable why "Ed" makes Thomism the standard of comparison. But unless you're invested in the truth of Thomism, that's a tendentious criterion. 

(For example, if it turns out that Thomism and ID theory really are incompatible, surely this can be “philosophically enlightening” for those who are drawn to Thomism…

"Drawn to Thomism." Proves my point. 

…but don’t know what to make of ID theory, or who are drawn to ID theory but don’t know what to make of Thomism.) 

If they don't know what to make of ID theory, then the analysis should begin with an exposition of ID theory, not an exposition of Thomism. Showing how ID theory is unlike Thomism is a poor way of evaluating ID theory, just as showing how a dog is unlike a chair isn't terribly informative about the nature of dogs. 

Finally, I have, of course, given arguments -- at length, in depth, and in various books and articles -- for the various aspects of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature.  I don’t say: “If you just happen by arbitrary preference to be a Thomist like me, then you should reject ID theory.”  I say:  “Here are the arguments for why you should accept the Aristotelian position vis-à-vis act and potency, substantial form, final causality, etc.; and since ID theory is incompatible with all that, you should reject ID theory.” 

Notice how he keeps conceding my point. Unless you already share his Thomistic starting-point, why would you think comparing ID theory to Thomism is an enlightening way to evaluate ID theory?

“Steve,” despite his touching concern for the sound formation of “aspiring Reformed philosophers,” does not answer, or indeed even seem to be aware of, any of these philosophical arguments.

In my younger days I read many Thomists expounding Aquinas. But it was never the stated aim of my post to assess Thomism. 

But when a Thomist [or a Leibnizian, or a naturalist, or whatever] offers arguments for a position, it is no good for an “aspiring philosopher” to say: “Well, I’m not a Thomist [or a Leibnizian, or a naturalist, or whatever], so I don’t find all that ‘philosophically enlightening.’”  An “aspiring philosopher” should respond to the damn arguments.  Awful luck for those who would prefer to limit their philosophical investigations to the “admittedly cursory” kind, but there it is. 

Which misses the point. HIs critique of ID theory is only cogent if you already agree with his arguments for Thomism. 

BTW, he's rather conceited to act as if, unless you've read his arguments for Thomism, you're not qualified to judge the merits of Thomism. What if you've formed your opinion of Thomism based on other Thomists who are frankly far more eminent in the field than "Ed"?  

Finally, every aspiring philosopher must severely limit his philosophical investigations. Feser is a specialist on Thomism, and related philosophers. He's investigated Thomism far more deeply than many other philosophical traditions. 

As a practical necessity, philosophers, including aspiring philosophers, must make cursory judgments about where to invest their time. "Ed" is just being silly.

That’s it.  That’s all he says about the matter.  Do you hear that, “aspiring Reformed philosophers”?  Feser’s views have been challenged!  That never happens to serious philosophers.

No. That's not all I said. In fact, he quotes me saying more than that. I went on to say, as he himself quotes me saying:

Consider the running debates between his blog and Uncommon Descent.

Anyone with Internet access can mouse over to Uncommon Descent or Evolution News, input "Feser" or "Thomism" in the search box, and pull up extensive responses to his "damn arguments." It's not incumbent on me to do that for them. They can do their own research. 

The funny thing is that “Steve” never actually cites a case where I claim that something is true merely because Aquinas or some prominent Thomist like Cajetan said it…

Another funny thing is that "Ed" never actually quotes me attributing that claim to him.

...or where I have rejected a claim merely because it deviates from Aquinas or from the Thomist tradition…

By his own admission, he's judging ID theory by Thomism. 

Then we're treated to "Ed's" deliciously bungled refutation:

“Steve” piously avers, as if he were saying something I would disagree with: 

From an intellectual standpoint, a misinterpretation can be more useful than a correct interpretation. Suppose you improve on Aquinas by unintentionally imputing to him a better theory than he held. That's bad exegesis, but good philosophy. 

Yet compare this passage from my book Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction: 

No great philosopher, no matter how brilliant and systematic, ever uncovers all the implications of his position, foresees every possible objection, or imagines what rival systems might come into being centuries in the future.  His work is never finished, and if it is worth finishing, others will come along to do the job.  Since their work is, naturally, never finished either, a tradition of thought develops, committed to working out the implications of the founder’s system, applying it to new circumstances and challenges, and so forth.  Thus Plato had Plotinus, Aristotle had Aquinas, and Aquinas had Cajetan – to name just three famous representatives of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Thomism, respectively.  And thus you cannot fully understand Plato unless you understand Platonism, you cannot fully understand Aristotle unless you understand Aristotelianism, you cannot fully understand Thomas unless you understand Thomism, and so on.  True, writers in the traditions in question often disagree with one another and sometimes simply get things wrong.  But that is all the more reason to study them if one wants to understand the founders of these traditions.

Except that "Ed" does disagree with what I said, because when "Ed" proceeds to quote himself, he's makes the opposite claim. Compare my statement:

A misinterpretation can be more useful than a correct interpretation. Suppose you improve on Aquinas by unintentionally imputing to him a better theory than he held.

with his:

True, writers in the traditions in question often disagree with one another and sometimes simply get things wrong.  But that is all the more reason to study them if one wants to understand the founders of these traditions.

"Ed" is stressing the importance of correctly understanding the philosopher in question. I said just the opposite. A misunderstanding can be more philosophically fruitful than a correct understanding (of a philosopher's actual position). For what ultimately matters in philosophy is the truth or falsity of the idea, not the truth or falsity of the attribution. 

Is "Ed's" judgment so clouded by personal pique that he can't tell the difference between black and white? 

But to be fair, “Steve” can’t have been expected to see passages like that, since it would require actually bothering to read someone’s work before criticizing it; and that, it seems, is not an approach to research he would commend to “aspiring Reformed philosophers.” 

Except for the awkward little fact that in the very passage where "Ed" is quoting himself, in application to my statement, he botches his attempted refutation. Evidently, "Ed" can't be bothered to understand what he himself has written. 

Then there’s all that non-existent work of mine synthesizing Aristotelian and Kripkean insights; synthesizing Aristotelian insights and insights drawn from Karl Popper; defending the principle of sufficient reason, despite its origins in Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism, against Gilsonian Thomists who reject it as a foreign import (Scholastic Metaphysics pp. 138-40)...

Except for the awkward little fact that I quote him verbatim on his purity as a classical Thomist. It's up to him, not me, to square that with extraneous influences to the contrary.