Apollinarianism redux

I've been asked to comment on the Apollinarian Christology of Craig and Moreland. It's been 11 years since they published Philosophical Foundations, so it's possible that they've refined their original position. I'll be quoting from pp608-12 of their book. But I'd like to make a few preliminary observations before commenting on specific statements:

i) For purposes of this post, I'm using Nestorian in the conventional sense (e.g. Christ is two distinct persons, human and divine). There's a scholar debate about whether Nestorius was a Nestorian. Did his enemies libel him by imputing to him a position he didn't espouse? My post ignores that debate.

ii) Craig/Moreland use Nestorianism as a negative benchmark. This is what is to be avoided. They use their opposition to Nestorianism to leverage their Apollinarian alternative. 

However, it's unclear why Nestorianism is worse than Apollinarianism. Why not espouse a Nestorian Christology? Because it's heretical? But Nestorianism is no more or less heretical than the Apollinarian/monothelite alternative which they champion. Since they don't feel bound by the authority of the ecumenical councils, they can't very well use the "heretical" status of Nestorianism to justify their equally "heretical" alternative. It's not as if Nestorianism must be avoided, but Apollinarianism/monothelitism need not be avoided. Once they reopen the ancient debate by treating Apollinarianism/monothelitism as a viable option, then there's no reason why Nestorianism shouldn't be a viable option as well. 

Notice, I'm not saying we should adopt any of these. 

iii) Speaking for myself, I'm ultimately concerned with NT Christology, not patristic or conciliar Christology, per se, except where that maps back onto NT Christology. It may also be the case that NT Christology is too coarse-grained to adjudicate some of the finer points raised in patristic debates or Protestant debates. Perhaps some of the more detailed models are underdetermined by Scripture. It moves beyond exegetical theology into philosophical theology. Nothing inherently wrong with that, but we're only bound by revealed truths. 

iv) Craig/Moreland are far too eager to relieve the apparent tensions in orthodox Christology. This betrays them into essentially denying the Incarnation by eliminating the true humanity of Christ–their protestations notwithstanding. It's fine to harmonize the data if we can. It's not permissible to harmonize the data by eliminating any essential datum. The theory mustn't be simpler than the facts. If we can't harmonize the data without oversimplifying the data, then it's incumbent on us to leave the stubborn data intact. Since the Incarnation is miraculous and sui generis, there's no presumption that it will be transparent to human reason. 

If we are to avoid a duality of persons in Christ, the man Jesus of Nazareth and the divine Logos must share some common constituent which unites their two individual natures.

There are two distinct issues here:

i) A union, per se, doesn't require a common constituent. Disparate things can be united. 

ii) It's not as if avoiding Nestorianism takes precedence over avoiding Apollinarianism or monothelitism. It's either a priority to avoid them all or else not avoid one rather than another.

…the Logos contained perfect human personhood archetypically in his own nature. The result was that in assuming a hominid body the Logos brought to Christ's animal nature just those properties that would serve to make it completely human. 

i) This way of framing the issue, which recurs in their discussion, presupposes an Aristotelian/Thomistic anthropology. But why should Christology take that for granted? It's not a requirement of Biblical anthropology or philosophical anthropology. It's just one option in philosophical theology. 

ii) Apropos (i), It treats the human body as an "animal" body, representing animal nature. What sets humans apart from the animal kingdom is the faculty of reason. Human minds in animal bodies. But I don't see any biblical warrant for that bifurcation. 

On the one hand, is the human body just an animal body? Is it just coincidental that God gave us humanoid bodies rather than putting our souls in the body of a snake, dolphin, or raccoon? Didn't God design the human body to be uniquely suitable to our nature and role? 

On the other hand, the Bible doesn't single out reason to distinguish humans from animals. The Bible is silent on that distinction, although it sometimes appeals to the instinctive wisdom of the animal kingdom to reprove human folly. 

Such an interpretation of the Incarnation draws strong support from the doctrine of man as created in the image of God (imago Dei). 

i) This reiterates a traditional mistake of historical theology. Instead of exegeting the image of God in Genesis, theologians use the image of imago Dei as a cipher for what they think demarcates man from animals, as well as what we share in common with God. But that facile prooftexting has no contextual warrant.  

ii) Bible scholars dispute what the imago Dei signifies. I'll just state my own interpretation:

a) The imago Dei is both ontological and function. Function reflects nature. Nature underlies function. 

b) "Image" and "likeness" are synonyms (a literary convention: synonymous parallelism).

c) In both Hebrew and cognate usage, "image" is usually a generic term for statues. And it frequently has a more specific referent. An idol represents a god. A royal statue represents a king. 

d) In the context of Gen 1-2, with its royal and priestly motifs, this signifies sacral kingship. 

e) That is further borne out by the cultural mandate. Man is God's earthly representative. His vice-regent. Man is a "idol" of God. 

Humans do not bear God's image in virtue of their animal bodies, which they have in common with other members of the biosphere. 

That repeats another traditional mistake of historical theology. Because God is incorporeal, theologians assume the imago Dei must denote the incorporeal aspect of man. His soul. The faculty of reason.

But that fails to operate at the relevant level of abstraction. For instance, Scripture often attributes body parts and vital or sensory organs to God. That's not because God is physical, much less humanoid. This is metaphorical and anthropomorphic. But metaphors are figurative analogies. 

The "eyes of the Lord" represent divine omniscience. The "arm of the Lord" represents divine omnipotence in action. God's "heart" represents moral and intellectual attributes. 

The human body is analogous to the incorporeal God inasmuch as this exemplifies or concretely manifests communicable attributes. So the imago Dei could well include the human body (as well as the human mind). It is, indeed, as embodied agents that we fulfill the culture mandate. 

Rather, in being persons they uniquely reflect God's nature. God himself is personal, and inasmuch as we are persons we resemble him.

They seem to be deploying the imago Dei as an implicit argument from analogy, viz., if God is personal, and we are made in his image, then we are personal.

But that proves too much. If God is omnipotent, and we are made in his image, then we are omnipotent. If God is omniscient, and we are made in his image, then we are omniscient. If God is eternal, and we are made in his image, then we are eternal. 

Thus God already possesses the properties sufficient for human personhood even prior to the Incarnation, lacking only corporeality. this Logos already possessed in his reincarnate state all the properties necessary for being a human self. In assuming a hominid body, he brought to it all that was necessary to complete human nature. 

On the face of it, that's equivocal. Although there's a sense in which God is the exemplar of man, divine attributes aren't human attributes. 

i) Divine attributes have a uniquely divine mode of subsistence (e.g. aseity, incorporeality, timelessness). 

ii) Divine attributes lack the limitations of their mundane instances. Both God and man are agents, but God is omnipotent. Both God and man have knowledge, but God is omniscient. 

iii) The divine attributes are inseparable. And some divine attributes are incommunicable. 

iv) Conversely, human nature is distinctively creaturely. For instance, we have emotional needs. We undergo cognitive development. And we properly view ourselves as vulnerable, dependent creatures. That indexical perspective is alien to God. God has no fears or aspirations. 

The church has typically dealt with the problem of Christ's evident limitations by means of the device of reduplicative predication, that is to say, by predicating certain properties of the person of Christ with respect to one nature or another. Thus, for example, Christ is said to be omniscient with respect to his divine nature but limited in knowledge with respect to his human nature…
How could Christ be omniscient and yet limited in knowledge if there is a single conscious subject in Christ?

To say there must be a "single conscious subject" in Christ is simplistic. 

We suggest that the "subliminal self" is the primary locus of the superhuman elements in the consciousness of the incarnate Logos. Thus Jesus possessed a normal human conscious experience. But the human consciousness of Jesus was underlain, as it were, by a divine consciousness. 

The conscious/subconscious distinction is valid for a truly human mind. But on their model, the divine mind takes the place of the human mind. Applied to a divine mind, that would commit them, not merely to an Apollinarian Christology, but a Kenotic Christology. A God who is able to repress his knowledge. 

…the Logos allowed only those facets of his person to be part of Christ's waking consciousness which were compatible with typical human experience, while the bulk of his knowledge and other cognitive perfections, like an iceberg beneath the water's surface, lay submerged in his subconscious.

But that really means the Incarnate Son allowed only those facets of his mind to be part of his waking consciousness, while the bulk of the Son's knowledge and other cognitive functions were not a part of the Son's conscious awareness. On their model, Christ has no human mentality distinct from his divine mentality. His mind is reducible to the divine mind. His mind is identical to the divine mind. The mind of the Son replaces the rational human soul. 

Such a model provides a satisfying account of the Jesus was see in the Gospel portrait. In his conscious experience, Jesus grew in knowledge and wisdom, just as a human child does. 

But on their view, that means God is maturing in wisdom and knowledge. 

One does not have the monstrosity of the baby Jesus lying in the merger possessing the full divine consciousness. 

i) To begin with, an omniscient baby is no more or less "monstrous" than an omniscient adult. Both are equally abnormal. But, then, the Incarnation is unique and miraculous.

ii) More to the point, it's simplistic to say the baby Jesus qua baby is omniscient. We're not predicating omniscience of his humanity. 

In his conscious experience, we see Jesus genuinely tempted, even though he is, in fact, impeccable.

But on their view, that means God is genuinely tempted.