Monday, August 27, 2012

1. Cor. 10:13 Redux

I assume most readers are familiar with the debate surrounding the claim that 1. Cor. 10:13 somehow demands "libertarian free will." I'll quote the relevant passage and raise a new objection to libertarian readings of the text.
11 These things happened to them as examples and were written down as warnings for us, on whom the culmination of the ages has come. 12 So, if you think you are standing firm, be careful that you don’t fall! 13 No temptation has overtaken you except what is common to mankind. And God is faithful; he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted, he will also provide a way out so that you can endure it.
The argument is, roughly, that the passage speaks about the live possibility of a Christian either succumbing to or resisting temptation to sin. That's what "way out" apparently means, and thus we have confirmation of live alternative possibilities that could both obtain even given identical world-histories up to the succumbing or resisting.

There's been several responses to this argument. One is to simply engage in exegesis and show that the passage does not intend to teach, instruct, or otherwise endorse exotic metaphysical views such as libertarianism. Another is to engage in exegesis and argue that the text actually supports perseverance of the saints, a key Calvinist tenet. Another is to point out that the metaphysical interpretation is redundant and silly, for if metaphysical libertarianism is true, then Paul's claim is curious given that he says God provides the "alternative possibilities." For on (most forms of) libertarianism, open futures and forking paths are simply part of the structure of what is required of the view; hence, God is not needed to create alternative possibilities (whatever that means, anyway), and "God will provide a way out" becomes otiose.

But here's another wrench to throw into the mix. Arminians typically view the temptations as fairly expansive, covering many different cases of temptation to sin. Himes says
[I]f this paper’s interpretation of 1 Cor 10:13 is correct, one must assert that a believer, no matter what the situation, has the ability to choose not to sin (since God does not allow the temptation to get to the point where the end result is, by necessity, sin). Since Christians sin, if they have the power/ ability not to sin at any given situation (regardless of their current value scale), then they must possess the power of contrary choice. In other words, Christians, in the face of temptation, possess libertarian freedom. ("When a Christian Sins," JETS 54.2 (June 2011) 329–44, emphasis mine)
I assume this is rather standard Arminian fare. Here's a problem (a big problem to my mind) such an interpretation raises. In order to avoid making their position look completely ridiculous and out of touch with empirical reality, sophisticated libertarians admit that there are cases when agents "can't do otherwise," even on libertarianism. Here's a paradigm case: Drinker Dale occasionally gets drunk. When he does, he cannot avoid the temptation to pass by a strip club if he drives by one and sees it. His will is weakened, and he gives into his baser desires. When drunk, he lacks the relevant control to avoid his akratic action, and thus cannot avoid the temptation. Dale is morally blameworthy, though.

The above is consistent with libertarianism. How so? They appeal to the concept of "tracing" and "will-setting." That is, Dale is responsible in the above scenario if and only if we can trace his decision to get drunk to some prior free and morally responsible choice. Suppose he's also a drunk. It's his character, and he cannot will otherwise (if things remain the same, sans interventions, etc). He's responsible for this character just in case he made a prior free and responsible decision (or set of decisions) that set his will this way. Thus, while he does not have the relevant control needed for making a free and responsible decision when drunk, he is responsible if and only if we can trace his character and action back to a prior free and responsible libertarian choice.

Cases like Dale's are so ubiquitous that all libertarians admit them and offer something like the above analysis to maintain a hold on responsibility. And we do not need cases of alcoholism or drug use to make the point. Someone could render themselves literally unable to do otherwise given certain current reasons and character traits he has (Robert Kane likes to speak of Martin Luther's claim that "He could do no other"). But for this to be consistent with the metaphysical apparatuses required by libertarianism, they appeal to a similar story as above. As libertarian Robert Kane says of someone like this:
If his act did issue from his existing character, then his moral accountability for it would depend on whether he was responsible by virtue of earlier choices and actions for being the sort of person he had become at that time. . . .Often we act from a will already formed, but it is 'our own free will' by virtue of the fact that we formed it by other choices and actions in our past for which we could have done otherwise" (A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford, 2006), p. 82, emphasis original).
That the above is standard libertarian fare could easily be substantiated beyond Kane. I'll cite two more libertarians to this effect, but I'll kill two birds with one stone since both of them authored the same paper! Kevin Timpe and Tim Pawl discuss the problem of libertarian free will in conjunction with our inability to sin in heaven. They offer what I take to be the most plausible route for the libertarian to take, i.e., the above tracing and will-setting approach. In the course of the paper they discuss Sennett's position, characterizing it thus,
Agents can, however, use their free will [on earth] to form their moral characters in such a way that they are determined to act in certain ways. So long as the moral character that determines them was itself freely formed, Sennett does not think that this sort of self-imposed determinism rules out free will. In fact, it is along precisely these lines that Sennett understands heavenly freedom. After death, the redeemed in heaven are determined by their own freely formed character in such a way that certain choices and actions are no longer possible.
They remark on Sennett's position thus,
It seems reasonable to think that there are some actions that are determined, but have not always been determined. For instance, given the moral character of a person—let’s call her Teresa—it might be true that she is determined not to swindle money from a homeless shelter in order to pay for a luxurious vacation for herself insofar as she sees no good or motivating reason for engaging in such behavior. She hasn’t always had that character, however; perhaps at some earlier time she would have been open to embezzling. And, on the assumption of incompatibilism, she wasn’t causally determined to have the kind of moral character that sees no good reason to take funds from the homeless shelter to finance a luxury. She could have formed her character such that swindling money from the poor to finance a vacation wouldn’t sound half bad to her. We could say in this case that, while it hasn’t always been the case that she is determined not to swindle the money from the homeless shelter, it is now the case that she is determined not to do so. We might also say that, while she once was undetermined with respect to swindling the money from the homeless shelter, it is no longer the case that she is undetermined with respect to this particular action. ("Incompatibilism and Sin in Heaven," Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 26 No. 4 October 2009, pp.396-417; p. 404 for both quotes)
The purposes of these quotes is to establish the libertarian bona fides of the common place (Kane says, "often") occurrence of our acting in ways that are presently-but-not-ultimately determined (Timpe and Pawl refer to this as proximately-but-not-remotely determined). This contingent determinism is compatible with global or remote indeterminism, as well as libertarian freedom and responsibility.

The hard work is now behind me. At this point, I now raise the possibility of a Christian rendering herself unable to do otherwise when faced with some 1-Cor.-13:10-temptation. Notice that for Himes, these cases are fairly expansive. There are no situations when a believer, B, is 1-Cor.-10:13-tempted to X and B cannot do other than X. Thinking up examples doesn't require being a brain surgeon. I'll trust the reader can easily come up with examples (fanciful or not). All you need are prior libertarian choices by B that set B's will a certain way such that B cannot avoid a type-X temptation. You might posit a pill, the "Rx Mangia 40mg," that renders those who take it incapable of avoiding a temptation to gluttonously overeat when tempted with an Italian food buffet. Carmine Scagnetti takes such a pill. If Carmine cannot avoid said temptation, but we can trace his decision to pop the "Rx Mangia 40mg" back to a prior libertarian free choice on his end, then he acts freely and responsibly when he gluttonously partakes of the relevant spread. If you don't like that example, come up with your own.

So here's the upshot: The overreaching (I say!) Arminian interpretation of 1 Cor. 13 seems to require either the impossibility of libertarian freely setting your will in such a way that there is some relevant 1-Cor.-10:13-temptation you can't avoid due to above tracing/will-setting considerations (placing a strong dialectical burden on the Arminian), that the above accepted proximate-determinism is impossible per se, perhaps requiring the belief that drunk or "Rx Mangia 40mg" subjects can simply will themselves to act in ways effectively negating the effects of the drugs (another strong position). Another option is to say that 1. Cor. 10:13 isn't talking about there not existing a temptation that a believer can, in the heat of the temptation, either succumb to or resist. Rather, what it really means is this: If one's will isn't set in the above way, then one can succumb to or resist any temptation; but, if one's will is so set, then, while one cannot resist the temptation, one could have resisted the temptation had one not previously set one's will in such a way that one wouldn't be unable to resist future temptations, and at that prior time of will-setting the believer was able to do otherwise. Of course, this is strained, to say the least (and makes "there is no (particular) temptation" read odd). It seems only a prior commitment to libertarianism could account for such a strange and forced and ad hoc reading. 

One might say that the set of temptation cases being referred to in 1 Cor. 10 is very small (perhaps just any temptation that would lead to apostatizing), and that when it comes to this set of temptations, and only this set, the believer will not have been able to at any prior time have set his will in a way that he would not be unable to resist these specific temptations. But then we should ask why this should be so and how it is consistent with libertarianism. Moreover, it demands that one always be perseverance not be guaranteed, but this is not at all clear even on Arminianism (let alone biblically). So I conclude that, apart from the other fine responses to the Arminian argument from 1. Cor. 10:13, these considerations make assenting to the overreaching and austere Arminian interpretation of the text simply fantastical, exegetically improbable, and doxastically unlikely for anyone not insistent that 1 Cor. 10:13 just has to be a silver bullet against Calvinism.

20 comments:

  1. Good Redux Steve.

    You helped me to understand that verse a long time ago.

    Something about, 'choosing between two evils is not a weevil'?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Actually, Paul Manata gets all the credit.

      Delete
  2. Paul,

    Drugs and alcohal alcohol seem to diminish inhibitions and fears and probably awareness of or ability to consider the consequences of our actions. To the extent they are not effective, our actions remain under our control. To the extent the are effective, they render sins committed under their influence to "sins of ignorance". But temptations lure us from considering one option to another, by highlighting the desirable qualities of the evil option. It may be that to be tempted, you have to be able to think about what is tempting you. Put another way, if you are drunk or stoned, you may not be able to be tempted or tested in the way 1 Cor 10:13 talks about.

    God be with you,
    Dan

    ReplyDelete
  3. Dan, first, they're not all sins of ignorance if you lack the requisite control needed for freedom. Indeed, being a former heavy and hard user of d&a, I know well what you can think of and how you can be tempted. Your character changes and various powerful desires spring to life, and, some people have irresistible urges to act in certain ways. It's similar in some ways to akratic actions, which libertarianism allows for. And, the literature is filled with libertarians bringing forth cases like these, and tracing is the standard response. Anyway, you're focusing on an incidental detail of the argument. For there are cases that don't need d&a, libertarians recognize these cases too, and a standard response is to appeal to "will-setting." Kane's discussion (in response to Dennett) of Martin Luther's statement, "Here I stand, I can do no other," taken to be *literal* truth is a classic. So fill it in with a case where one has formed his/her character through prior past free decision such that they now act out of a formed character and cannot do otherwise (left to continue in a normal course). It seems to me, as well as the vast majority of libertarians, that such cases are possible. Moreover, it seems possible that one could form their will in such a way that they can't resist a 1 Cor 10:13 temptation (unless those temptations are temptations to apostatize and perseverance is granted). Given the expansive nature of temptations Arminians have granted for the text (cf. Himes), this makes it all the more possible to my mind. So I take it your position is to deny the possibility of such a case, i.e., you hold that such a case is *impossible*. Is that right?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I'd add that the alcohol cases was used mainly for set up to introduce notions of tracing. Same with "Rx Mangia 40 mg." And as the designer of that drug, I can tell you that it does no such thing as those things you say. It's a deterministic pill, though, and those who have taken it satisfy (your favorite) compatibilist account of control, freedom, rational abilities, etc. So if Carmine is tempted by an italian food buffet, he necessarily succumbs and gives in, even after a long internal struggle. The point again was to introduce the notion of tracing.

      Delete
    2. Paul,

      Given the qualifications I provided above, yes that's right. God does not permit Christians to be tempted beyond what they are able to bear. My main reason for responding was to point out that their's not only a ceiling but a floor to the parameters you are giving for the question your asking. Your post accounts for the idea that one sip of alcohol doesn't have to make one run amok. But what you don't seem to account for is that if our reasoning ability is significantly diminished, then we can't really be tempted/tested and our sins are sins in ignorance. As a libertarian, it's hard for me to imagine that the ceiling and floor are not right up against each other - leaving no room for the question your asking. It seems binary, either you can consider and choose alternatives, or you cannot. Without the ability to consider alternatives, our actions may be voluntary, but they are not choices.

      God be with you,
      Dan

      Delete
    3. Hi Dan (you've misread or not read what I wrote above, please read this response more carefully),

      Thanks, that's one of the possible answers I listed in my post. There's a finite number of "outs" an Arminian can take. And, I never thought my post would leave the Arminian speechless. The point was to make the Arminian endorse an ad hoc response, stake out an exegetically overreaching claim, make a wildly implausible claim, or reduce the argument for 1 Cor 10:13 to a trivial one, one that could hardly be said to bother the Calvinist.

      However, I note that again you're focusing on irrelevant details. I really can't wrap my mind around why you repeated your objection from alcohol given I told you to think of a case of will-setting that renders the person incapable of willing otherwise. Will-setting is a very common place and popular theme among libertarians, and all I need is its possibility. To show that will-setting is impossible you'd need to do something like show that will-setting ends in a contradiction.

      Now, I simply disagree with you on the empirical details that someone who is drunk is not able to considering doing A or B, and is unable not to choose B. But as I said, leave the drunk aside (the drunk is actually not a good example for what I want to show, and for a second time, the reason I brought it up was to introduce the tracing requirement). However, what my argument does assume is this: Grant libertarianism. On libertarianism, it is possible to libertarian freely set your will such that you cannot do other than A. The concept of 'tempted to do X' is consistent with the inability to avoid X-ing. Given the expansive nature of "temptation to sin" the Arminian gives 1 Cor. 10:13 (i.e., non-apostasy sins), it is possible that some Christian set her will in such a way that she cannot do other than give into a temptation. Cases of actions springing out of a set will are not at all like your cognitively impaired drunk, but they are rational actions done in complete knowledge and under control. However, to show people in these cases are responsible for their actions, tracing is needed (illustrated by *paradigm* cases of tracing, a la the Drinker Dale story and the "Rx Mangia 40mg" story). So if you hold that someone can't set their will such that if faced with a I Cor. 10:13 temptation they could not avoid succumbing, or; conversely for that matter, they can't avoid resisting, then you must say that such cases are *impossible* (contrary to what *all* libertarians I am aware of say, citing Timpe and Pawl again: "It seems reasonable to think that there are some actions that are determined, but have not always been determined."). For that you need a strong argument, one that shows such a case is *impossible*, but you can't do this. Now, of course, you can make ad hoc stipulations like: "Necessarily, by conceptual analysis, 'tempting to do X' *entails* that indeterminism is true," and at that point I just bid you good day. I know I can't force you off that perch (indeed, I couldn't do that with the "choice" argument even though I cited Plantinga, Goetz, Timpe, and Kane all clearly disagreeing with you), even if in this case the dictionary does not include the word "alternative" in the definition of "tempt." But, if that's where you have to come down, and you don't see the obvious dialectical error in making such an argument (e.g., I *define* X to be incompatible with your argument), then there's not much to say. The argument's not intended for you; rather, it's intended for sensible libertarians ;-).

      Delete
    4. Paul,

      We are repeating, no reason to continue.

      God be with you,
      Dan

      Delete
    5. Dan, not repeating, since you continued to only address the drunk story, which I've said twice (well, three times) now to substantiate the tracing principle. I assume you believe a drunk person who murders his girlfriend can be morally responsible and blameworthy for that action even if he didn't satisfy libertarian desideratum for responsibility while drunk. So, how could you hold him responsible and blameworthy? The only plausible answer I can think of is by an appeal to tracing. Are you saying you don't even hold to this position, and if the drunk literally could not avoid killing his wife then he's not responsible??? I doubt you hold that view, so that leaves accepting the principle of tracing. That was the main purpose of the drunk Dale story. As you can see, then, you haven't even begun to address my responses and the only thing you have dealt with is not a point of contention between us. If you can't see this, I trust the readers can.

      Delete
    6. To put the point differently: Dan has twice raised his issues with the drunk case and the drunk case alone. Yet, he agrees with what I claim my drunk case shows the libertarian must do to maintain responsibility in certain cases. So his disagreement here is curious. However, I have asked him to comment on cases of *will-setting*. In the literature, these cases are not cases of people who are drunk or on drugs but are cases of people who, through various prior libertarian free choices, have "set their wills" in such a way that what wasn't determined for them to do becomes determined. Dan has not even bothered to address this yet claims we're "repeating ourselves."

      Delete
    7. Paul,

      My concern is that you seem to make this personal. Maybe you do this because you place greater weight on authority than reason (as if it's me vs Timpe as opposed to the arguments I put forward vs. the arguments Timpe put's forward). I don't know, but that's my guess. But whatever the reason, I seem to be irritating you and that's not my goal. If what I say isn't helping, then no reason to continue.

      On the actual issue, you seem to be wrapped up in the drunk case vs. other cases of will setting. Any will setting would do. Let me repeat with a minor change:

      Given the qualifications I provided above, yes that's right. God does not permit Christians to be tempted beyond what they are able to bear. My main reason for responding was to point out that their's not only a ceiling but a floor to the parameters you are giving for the question your asking. Your post accounts for the idea that one *event or circumstance that could lead to will setting* doesn't have to make one's *will set in a deterministic way*. But what you don't seem to account for is that if our reasoning ability is significantly diminished, then we can't really be tempted/tested and our sins are sins in ignorance. As a libertarian, it's hard for me to imagine that the ceiling and floor are not right up against each other - leaving no room for the question your asking. It seems binary, either you can consider and choose alternatives, or you cannot. Without the ability to consider alternatives, our actions may be voluntary, but they are not choices.

      Finally, sins of ignorance are still sins. I am not letting people off the hook for what they do when they are drunk, stoned or will-set in some other way.

      God be with you,
      Dan

      Delete
    8. Dan, I'll forgo comment on your "concerns" and innuendoes and back handed remarks about me placing greater weight on authority than reason.

      On the actual issue, you have raised the drunk case but say I am "wrapped up in it", but "any case of will-setting will do." Okay, for the third time now, the drunk case is not about will-setting, it's about tracing. So you continue to misunderstand the dialectic.

      You then say, "yes that's right. God does not permit Christians to be tempted beyond what they are able to bear." But of course that's your position, that's what the text says! That's my position too. I didn't ask if you disagreed with the text, I asked you if you hold that it is impossible that a person libertarian freely set their wills in such a way that they cannot succumb or resist at least one 1. Cor. 10:13 temptation.

      Now, you repeat yourself and say, "But what you don't seem to account for is that if our reasoning ability is significantly diminished, then we can't really be tempted/tested and our sins are sins in ignorance." How don't I account for that? I can admit that. You're not accounting for one who's reasoning ability is working properly but has set their wills such that they now cannot do otherwise than they do. Again, cases like this are standard fare and accepted by virtually all libertarians. So I ask again: do you take the extreme, idiosyncratic, and hard-line view that such will-setting is impossible? If so, what's your *argument* for that.

      So again, you have shown that you really don't understand the argument you've taken to responding to. We should also note that that the concept of "choice" is not analytically obtained in "tempt." You now have a new burden, to show that *necessarily* 'S was tempted to A' means 'S had a choice about whether he A-ed and *necessarily* must have been able to either resist or succumb to the temptation. I maintain you can't argue for that (and the dictionary (your go-to) doesn't support that, and neither does conceptual analysis) but can only *stipulate* it as a forced, constrained, and idiosyncratic definition. Moreover, note what you do: if you truly take the above view, you've rendered 1 Cor. 10:13 completely suprerfluous. For *necessarily* all temptations, to be a temptation, have "way out" clauses attached to them. But that makes the text even odder when Paul says "God will provide you a way out." The Corinthians could have responded, "But Paul, if it's a temptation, we *always* have a way out, God doesn't matter." Lastly, you gut the *exegetical* argument some more. For if temptation necessarily implies indeterminism, then one doesn't need to write 10+ page papers and engage in "exegesis." I really cannot figure out why you've chosen such an extreme stance on this. Anyway, neither the Bible nor Corinthians teaches that will-setting in the above way is impossible. That's an ad hoc posit you've had to make to make the text fit your prior commitment that this text somehow "refutes" determinism.

      Delete
    9. Paul,

      "You then say, "yes that's right. God does not permit Christians to be tempted beyond what they are able to bear." But of course that's your position, that's what the text says! That's my position too. I didn't ask if you disagreed with the text, I asked you if you hold that it is impossible that a person libertarian freely set their wills in such a way that they cannot succumb or resist at least one 1. Cor. 10:13 temptation. "

      Those two questions are convertable. Isn't that your point too (i.e. finding alternative possibilities in 1 Cor 10:13 conflicts with will setting)?
      Part of the problem is I don't see another allowable interpretation of 1 Cor 10:13. I don't have ground to retreat to. The text is fairly directly saying your argument is wrong, such will setting does not exist. Your long on counter-arguments and short on explaining the text.

      "Now, you repeat yourself and say, "But what you don't seem to account for is that if our reasoning ability is significantly diminished, then we can't really be tempted/tested and our sins are sins in ignorance." How don't I account for that? I can admit that. You're not accounting for one who's reasoning ability is working properly but has set their wills such that they now cannot do otherwise than they do. Again, cases like this are standard fare and accepted by virtually all libertarians. So I ask again: do you take the extreme, idiosyncratic, and hard-line view that such will-setting is impossible? If so, what's your *argument* for that. "

      This has the potential to move from "does the text conflict with will setting" to "does the text conflict with a certain kind of will setting". Your looking for a certain type of will setting one that does not leave us with something like an instinct or a programed response. But as I said above, I seriously doubt such a will setting exists, because either we have the ability to consider the alternative or we do not. If we do, we have LFW. If not, then we are not able to think through what we are doing and we are back type of will setting that does not support your argument. But really the burden isn't on me to show that the specific type of will setting you are after doesn't exist. But again, even if it does exist, the text is saying a regenerate Christian never has such a will setting towards sin.

      As for your statement that virtually "all libertarians" hold to such a specific type of will setting, from my readings, I would say a lot of libertarians grant will setting, but very few get into exactly how will setting works. You could probably find some, but "virtually all" is greatly overstated. On the other hand, I could cite several counter examples of libertarian theologians who describe God's hardening of hearts as a kind of blindness - a reduction in our reasoning ability.

      "For *necessarily* all temptations, to be a temptation, have "way out" clauses attached to them. But that makes the text even odder when Paul says "God will provide you a way out." The Corinthians could have responded, "But Paul, if it's a temptation, we *always* have a way out, God doesn't matter." Lastly, you gut the *exegetical* argument some more."

      God's grace opens up alteratives to evil.

      God be with you,
      Dan

      Delete
  4. Even if we grant Dan's idiosyncratic definitions, he can't prooftext that from 1 Cor 10:13. That's not exegetically sustainable. He's getting out of the text what he's adding to the text. He can't find all that in 1 Cor 10:13.

    ReplyDelete
  5. Steve,

    What "that" are you referring to? My response to Paul regarding sins of ignorance or my understanding that 1 Cor 10:13 teaches alternative possibilities?

    My response to Paul was basically Paul's examples don't have anything to do with the text, so yes, I didn't get that from the text. Maybe the basic definition of tempt is reliant, but that's about it. From there we can see if Paul's examples are inside or outside that definition.

    God be with you,
    Dan

    ReplyDelete
  6. Godismyjudge

    "My response to Paul was basically Paul's examples don't have anything to do with the text."

    Manata's examples have to do with Himes's argument.

    Additionally, Himes made the following claim:

    "To be fair, Scripture is generally unclear on such matters as the nature
    he human will, human choice, and divine sovereignty. First Corinthians
    10:13, however, may be an exception. If πειρασμός is interpreted as 'tempta-
    tion to sin' (rather than 'trial' or 'tribulation'), then Scripture’s promise for
    a way out and limit to the temptation would seem to indicate the power of
    contrary choice. If so, then libertarian free will would be assumed, at least in
    any case where a Christian is faced with the temptation to sin."

    So his argument must be essentially exegetical to go through.

    ReplyDelete
  7. Steve,

    "Manata's examples have to do with Himes's argument."

    Yes, but they were more like a reduction to absurdity rather than a challenge to Himes understanding of the definitions, context or sense of the text. If Paul M had argued that Himes interpretation means the moon is made of cheese, I probably wouldn't have responded exegetically in that case either.

    Paul M. only lightly hinted at counter-interpretations to 1 Corinthians 10:13, but that wasn't his main focus. Rather he was looking at what he viewed as downstream consequences of finding alternative possibilities in the text.

    God be with you,
    Dan


    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Dan, you continue to show you don't understand my argument: you said my arguments "were more like a reduction to absurdity." I do not take this my argument be a reductio ad absurdem. For there are some responses that are not absurd. However, some responses I do take to be extreme and exegetically unmotivated (yours). And moreover, a reductio argument assumes some position and then deduces its negation, which I did not do.

      Delete
    2. If anything, I take myself to have shown that there's going to be certain unnatural "costs" to the Arminian interpretation under discussion, either making it less exegetically plausible, or by forcing one to hold to certain extreme metaphysical implications of their libertarianism, making it less plausible. Interested participants can read the debate and see if the various costs are worth it. If the "price to pay" for making the Bible speak on intricate metaphysical details is worth it.

      Delete
  8. To make the bullet harder to bite: We've focused on *wrong* actions and *bad* characters. However, let's look at the other side of the coin. A Christian might, by the Holy Spirit in sanctification, war against sin in some area so mightily, endeavoring to turn from the sin and become more Christlike, eventually set his will in such a way that he cannot *succumb* to a temptation to sin in that way, even if he must struggle to restrain the desire. This temptation to sin might be a 1 Cor. 10:13 temptation to sin. Thus this sanctified believer can *be* tempted to sin in this way but cannot succumb to it. This seems eminently plausible and seems to enjoy more biblical support than the overreaching Arminian interpretation of 1 Cor. 10:13 enjoys (jn fact, we know it *will* be the case in heaven!). He would be (ad arguendo) responsible, praiseworthy, etc., in a libertarian free way because of tracing and will-setting considerations. He would not be "irrational" or "ignorant" but would be doing the right thing for the right reasons. Therefore, if this case is possible, then "temptation" in 1 Cor. 10:13 cannot be said to entail that the tempted must be able to resist or succumb to the temptation.

    ReplyDelete