Tobin has posted a final reply to me. (We’ll see how final that really is.) For now I’ll focus my attention on one section of his reply: “On Biblical Scholarship and Evangelical Apologetics.”
Perhaps this would be a good time to explain why the word ‘scholarship’ cannot be used when referring to evangelical literature[9] and why people like Hays are mistaken in placing their trust in such works.
The mark of scholarship is its dependence of evidence and reason regardless of where it leads.
Yet we find that many evangelical institutes have very strict rules about what their “scholars” are supposed to accept. Many evangelical theological seminaries, such as the Dallas Theological Seminary,[10] Denver Seminary[11] and Fuller Theological Seminary[12] require its faculty to sign a strict statement of adherence to biblical inerrancy before they are allowed to teach there. Some institutions even require the faculty member to recommit to this statement annually, just in case they have changed their mind on inerrancy after signing the statement.
Not adhering to these statements could mean loss of one’s tenure and may even result in sacking or forced resignation. The recent case of Bruce Waltke, an evangelical professor of Old Testament and Hebrew, is one such example. He had to resign his post from the Reformed Theological Seminary in circumstances still unclear – but it clearly had to do with his advocating the compatibility of evolution and biblical creation, something clearly anathema to many, if not most, evangelicals.
How can honest scholarship be done when one is already adhering to a position of inerrancy? Imagine physicists being required to sign a statement affirming the “inerrancy” of quantum mechanics before they can get a teaching position in any university! One would not believe any “research” on the fundamentals of physics that comes out from such an institution.
It is the same with evangelicals. When they are already committed to an unalterable belief, then that very position cannot but produce “scholarship” which agrees with such a belief. Thus, it should come as no surprise that any book by Craig Blomberg on the reliability of the gospels will conclude that the gospels are “reliable.”[13] And if Ben Witherington III were to write a book about the Acts of the Apostles, you can bet your bottom dollar he is going to “find” the book historically reliable and that Luke is its author.[14]
Studies where the end results are known beforehand are not works of scholarship but of pure apologetics. As Robert M. Price noted in his recent book, “The Case Against the Case for Christ,” such “scholarship” has only one main goal – to “turn back the clock” to a time when the Bible made is safe from historical criticism.[15]
http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2010/09/paul-tobin-responds-to-infidel-delusion.html
This raises a nest of issues:
1. Tobin’s objection is textbook case of the circumstantial ad hominem fallacy. He tries to preemptively discredit the arguments of evangelical scholars by impugning their motives. But that’s irrelevant to the quality of their arguments.
For instance, suppose a disgruntled employee gets back at the company that fired him by going to the authorities with evidence that his company is guilty of racketeering. Should the authorities not even bother to study the evidence because the former employee is motivated by revenge?
2. But let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that evangelicals don’t “follow the evidence wherever it leads” (whatever that means). In that case, it should be easy for Tobin to show how unreasonable their arguments are.
3. To say that we should “follow the evidence wherever it leads” is a catchy slogan to put on your bumper, but what does that even mean?
Suppose I have a lifelong friend who, in my experience, is a man of unimpeachable integrity. He is honest even when his honesty puts him at a disadvantage. Moreover, he has a very good memory.
Suppose we’re having lunch, and in the course of our conversation he mentions his whereabouts the day before. And suppose I later come into some information which appears to be inconsistent with his account of his whereabouts that day.
Given that apparent contradiction, what would it mean for me to follow the evidence wherever it leads? That’s not a simple question to answer since there’s more than one set of evidence, and each set of evidence doesn’t point in the same direction:
i) There’s the general evidence that he’s a reliable witness. He has a track-record of honesty. And he has a good memory.
ii) There’s his firsthand account of his whereabouts on that day. That’s prima facie evidence for his whereabouts on that day.
iii) But there’s also some prima facie counterevidence concerning his whereabouts that day.
So where does the evidence lead? Well, it doesn’t point in any particular direction. Rather, I have conflicting lines of evidence.
What should we do in a situation like that? (a) We could suspend judgment. (b) Or we could go with the best overall explanation.
4. What evidence does a Christian bring to bear when he reads the Bible? There are many potential lines of evidence. Prophecy. The Resurrection. Archeological corroboration. Undesigned coincidences. The criterion of embarrassment. Early patristic testimony. Concessions by early enemies of the faith. The argument from religious experience. And so on and so forth.
There are many potential lines of evidence. Moreover, this is person-variable. Some people find some types of evidence more compelling than others. Each individual is unique, with a distinctive personality and life-story.
So when a Christian comes to a “problem passage” in Scripture, he evaluates that passage against a larger body of evidence. The total evidence of his belief-system. As Quine put it, the web of belief. Or as Newman put it, “the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible.”
So where does the “evidence” lead? Depends on how broadly or narrowly you construe the relevant evidence.
5. Do so-called “mainstream/critical” scholars just follow the evidence wherever it leads? Tobin likes to cite Robert Price. But when Price invokes “methodological atheism” (TCD, 275), is he “following” the evidence? No. Just the opposite. He is prejudging the evidence.
Tobin also likes to cite Bart Ehrman. But when Ehrman says that, as a “historian,” he cannot affirm or deny the occurrence of a miracle, is he “following” the evidence? No. Just the opposite. He is prejudging the evidence.
When John Collins says “historical knowledge is possible because all events are similar in principle. We must assume that the laws of nature in biblical times were the same as now. Troeltsch referred to this as ‘the almighty power of analogy.’” (Encounters with Biblical Theology, 12), is he merely following the evidence? No. Just the opposite. That prejudges the evidence.
The historical method of “critical” scholars like Price, Ehrman, and Collins isn’t the a posteriori pursuit of the evidence wherever that leads, but the a priori commitment to naturalistic explanations. Far from following the evidence, they install a filter to screen out supernatural factors regardless of the evidence. They only follow the evidence if it goes where they want to go.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that any book reflecting a presuppositional commitment to methodological naturalism will arrive at naturalistic conclusions.
6. As usual, Tobin is unable to think outside his own box. He imputes his obsequious attitude to me. But I don’t “trust” evangelical scholars. I don’t take what they say on faith. Rather, I evaluate their arguments.
That’s a foreign concept to Tobin, for his submits his conscience to the authority of his favorite liberals.
7. Inerrantists, per se, don’t have an “unalterable” commitment to inerrancy. Not every inerrantist operates with the same epistemology. Anyone who’s conversant with debates over evidentialism, presuppositionalism, and natural theology would be aware of that. (Not that I object to having such a commitment.)
Tobin is guilty of gross overgeneralizations, based on his self-reinforcing ignorance. Many scholars who defend the credibility of Scripture do not subscribe to the inerrancy of Scripture. And not all those who affirm the inerrancy of Scripture have a presuppositional commitment to the inerrancy of Scripture. Likewise, not all of those who defend the inerrancy or credibility of Scripture teach at institutions which require them to do so.
But Tobin begins with his theory, then turns a blind eye to all of the evidence that runs counter to his theory.
8. To think that Fuller Seminary seriously adheres to inerrancy evinces complete ignorance of the highly publicized history of that checkered institution, viz. George Marsden, Reforming Fundamentalism: Fuller Seminary and the New Evangelicalism.
9. Secular institutions also have their unwritten doctrinal oaths. Look at what happens to biology profs. who betray any public sympathy or intelligent design theory. Likewise, what would happen if Kurt Wise, Jonathan Sarfati, or even William Dembski applied for job at Cornell?
10. Tobin labors under the illusion that Asbury Seminary adheres to the inerrancy of scripture. But, of course, Asbury is closely associated with the United Methodist Church. Moreover, anyone who’s read Bill Arnold’s commentary on Genesis (to take one example) can see that this represents standard historical-critical methodology.
Ben Witherington has been in a position to write his own ticket for years. He’d have no difficulty finding employment if he lost his job at Asbury. Just look at his speaking itinerary.
Bruce Waltke is already collecting Social Security and a pension. He’s 79 years old! After he changed his mind about Dispensationalism, he left Dallas Theological Seminary and taught for many years at Regent College. Then he retired to RTS. He's also been a visiting prof. at WTS. So he's never been at a lost for gainful employment.
11. Seminary profs. teach at confessional seminaries because they share theological outlook of the institution. No one is putting a gun to their head. They don’t swear by inerrancy because they teach at inerrantist seminaries; rather, they teach at inerrantist seminaries because they swear by inerrancy.
12. Finally, Tobin’s distinction has precisely nothing to do with “modern scholarship.” Following the evidence wherever it leads (whatever that means) isn’t something unique to modernity.
We do not find this in mainstream biblical scholarship, where debates and differing positions are taken based on how each scholar marshals the evidence. When a consensus is reached by such a boisterous group of scholars–it tends to mean that the evidence for such a consensus is strong. Thus when we say that 80% to 90% of such scholars agree that the pastorals were not written by Paul, we can be certain that the reason for such a consensus must be compelling.
i) Academia is notoriously faddish. Subject to peer pressure and groupthink.
ii) “Mainstream” consensus mirrors a precommitment to naturalistic historiography. Likewise, if they abuse the argument from silence, then their conclusions will reflect their fallacious assumptions.
iii) Despite his intellectual affectations as a free thinker, notice Tobin’s essentially anti-intellectual posture. Not only doesn’t he evaluate the arguments of evangelical scholars, he doesn’t evaluate the arguments of “critical” scholars. Instead, he has a faith-commitment to the reliability of their reasoning. If they agree on something, then it must be true!
Tobin can’t think for himself. He doesn’t even try. He simply defaults to his liberal authority-figures. “Tell me what to believe!” He’s abdicated reason.
A “Consensus” among evangelicals however, comes not from the result of arguments and evidence but from their “statements of faith.” In other words, such “consensuses” among evangelicals come from the unquestioned presuppositional biases.
So when Hays cites his “authorities” on the reliability of the Bible, all he is saying to the skeptic is, ‘Hey, see how all these apologists with PhD’s are using ingenious methods to defend beliefs which cannot be held without a presuppositionary belief in Biblical inerrancy!”
i) Once again, Tobin can only see the opposing position through his own tinted glasses. I didn’t appeal to an evangelical “consensus.” I didn’t appeal to evangelical “authorities.”
ii) And Tobin is blind to the presuppositional beliefs of “critical” scholars, viz. the principle of analogy. Tobin is a classic case of somebody who’s oblivious to his own controlling presuppositions.
iii) As Jason and I have both documented, repeatedly, Tobin is a hypocrite about “mainstream” scholarship. He cites fringe scholarship whenever it suits his purpose, and he does so frequently.
I would add that sometimes presupposing errancy can lead to an uncritical interpretation of the text.
ReplyDeleteUpon seeing an apparent contradiction in the same Biblical book or between books, critical scholars will sometimes lazily give up trying to find an interpretive solution that will resolve the tension between the statements.
Inerrantists, on the other hand, will try to find a careful nuance that will resolve the tension, and this resolution could be a true insight and helpful.
An example of this would be Heikki Raisanen's critical view of Paul and the Law and Tom Schreiner and Frank Thielman's view.
The critical scholar's laziness resulted in a bad interpretation, and the two inerrantists' careful nuance led to a true insight.
Another example would be the difference between Zimmerli's commentary on Ezekiel and Block's commentary over the issue of 3:16-21.
9. Secular institutions also have their unwritten doctrinal oaths. Look at what happens to biology profs. who betray any public sympathy or intelligent design theory. Likewise, what would happen if Kurt Wise, Jonathan Sarfati, or even William Dembski applied for job at Cornell?
ReplyDeleteThis was the most obvious flaw in Tobin's reply. The only difference here would be the somewhat implicit (or even hidden) nature of the standards at secular institutions. But the standards still exist and are enforced; if this kind of behavior disqualifies Evangelical scholarship as biased (and, therefore, unworthy of consideration or some such thing), it also disqualifies secular scholarship in the same manner.