http://formerfundy.blogspot.com/2010/04/christian-delusion-chapter-two.htmlThe more we learn about the hardware and operating systems of the human brain--the more we understand about human information processing--the more we glean bits of insight into the religious mind. For example:
- We humans are not rational about anything, let alone religion.
- Certainty is a feeling, not proof of knowing. It can fail to materialize even when evidence is enormous, and can manifest itself independently of any real knowledge.
- The structure of thought itself predisposes us to religious thinking. Given how our minds work, certain kinds of religious beliefs are likely and others are impossible.
- The "born again" experience is a natural phenomenon. It is triggered by specific social and emotional factors, which can occur in both religious and secular settings (p. 48).
I'll take a brief look at each of these bulleted points one-by-one.
We humans are not rational about anything, let alone religion.Well now, if we can't be rational about anything, then we can't be rational about that proposition either; thus, a self-referentially incoherent statement. This is easily reversible to, "We humans are not rational about anything let alone atheism."
Nevertheless, if naturalism and evolution were true, and given the conjunction between them, Tarico's comment about rationality would seem to hold since our cognitive faculties would be unreliable. As physicalist philosopher of mind Patricia Churchland has said in her oft quoted paragraph:
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in . . . feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principle [sic] chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances for survival. Truth, whatever that is, takes the hindmost. [Patricia S. Churchland, “Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience,” Journal of Philosophy 84 (October 1987): 548.]This is exactly what Alvin Plantinga was getting at when he proffered his argument known as the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. In other words, if naturalism is true, then we can't trust the deliverance of our cognitive faculties. Given this hypothetical problem for the naturalist, not only can we not be rational about atheism, but we can't be rational about anything. This is because given the conjunction between evolutionary processes and naturalism, rationality is not what is important, behaviors that produce survival value is; and the behaviors that bring about survival value aren't necessarily concerned about truth and rationality.
Certainty is a feeling, not proof of knowing. It can fail to materialize even when evidence is enormous, and can manifest itself independently of any real knowledge.Really? Has Tarico ever heard of apodictic certainty, a logical demonstration of certainty wherein the premises are framed in such a way that the conclusion must follow? It also seems that she is totally unfamiliar with concepts like warrant and defeaters. Nevertheless, if we can't be certain of anything because certainty is based upon feeling, then we can reject everything she says since we can't be certain of any of her statements. This is another self-referentially incoherent statement.
The structure of thought itself predisposes us to religious thinking. Given how our minds work, certain kinds of religious beliefs are likely and others are impossible.Richard Dawkins agrees with this statement in The God Delusion on pp 180-181 by quoting others who say that we have "a natural predisposition to embrace religious ideas", that "[C]hildren are native teleologists", "native dualists", and "many never grow out of it"; thus suggesting that we are naturally theistic. Of course, Dawkins intimates that this occurred as a result of evolutionary development occurring in a part of the human brain that produced these false beliefs via natural selection because they promoted survival value. However, this is just another example of the atheologians trying to suppress the truth a la Romans 1:18 by denying the truth of Romans 1:19-21.
I wonder if Dr. Tarico also thinks, like Dawkins, that religious belief is a sort of "mind virus"? (The God Delusion, 188) If so, then she believes that humans are inherently religious because our brains evolved to be that way because such false beliefs produced accompanied behaviors that promoted survival value. But because such beliefs are useless in our modern enlightened society, the vestigial mental faculty that once promoted survival value has now been reduced to a "mind virus".
However, why the push to get rid of the religious "mind virus" via rational dialogue since given the naturalist assumptions it was selected for to promote survival value? I mean, how do we know that such things won't promote survival value in our modern society? For example, a religion that encouraged its adherents to have loads of children "works" pretty well to promote survival value if most of the non-religious in the population either doesn't choose to have children, decides to abort them, or doesn't meet the replacement rate. That would qualify pretty well as religious beliefs producing survival value in the modern world. Second, since our minds are naturally wired to believe such supposed nonsense via the very evolutionary processes that gave them to us, why chide theists for what she admits is natural?
Third, why write a book exposing the so-called irrationality of Christian theism since we can't be certain of anything? If we can't be certain of anything, and Dr. Tarico is part of the "we", then she can't be certain of anything either, so why should we listen to her?
The "born again" experience is a natural phenomenon. It is triggered by specific social and emotional factors, which can occur in both religious and secular settings (p. 48).Dr. Tarico just told us that we can't be certain of anything, but she seems pretty certain of this naturalistic explanation of regeneration. She goes on to further explain per apostate Ken Pulliam,
Cognitive research does offer what is rapidly becoming a sufficient explanation for belief. More and more, we can explain Christian belief with the same set of principles that explains supernaturalism generally. This is a serious blow to orthodoxy--to a religion based on right belief. In the past, one of the arguments put forward by believers was that there simply was no explanation for the "born again" experience, the healing power of Christianity, the vast agreement among believers, or the joy and wonder of mysticism, save that these came from God Himself. We now know this not to be the case. Humans are capable of having transcendent, transformative experiences in the absence of any given dogma. We are capable of sustaining elaborate systems of false belief and transmitting them to our children. We are capable of feeling so certain about our false beliefs that we are willing to kill or die for them (pp. 62-63). [bold mine for emphasis - DSS]Remember that Dr. Tarico has said,
- "We humans are not rational about anything, let alone religion."
- "Certainty is a feeling, not proof of knowing . . . ."
Dr. Tarico says she knows that these religious experiences are not what they claim to be. In other words, she claims to have psychological certainty of this. But she contradicted herself earlier since she says that certainty is only a subjective mental state, not proof that something is actually veridical. Hence, consider the following syllogisms,
P1 - Dr. Tarico knows that religious experiences have naturalistic explanations.Or let's consider this syllogism in light of her statement that we aren't rational about anything:
P2 - To know something is to have a high degree of psychological certainty about it.
P3 - Dr. Tarico is psychologically certain that religious experiences have naturalistic explanations.
P4 - Dr. Tarico equates certainty with feeling, not proof of knowing. C - Therefore, since Dr. Tarico equates certainty with feeling, not proof of knowing, then she can't know that religious experiences have only naturalistic explanations.
P1 - Dr. Tarico says she knows via rational inquiry that religious experiences have naturalistic explanations.So please tell me again why I should believe in atheism?
P2 - Claiming to have knowledge about religious experiences is a religious proposition.
P3 - Dr. Tarico says that we can't be rational about anything, including religious propositions. C - Therefore, Dr. Tarico can't be rational about her religious propositions.
Do people who make the types of arguments that Tarico has made ever answer this objection? I mean, it is essentially the same objection that you guys have been making to Loftus and Avalos... I would think they would want to come up with a coherent response since it seems to defeat them all.
ReplyDeleteI've been mentally rolling around a form of the Evolutionary Argument Plantinga for some months now and I've presented it to a few atheist friends IRL but I've yet to get a response. I don't roll on the atheist blogs since it is all I can do to keep up with the Christian blogs I follow, but I thought perhaps some of the guys here may have seen a response (even a poor one) somewhere.
Mr. Fosi,
ReplyDeleteThere are many responses in the book, Naturalism Defeated: Essays in honor of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. There's also a response by Plantinga to all the objections in the final chapter.
Roger that and thanks very much for the reply, Paul.
ReplyDelete"Pre-Wired for Atheism or Theism?"
ReplyDeleteI affirm the Doctrine of Original Sin.
I affirm that we are made in the Image of God, but that image is badly marred by the Fall.
Pre-Wired? Seems like the discussion could get into Election, pre-destination, double pre-destination, Calvinism vs. Arminianism....
Anyways, apostate Tarico's arguments don't hold up.
Dusman,
ReplyDeleteI agree with you that many arguments that try to completely debunk religious belief psychologically are self-referentially incoherent. Certainly Tarico's statements as they stand are. But we should be careful not to dismiss legitimate questions too easily by framing them in an extreme way which makes them easy to knock down.
Let me give a personal example. I was born and raised in a bizarre Christian cult whose founder claimed to be God's Endtime prophet and received new revelations from God and Jesus seemingly on a weekly basis. His theology was aberrant in the extreme, and included the idea that female members of the cult should prostitute themselves in order to attract converts, all with Jesus' sanction, of course. And for as long as I could remember, well into my high school years, I was completely certain that 'Father David' really was God's Endtime prophet. I even convinced myself that I was receiving regular prophecies from Jesus.
Needless to say that conviction came crashing down in college when I was exposed to real theology, as well as biblical criticism, religious diversity, the evidence for the age of the earth and slow, evolutionary development, etc. I remained a believer, and today I believe in the resurrection, the tenets of the creeds, the reality of sin and evil, etc. But my beliefs underwent a radical revision which has made me quite skeptical of religious claims unless I think they are backed by good evidence and arguments.
My point in sharing this story is that, while the fact that certainty is primarily a feeling does not mean we cannot be objectively certain about anything, it should at the very least make us cautious and not take it for granted that the beliefs we hold with the most conviction are necessarily the best grounded. And it is quite well established psychologically that the feeling of certainty is NOT reliably connected with the grounding of the beliefs one feels certain about. This is not cause for universal skepticism, but it is cause for some skepticism.
Similarly, there is good evidence that human beings are quite prone to certain basic cognitive errors, and many of them manifest in religious perception and thinking. Among them are the much discussed Hyperactive Agency Detection Device, the propensity to explain natural processes anthropomorphically, etc. If the impression we get that the Universe must have been designed is on the same level as the tendency to see faces in the clouds, we would have good reason to be skeptical of that perception.
Now again, this is not an argument for universal skepticism. The fact that human beings have the propensity to commit certain basic reasoning errors does not mean that they are inevitable. But it does mean we need to be very careful and not be easily convinced by claims and arguments that merely 'seem' right or have the 'ring of truth'.
JD Walters,
ReplyDeleteI appreciate your comments and interaction. I agree completely that people can be religiously deceived/self-deceived and have tremendous subjective, psychological certainty about said deception.
My beef with Dr. Tarico's comments has to do with her dismissing of legitimate *Christian* religious experience (i.e., "born again") as a mere artifact of the brain, yet given her own standards she can't know that those very arguments against religious experience are rational, certain, or true since according to her, human beings aren't rational about anything.
Good post, Dusman! :-)
ReplyDeleteBTW, for people who might be interested in the underlying neuroscience, here is what looks like a nice website about what (little) we know about how the brain works. (Of course, I don't agree with everything on this website. But again the underlying neuroscience is generally solid, I think.)
JD Walters,
ReplyDeleteSimilarly, there is good evidence that human beings are quite prone to certain basic cognitive errors, and many of them manifest in religious perception and thinking. Among them are the much discussed Hyperactive Agency Detection Device, the propensity to explain natural processes anthropomorphically, etc.
I understand the point you're making. But doesn't the HADD either A) beg the question against many theists, or B) spin off into an area utterly beyond science?
Let me put it this way. Many theists would say that our universe was made by an omnipotent, omniscient God. And I mean the universe as a whole, not merely complex things. And that means, for the theists, 'natural processes' are not and cannot be some class of things in a different set in contrast to "things that resulted from the will of an omniscient, omnipotent deity".
But that would mean, for those theists, to explain something in terms of natural processes alone is not to explain it completely. At the same time, they wouldn't need to deny that natural processes played a role in what's observed.
So if those theists are correct, the fact that they see agency* everywhere is not a mistake on their part. Agency IS everywhere.
(* Of course, a person can be incorrect about who they attribute agency to, while still being correct about agency in the broad sense.)
We are pre-wired for belief as an act of will. Faith is to believe in something as an act of will. Will is to desire something and make it happen. At some level, anything we believe is an act of will, whether it is based on empirical observation as in science, anecdotal scripture as in biblical accounts, or whether it is based on no evidence at all. The philosopher William James in his work, The Will to Believe, describes several criteria we use in forming beliefs, but attributes our will to believe as the foundation of our beliefs.
ReplyDeleteWill is a basic biological need, a neurologically based response needed to acquire the basic needs for survival . We use our will to carry out expectations for an outcome we have chosen. Our biologically based will has evolved beyond the need for survival to include higher order thinking, thinking required for philosophical or even superstitious and the corresponding religious beliefs.
Well, there is so much to dismiss in this post I don't know where to start.
ReplyDeleteI'll just limit myself to the first point made. Plantinga has no idea what he's talking about when it comes to evolution. Evolution does not prohibit anything from evolving. Even non-beneficial traits are not prohibited from forming. What benefit is red hair for instance?
The biggest flaw in the whole argument against evolutionary rationality is that people that argue against it seem to believe in randomness.
If you look around, you will be unable to find a single thing that is not rational. You may find things that seem irrational, but that is a flaw in perception, not reality. The causal nature of things is so ubiquitous that theists even use this as an argument for the existence of God.
Since everything has a reason, it merely takes the ability to recognize those patterns in order to think rationally. Pattern recognition, surprisingly enough, is an extremely simple process.
Anyway, I think I'll leave it at that for a response for now.
Godlessons said:
ReplyDeleteWell, there is so much to dismiss in this post I don't know where to start.
As we'll soon see, what you say here would be far better directed at your own comment.
Evolution does not prohibit anything from evolving.
With all due respect, your sentence is absurd. Walking does not prohibit anything from walking. Eating does not prohibit anything from eating. Typing does not prohibit anything from typing. I suspect you don't even understand your own point. Well, unless what you say is some sort of a joke, and you're going for a non sequitur.
Even non-beneficial traits are not prohibited from forming.
Which is one of the points of Plantinga's EAAN. So now you're supporting the EAAN?
What benefit is red hair for instance?
From an evolutionary standpoint, perhaps red hair is more attractive to the opposite sex and thus helps reproductive rates in the human species.
Besides, "benefit" can be in the eye of the beholder. What might seem disadvantageous to you might seem advantageous to me. Say I'm a red head. As such it's possible (although this point is debatable) that I'll be more sensitive to pain. But in some circumstances it might be beneficial for me to be more sensitive to pain than others. Perhaps because I'm more sensitive to thermal pain I can warn others if the temperature is rising too high too quickly.
At any rate, pardon the pun, but your question is a red herring as far as the EAAN goes.
The biggest flaw in the whole argument against evolutionary rationality is that people that argue against it seem to believe in randomness.
No, sorry, but you're wrong. People who use the EAAN assume the perspective of the atheist who subscribes to naturalism and macroevolution in order to indicate to them that, given their beliefs, the likelihood that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low or at least indeterminate. So it's not that EAAN people believe in randomness. Rather it's that EAAN people assume the perspective of the atheistic naturalist and evolutionist in order to undermine such a worldview. EAAN people not assume either randomness or non-randomness. Their beliefs don't need to figure into the EAAN at all.
If you look around, you will be unable to find a single thing that is not rational.
ReplyDeleteThis is an assertion in lieu of an argument. You haven't dealt with the EAAN. You just assert people are "unable to find a single thing that is not rational" sans argumentation.
You may find things that seem irrational, but that is a flaw in perception, not reality.
Once again, you say so, but you don't argue why you think so, given atheism, naturalism, and evolution. How do you know what you perceive is veridical in the first place?
The causal nature of things is so ubiquitous that theists even use this as an argument for the existence of God.
This is vague. Are you referring to a version of the cosmological argument? Which one?
In any case, your point doesn't address the demerits of the EAAN. Yet again, you're long on rhetoric but short on substance.
Since everything has a reason, it merely takes the ability to recognize those patterns in order to think rationally.
Given the confluence of atheism, naturalism, and macroevolution, it's hardly evident that "everything has a reason."
Pattern recognition, surprisingly enough, is an extremely simple process.
Sorry but this is so naive. Some patterns are easy to recognize while others aren't. It depends on the pattern. As well as the percipient. For example, how easy is it for, say, someone with Asperger's syndrome to recognize emotions in humans? Or how easy is it for a computer to recognize facial patterns? It hasn't been till recently that we've been able to make some strides. How reliable are computer-aided diagnostics in clinical medicine? Is fluid dynamics a comparatively "easy" field? How easy is it to predict weather patterns? Perhaps you'd care to tell that to the mathematicians, computer scientists, neuroscientists, linguists, and others who work in the very broad field of pattern recognition that pattern recognition is an extremely simple process?
A. J. Grady said: "Our biologically based will has evolved beyond the need for survival to include higher order thinking, thinking required for philosophical or even superstitious and the corresponding religious beliefs."
ReplyDeleteIt seems to me that this statement reveals a misunderstanding of evolution and not only because you framed you assertions in terms of survival alone.
Your implicit assumptions are that: 1) "will" is beneficial for survival, 2) that "will" can be selected for/against and 3) "will" is heritable. Perhaps it would be good to justify your assumptions first? Once you've done that, you should present an argument to support your assertions.
If the above assumptions are justified, "will", by definition, cannot "evolve beyond the need for survival" and reproduction. As a mechanism, evolution can only drive traits so long as survival and reproduction within the population are upwardly impacted and it's always a generation behind the times.
Patrick,
ReplyDeleteYou say in reference to Godlessons that "you're long on rhetoric but short on substance." Actually, rhetoric is defined as "the art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing," so in this case, he's lacking in that area as well.
Unfortunately, I browsed over to his website and found much more of the same. To be fair, from the incoherence of some of the posts on his bsite I'm assuming he may not be a native English speaker (is this the case Godlessons?) and this may be contributing to the problem.
Even so, the general naïvete in his comments and posts at his site make me think he's not too well read on the issues, and may have the overconfidence usually associated with those new to the discussion. Hopefully your explanation of his errors here will help him to understand the EAAN better so that he can attempt to address it.
A couple of problems with the EAAN:
ReplyDelete1. Our cognitive faculties aren't simply reliable. They're naturally highly reliable at some things (like navigating our normal physical environment and processing information about it) and extremely unreliable in other respects (we tend to be very bad at assessing probabilities, for example).
The reliability is high in those areas that would directly pertain to the survival of our ancestors and low in those areas that wouldn't---precisely what one would expect of cognitive processes that evolved naturally.
2. Plantinga concludes that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is either "low or inscrutable". However, so long as our sense organs are not unreliable (and Plantinga does not argue that they are), it is obvious that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is, in the respects we atheists would call them reliable, not inscrutable at all. Their reliability can be measured with great precision.
Our cognitive faculties are used, both in mundane affairs and in scientific investigations, to make predictions (often extremely precise predictions). And if our senses are reliable we can observe whether those predictions were correct.
So how is it that it can be said the reliability of our cognitive faculties may be inscrutable?
The idea that they are fails if our sensory apparatus is generally reliable at reporting about our natural environment---and it is implausible in the extreme that survivability would be possible otherwise.
So it is also implausible in the extreme that the EAAN is a sound argument.
David B. Ellis,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your comments. You stated,
"1. Our cognitive faculties aren't simply reliable. They're naturally highly reliable at some things (like navigating our normal physical environment and processing information about it) and extremely unreliable in other respects (we tend to be very bad at assessing probabilities, for example).
The reliability is high in those areas that would directly pertain to the survival of our ancestors and low in those areas that wouldn't---precisely what one would expect of cognitive processes that evolved naturally."
But that doesn't address the problem posed by the EAAN. The EAAN isn't interested in behaviors produced by cognitive faculties that reliably produced survival value in our supposed ancestors; it is concerned with whether the cognitive apparatus that humans posses today is reliable in producing *true* beliefs given the conjunction of naturalism & evolution.
Plantinga spills quite a bit of ink discussing and defending how behaviors associated with *false* beliefs in our supposed hominid ancestors could have produced survival value (cf. Warrant and Proper Function, 225ff). He notes on p. 225, " . . the problem is that that clearly there will be any number of different patterns of belief and desire that would issue in the same action; and among those there will be many in which the beliefs are wildly false." He then goes on to give us some examples by way of "Paul" a prehistoric hominid who, as a matter of fact, *likes* the idea of being eaten, but has the false belief that running away from the tiger will result in him being eaten because that particular tiger is unlikely to eat him and so Paul runs off looking for a better prospective tiger. Or perhaps Paul believes that the tiger is a huge pussycat that needs to be cuddled and petted but Paul has the false belief that the best way to cuddle and pet a tiger is by running away from him. Maybe even Paul confuses running toward the tiger with running away from it.
Plantinga's obvious point is this: there are any number of false beliefs that can produce behaviors that promote survival and if we inherited those cognitive faculties there is no reason to assume that ours are any more reliable at producing true beliefs than those of our supposed hominid ancestors.
". . .so long as our sense organs are not unreliable (and Plantinga does not argue that they are), it is obvious that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is, in the respects we atheists would call them reliable . . ."
But this begs the question. The issue is not can we assimilate sensory information; the issue is whether the cognitive faculties we use to draw conclusions from that sensory data are themselves reliably producing true beliefs given naturalism & evolution.
Worse yet, it begs the question to say that your senses will continue to work reliably given naturalism and evolution. Upon what basis do you *know* that your senses will operate in a consistent, uniform fashion the same way in the future that they have in the past? To say "well, based upon past experiences we know this" is to assume the very things you're trying to prove. If you say, "well, there is a high degree of probability that this will be the case", then I must ask what basis you have to know that the laws of probability themselves will operate in a uniform and law-like way in the future the same way they have in the past. That again, is begging the question.
"So it is also implausible in the extreme that the EAAN is a sound argument."
I would encourage you to read Naturalism Defeated: Essays in honor of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism." Plantinga answers the philosophical objections to his EAAN in that book.
Cheers,
Dusman
ReplyDeleteThe EAAN isn't interested in behaviors produced by cognitive faculties that reliably produced survival value in our supposed ancestors;
Nor am I talking about behaviors. I'm talking about beliefs. I'm aware of Plantinga's discussion about false beliefs resulting in survival promoting behavior---the only examples Plantinga manages to come up with (like the man who wants to be eaten by a tiger) are so absurd that that he's essentially making the naturalist's case for him.
Plantinga's obvious point is this: there are any number of false beliefs that can produce behaviors that promote survival and if we inherited those cognitive faculties there is no reason to assume that ours are any more reliable at producing true beliefs than those of our supposed hominid ancestors.
This is exactly the point on which Plantinga's argument fails. He merely raises the bare logical possibility that cognitive faculties producing broadly false beliefs can yield survivable behavior but he does NOTHING to establish that this sort of thing is even remotely plausible. And that's what he must do to make his case.
I would encourage you to read Naturalism Defeated: Essays in honor of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism." Plantinga answers the philosophical objections to his EAAN in that book.
It's on my "to read" list. In the meantime I've read quite a lot that Plantinga and others have written in defense of the argument and I'm less than impressed.
Ranger said:
ReplyDeleteYou say in reference to Godlessons that "you're long on rhetoric but short on substance." Actually, rhetoric is defined as "the art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing," so in this case, he's lacking in that area as well.
Lol, I'll concede your point, Ranger. :-)
David B. Ellis said:
ReplyDelete1. Our cognitive faculties aren't simply reliable. They're naturally highly reliable at some things (like navigating our normal physical environment and processing information about it) and extremely unreliable in other respects (we tend to be very bad at assessing probabilities, for example).
The reliability is high in those areas that would directly pertain to the survival of our ancestors and low in those areas that wouldn't---precisely what one would expect of cognitive processes that evolved naturally.
Given atheism, naturalism, and evolution, how do you know our cognitive faculties are "highly reliable at some things" but "extremely unreliable in other respects"? How do you know we're better at, say, "navigating our normal physical environment" while we're "very bad at assessing probabilities"? How do you know it's not the other way around, for instance? In other words, for you to make such a pronouncement implies you can distinguish between what's reliable and what's unreliable in the first place. But how do you know your reasoning and discernment about these things is reliable given atheism, naturalism, and evolution?
2. Plantinga concludes that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is either "low or inscrutable". However, so long as our sense organs are not unreliable (and Plantinga does not argue that they are), it is obvious that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is, in the respects we atheists would call them reliable, not inscrutable at all. Their reliability can be measured with great precision.
Actually, I'm afraid what's obvious is that you don't understand the EAAN.
You're arguing that, because our cognitive faculties are not unreliable, then they're reliable, and therefore they're not inscrutable.
First of all, what you mean by "reliable" is not necessarily the same as what Plantinga means by "reliable." And since the EAAN is his argument, then you have to deal with the argument using his definitions and terms in order to overturn it.
Also, even if this were the argument, it wouldn't necessarily follow that because our cognitive faculties are "not unreliable," then they're reliable, and therefore not inscrutable. It'd be sort of like arguing, "Petting rottweilers is not unsafe, therefore it's safe."
Finally, te EAAN's argument that our cognitive faculties are either "low or inscrutable" is not a premise but the conclusion of the argument. You need to address the premises if you want to invalidate the conclusion.
Imagine if I argued:
Premise 1: All men are mortal.
Premise 2: Socrates is a man.
Conclusion: Therefore Socrates is mortal.
Then you respond: Socrates is not mortal. Therefore he's immortal.
However, that's not responsive to the argument itself.
Our cognitive faculties are used, both in mundane affairs and in scientific investigations, to make predictions (often extremely precise predictions). And if our senses are reliable we can observe whether those predictions were correct.
So how is it that it can be said the reliability of our cognitive faculties may be inscrutable?
The idea that they are fails if our sensory apparatus is generally reliable at reporting about our natural environment---and it is implausible in the extreme that survivability would be possible otherwise.
So it is also implausible in the extreme that the EAAN is a sound argument.
See my comments on your first point.
BTW, I should note I don't think the EAAN is perfect. There are legitimate criticisms. See Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.
OTOH, the EAAN is more than sufficient to defeat simple-minded atheists like Tarico.
David B. Ellis said:
ReplyDeleteThis is exactly the point on which Plantinga's argument fails. He merely raises the bare logical possibility that cognitive faculties producing broadly false beliefs can yield survivable behavior but he does NOTHING to establish that this sort of thing is even remotely plausible. And that's what he must do to make his case.
So you say, but don't show. You dismiss the EAAN without interacting with the argument. You use words and phrases like "merely," "bare," "he does NOTHING," and so on to indicate your disagreement with Plantinga. But indicating your disagreement with Plantinga is a long way from overturning his argument.
ReplyDeleteSo you say, but don't show.
Where does he present a case for this being a plausible possibility rather than merely logically possible? If I'm mistaken in saying he doesn't do this (and I could be---I've read many things he wrote on the EAAN but certainly not all) then simply quote him doing so.
Then I can, as you put it, "interact" with this element of his argument.
But if this element isn't present then the argument never even gets off the ground---the argument stands or falls on the strength of this point.
David B. Ellis said:
ReplyDeleteWhere does he present a case for this being a plausible possibility rather than merely logically possible? . . . But if this element isn't present then the argument never even gets off the ground---the argument stands or falls on the strength of this point.
1. Among other things, this assumes there's something inadequate about "logical possibilities." I'm not exactly sure what you mean by this phrase, but it sounds like you mean it's nothing more than a hypothetical argument. If this is the case, then, given the history of philosophy, I'd think you'd bear the burden of proof for arguing that there's something inadequate or deficient about hypothetical arguments or "logical possibilities."
2. Let alone logical possibilities over and against what you label "plausible possibilities," by which I take it you mean something like it's able to be actualized in the real world. Otherwise, if that's not what you mean, if perhaps by "plausible" you mean something more like it's "reasonable," then if something is "logical," then it'd be "plausible" as well, wouldn't it? So I don't see how there'd be a problem in the first place.
3. What's more, I'm curious, but given the confluence of atheism, naturalism, and evolution, how do you know for certain the premise of the EAAN hasn't taken place? How do you know it hasn't been actualized?
4. I should also note in passing, in case this is what you're suggesting as an alternative, that looking at the world strictly through the lens of empiricism is fraught with its own problems. But that's another debate.
5. If you're going to assume there's something inadequate or deficient about an objection because it's a "logical possibility" rather than a "plausible possibility," then atheistic objections to theism which rely on "logical possibilities," for instance, would likewise be defeasible on the same grounds. For example, let's say God does not exist. Now let's say the atheist begins his argument with, "Let's say God exists." From the atheist's perspective, since there's no God, then it's a hypothetical argument that God exists. By your logic, this would invalidate the atheist's argument right from the start. I'd think all sides would find this an absurd move to make.
6. Again, I don't say the EAAN doesn't have its problems. But keep in mind the context of Dusman's post: the EAAN is more than enough as an argument to disestablish Tarico.
ReplyDeleteAmong other things, this assumes there's something inadequate about "logical possibilities." I'm not exactly sure what you mean by this phrase, but at this point it sounds like you mean it's a hypothetical argument.
If you're "not exactly sure what you mean by this phrase" then I have to question whether you have even the most basic familiarity with philosophy. Something is logically possible if it does not involve (either explicitly or implicitly) a self-contradiction.
Things like square circles or the proposition "2+2=5" are logically impossible. Superman, the Incredible Hulk and Dracula on the other hand, are all logically possible.
Does this begin to suggest to you why being merely logically possible is, to use your word, "inadequate"? Being logically possible is vastly less than being plausible. A whole host of ideas that you would consider utterly absurd are logically possible.
Let alone logical possibilities over and against what you label "plausible possibilities," by which I take it you mean something like it's able to be actualized in the real world.
Plausible does not mean "able to be actualized in the real world". For something to be plausible (at least in any sense of the word "plausible" I'd agree with) it must meet a much higher standard than that. You'd probably agree as well if you stopped and thought about it for a minute. For example, it's probably physically possible(able to be actualized in the world) that aliens invaders are observing earth from orbit at this moment and will attack tomorrow morning. But that doesn't make the claim that this proposition is true plausible.
What's more, I'm curious, but given the confluence of atheism, naturalism, and evolution, how do you know for certain the premise of the EAAN hasn't taken place?
I never said I know it for certain. I said it was a bare logical possibility and when something is logically possible you can almost never be absolutely certain it isn't true (no matter how utterly absurd and hugely implausible the proposition may be).
What I said is that Plantinga must do more than simply point out that cognitive faculties that produce survivability while also being broadly unreliable in regards to producing true beliefs is a logical possibility. Being logically possible is a very low hurdle---one that even utterly absurd propositions can usually manage.
The nuttiest conspiracy theories you've ever heard are usually logically possible.
Again, I don't say the EAAN doesn't have its problems. But keep in mind the context of Dusman's post: the EAAN is more than enough as an argument to disestablish Tarico.
The EAAN can't "disestablish" anything if it's an unsound argument (even if what you're trying to use it to "disestablish" is also unsound reasoning).
Regarding the EAAN, I think it's important to mention that for the argument as Plantinga presents it, "naturalism" is more or less equivalent with "atheistic materialism". I point this out because nowadays there are full blown dualists, panpsychists, etc who present themselves as naturalists.
ReplyDeleteSecond, here's Patricia Churchland on evolution and belief: Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive... Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.
That doesn't prove Plantinga is right, or even that Churchland is right. It's just pointing out where Plantinga is coming from on this: Namely that evolution, as envisioned by Darwin and naturalists in general, "cares" for nothing more than survival and fitness. And survival reduces to action detached from thought, or truth, or belief, etc.
Third: Plantinga is not at all saying that evolution can't produce beings whose beliefs are likely true, or even that evolution as a whole can't be set up such that truth is ultimately favored. There's theistic evolution, there's teleological evolution, there's front-loaded evolution - all kinds. They just happen to be (again, as Plantinga sets the standard) forms of evolution that naturalists cannot accept. Changing "survival of the fittest" to "survival of those closest to the truth" places evolution out of the naturalist's column.
I bring up the third in particular because I see so many EAAN discussions get recast as a claim that "evolution can't, even in principle, do certain things, like produce agents with true beliefs", which simply isn't the claim.
David B. Ellis said:
ReplyDeleteIf you're "not exactly sure what you mean by this phrase" then I have to question whether you have even the most basic familiarity with philosophy. Something is logically possible if it does not involve (either explicitly or implicitly) a self-contradiction.
Things like square circles or the proposition "2+2=5" are logically impossible. Superman, the Incredible Hulk and Dracula on the other hand, are all logically possible.
Does this begin to suggest to you why being merely logically possible is, to use your word, "inadequate"? Being logically possible is vastly less than being plausible. A whole host of ideas that you would consider utterly absurd are logically possible.
Plausible does not mean "able to be actualized in the real world". For something to be plausible (at least in any sense of the word "plausible" I'd agree with) it must meet a much higher standard than that. You'd probably agree as well if you stopped and thought about it for a minute. For example, it's probably physically possible(able to be actualized in the world) that aliens invaders are observing earth from orbit at this moment and will attack tomorrow morning. But that doesn't make the claim that this proposition is true plausible.
I never said I know it for certain. I said it was a bare logical possibility and when something is logically possible you can almost never be absolutely certain it isn't true (no matter how utterly absurd and hugely implausible the proposition may be).
What I said is that Plantinga must do more than simply point out that cognitive faculties that produce survivability while also being broadly unreliable in regards to producing true beliefs is a logical possibility. Being logically possible is a very low hurdle---one that even utterly absurd propositions can usually manage.
The nuttiest conspiracy theories you've ever heard are usually logically possible.
In other words, you don't have an argument. All you've said here is, "Sure, it's theoretically possible that such and such could be, but how likely is it? Not likely at all!" What you've said is utterly unresponsive to Plantinga's EAAN.
The EAAN can't "disestablish" anything if it's an unsound argument (even if what you're trying to use it to "disestablish" is also unsound reasoning).
Of course, you're still a long way off from demonstrating the EAAN isn't a tenable argument. Did you want to try again, or did you want to stick with your assertions based on your opinions?
ReplyDeleteYou admit the EAAN is logically possible. If you say it's logically possible, then by your lights it should likewise be a logically sound argument, no? In which case you've just disproven yourself.
LOL
Can somebody on the pro-EAAN side of this debate please explain to him why the fact that a statement which is the conclusion of an argument and which is logically possible does not imply that the argument is sound so that he stops being an embarrassment to your side? I don't think he'd believe me if I told him water was wet.
ReplyDeleteThat doesn't prove Plantinga is right, or even that Churchland is right. It's just pointing out where Plantinga is coming from on this: Namely that evolution, as envisioned by Darwin and naturalists in general, "cares" for nothing more than survival and fitness. And survival reduces to action detached from thought, or truth, or belief, etc.
Yes, it cares only for survival. The problem for Plantinga's argument is that being generally "truth-tracking" is an excellent path to survivability. It is, in fact, probably the only plausible path to survivability that's ever been proposed (glossing over the complexities of evolutionary psychology which Plantinga neither addresses, nor appears comepetent to address, in any depth).
And, Crude, if you don't mind, please explain to Patrick the difference between something being logically possible and an argument's being sound.
David B. Ellis,
ReplyDeleteYou said,
"Can somebody on the pro-EAAN side of this debate please explain to him why the fact that a statement which is the conclusion of an argument and which is logically possible does not imply that the argument is sound so that he stops being an embarrassment to your side?
The EAAN is sound if placed in propositional form and the premises are granted. The rub is the premises. You say they are invalid, we say they hold given the probability calculus. It is fair play to use a probability calculus to make the case for your premises; especially in philosophical/scientific circles. Given the EAAN, a probability calculus that yields < .5 is pretty low; hence, Plantinga's conclusion.
You noted in regard to my response,
". . . He merely raises the bare logical possibility that cognitive faculties producing broadly false beliefs can yield survivable behavior but he does NOTHING to establish that this sort of thing is even remotely plausible. And that's what he must do to make his case."
Actually, Plantinga does address this objection in Warrant and Proper Function, but folks here can do the essential reading themselves, which should include of course Naturalism Defeated: Essays in honor of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.
Finally, as I noted before, all of this begs the question from the standpoint of atheism, given that your objections not only depend upon the reliability of your cognitive faculties, but also your senses as you read this response.
The issue is not can we trust our cognitive faculties to assimilate sensory information; the issue is whether the cognitive faculties we use to draw conclusions from that sensory data are themselves reliably producing *true* beliefs given naturalism & evolution.
Also, it begs the question to say that your senses will continue to work reliably given naturalism and evolution. Upon what basis do you *know* that your senses will operate in a consistent, uniform fashion the same way in the future that they have in the past? To say "well, based upon past experiences we know this" is to assume the very things you're trying to prove. If you say, "well, there is a high degree of probability that this will be the case", then I must ask what basis you have to know that the laws of probability themselves will operate in a uniform and law-like way in the future the same way they have in the past. That again, is begging the question.
BTW, nice paintings!
Cheers,
Dusman
David B. Ellis said:
ReplyDeleteCan somebody on the pro-EAAN side of this debate please explain to him why the fact that a statement which is the conclusion of an argument and which is logically possible does not imply that the argument is sound so that he stops being an embarrassment to your side?
Can somebody (anybody) please explain to Mr. Ellis why his own statement which is the conclusion of his own argument based on his own reasoning means he's in fact arguing against himself so that he can stop being an embarrassment, period?
I don't think he'd believe me if I told him water was wet.
Well, Mr. Ellis, given that your cognitive faculties are unreliable, perhaps what you think is wet is actually dry. Sorry, I guess the joke's on you!
BTW, I suppose these are the sorts of things that someone who has no argument finds solace in.
David B. Ellis said:
ReplyDeleteThe problem for Plantinga's argument is that being generally "truth-tracking" is an excellent path to survivability.
Once again, it's obvious Ellis doesn't know an argument from an assertion. Mr. Ellis, this statement of yours - see the one I've just bolded directly above? - would be an assertion, not an argument. To see the difference between the two, you could start here. Or perhaps here. Then you're welcome to try again.
And, Crude, if you don't mind, please explain to Patrick the difference between something being logically possible and an argument's being sound.
Well, given that this is all based on your own assumptions in the first place, Mr. Ellis, if you want to say there's a problem, that's fine by me. You're just shooting yourself in the foot.
ReplyDeleteThe EAAN is sound if placed in propositional form and the premises are granted. The rub is the premises. You say they are invalid, we say they hold given the probability calculus. It is fair play to use a probability calculus to make the case for your premises; especially in philosophical/scientific circles. Given the EAAN, a probability calculus that yields < .5 is pretty low; hence, Plantinga's conclusion.
The quote from me that you said this in response to has nothing to do with Plantinga or the EAAN. I was referring to Patrick's glaring misunderstanding of the meaning of basic philosophical terms when he said:
You admit the EAAN is logically possible. If you say it's logically possible, then by your lights it should likewise be a logically sound argument, no?
Oh, and, regarding this (your first sentence):
The EAAN is sound if placed in propositional form and the premises are granted. The rub is the premises.
It's sound if it's in logically valid form and the premises are TRUE. A person may grant a premise and be mistaken in doing so (it may, in fact, be false despite his having "granted the premise").
Actually, Plantinga does address this objection in Warrant and Proper Function, but folks here can do the essential reading themselves, which should include of course Naturalism Defeated: Essays in honor of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.
For the sake of the discussion would you care to outline his response. I have neither book in front of me (though I did put in a request for Naturalism Defeated through interlibrary loan---I may not get for 2 weeks or more though).
Finally, as I noted before, all of this begs the question from the standpoint of atheism, given that your objections not only depend upon the reliability of your cognitive faculties, but also your senses as you read this response.
Ah, but don't forget that you believe we are living in a theistic universe where we, in fact, DO have reliable cognitive faculties.
I'm free to grant that premise for the sake of discussion and then argument that, even if we didn't live in a theistic universe, we'd still have the same level of reliability we do now. The argument, after all, does not claim that ATHEISTS have unreliable cognitive faculties. It claims human beings in general would have unreliable cognitive faculties if we lived in an atheistic universe. Not the same thing at all.
Also, it begs the question to say that your senses will continue to work reliably given naturalism and evolution. Upon what basis do you *know* that your senses will operate in a consistent, uniform fashion the same way in the future that they have in the past?
We're discussion Plantinga's version of the argument from reason. Not the problem of induction. I think we already have enough on our plate.
BTW, nice paintings!
Thanks.
Oh, and Valerie Tarico's blog is fascinating (thanks for posting the links that brought it to my attention Dusman):
ReplyDeletehttp://awaypoint.spaces.live.com/
Mostly about her travels and social issues rather than religion (at least for the last several posts, which is as far as I've gotten). Well worth giving a look.
ReplyDeleteDavid B. Ellis said:
The problem for Plantinga's argument is that being generally "truth-tracking" is an excellent path to survivability.
Once again, it's obvious Ellis doesn't know an argument from an assertion. Mr. Ellis, this statement of yours - see the one I've just bolded directly above? - would be an assertion, not an argument.
Yes, the idea that "being generally "truth-tracking" is an excellent path to survivability" is an assertion rather than an argument.
And would you like to know why I felt absolutely no need to make an argument for it:
because it's a) obviously true, and b) not something Plantinga disputed.
Hi David,
ReplyDeleteI was simply responding to your comments about "soundness" in light of Patrick's statements, that's all.
I assumed that "premises being granted" are equivalent to being true. I'm not trying to make a distinction, but I can certainly understand why you made the clarification. It is much appreciated.
"For the sake of the discussion would you care to outline his response. I have neither book in front of me (though I did put in a request for Naturalism Defeated through interlibrary loan---I may not get for 2 weeks or more though)."
Well, it's a long discussion and I've got to review my sermon for tomorrow, so right now is not the best time. I mistakenly assumed you had immediate access to the book. I'd recommend reading pp. 225ff in Warrant and Proper Function when you obtain it. That would work best for me since I really don't have time to outline Plantinga's argument. Sorry, but I simply don't have time tonight or tomorrow.
"Ah, but don't forget that you believe we are living in a theistic universe where we, in fact, DO have reliable cognitive faculties.
Indeed, but there's more to it than that. But I don't have time to get into other issues now.
"I'm free to grant that premise for the sake of discussion and then argument that, even if we didn't live in a theistic universe, we'd still have the same level of reliability we do now. The argument, after all, does not claim that ATHEISTS have unreliable cognitive faculties. It claims human beings in general would have unreliable cognitive faculties if we lived in an atheistic universe. Not the same thing at all."
That wasn't what I said, I said, "from the standpoint of atheism . . .", which of course assumes naturalism and evolution.
"We're discussion Plantinga's version of the argument from reason. Not the problem of induction. I think we already have enough on our plate."
But it was you who brought up the reliability of the senses in your initial comment as a means to bolster the idea that given naturalism and evolution our cognitive faculties are reliable:
"Our cognitive faculties are used, both in mundane affairs and in scientific investigations, to make predictions (often extremely precise predictions). And if our senses are reliable we can observe whether those predictions were correct."
I was simply pointing out that the problem of induction is a defeater for your defeater-defeater for the EAAN.
That's all for tonight my friend! Gotta get ready for tomorrow.
Cheers,
Dusman
No evolutionary theory I've ever heard of asserts that beliefs are heritable. The only part of an organism which is heritable is the physical infrastructure which provides both sensory input and the substrate governing belief-forming processes. In other words, organisms inherit their senses and their brains, but not their sensations or their beliefs. I think everyone should be able to agree on that.
ReplyDeletePlantinga's stupid story about Paul and the tiger is therefore entirely beside the point. Under evolution, it doesn't matter whether a specific individual has a specific belief which is untrue, unreasonable, or unrelated to reality. What matters to natural selection is whether the belief-forming process which each individual inherits is, on average, more likely to produce beliefs which lead to survival and reproduction than do the belief-forming processes of its conspecifics. Plantinga is asking us to believe, not that people occasionally have bizarrely incorrect beliefs (that's obvious) but that people who consistently came to bizarrely incorrect conclusions about everything were favored by natural selection over people who didn't.
Note that "everything" - for Plantinga's position to be worth considering, it needs to do more than argue that we might be wrong about tigers: it needs to argue that it's plausible that creatures which are always wrong are better at surviving than creatures that are not always wrong. And we're not talking about logical possibility here (it's logically possible we were all created yesterday) we're talking about whether you think the odds are for it or against it. Personally, I think the odds of Plantinga's being right are low... or just maybe, inscrutable.
That being said, the reliability of our cognitive faculties is not "low or inscrutable", it's poor to moderate, as demonstrated by Plantinga himself, the people on this blog, and everyone else. But Plantinga and you triabloguers need to stop trying to force everyone into a Cartesian pit, where everything which isn't absolutely certain is absolutely uncertain. It's not a standard you impose on yourselves, and it's pretty dishonest to impose it on everyone else. If your only counter-argument is "You can't be absolutely certain that you're right" you're in a pretty sorry state.
ReplyDeleteThat wasn't what I said, I said, "from the standpoint of atheism . . .", which of course assumes naturalism and evolution.
The atheist is not, however, obligated to prove that his cognitive faculties are reliable. Both Plantinga and naturalists share the belief that they are---it is not a point in dispute. The question is whether Plantinga is right in thinking that his argument provides a good case for thinking this a problem for naturalism.
But it was you who brought up the reliability of the senses in your initial comment as a means to bolster the idea that given naturalism and evolution our cognitive faculties are reliable...
The question of the reliability of sense perception is not the same thing as the problem of induction. I can see how you might have made that sort of error---they're similar sorts of issues. But, regardless, not really the same problem.
I was simply pointing out that the problem of induction is a defeater for your defeater-defeater for the EAAN.
Please elaborate when you get the chance. And I'm not so much presenting a defeater as simply arguing that Plantinga doesn't make his case on a crucial point---he only points out the logical possibility of globally unreliable cognitive faculties that result in consistent survivability rather than making a case for it's plausibility.
At least I'm not aware of him ever doing so. If you know of anywhere he does please quote him doing so (again, when you get the chance---no hurry).
Yes, it cares only for survival. The problem for Plantinga's argument is that being generally "truth-tracking" is an excellent path to survivability.
ReplyDeleteThis response relies on some tremendous obfuscation about what Plantinga is talking about, and ignores the heart of what Churchland herself is highlighting. And arguing that "truth" occupies a privileged place in natural selection is to wreak havoc on naturalism. That's not "unfortunate" for his argument, it's a horn for the naturalist to be impaled on.
Let's say that engaging in act X confers a net survival advantage to species A. Does engaging in act X only work if members of species A has true beliefs about what they are doing? Say act X is, as is the popular example, "runs away from tigers". Will act X only work if members of species A run away from tigers because "that tiger is going to eat me!"? What if they engage in act X because "that tiger is a pterodactyl in disguise!" or "it's a lot of fun"?
No. If act X confers a survival advantage, the beliefs or reasons for engaging in act X don't matter. Simply engaging in act X matters, for whatever reason - true or false or even no conscious reason at all.
And therein lies a major problem. Natural selection selects for survival, period. Not truth, certainly not true beliefs.
Now, we can certainly augment natural selection and evolutionary theory, such that "true beliefs" are somehow arranged in a particularly and privileged slot, either universally ("Natural selection always and everywhere on average favors acts tied to true beliefs over false ones") or particularly ("For beings which reach cognitive threshold X, natural selection will always and everywhere on average favor acts tied to true beliefs over false ones"). Rather like how Conway Morris argues that there are certain environmental niches that always exist and will inevitably be filled, such that human life is actually pretty much inevitable evolutionary speaking.
But this saves evolution by knifing naturalism in the gut. Now, far from being a blind, indifferent process without goals or guidance, now we have a rigged game - true beliefs are particularly favored. Evolution now looks one hell of a lot more teleological, guided, front-loaded, etc.
Again, people seem to forget that part of Plantinga's argument is that evolution is *acceptable for the non-naturalist*. It isn't an argument against evolution, it's an argument against a naturalistic rendering of evolution. Come up with a way for truth and true beliefs to be favored by evolution, sure. You haven't defeated Plantinga's argument. You've succumbed to it.
ReplyDeleteAnd arguing that "truth" occupies a privileged place in natural selection is to wreak havoc on naturalism.
Except, of course, that I'm saying nothing of the sort. It's not truth that occupies a privileged status. It's survival. Truth-tracking (in broad strokes, at least: accurate modeling of one's environment) is just the only plausible way known for the "goal" of survival to be achieved.
Which is why this "problem":
And therein lies a major problem. Natural selection selects for survival, period. Not truth, certainly not true beliefs.
is no problem at all.
Having sensory apparatus and cognitive processes that reliably "model" the world (again, within limits---it's hardly a secret that we're capable of cognitive errors) is the only way we know of for long-term survival to be plausible (and I rather doubt that there are others waiting to be discovered).
Now, we can certainly augment natural selection and evolutionary theory, such that "true beliefs" are somehow arranged in a particularly and privileged slot, either universally ("Natural selection always and everywhere on average favors acts tied to true beliefs over false ones") or particularly ("For beings which reach cognitive threshold X, natural selection will always and everywhere on average favor acts tied to true beliefs over false ones").
Accurate modeling of the world and how it works is needed for survival. And accurate modeling of the world allows, once beings become intelligent enough for abstract thinking of a high order, for people to check their beliefs against observation.
I'm not at all, and most naturalists would agree, saying that people are inclined toward true beliefs without qualification. Quite the contrary. Human beings are inclined toward believing a host of falsehoods.
But the groundwork necessary to survival, accurate modeling of one's environment, makes correction of the errors toward which we are prone correctible (much of the history of human intellectual progress has been precisely in ever more refined methods of correcting our natural cognitive errors and flaws).
And, finally, I think it's worth noting the absence of engagement with modern cognitive science, evolutionary psychology or any other relevant scientific fields in Plantinga's stumbling through this territory. There is little indication in anything I've read by him on this topic that shows that he's even bothered learning the basics about the complex scientific disciplines directly relevant to this issue.
Except, of course, that I'm saying nothing of the sort. It's not truth that occupies a privileged status. It's survival.
ReplyDeleteSix of one, half a dozen of another. To say 'Survival is all that matters! And coincidentally, true beliefs are universally privileged with regards to survival!' is simply to restate what I've said. Mmm, teleological evolution. It's the future, you know.
Your reworking of natural selection is a natural selection that fits poorly with naturalism. And there's that horn.
Truth-tracking (in broad strokes, at least: accurate modeling of one's environment) is just the only plausible way known for the "goal" of survival to be achieved.
And this is obfuscation about the sort of truth and belief Plantinga is talking about. "Accurate modeling of one's environment"? So when biologists study bacteria that thrive in a given environment, those biologists are talking about the bacteria's subjective beliefs? Pull the other one!
"Accurate modeling" in that situation would reduce to bare act devoid of subjective belief. And that reduction goes far beyond bacteria.
Having sensory apparatus and cognitive processes that reliably "model" the world (again, within limits---it's hardly a secret that we're capable of cognitive errors) is the only way we know of for long-term survival to be plausible (and I rather doubt that there are others waiting to be discovered).
This is mere obfuscation. Your "reliable sensory apparatus and "models"" reduces to bare conditioned act and nothing more. You can argue that my Roomba "accurately models its environment" because its algorithms are set up in such a way to perform a good to very good job when cleaning floors (maximizing coverage, etc). But unless you want to walk down a panpsychist or similar, the roomba has no beliefs, "true" or otherwise. It doesn't think "This a very efficient method for cleaning Crude's floor!" Nor does it have to. It just has to clean the floor.
You can apply certain beliefs to my Roomba in an extrinsic manner - you can talk about how it has "great truth tracking" and "reliable sensory apparatus", if by truth tracking you mean a code it follows without thought and mechanisms that do what the good people at iRobot designed them to do. But you haven't introduced truth or true beliefs or even beliefs at all to my roomba intrinsically. And you haven't gotten them into nature either.
Plantinga does not deny that evolution can produce beings and populations that act in ways which are conducive to survival. In fact, it's central to his argument. Nor is he arguing that no type of evolutionary development or history can accomplish this. He's pointing out that conceiving of evolution as a process ordered towards truth and towards producing agents with true beliefs is as "naturalistic" as a Tiplerian or DeChardinian Omega Point.
ReplyDelete"Accurate modeling of one's environment"? So when biologists study bacteria that thrive in a given environment, those biologists are talking about the bacteria's subjective beliefs? Pull the other one!
You raise a good point. Bacteria, plants and other nonconscious life survive despite not forming mental models of their environment of any kind---accurate or inaccurate.
So, obviously, some life can survive without modeling it's environment. I accept then that this requires a minor revision in what I said:
It is not that accurate mental models are necessary to all life forms for their survival (it can't be since some don't have minds). But for beings who DO have minds and form mental models of their environment it is not plausible that they could be using grossly inaccurate models and still have much chance of surviving in it. This is pretty obvious (it's why the argument from reason is so counter-intuitive) and I don't think Plantinga's EAAN has provided any reason to doubt that this is so. And lacking any reason for thinking this idea false the reliability of cognitive faculties presents no problem for naturalism.
He's pointing out that conceiving of evolution as a process ordered towards truth and towards producing agents with true beliefs is as "naturalistic" as a Tiplerian or DeChardinian Omega Point.
Again, it's not that it's "ordered toward truth". It's that inaccurate cognitive models of the environment are an obstacle to survival and would tend to be eliminated by natural selection.
You raise a good point. Bacteria, plants and other nonconscious life survive despite not forming mental models of their environment of any kind---accurate or inaccurate.
ReplyDeleteNonconscious? We know they're nonconscious now? Since when?
There are philosophers and physicists who say freaking thermometers are / may be conscious, to say nothing of cells and plants and such. Sounds kinda wild to me, but I also haven't seen anyone come up with a way to check out their claims. That problem of other minds gets set aside for convenience's sake, not because it's solved.
For all we know, thermometers and plants and bacteria have conscious thoughts. Maybe even beliefs! But if they do, they are treated as epiphenomenal as far as evolutionary theory + naturalism is concerned. And I think that extends to animal life as well.
So, obviously, some life can survive without modeling it's environment. I accept then that this requires a minor revision in what I said:
Minor revision? Seems a lot more than minor to me. Conceding that there are large classes of life which can thrive and adapt, yet their "minds" are either non-existent or non-important as far as NS is concerned is pretty big. It's illustrating that on N+E, it's the act which is selected for, not the content of belief that precipitated the act.
All you're saying is that you believe in your heart of hearts that if a given organism is capable of making a model or having a belief, then that model or belief is going to be truthful and accurate far more often than not. But Plantinga, and many others, give plenty of examples where acts born of false belief or even no belief can be adaptive. Hell, "widespread delusion leading to adaptive behavior" is a regular skeptic schtick.
But we're supposed to believe that evolution happens to be set up in such a way where, while it's possible for organisms with no beliefs to adapt and thrive, and possible for organisms with deceptive or untrue beliefs to adapt and thrive, the whole process is skewed in such a way that guarantees the overall perfection and selection of truth? And also that this is just hunky-dory on naturalism, the metaphysic which (at least once upon a time) was committed to the view that minds and the mental aren't privileged in nature?
As I said, pull the other one.
Again, it's not that it's "ordered toward truth". It's that inaccurate cognitive models of the environment are an obstacle to survival and would tend to be eliminated by natural selection.
And again: Six of one, half a dozen of another. It's teleological evolution, it's front-loading, it's non-naturalistic evolution. It is an inclusion of direction in the evolutionary process on a fundamental level.
It's also just the tip of the iceberg for the EAAN, since getting beliefs and mental causation into the physical world without gutting the sort of naturalism Plantinga is talking about (materialism, prior to panpsychism and various flavors of dualism being relabeled "materialism") is damn difficult on its own. But the fact that Plantinga's EAAN puts some naturalists in the position of having to argue that fundamental concerns skew the trajectory of evolution towards truth and true beliefs is enough to make it a successful argument.
David B. Ellis said:
ReplyDeleteYes, the idea that "being generally "truth-tracking" is an excellent path to survivability" is an assertion rather than an argument.
And would you like to know why I felt absolutely no need to make an argument for it:
because it's a) obviously true, and b) not something Plantinga disputed.
1. You've got it completely wrong. Looks like Crude already dealt with you here though.
2. Honestly, have you read Plantinga's EAAN? Or at least the Wikipedia article on the EAAN? Are you making all this up on the fly (e.g. Googling every time a new term comes up you're not familiar with)? That's what it seems like you're doing.
3. At this point, you're just repeating yourself despite what I and others have already pointed out is faulty in your thinking.
4. In addition, even though you're essentially repeating yourself, I'll point out you're likewise backing down from your original claims in this combox. What you say in later comments is weaker than what you've originally contended. Sorta like a chorus singing the same old song but with a diminishing voice.
Crude, do you feel like you are arguing consistantly and in good faith? I ask because your switch from claiming emphatically that you Roomba has no beliefs to finding it plausible that thermometers may have beliefs makes it look like you don't care what you say, as longv as it makes you feel correct.
ReplyDeletePatrick and Crude, if you think it's possible to have a model of the world which is wrong in every particular yet generates correct bahaviors and is consistent with sense perception, would you be so kind as to explain how it would work?
ReplyDeleteNo stories about tigers, please.
Irrendenta,
ReplyDeleteYou said,
"Plantinga's stupid story about Paul and the tiger . . ."
and
"No stories about tigers, please."
O.k., we won't tell anymore stories about tigers as long as you don't tell us stupid bedtime stories about dinosaurs turning into birds, fish turning into lizards, and people coming from rocks.
Regarding your question, if you want an atheist to make Plantinga's point for him, just go to Chapter 5 in The God Delusion where Richard Dawkins argues that *false* religious beliefs have led to adaptive behavior that produced survival value.
If you don't like Plantinga's "stupid story about Paul and the tiger", then don't appeal to the stupid evolutionary fairy tales that come from your own atheistic backyard.
Dusman
Dusman, if you're willing to reduce Plantinga's argument to the trivial claim that people have mistaken beliefs and that mistaken beliefs can improve survival rates, I'm quite willing to go along with you. However, that does remove the force of Plantinga's argument, as it gives us no reason to think that our underlying belief-forming processes are fundamentally unreliable.
ReplyDeleteTo say, with Dawkins, that some heuristics under some circumstances generate beliefs which have historically been survival-enhancing but do not correspond to reality as we understand it today is not to say that all belief forming processes are terminally unreliable. To say otherwise is equivalent to saying that any belief forming process which ever produces false beliefs must be discarded, which leaves you a Cartesian skeptic.
Plantinga's story about the Paul and the tiger is stupid because, while it purports to be part of an argument about belief-forming processes, it speaks only to the possibility of the existence of incorrect beliefs, and not at all to how those beliefs came to exist. It therefore has nothing to do with the argument.
No evolutionary biologist tells stories about "dinosaurs turning into birds, fish turning into lizards, and people coming from rocks", as I'm sure you know. It's your bedtime stories, after all, which describe people coming from rocks - "the dust of the ground" I think it's called.
ReplyDeleteAll you're saying is that you believe in your heart of hearts that if a given organism is capable of making a model or having a belief, then that model or belief is going to be truthful and accurate far more often than not.
What I'm saying is something so obvious none of you would be disputing it if it hadn't been associated with an argument from a well-known Christian apologist:
that acting on a grossly inaccurate model of the world is likely to quickly result in death.
But Plantinga, and many others, give plenty of examples where acts born of false belief or even no belief can be adaptive.
And no one disputes this. What's disputed is whether globally inaccurate models of the world wouldn't tend to be eliminated by natural selection. Again, Plantinga has merely raised a logical possibility. He has done nothing to address plausibility (which is unsurprising---doing anything but gloss over this issue only makes it obvious how absurd his argument is).
Would you care to finally address the plausibility issue I raise (yet again) above and which you still have not addressed? The one which Irredenta was also asking you to deal with when he/she asked:
Patrick and Crude, if you think it's possible to have a model of the world which is wrong in every particular yet generates correct bahaviors and is consistent with sense perception, would you be so kind as to explain how it would work?
No stories about tigers, please.
I'm wondering about that as well. You seem, in this whole discussion, to be ignoring that it's Plantinga who is making a claim which is strongly counter-intuitive (to the point of sounding absurd). So it is he who has the burden of supporting that claim. A burden he has failed to met.
Irredenta,
ReplyDeleteCrude, do you feel like you are arguing consistantly and in good faith? I ask because your switch from claiming emphatically that you Roomba has no beliefs to finding it plausible that thermometers may have beliefs makes it look like you don't care what you say, as longv as it makes you feel correct.
Baloney!
First, I didn't say I found it plausible. I said I found it wild! But I also admitted that I know of no way to verify such, nor does anyone else apparently.
Second, the point of the Roomba example was that the good people at iRobot aren't in the business of constructing subjective beliefs for the Roomba to have it function adequately. It is purely a third-person, extrinsic, mechanical endeavor for them. That remains the case whether the Roomba has no subjective consciousness / beliefs, or somehow some.
If you want to tell me that thermometer manufacturers have to be panpsychists who take into account the thermometer's consciousness to create a thermometer, by all means do so. In that case, though - how would you like to own an atheistic, left-leaning car? Yours for a very low price of half a mill. It looks like a kind of beat up Toyota I haven't driven in a while, but what can I say - you seem like someone who knows value when you see it.
What I'm saying is something so obvious none of you would be disputing it if it hadn't been associated with an argument from a well-known Christian apologist:
ReplyDeletethat acting on a grossly inaccurate model of the world is likely to quickly result in death.
David, you've already conceded that the natural world is filled to the brim with organisms who are successful survival-wise despite having in your view *no* beliefs, and which I point out can be expanded to either *no* beliefs or *wildly incorrect* beliefs.
So think about the two claims you're making here:
1) Acting on a grossly inaccurate model of the world is likely to quickly result in death!
2) Acting with absolutely no model of the world is compatible with survival and evolutionary success!
I'm pointing out that this is ridiculous. I'm also pointing out, not merely with Plantinga but *with naturalists*, that whether the model is accurate or inaccurate means diddly according to natural selection. Acts are what are selected for, based on the Darwinian model - even those borne of inaccurate or false beliefs, so long as they encourage acts which contribute to survival. And arguing that, hey, it just so happens that true beliefs confer across the board positive fitness, is sacrificing naturalism. Not that anyone cares anymore, it seems.
Would you care to finally address the plausibility issue I raise (yet again) above and which you still have not addressed?
The hell I haven't! I spelled it out again for you above: You're telling me that life which does, in your view, zero modeling whatsoever is capable of thriving and surviving. But somehow, the moment you think the organisms are capable of making a model, those models *must be true largely and for the most part*. Surviving with zero beliefs, not counterintuitive. Surviving with false beliefs, counterintuitive.
I find that... counterintuitive. And honestly, if all you've got for me now is "Well... I find that hard to believe! I see no problem with evolution being rigged to favor truth and true beliefs across the board!", then what more is there to say here? You've got nothing but an inconsistent position and incredulity. You can have 'em. Hell, evolution may select for acts borne of that!
And as I keep saying: Hey, if you want to dig in your heels and defend an evolutionary theory re-imagined such that truth and true beliefs are on the whole always favored over false beliefs, you do that. You'll have plenty of company. Just, it'll be at Biologos, or the Templeton Foundation, and among some Intelligent Design theorists.
One more time: If your answer to Plantinga is to claim that it's tremendously counterintuitive to you that evolution does not operate in a teleological manner, Plantinga's argument has done its job.
ReplyDeleteDavid, you've already conceded that the natural world is filled to the brim with organisms who are successful survival-wise despite having in your view *no* beliefs, and which I point out can be expanded to either *no* beliefs or *wildly incorrect* beliefs.
Do you really have such difficulty recognizing that plants and animals have radically different survival needs?
A tree does not navigate it's environment. It stands rooted in one spot and it's cells just carry on doing what they do.
A gazelle, on the other hand, must find water, find food, avoid danger obstacles, avoid predators and so on. It is not reasonable to suppose that this can be done if that gazelle is acting on a grossly inaccurate model of it's environment. The fact that trees survive without minds in no way changes this utterly obvious fact.
Again, something you would almost certainly acknowledge without reservation if it weren't for the fact that an argument by a prominent Christian apologist depends on denying it.
I am irredenta. I configured my blogger account to give me a real name.
ReplyDeleteCrude, you're really unpleasant to talk to. You don't seem to have any interest in actually thinking about your opponents positions, or trying to address the strongest version of your opponents arguments. You also veer off into irrelevant tangents and bizarre sarcastic personal attacks ("atheistic, left-leaning car"?), which makes understanding your points even more difficult.
I don't know why you're bringing "panpsychism" into this conversation, or why you think it's important to dispute whether thermometers have beliefs. It doesn't matter whether Roomba builders put beliefs into Roombas, as no one here is arguing that Roombas are the kinds of things which have beliefs. Everyone here agrees that humans have beliefs, and that's what we're discussing.
Humans have beliefs which model the world and are developed and updated through sensory observation and reflection. We generate behaviors by imagining potential behaviors and checking the outcomes based on our internal models. We are quite often wrong in our predictions, sometimes because our models are missing aspects of the world, sometimes because we don't think things through. Nevertheless, David and I are arguing that such models must track reality to some degree. We argue this because we think it is terminally implausible that a human could have a model of the world which is entirely wrong and still generate behaviors which are survival enhancing. We've asked you repeatedly for some argument to the effect that such a thing is possible or plausible, which you have repeatedly failed to provide. Instead you talk about how things without beliefs don't need beliefs (we agree), and have completely missed the point.
You came very close to understanding when you said, "...on N+E, it's the act which is selected for, not the content of belief that precipitated the act." We know. What we're arguing is that you have given us no reason to think that beliefs which have utterly incorrect content can consistently precipitate survival enhancing acts. Why do you disagree, and what reasons do you have?
I am irredenta. I configured my blogger account to give me a real name.
ReplyDeleteCrude, you're really unpleasant to talk to. You don't seem to have any interest in actually thinking about your opponents positions, or trying to address the strongest version of your opponents arguments. You also veer off into irrelevant tangents and bizarre sarcastic personal attacks ("atheistic, left-leaning car"?), which makes understanding your points even more difficult.
I don't know why you're bringing "panpsychism" into this conversation, or why you think it's important to dispute whether thermometers have beliefs. It doesn't matter whether Roomba builders put beliefs into Roombas, as no one here is arguing that Roombas are the kinds of things which have beliefs. Everyone here agrees that humans have beliefs, and that's what we're discussing.
Humans have beliefs which model the world and are developed and updated through sensory observation and reflection. We generate behaviors by imagining potential behaviors and checking the outcomes based on our internal models. We are quite often wrong in our predictions, sometimes because our models are missing aspects of the world, sometimes because we don't think things through. Nevertheless, David and I are arguing that such models must track reality to some degree. We argue this because we think it is terminally implausible that a human could have a model of the world which is entirely wrong and still generate behaviors which are survival enhancing. We've asked you repeatedly for some argument to the effect that such a thing is possible or plausible, which you have repeatedly failed to provide. Instead you talk about how things without beliefs don't need beliefs (we agree), and have completely missed the point.
You came very close to understanding when you said, "...on N+E, it's the act which is selected for, not the content of belief that precipitated the act." We know. What we're arguing is that you have given us no reason to think that beliefs which have utterly incorrect content can consistently precipitate survival enhancing acts. Why do you disagree, and what reasons do you have?
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ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteDAVID B. ELLIS SAID:
ReplyDeleteDo you really have such difficulty recognizing that plants and animals have radically different survival needs?
A tree does not navigate it's environment. It stands rooted in one spot and it's cells just carry on doing what they do.
A gazelle, on the other hand, must find water, find food, avoid danger obstacles, avoid predators and so on. It is not reasonable to suppose that this can be done if that gazelle is acting on a grossly inaccurate model of it's environment. The fact that trees survive without minds in no way changes this utterly obvious fact.
*********************************
And what about social insects like bees and ants? Unlike a tree, social insects have to navigate their environment. Does this mean bees and ants have true "beliefs" about their environment?
Isn't that a problem for physicalism, which reduces minds to brains? What's the brainpower of an ant?
ReplyDeleteUnlike a tree, social insects have to navigate their environment. Does this mean bees and ants have true "beliefs" about their environment?
Never having been a bee or ant I can't be sure if they have consciousness or are merely biological automata. Either way, though, it seems that they must use their sensory inputs to model their environment with reasonable accuracy to navigate it successfully.
Isn't that a problem for physicalism, which reduces minds to brains? What's the brainpower of an ant?
I don't see why that would be a problem for physicalism. But even if it were, not being a physicalist, it's no problem for me.
I'm agnostic on the metaphysical question of what the most basic "stuff" of reality is. I don't know and I don't see any evidence anyone else knows either.
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ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteDAVID B. ELLIS SAID:
ReplyDelete“Never having been a bee or ant I can't be sure if they have consciousness or are merely biological automata. Either way, though, it seems that they must use their sensory inputs to model their environment with reasonable accuracy to navigate it successfully.”
You initially responded by casting the issue in terms of beliefs, cognitive faculties, information processing, mental models, conscious life, and minds. You later contrasted mindless trees with gazelles.
But bees and ants can’t “mentally model” their environment unless they have minds. There has to be something behind the sensory inputs to interpret the sense data.
So are you attributing “true beliefs” to social insects? Do they have the brainpower to entertain beliefs?
If you reject physicalism, what’s your alternative? Substance dualism? Panpsychism?
Unless you can justifiably impute mental states to ants and bees, you can’t attribute mental models to ants and bees. You can’t say they survive due to their adaptive beliefs about their environment. As such, you can’t say natural selection selects for true beliefs. So do true beliefs/models confer a survival advantage or not?
David B. Ellis said:
ReplyDeleteWould you care to finally address the plausibility issue I raise (yet again) above and which you still have not addressed? The one which Irredenta was also asking you to deal with when he/she asked:
Patrick and Crude, if you think it's possible to have a model of the world which is wrong in every particular yet generates correct bahaviors and is consistent with sense perception, would you be so kind as to explain how it would work?
No stories about tigers, please.
I'm wondering about that as well.
1. Since I don't think "it's possible to have a model of the world which is wrong in every particular yet generates correct bahaviors [sic] and is consistent with sense perception," there's nothing to which I need respond.
2. BTW, as a friend points out: "He [Ellis] also talks about the senses working properly, but that's not part of the *cognitive* faculties. The relevant cognitive faculty here would be covered by *perception*, i.e., the *beliefs* produced by or held on the basis of the senses."
You seem, in this whole discussion, to be ignoring that it's Plantinga who is making a claim which is strongly counter-intuitive (to the point of sounding absurd). So it is he who has the burden of supporting that claim. A burden he has failed to met.
You seem, in this whole discussion, to be ignoring that it's you who initiated the criticism of the EAAN here. Sure, you could say in the wider public arena of academic scholarship and so forth Plantinga shoulders a burden of proof. But as far as this combox is concerned, since you're the one who initiated the debate, it's on you to make good on your initial criticism.