Wednesday, June 12, 2013

The fate of unbaptized infants

This is a continuation of a debate I had on the Amazon discussion board, occasioned by JD Hall’s book for kids:

Part 1 is here:



Nelson Banuchi says:

Now the kid will have nightmaresnot being chosen and being so bad, not even God wanted him.

keystone says:
Actually, the fear that God won't choose someone because they are too bad dovetails with the classic Arminian doctrine of conditional election, whereas unconditional election isn't based on how good or bad the sinner is. So thanks for shooting yourself in the foot. Conditional election would give a kid nightmares.

keystone says:
Nelson Banuchi says:

"That's the point of 'unconditional election'. It has nothing to do with merit or demerit."

Which directly contradicts what you previously said: "Now the kid will have nightmaresnot being chosen and being so bad, not even God wanted him."

"Conditonal election would not give nightmares for the Arminian can truthfully tell the child God loves him..."

But according to Arminianism, God's love doesn't prevent anyone from going to hell.

"...and will save him; all he need do is trust Christ."

But according to Arminianism (especially Wesleyan Arminianism), you can trust in Christ, be saved, then lose your salvation.

"If the Calvinist were honest..."

You're very fond of that phrase. But you should start learning how to be an honest Arminian before you point fingers. Try to put a damper on your spiritual pride and take a good hard look at yourself in the mirror. You're just another Arminian partisan.

keystone says:
Nelson Banuchi says:

"1. Well, the contradiction is not due on my part but to theological double-think of Calvinism."

You said that according to reprobation, God might not choose to save someone because they were too bad to be saved. Demonstrate how that's an implication of (or even consistent with) reprobation.

"2. Arminian theology does not prevent anyone from damnation. Again, that comment shows you have no correct understanding of Arminian theology."

Quote where I said what you impute to me.

"On the other hand, God does prevents many from going to heaven and by creating them to choose them, without any reference to deserts, for hell."

Actually, the Arminian God does prevent many from going to heaven. If we have the libertarian freedom to do otherwise, then there's a possible world where I choose Christ and go to heaven as well as a possible world where I reject Christ and go to hell. That means if someone goes to hell in the actual world, God prevented him from going to heaven by creating the possible world where he is hellbound rather than the possible world where he is heavenbound.

"As far as losing salvation (a) some Arminians believe in 'eternal security';"

I specified Wesleyan Arminians. You're not paying attention.

"(b) Calvin (in his Institutes) taught that God gives some a temporary faith or grace in order to take it away and damn them in the end and there would be no outward difference between the counterfeit believer and the genuine believer (which seems to make it hard to figure out if you're one or the other)."

Your argument is fallacious. Figuring out which you are wouldn't depend on "outward" differences, but inward differences. The unregenerate don't have the same gracious experience as the regenerate.

keystone says:
Nelson Banuchi says:

"1. I didn't argue it was. I only mentioned that if there is a contradiction, it is on the Calvinist side as I made my comment based on Calvinist presuppositions. Calvinism teaches both that God elected to eternal damnation whomsoever he chose to damn without any consideration of their moral character; and, simultaneously, Calvinists assert that those whom God damned deserved it. Since I do not espouse Calvinism, I am not required to explain the contradiction."

You confuse unconditional election with reprobation. The fact that election is unconditional does not entail that reprobation is unconditional. Reprobation is unconditional in the qualified sense that if sin was a sufficient condition of reprobation, then everyone would be damned. However, sin is a necessary condition of damnation.

"God's love does not prevent the person who receives his love demonstrated on the Cross through faith from salvation; salvation is conditional. In Arminianism, if one goes to hell, it is by his own choice."

Which paraphrases what I said. Therefore, you've failed to demonstrate that I misrepresented Arminianism.

What makes you think conditional salvation is more loving than unconditional election?

"Not interested in philosophical speculations re: possible worlds so, respectfully, here you're talking to the wall. Show in the Bible where Arminian theology is flawed, and then we can discuss it. And, again, respectfully, you demonstrate a misunderstanding what Arminian theology is."

This is how Jerry Walls defines the Arminian concept of freewill:

"As he makes the choice, the agent has the power to choose A and the power to choose not-A."

That means there's a possible world (A) in which the individual accepts Jesus as well as another possible world (not-A) in which the individual rejects Christ.

Yet the Arminian God only creates one of those possible worlds. And in many cases, he creates the world in which the individual rejected Christ rather than the alternative world in which the individual accepted Christ.

Therefore, the Arminian God prevents countless individuals from ever being saved-or even saveable.

That's a logical consequence of your theological system.

"In any case, again, it is Calvinism that teaches God prevents many, many people from being saved because it was God's choice to eternally damn many, many people; and that is the ultimate reason for the damnation of men and not notions of demerit."

And the Arminian God prevents many, many people from being saved because it was his choice to create the timeline in which they reject Christ rather than the timeline in which they accept Christ.

You need to learn how to think through the ramifications of your own position, instead of adopting a purely reactionary stance.

"You did not `specify Wesleyans.'"

To the contrary, I did just that. I said "especially Wesleyan Arminians."

And if you're going to defend eternal security, you need to explain why we must have libertarian freedom to accept the faith, but not have libertarian freedom to stay in the faith. How is that not an artificial bifurcation?

"As I understand the reading, that there is practically no outward difference was Calvin's point (regardless of how it is doctrinally explained)."

You keep missing the point. Outward differences are irrelevant. The salient distinction involves internal differences (e.g. whether or not the individual is in a state of grace).
 

keystone says:
Nelson Banuchi says:

"No I am not confusing one with the other. However, it does seem to me that what you're affirming is double-think. The Calvinistic interpretation of Rom 9:11 as affirming unconditional election, necessarily and logically entails - if the Calvinist is to be faithful to and consistent with the text and the context and, at the same time, remain logically coherent in forming an explanation for others to understand - unconditional reprobation. Otherwise, from my perspective, the argument that the former does not necessitate the latter is double-think."

You're confused. To say that election implies reprobation does not require unconditional election to entail unconditional reprobation. If you think otherwise, you need to present an actual argument to demonstrate that the grounds for election and reprobation must be identical. Likewise, you need to present an actual argument to show how the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions is "double-think."

All you've done is to tendentiously assert that it's "double-think." Likewise, to merely assert that unconditional election "necessarily and logically entails unconditional reprobation" is not a logical argument with a necessary entailment.

"You misrepresent Arminianism by implying that such theology makes God's love ineffectual. God's love effectually prevents the one who believes from going to hell; but that is the condition: one must believe in Christ. And if one is damned, they are damned by their own choice."

By your own admission, God's love is impotent to save unbelievers. His love was unable to save unbelievers.

"In Calvinism God's love is ultimately, for all intents and purpose and contrary to claims made by Calvinists, irrelevant (if one is to think it out coherently)."

In Calvinism, God's love for the elect ensures their salvation.

"In Calvinism it is God's decree alone that (a) is the foundation of salvation, therefore, the Cross becomes ancillary, neither demonstrative, foundational, nor essential to the divine work of saving."

i) God's decree is not an empty decree, but includes all the means necessary to achieve the appointed end.

ii) BTW, many Arminians deny penal substitution. Therefore, the Cross is inessential to salvation.

"(b) God damns without any reference whatsoever to either one's moral character or deserts."

You're just reiterating your willful confusion. Repeating the same mistake doesn't make it any truer.

"As stated earlier, I am not interested in the philosophy of possible worlds."

I understand why you'd rather not talk about the fatal weaknesses in your system. Your refusal is a tacit admission of defeat.

The Arminian definition of freewill can't avoid "the philosophy of possible worlds." It's a package deal.

"Respectfully, it seems you are missing the point and not me, which point is that one cannot determine `whether or not the individual is in a state of grace' because (a) outwardly there is no difference, and (b) inwardly one may really believe they are in a state of grace while, in fact, they are not."

You're confusing an inward state of grace with belief about an inward state of grace. Try again.

keystone says:
Nelson Banuchi says:
"I have been researching your comment that Wesley taught infant damnation and have so far found that you have misunderstood his `Treatise' and that, in fact, he taught the opposite."

I quoted him verbatim to prove my point. You quote nothing to the contrary.

"His Treatise was mainly to point out the validity of practicing the baptizing of infants."

And what's the rationale?

"As it stands, thus far, it seems you are here erred in your undersatnding of what Wesley taught. You might do well to further investigate the issue. and re-examine your understanding of Wesley on this issue."

Wesley was an Anglican priest. What do you think is the rationale for infant baptism in traditional Anglican theology? Have you ever bothered to read the baptismal service in the BCP? To take a few examples:

DEARLY beloved, forasmuch as our Saviour Christ saith, None can enter into the Kingdom of God, except he be regenerate and born anew of Water and of the Holy Ghost; I beseech you to call upon God the Father, through our Lord Jesus Christ, that of his bounteous mercy he will grant to this Child (or Person) that which by nature he cannot have; that he may be baptized with Water and the Holy Ghost, and received into Christ's holy Church, and be made a living member of the same.

We call upon thee for this Child (or this thy Servant), that he, coming to thy holy Baptism, may receive remission of sin, by spiritual regeneration. Receive him, O Lord, as thou hast promised by thy well-beloved Son, saying, Ask, arid ye shall have; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you. So give now unto us who ask; let us `who seek, find; open the gate unto us who knock; that this Child (or this thy Servant) may enjoy the everlasting benediction of thy heavenly washing, and may come to the eternal kingdom which thou hast promised by Christ our Lord. Amen.

SEEING now, dearly beloved brethren, that this Child (or this Person) is regenerate, and grafted into the body of Christ's Church, let us give thanks unto Almighty God for these benefits; and with one accord make our prayers unto him, that this Child (or this Person) may lead the rest of his life according to this beginning.

keystone says:

Nelson Banuchi says:
“It may even be that some Calvinists have similar opinions as Wesley re: infant baptism:”

Presbyterians don't think infant baptism is necessary for salvation. To the contrary, they think that because the child of believers already enjoys a special status, he is thereby entitled to the rite of baptism. Try consulting a standard exposition of the Presbyterian position, like John Murray's classic monograph.

"1. If God chooses one and not the other, he has made a conscious, deliberate choice of both choosing and not choosing. That is not double-think."

How does that disprove my contention?

"2. God's love cannot save them not because his love does not/cannot save but because of the unbelievers refusal to receive it."

Which proves my point. His love is ineffectual.

"3. In Calvinism, all the means are themselve, in every minute instance and detail, decreed. All the chess pieces are put in place."

So what?

"4. You're comments show that you really do not know what Arminians believe. Read Arminius' `Works.'"

It's in the self-interest of Arminians not to carry some of their beliefs to their logical conclusion.

"5. Give me Scripture to support you refutation of what I have stated instead of speculative philosophy."

This is your speculative philosophy. I'm arguing from Arminian assumptions. This follows from your own definition of libertarian freedom (e.g. Jerry Walls).

"Please note that I do not feel I am under obligation to prove my point; it is you who is challenging my view and, therefore, ought to come up with Biblical support to invalidate my position and validate yours."

When you commented on the book, you initiated an attack on Calvinism. The fact that you can't defend your position exposes the fact that your position is indefensible. I appreciate your tacit surrender.

keystone says:
Nelson Banuchi says:

"1. No need to repeat myself. I'll need to let you figure out how it invalidates your contention."

Meaning you have no counterargument. Just rhetorical bravado.

"2. Problem is, your point is coming from an incorrect understanding of Arminianism."

An assertion in search of an argument.

"3. I guess if you don't mind being nothing more than a chess piece, a `So what?' response is sensible."

I'm happy to play my little part on God's chessboard.

"4. Actually, the problem, from my experience, is Calvinist who do not follow the logic of what they believe; that is why they are double-thinkers. What you think are the Arminian's `logical conclusion' is only so because you base it on a misunderstanding of Arminianism."

Another assertion in search of an argument.

"5. And I am forced to repeat myself, your assumptions of Arminianism are flawed, therefore, you're coming to this discussion from the wrong corner. I can only suggest, again, you read, Arminius' "Works" or, at least, Dr. Roger Olson's, "Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities." It seems whatever you know of Arminianism you may have received from Calvinist writers, which is not exactly the best place to get it."

Just off the top of my head, the Arminians I've read include Arminius, Brian Abasciano, William Abraham, Bill Arnold, Gareth Cockerill, Paul Copan, Jack Cottrell, Joseph Dongell, Norman Douty, Guy Duty, Roger Forster, David Garland, Norman Geisler, Joel Green, Kenneth Grider, Kenneth Keathley, Craig Keener, William Klein, William Lane, Robert Lightner, I. H. Marshall, Paul Marston, Thomas McCall, William McDonald, Scot McKnight, Terry Miethe, John Miley, Thomas Oden, Roger Olson, Grant Osborne, John Oswalt, Robert Picirilli, Randal Rauser, Vic Reasoner, Robert Shank, Jerry Walls, John Wesley, Charles Wesley, Ben Witherington, &c.

And that doesn't count all of the Arminian Molinists and open theists.

"Finally, it is difficult to have a sensible discussion with one who does not know correctly what the other side really believes and who argues on the basis of misinformed information and speculation."

Your confidence isn't matched by your competence, or lack thereof.

"Let me know if you want to put Walls aside and start from the Bible."

Arminians filter the Bible through philosophical categories like libertarian freewill.

"No hard feelings on my side, just so you know..."

You did a wonderful job of modeling another Arminian who suffers from overweening pride.

keystone says:
Nelson Banuchi says:

"I am predestined to be an Arminian."

And Pharaoh was predestined to be the fall guy.

18 comments:

  1. Steve said...
    That means there's a possible world (A) in which the individual accepts Jesus as well as another possible world (not-A) in which the individual rejects Christ.

    Yet the Arminian God only creates one of those possible worlds. And in many cases, he creates the world in which the individual rejected Christ rather than the alternative world in which the individual accepted Christ.


    This question is to anyone.

    If an Arminian held to the A-Theory of time, would it still make sense to say that God created the possible world where the individual would be lost if in fact the person ended up lost? Meaning, the determining factor in the person's salvation or damnation was God's choice, rather than the person? It seems to me in a basic A-Theory type of Arminianianism one couldn't say that God created one possible world over against another. Especially if election and reprobation were based on mere foreknowledge.

    Given William Lane Craig's Molinistic A-Theory Arminianism, it does seem to me (with my limited understanding) that God's choice to create one possible world over another makes God's choice the ultimate determining factor in a person's salvation/damnation, while (allegedly) at the same time preserving the person's libertarian free will choices. But not all Arminians hold to middle knowledge or the concept of feasible worlds from which God had to choose from.

    I'm still trying to understand these issues.

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    1. Btw, I do think that Steve's criticism holds for Arminianism that holds to a B-theory of time. I'm just not sure it holds to A-theory Arminianism.

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    2. What I'm saying is that it seems to me that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) if applied to A-theory would mean that the future is metaphysically open (even if the future might be epistemologically closed if one [e.g. an Arminian] also believed in exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge). In which case, it wouldn't make sense to say that God created one world over another and so metaphysically determined whether a person would be saved or not by the choice of which possible world to actuate.

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    3. How is the A-theory of time relevant? Say the A-theory is correct. You have two A-theoretical alternate timeless, one in which the individual believes in Christ, and the other in which he disbelieves in Christ. If someone goes to hell in the actual A-theoretical timeline, then God didn't instantiate the alternate timeline. Therefore, God's choice of which A-theoretical timeline to instantiate foredoomed the sinner.

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    4. But both timelines are merely logically possible timelines in God's natural/necessary knowledge. Neither one (it seems) would determine God's free knowledge. That would be determined (per A-theory Arminianism) by man's choice in time (made via prevenient grace).

      So long as a person is still alive (assuming presentism and A-theory), it's metaphysically possible for him to be saved even if somehow epistemologically God may [magically] know via his infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge that that person will be lost. I say "magically" because it's a mystery to me how non-Calvinists can make sense of (by grounding) infallible foreknowledge.

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    5. Maybe my objection only makes sense if both creation and God are temporal (i.e. "in" time). Either because God is inherently temporally eternal, or like William Lane Craig, God is timelessly eternal sans creation but temporal since creation.

      Whereas if God were timelessly eternal and creation were A-theory temporal, then the A-theory of time may not make a difference.

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    6. ANNOYED PINOY

      "But both timelines are merely logically possible timelines..."

      My argument takes that for granted. Both are merely possible until one is actualized to the exclusion of the other.

      "Neither one (it seems) would determine God's free knowledge."

      My argument wasn't predicated on God's knowledge.

      "That would be determined (per A-theory Arminianism) by man's choice in time (made via prevenient grace)."


      You're saying men rather than God actualize possible worlds? Even Molinists don't go that far.

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    7. I guess I just don't know what it means for God to instantiate/actuate a world if A-theory were true. It just seems to me that in A-theory the future isn't yet settled. In which case any past circumstances (even those which God set up at an earlier time) cannot determine future events or choices, most especially if Libertarian free will were true (since it leads to the principle of alternative possibilities as well as to the supposed power of contrary choice). Isn't it standard fair for Arminians to deny that God's actual creating determines free human choices? Otherwise, it wouldn't be "free" (as they understand freedom).

      My argument takes that for granted. Both are merely possible until one is actualized to the exclusion of the other.

      Actualize it en toto (from beginning to end) as in a block view of the universe (which some physicists and philosophers speculate about when they talk about "eternalism" as opposed to "presentism" or "possibilism") ? Or in part moment by moment as in A-theory which (it seems) is equivalent to continuous creation? Maybe I'm wrong but A-theory and presentism would suggest to me that God is "continuously" actuating creation moment by moment and that the past no longer exists and the future doesn't yet exist.

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    8. By the way, my understanding is you're fairly dogmatic on God's timelessness, but aren't dogmatic on A-theory vs. B-theory (you see advantages and disadvantages in both).

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    9. ANNOYED PINOY

      “I guess I just don't know what it means for God to instantiate/actuate a world if A-theory were true. It just seems to me that in A-theory the future isn't yet settled.”

      It would just mean the world is phased in over time. But each stage could still be preplanned. Even in human affairs, that’s commonplace. We have a plan. If we’re successful in implementing our plan, that’s often a cumulative process. We have a goal, and a series of steps to realize our goal.

      “In which case any past circumstances (even those which God set up at an earlier time) cannot determine future events or choices…”

      If we’re discussing an A-theoretical version of predestination, it’s not so much the past determining the future, but God’s plan determining what will be past, present, and future–like the teleology of a novel. The plot, where one thing logically leads to another.

      “…most especially if Libertarian free will were true (since it leads to the principle of alternative possibilities as well as to the supposed power of contrary choice).”

      That’s a theory of the will, not a theory of time.

      “Isn't it standard fair for Arminians to deny that God's actual creating determines free human choices?”

      That wasn’t my argument. My argument is that if you have two opposing free human choices, God instantiates one rather than another.

      If humans could just wish possibilities into being, we’d inhabit a very different kind of world. A magical world.

      “Actualize it en toto (from beginning to end) as in a block view of the universe…”

      Actualize one timeline rather than another. It’s a familiar concept in science fiction.

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    10. okay, I think I'm getting it.

      That wasn’t my argument. My argument is that if you have two opposing free human choices, God instantiates one rather than another.

      But given Arminian A-theory doesn't he instantiate one timeline over another based on what the person chose in the past?

      Say person S ("Sam") is an unbeliever at time T1, then as a response to prevenient grace (which healed his depravity so that he can now freely accept/reject the gospel, he) positively responds to the gospel at T2. At T3 he is now a Christian (decisional regeneration).

      While God's instantiation of Sam being a Christian at T3 is ontologically prior to the person being a Christian at T3 (and continuing to be one at T4, T5 etc.), (it seems) Sam's decision to be a Christian at T2 is logically, chronologically and (more importantly) causally prior to T3 when God instantiates Sam to be a Christian in keeping with the way the story has been progressing and with Sam's freewill choice.

      Given A-theory Arminianism, the novel's details haven't been written or decided yet (by man or God). God as author only has a general outline of how he would have the novel to end. Only after a person makes choices can God continue to instantiate one set of timelines which match the actual past up to that point, as opposed to other timelines (which do not match the actual past). Timelines aren't settled until humans make their choices.

      It's like those "Find Your Fate" books Ballantine Books used to produce (e.g. the G.I. Joe series). You would read so many pages and then were given choices to make. Depending on the choice, you're told to continue reading at a certain page. You continue making such choices throughout the story till the end of the novel. The author sets the parameters, but the reader fills in the details by his choices; and by so doing he decides which timeline will be actualized.

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    11. You're saying men rather than God actualize possible worlds? Even Molinists don't go that far.

      Yes, only God instantiates worlds. In Molinism, God instantiates worlds according to his plan. His decision as to which timeline will be actualized is the determining factor. But in simple prescience/foreknowledge A-theory Arminianism man's decisions seem to be the determining factor as to which timeline is ultimately actualized.

      I understand if you get tired of this thread. I just think that most Arminians aren't theologically sophisticated enough to realize that their views usually presume A-theory and simple foreknowledge. If that's true, then certain objections to Arminianism may not be as useful when dealing with those type of Arminians.

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    12. ANNOYED PINOY

      But given Arminian A-theory doesn't he instantiate one timeline over another based on what the person chose in the past?…Only after a person makes choices can God continue to instantiate one set of timelines which match the actual past up to that point, as opposed to other timelines (which do not match the actual past). Timelines aren't settled until humans make their choices.

      i) To begin with, past libertarian choices don’t fix future choices. It’s like throwing dice. One throw of the dice has no affect on the next throw. They are causally independent.

      ii) More to the point, there is no one choice the libertarian agent makes. Rather, to say it’s possible for him to accept Christ and possible for him to reject Christ means he makes both choices! Kinda like the Everett universe.

      He makes two opposing abstract choices. So his abstract choices don’t select for which one will become the actual choice. Both abstract choices are on a par, metaphysically speaking. Therefore, only God can be the tiebreaker. God must decide which of the two abstract choices to reify.

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    13. i) To begin with, past libertarian choices don’t fix future choices. It’s like throwing dice. One throw of the dice has no affect on the next throw. They are causally independent.

      Agreed. That's why (IMO) consistent Arminianism should affirm the real possibility of truly regenerate Christians finally and eternally falling away and ending up in hell.

      ii) More to the point, there is no one choice the libertarian agent makes. Rather, to say it’s possible for him to accept Christ and possible for him to reject Christ means he makes both choices! Kinda like the Everett universe.

      I know very little physics so I'll be "winging it" when I discuss it.

      In an internal critique it's important to represent the position of one's opponent accurately. I don't see how the concept of an Everett universe is entailed in Simple Prescience A-theory Arminian Theology/ian/ism [hereafter SPAAT]. If it is, maybe you can explain how.

      Also, wouldn't you be the first to say that a defensible Molinistic view would require something like a Platonic plenum to make it work. But a concept like that is not only contrary to Scripture but is something that would be external to the various standard Molinistic positions out there. Similarly, an Everett universe seems like an external imposition, and I'm not aware of any Arminian appealing to it.

      It's my understanding that the many worlds interpretation of science has corresponding similarities to God's knowledge of counterfactuals. Since, we're dealing with SPAAT they would locate counterfactuals in God's necessary knowledge as we Calvinists do. You seem to be positing an extra ontology. So, if you were to appeal to Schrödinger's cat thought experiment (which you might do, or might be hinting at) that would be dealing with physics (or metaphysics) rather than epistemology and God's necessary knowledge which is all that SPAAT needs to do (per parsimony/Occam's Razor).

      Rather, to say it’s possible for him to accept Christ and possible for him to reject Christ means he makes both choices! He makes two opposing abstract choices. So his abstract choices don’t select for which one will become the actual choice. Both abstract choices are on a par, metaphysically speaking.

      I don't understand that apart from appealing to an extra-Biblical and extra-Arminian ontology.

      Therefore, only God can be the tiebreaker. God must decide which of the two abstract choices to reify.

      But then it seems you're not representing libertarian free will accurately. By definition isn't it the case that Libertarian Free Willers (LFWs) believe that choices are self-determined and self-caused? How then can God be the tiebreaker?

      In a different blog you said...

      ii) Moreover, the libertarian agent’s “self-determined choices” is not a sufficient condition to achieve that effect. For God must make the agent before the agent can exercise his (alleged) libertarian choices. Therefore, even on libertarianism, God has a causal role to play in where the damned wind up.

      If that's what you're getting it, it seems to me that it's still the agent who's making his own choices, not God (unless you're proposing something like Cheung's occasionalism). But then historically there have been occasionalists who don't have God controlling the will of agents. They did so precisely to affirm dualism in order to be able to deny/escape determinism (e.g. Geulincx and Malebranche)

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    14. typo correction:
      If that's what you're getting it ["at" not "it"]

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    15. ANNOYED PINOY

      “In an internal critique it's important to represent the position of one's opponent accurately. I don't see how the concept of an Everett universe is entailed in Simple Prescience A-theory Arminian Theology/ian/ism [hereafter SPAAT]. If it is, maybe you can explain how.”

      I didn’t suggest it entailed an Everett universe. Rather, I used an analogy (“kinda like”) for illustrative purposes. Don’t be obtuse.

      “I don't understand that apart from appealing to an extra-Biblical and extra-Arminian ontology.”

      It’s hardly “extra-Arminian” to explicate libertarian freedom as defined by Arminian philosophers like Jerry Walls. Don’t be obtuse.

      “But then it seems you're not representing libertarian free will accurately. By definition isn't it the case that Libertarian Free Willers (LFWs) believe that choices are self-determined and self-caused? How then can God be the tiebreaker?”

      You disregarded the supporting argument I gave for my conclusion.

      You’re wasting my time with confused, irrelevant objections. Don’t post further comments on this thread.

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  2. Nelson Banuchi said:
    The Calvinistic interpretation of Rom 9:11 as affirming unconditional election, necessarily and logically entails - if the Calvinist is to be faithful to and consistent with the text and the context and, at the same time, remain logically coherent in forming an explanation for others to understand - unconditional reprobation.

    I was under that impression too. But after further research, I realize that's not necessarily true. Here's a link to my conclusion on whether reprobation is conditional or unconditional. It includes many quotes from various Calvinists (many of whom are supralapsarian). I'm open to correction as always.

    Reprobation: Conditional or Unconditional
    misclane.blogspot.com/2013/05/reprobation-conditional-or-unconditional.html


    Basically, I found some supralapsarians who believed reprobation was conditional while others believe it was unconditional. My conclusion is that those who rejected conditional reprobation did so thinking it would have to be conditioned on foreseen sins in time, and therefore rejected (presumably based on Rom. 9:11). Whereas those supralapsarians who affirmed it's conditional did so by pointing to two aspects/elements to reprobation. The first element is preterition which is unconditional (since it is the logical corollary of election). The second element is pre-damnation (AKA pre-condemnation) with is conditional. Conditioned presumably on foreordained sin and demerit (rather than foreseen sin and merit). If I'm wrong and anyone who really knows Calvinistic theology want to correct me, I'm listening.

    So, provisionally/tentatively, I now hold reprobation to be conditional as a supralapsarian rather than unconditional (like i used to).

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    1. typo corrections are inside brackets:

      The second element is pre-damnation (AKA pre-condemnation) [which] is conditional. Conditioned presumably on foreordained sin and demerit (rather than foreseen sin and [de]merit). If I'm wrong and anyone who really knows Calvinistic theology want to correct me, I'm listening.

      Correction of my actual position:

      So, provisionally/tentatively, I now hold reprobation to be BOTH unconditional and conditional as a supralapsarian rather than as merely unconditional (like i used to). I do so based on the two elements of reprobation being unconditional in preterition and conditional in pre-condemnation (as Berkhof explained in his Systematic Theology).

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