If anyone has not read the previous post, I would recommend it; however, I will also give an overview of my argument as well as the counterarguments below.
The original question I looked at was simple: “Is it even possible for God to actually create a being that can make a non-determined choice, or does the brute fact of creation render that impossible?” To shorten it a bit, we can ask: “Is it possible for God to create a being capable of a non-determined yet also non-random choice?” I argued that it is impossible, and in the comments went so far as to say that the only type of being capable of making a non-determined, non-random choice is one that is self-existent (namely, if it is possible, only God can do it).
The reasoning is fairly simple and since you can read the original argument, which used an illustration and more laymen language, I will present it here in a more precise way than I originally did. (Also, please note this argument assumes Christianity to be true.)
1. Let the faculty that produces a choice in an agent (whether that be the will, the mind, the soul, or whatever) be X.There have only been three counterarguments presented to me thus far (well, four if you count “You’re wrong” statements as an argument, which apparently some people do). The first is to insist that just because we can’t do it doesn’t mean God can’t do it; the second is to say that there is some feature of the soul that gets around this problem; the third is to fall back to quantum mechanics.
2. Let X be created (that is, X is not self-existent).
3. Let C be a choice of X such that the statement “X chose C” is true.
Given the above:
4. If X is created, then X was created by something other than X (definition of “created”).
5. X could not create itself (implications of 4)
6. X has properties that enable X to produce choices (per 1).
7. The properties of X that produce choices are either a direct result of creation or they are accidental features.
8. If the properties of X that produce choices are accidental features, then X was not created with the intention of X producing choices.
9. If X was not created with the intention of X producing choices, then the ability of X to make choices cannot be ascribed to the creator.
10. Christians do ascribe the ability of X to make choices to the creator.
11. Therefore, Christians cannot hold that the properties of X that produce choices are accidental features.
12. Therefore, the properties of X that produce choices are a direct result of creation (from 7 & 11).
13. Since C is a choice of X, then either C originates in some fashion in the properties of X, or C is accidental to the properties of X.
14. If C is accidental to the properties of X, then X did not intend for C to occur.
15. If X did not intend for C to occur, then X did not choose C.
16. Premise 15 contradicts 3.
17. Therefore, C must originate in some fashion due to the properties of X.
18. The properties of X are a direct result of creation (restatement of 12).
19. Therefore, if X chose C, then C is made, in some fashion, due to a direct result of creation.
To examine these in reverse order: Quantum mechanics does take away the determinism of physics, but only by adding an element of randomness into the equations. Yet my argument has never claimed that choices couldn’t have arisen from random behavior—yet if they did arise from random behavior, then the will wouldn’t properly be considered to have been making the choice. (In my above argument, this would be premises 14-16.)
Secondly, to say that there is some property of the soul that gets around the problem is wishful thinking. As I’ve demonstrated above, it doesn’t matter what X is composed of. There are only two relevant issues: 1) was X created and 2) did X make the choice? If X did make the choice (that is, C is not random) and X was created, then it follows that the choice is, in some fashion, a direct result of the creation of X, no matter what X is.
This is true, mind you, even if the human will is sui generis (which it is not), which leads us to the first objection. Just because man cannot do something obviously doesn’t mean God cannot do something; but there are certain things that are simply impossible to do by definition. A bachelor cannot be married, a square cannot be round, and a created will cannot make choices independent of the properties of its creation.
So the counter that “God has sui generis will, so why can’t humans?” fails because even if we embrace the contradiction and stipulate that man has sui generis will, it is must be a sui generis will that is created. Again, the only way to avoid the logic of the situation is to assert that man’s will is self-existent. If it is created, no matter what physical or immaterial properties are created, then my argument stands.
And with that, I open up the comments once more for continued discussion.
Thanks, Peter, for restating your argument - I think it'll help clarify a few things. I'll highlight a few statements:
ReplyDelete13. Since C is a choice of X, then either C originates in some fashion in the properties of X, or C is accidental to the properties of X.
17. Therefore, C must originate in some fashion due to the properties of X.
19. Therefore, if X chose C, then C is made, in some fashion, due to a direct result of creation.
"If X did make the choice (that is, C is not random) and X was created, then it follows that the choice is, in some fashion, a direct result of the creation of X, no matter what X is."
"...a created will cannot make choices independent of the properties of its creation."
Those are the cruxes (cruces?) of your argument. And, understood in the right way, a libertarian will agree with every single one of them. So far, I don't see where your views, as expressed above, conflict with what a libertarian will say. Unless, that is, phrases such as "originates in some fashion" and "a direct result of" are supposed to be equivalent to, or entail, a causally deterministic relation, in which case, of course, the libertarian will demur. Otherwise, the libertarian should happy agree that free actions "originate in some fashion" in the properties inherent in their created nature. And they should insist that of course any choice that is made is the "direct result of creation," for instance in the sense that, without that creation, there would be no creature to make a choice (and without the specific properties of that creation, it's unlikely that the creature would have made that choice). Finally, the libertarian should think it obvious that choices cannot be made "independent of the properties of its creation." But of course, this is just to agree that the properties with which they were created are necessary conditions of their having made choice C.
But why think they are logically sufficient - that is, why think that, given that some creature has faculty X, then it follows of logical necessity that X makes choice C (as opposed to D)?
You can't say: "because otherwise it would be random." That's false: we know that having some nature or faculty X which does not entail every choice C needn't be random. After all, God has a nature/faculty X which allows choices that are neither determined nor random. So "being necessitated by X" is not the conceptual contradictory of "is random."
So what's the argument for reading 13, 17, and 19 in a deterministic way, given that "undetermined" does not conceptually entail "random."? The fact that C is not independent of X does not go any distance toward showing that facts about X entail or determine C. It just shows that they are necessary conditions - something no sane libertarian has ever denied.
(I suspect you may point me back to your premises that speak of "accidental features" as proof that, for created beings, if something is not necessitated by X, then it must be the "product" of an accidental feature. I confess I don't quite understand what you mean by an accidental feature in this context, or why anyone should think that accidental features "produce" choices. If this is relevant to my questions, perhaps you can clarify what you mean here?)
A shorter response, and a dilemma:
ReplyDeleteIs the concept of God's having LFW logically coherent?
If NO: then I don't see what work "being created" does in arguing against the possibility of human LFW (and note that your conclusion suggests that it is in virtue of being created that human LFW is logically impossible). Unless there's some distinct reason to think that God can't have LFW, surely whatever argument leads you to deny the possibility of God's being LFW should serve equally well against human freedom.
If YES: If God's having LFW is coherent, then some action's being Non-Necessitated but Non-Random (NN-NR) is coherent, and you need to show how the property "being created" is logically incompatible with being NN-NR. (My guess is that any attempt to show this will count against the possibility of God's LFW as well, so that reference to being created will be otiose after all.) So, human freedom is not sui generis: its a species of the genus 'metaphysical freedom.' Show me how 'being created' counts against the former in a way that doesn't count against the latter. Once it is granted that an event could be NN-NR, it's I think fairly easy to show how God could grant, as part of a creature's design, the NN-NR power to choose freely. Re-read your crucial premises above with NN-NR in mind: I don't see a non-question-begging way to show that "being created" plays any interesting role against the possibility of human LFW.
Brian, I think your problem is your definition of LFW. If you define LFW as "the ability to do anything that can be conceived" then you have a logically impossible definition, even for God. Because even God cannot act against his nature (e.g., he cannot lie or create a logical contradiction).
ReplyDeleteCentral to the argument at hand is the premise that every act is consistent with the nature of the actor. Your argument posits an actor capable of acting outside of its nature, which is a logical impossibility.
The nature of the unbeliever is to hate God, but still do some righteous things, because he bears God's image and has intrinsic knowledge which he supresses. The nature of the believer is to love God and strive to be like Christ, but also to fail on many occasions because the sin nature is still present.
God's nature is sui generis. Man's is created. Ergo, man's nature cannot be changed by him. Only the creator can change the nature of that which is created, making it a new creature.
Jonah,
ReplyDeleteI don't see where Brian said that definition of LFW.
Dan,
ReplyDeleteIt's implied from his argument. If he uses the correct definition of "free will" ("libertarian" is a red herring), that being "the ability of an agent to act freely according to its nature or desire, without external coercion", then his argument collapses.
If I'm wrong, I invite Brian to give us his definition of whatever free will he wants to argue that exists.
Jonah, perhaps you don't know what people mean by LFW. We don't mean "able to do anything that can be conceived". I don't know why people who don't believe in LFW continue to define LFW differently to what it actually means...
ReplyDeleteIt means the ability to make some (non-determined) choices in some situations.
God may not be able to lie, but God can choose freely (in the libertarian sense) between different good things.
It is false to say that acting within ones nature means that their choice is determined. There can more than one available choice within ones nature that one can choose between.
"Brian, I think your problem is your definition of LFW. If you define LFW as "the ability to do anything that can be conceived" then you have a logically impossible definition, even for God."
ReplyDeleteI don't know of any libertarian theorist who defines free will in this way. I certainly hope I didn't. You say that my argument "implies" this definition. Could you clarify which part(s) of my argument implies this?
You say:
"Central to the argument at hand is the premise that every act is consistent with the nature of the actor. Your argument posits an actor capable of acting outside of its nature, which is a logical impossibility."
I think I see where the disagreement lies. When I talked about a free action's not being entailed by the facts about the agent's nature, you thought that I meant that a free action could be inconsistent with that nature. But this doesn't follow. Consider: God decides whether to create a world with X human beings, or a world with X+1 human beings. Suppose that either option would bring about just as much overall goodness (glory to God, etc.) as the other, so that, morally speaking, God could choose either option without violating his nature. In such a case (which is surely imaginable, if not actual), both options are consistent with his nature, in the sense that neither would make God unjust, less glorified, a liar, less than perfect, etc. But neither options is entailed by his nature: God is free to choose either one, and the facts about his nature do not single out one over the other as the only permissible or actualizable thing to do.
Obviously you're right that no being can act "outside its nature" in the strong sense of doing something outside of its limitations. But that has nothing to do with whether a being can act in more than one way, within those limitations.
And that's a standard way to define free will - or at least to define a necessary condition on free will: an agent S freely does action A at a time t only if at t, S was able to (choose to) do A, and at t, S was able to (choose to) refrain from doing A (i.e. to choose to do something else instead). (One problem with the definition of free will you offer -
"the ability of an agent to act freely according to its nature or desire, without external coercion" - is that it contains the word 'freely' in the definiens, which makes it circular, or at least unhelpful.)
Notice that "being able to do otherwise" (in the libertarian sense of that phrase) does not entail "being able to do anything conceivable," nor does it entail "being able to act beyond the limitations imposed by its nature." So that's at least a fairly traditional understanding of libertarian freedom (with bells and whistles and amendments added by individual theorists, as one would expect).
Brian,
ReplyDeleteFirst, my use of the phrase "in some fashion" is only meant to show that one need not detail exactly how this occurs in order for the chain of reasoning to work. It would be similar to if I had said, "The pulling of the trigger on a gun in some fashion causes the bullet to fire." If you wanted to, you could replace the phrase "in some fashion" with the word "somehow" to catch my meaning more clearly. However, ultimately it appears to be a superfluous clause; I think the statements work just fine without it too. Thus:
13. Since C is a choice of X, then either C originates in [perhaps better would be "from"] the properties of X, or C is accidental the properties of X.
In any case, you said: "And, understood in the right way, a libertarian will agree with every single one of them."
In what way would you define LFW then so as to be consistent with these statements? After all, we could easily add to my argument the following:
If X chose C due to the way that X was created, then were X to have been created other than how it was created, C would likewise be different (excluding such variations as when two or more versions of X could result in the same C).
I think this inevitably follows from what I've said before, which means that I don't see how it could be consistent with LFW.
Allow me to give a mathematical illustration (and again, since others--I do not include you in this, Brian--have trouble differentiating between an illustration and an argument, this is NOT an argument), imagine that we're looking at some function, say f(x) = 4x. Suppose you put in the input, x = 3. Then the result of that function is 12. But if f(x) = 5x, then x = 3 would yield 15. Here we see that the output changes because of the way the function is designed.
Essentially, that is what I'm saying. If you put some input into the X of my argument, you get choice C, but if X were different the same input would yield a different C. Thus, X determines C, but X is itself determined by how it was created.
Brian said:
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But why think they are logically sufficient - that is, why think that, given that some creature has faculty X, then it follows of logical necessity that X makes choice C (as opposed to D)?
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Well, the way that argument was structured, the choice is, by definition, C. C is undefined; it could be anything.
We could substitute some choices for C and let's just call X "the will" for ease of reference. We could then say:
Bob's will chose vanilla ice cream.
X = Bob's will
C = vanilla ice cream.
You could say:
Bob's will chose chocolate ice cream.
But then, while X remains the same, C does not.
C = chocolate ice cream.
So C is variable, depending on the circumstances. However, since Bob can only make one choice at a time, and he cannot relive the past to choose otherwise, if C = vanilla then C cannot = chocolate, etc. Whatever X chose is what X chose.
You said:
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After all, God has a nature/faculty X which allows choices that are neither determined nor random.
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But God is also self-existent and wasn't created. Again, my argument is in regards to creation. If something is created, then it is created with certain constraints. My argument deals with those constraints on the faculty of choosing. If the faculty that makes a selection is itself created, then how it selects something is determined by how it was created. None of this follows for a self-existent being.
Brian said:
ReplyDelete---
If YES: If God's having LFW is coherent, then some action's being Non-Necessitated but Non-Random (NN-NR) is coherent, and you need to show how the property "being created" is logically incompatible with being NN-NR.
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Let us assume that God does have LFW for the sake of argument then. Let us further assume that LFW means one makes choices consistent with one's nature (it means more than this, but let us focus it to this for the sake of argument).
If you say that God's LFW makes it possible for man to have LFW, then you have to demonstrate how a created nature is essentially no different from a self-existent nature.
God is self-existent; man is not. There is no part of man that exists that is not created by God, and that includes his nature. In other words, to say man acts consistent with his nature is to say that man acts consistent with the nature God has made for him; but to say God acts consistent with His nature is NOT to say that God acts consistent with a nature made for Him.
Indeed, we have empirical evidence that man's nature is sufficiently different from God's. For we know that God's nature is such that it is impossible for Him to sin. Yet we act consistent with our nature all the time and sin, do we not?
Put it this way: were God to have been the one in the Garden of Eden, with His will and His nature, does anyone believe He would have sinned?
I also find it ironic that one of the arguments used against me is "Just because man can't do it doesn't mean that God can't do it." And here I point out: "Just because God can do it doesn't mean man can too." :-)
By the way, I don't want to stray too far down the road of choices consistent with one's nature, or saying God has LFW, etc. Because I don't hold that God has LFW, since his will is sui generis. Naturally, I wouldn't say that God's creation of the universe was a necessary act (the customary objection to saying God doesn't have LFW). I will say, however, that it was a self-determined act.
ReplyDeleteI think it might be fruitful to highlight the following exchange:
ReplyDeleteI said:
"If God's having LFW is coherent, then some action's being Non-Necessitated but Non-Random (NN-NR) is coherent, and you need to show how the property "being created" is logically incompatible with being NN-NR."
In your reply to this, you granted for sake of argument that God has LFW, and then said:
"If you say that God's LFW makes it possible for man to have LFW, then you have to demonstrate how a created nature is essentially no different from a self-existent nature."
I've asked for some reason to think that "being created" and "being NN-NR" are incompatible properties. Your response appears to amount to "well, show me that they are compatible!" I find this dialectically puzzling. You're the one who's claimed to have an argument proving the impossibility of human LFW. I've pointed out that your argument appears to require the claim that "being created" and "being NN-NR" are incompossible. I've asked for a reason to think this is even prima facie plausible. So why should the libertarian at this point have to argue that they are compatible? Suppose I don't - it clearly doesn't follow that you've shown them to be incompatible, or even that there's good reason to think so.
Furthermore, I didn't argue that "If God has LFW, then it's possible for humans to have LFW." Indeed, I didn't (in that post) argue for any positive conclusion about human LFW. I was merely pointing out that your argument couldn't rely on the claim that a NN-NR event is impossible per se - I didn't argue that God's possession of LFW was a reason to believe humans do, or could, have it (since that clearly doesn't follow). The libertarian can happily grant that created natures are different from self-existent natures, but ask why this difference makes a difference to the possibility of the former possessing the property of being metaphysically free (to some extent). Created vs. self-existent does make a difference when it comes to, say, having a temporal beginning - and we can show why. It does not make a difference when it comes to, say, being able to have desires, or being morally appraisable, or being able to act. So, why do you think it makes a difference when it comes to acting freely? The libertarian needn't show anything here - you're the one with the argument!
I think you mean to answer these questions with the following:
"If something is created, then it is created with certain constraints. My argument deals with those constraints on the faculty of choosing. If the faculty that makes a selection is itself created, then how it selects something is determined by how it was created. None of this follows for a self-existent being."
I disagree with both major claims made here. It's true that being created gives the creature certain constraints; it's false that these constraints must, of necessity, be deterministic. Lumps of radioactive uranium are clear counter-examples: they have a created nature, but their "behavior" is not determined by that created nature (though it's certainly constrained by it: there are limits to the kinds of things that lumps of uranium "do.") Now, to restate the obvious, that doesn't show that uranium "acts freely." But it does show that your claim, that if X is created with nature D, then any event involving X must be determined by D, is false. So, created things can be indeterministic, though constrained. (This shows that talk of "functions" is misguided - for that presupposes a deterministic relation between input and output.)
(cont'd...)
We already know that something's being indeterministic and non-random is possible (since God's acts are). So what rules out a created thing's being indeterministic and non-random? It can't be the principle you state above: that if something has a nature, then its activity is determined by that nature. But then what's the principle?
ReplyDeleteSecondly, if your principle were correct, we could show that God couldn't possibly be free. God has a nature, N. Did God freely choose to have nature N (could he have chosen a different one)? No - N is essential to God. But then God and humans are in the same boat in this respect: neither had any choice about which nature they had - and neither can, by an act of will, change what it is. On your principle, this suggests that God couldn't possibly be free. But that's false: so, that principle is false. (Notice that the concept "being self-existent" played no role in any of this.) God could be unfree with respect to which nature he has, and yet free and undetermined (though constrained by his nature) with respect to which actions he chooses.
I think that leaves us with this:
1) If God can have LFW, then there can be NN-NR events.
2) What makes it impossible for created beings to act freely (in a NN-NR way)?
3) It can't be the principle that an unchosen or created nature determines one's activity (God and uranium falsify this).
4) It can't be the principle that if an event is undetermined, then by definition it is random (see 1)
5) Might it be that if an event is undetermined but involves a created entity, then it must be random?
6) But what could possibly motivate such a view? If an entity is created, then its nature is unchosen, so perhaps we should say that if something's nature is unchosen and its activity is undetermined, then it is random? No, that won't work either (see 1 - God's nature is unchosen).
7) Might it be the principle that if an entity has an unchosen and created nature, then if its activity is undetermined, then it must be random? Again, this is hardly self-evident, and seems entirely ad hoc.
So why think that 'being created' is incompatible with 'being NN-NR'?
Brian,
ReplyDeleteOkay, I think your subsequent posts have clarified your position. We appear to be operating from the same basic definition of free will (or LFW, if you like).
Given that, how does your position address a) the condition of the unbeliever, and b) God's exhaustive knowledge of human history and actions?
Thanks for more fully spelling out your disagreement, Brian. To clarify, I don't hold that God does have LFW, so even if my reasoning regarding the LFW argument fails, that wouldn't disprove my argument.
ReplyDeleteThat said, I still think my reasoning holds :-)
First, a bunny trail regarding uranium (I will address the other issues too, as I get time during the day). Even if this is a non-determined action, I still maintain that it is random. So I disagree that it fits the NN-NR mold, because at best it would be NN-R. I also think that it behaves necessarily, given the correct time context (more on that below).
I likewise doubt you would insist that uraniam has free will. Uranium doesn't choose when to decay. Uranium is not a willful agent.
Now on to necessity, as it relates to uranium. While it is true that each individual partical of uranium behaves in a manner suggesting randomness, the uranium lump as a whole behaves deterministically. Exactly half the atoms in the lump will decay during the half-life of the radioactive material. This means that whether you say uranium is random or determined seems to depend completely on scope. If you view each atom, it appears to be non-determined, but if you view the entire lump, it appears to be determined. So much so that scientists use it to calculate the passage of time (and I don't just mean dating old rocks--we use atmoic decay for the atomic clock that gives "official" time right now).
We know from the study of chaos that deterministic data can be run through deterministic equations and yield results that appear random. Given the universal occurances of fractals and other such chaos-related entities, it would not surprise me in the least if we found that the decay of uranium was actually the chaotic outcome of a deterministic function, in which case it would be necessary after all.
After all, we know of mathematical functions that appear to show some kind of structure on a large scale, yet which behave chaotically zoomed in. A perfect example of this is Lorenz attractor, which you can see here. The general shape of the curve is easy to see--it's not so easy to predict where the next line will appear as you plot more values.
Ultimately, if I had to predict between uranium being random or being chaotically determined, I would pick that it's chaotically determined simply because it seems to obey the principal of scale. However, I don't believe we have enough information yet to make a dogmatic claim on that point.
I said:
ReplyDelete---
"Ultimately, if I had to predict between uranium being random or being chaotically determined..."
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I meant: "if I had to PICK" instead of "predict."
Got determinism stuck in the brain :-)
Now let me answer the more important issue that Brian brought up.
ReplyDeleteIt is true that God did not choose His nature; but it is also true that no one chose God's nature for Him either. This is not the case with human beings. While we don't chose our nature, it remains the fact that our natures were chosen for us--by God.
God's nature is essential to His ontology. In that sense, God's nature is necessitated by God's ontology. God's ontology is necessitated by God's self-existence.
Even were we to say that man's nature is necessitated by man's ontology, we're left with the fact that man's ontology is not necessitated. But I don't believe that man's nature is necessitated by his ontology either, for it is easy to think of several variations of a man's nature while he would still be a human being.
So with that in mind, we see Brian's statement:
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If an entity is created, then its nature is unchosen
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This is wrong. If an entity is created, then it's nature is chosen--it's chosen by its creator.
Even if we say that there is similarity between the nature being unchosen by the specific entity, God's unchosen nature is an essential nature, while man's unchosen nature is dependent upon God's good pleasure.
It is because of such dissimilarities that I have to maintain that God's will is sui generis. There is really nothing else like it. And it seems to me that if you establish that some entity that has nothing else like it has a certain property, the fact that nothing else is like that entity mitigates against the possibility that others have that same property.
Peter,
ReplyDeleteYou bring up several very good points about the difference between God and man. God's nature is unchosen, man's nature is chosen by God. God would not have sinned in the garden of Eden. Etc.
But you see, we all agree that God is very different from man. However, there are similarities too. We are made in the image of God.
The idea is put forward that God has NN-NR choices. First of all, I do not see why you disagree about this. Do you see God's choices as necessary, or random? But also the idea is put forward that if God can make NN-NR choices, then that could be one of the similarities between God and man. That perhaps man also could have NN-NR. We allow that there are differences between God and man, but what makes you so sure that NN-NR choices isn't one of the similarities?
Your answer seems to be: Because God's will is sui generis. Man cannot have a sui generis will. Therefore, man cannot make NN-NR choices. But I really don't see the logic in that. Could you explain more what Precisely you mean by sui generis, and how any being without it could not Possibly make NN-NR choices?
There's not enough known to claim that "If God can make nn-nr choices, then maybe we can." First, "maybe" is a slippery word. I wouldn't think whether we were free and responsible depends upon a maybe! Indeed, if "maybe" we can, then "maybe" we can't.
ReplyDeletePerhaps people out to think about why God can make nn-nr choices (assuming he can for the moment). Is God-freedom a communicable or a noncommunicable attribute? Why would it be the latter? Well, here's one reason: God is sovereign and omnipotent and these are incommunicable attributes. Perhaps the only being that could be fully sovereign and omnipotent is a being who has God-freedom, a libertarian freedom. I don't see anything irrational about claiming that. So, "maybe" is as "maybe" does.
Anyway, nn-nr isn't enough for a full fledged libertarianism. Ability to do otherwise has been prized in this discussion as definative of LFW. But as narrow-source incompatibilists will want to argue, nn-nr choices can be made without APs. And if APs are going to be put forth as a desiderata of the type of LFW being defended here, then more needs to be said besides God has "nn-nr."
However, it has been argued that God's choices are not necessitated. Maybe not nomically necessitated, but infallible fore (or timeless) knowledge causes a problem for those who think God-freedom is LFW and LFW has to include AP. For as one philosopher pointed out:
"Examining now the previous examples from this point of view, it is not at all clear to me that they describe situations in which Jones can be said to be acting on his own. Since in them God is assumed to be infallible, the fact D(B) occurs at T is entailed (in the broadly logical sense) by the prior act of God's believing at T' that D(B) occurs at T (T' is metaphysically necessitated or metaphysically determined by the belief of God. Now, if a libertarian rejects as an instance of an agent's acting on his own a scenario in which an agent's decision is nomically necessitated by a temporally prior fact (or a conjunction of such facts), why wouldn't he reject the one in which the decision is metaphysically necessitated by a prior event? What, in my opinion, is crucial to the libertarian's conception of free decision is that such a decision is not necessitated or determined in any way by any antecedent fact. . . . Now, one may object that metaphysical necessitation is not nomic necessitation. But why should this difference be relevant? If a decision is rendered unfree by the fact that its occurrence at T is entailed by the conjunction of some temporally prior facts together with the laws of nature, then why would it not be rendered unfree if its occurring at T is entailed by God's prior belief that it will occur at T? If the critic still thinks that there is a difference between the two cases, it is incumbent upon him to explain why." (Widerker, Responsibility and Frankfurt Examples, Oxford Handbook of Freewill, 328, emphasis original).
Jonah asks:
ReplyDelete"how does your position address a) the condition of the unbeliever, and b) God's exhaustive knowledge of human history and actions?"
These are good questions - quite involved ones. Here I've only been trying to respond to Pike's argument, rather than build a positive case for views on the matters you raise.
I don't want to hijack Peter's thread, so I'll just say a few short comments about (a) and (b).
Regarding (a) - we can distinguish the thesis that (libertarian) free will exists from the thesis that there is (what Plantinga calls) morally significant freedom. The first thesis (on most libertarian views) states only that there is at least one agent and one act which are such that the agent could have done something other than that act (at that time). The second thesis is stronger: S has morally significant freedom with respect to some act A only if S can do A, S can refrain from doing A, and either doing A would be morally right for S and refraining from doing A would be morally wrong, or vice versa. (Tim Pawl and Kevin Timpe, in a recent paper, identify a third option: the thesis that morally relevant freedom exists, which is the claim that S can do A or refrain from doing A, and one of those options is morally better than the other. Notice that while all cases of morally significant freedom are also morally relevant, the converse does not hold.)
The libertarian is (technically) committed only to the thesis that free will exists, not to the existence of morally significant or even relevant freedom. Of course, most libertarians will in fact argue that at least morally relevant, if not significant, freedom also exists, but the theses are distinguishable. Insofar as Pike's argument claims to show the logical impossibility of LFW, the condition of the unbeliever isn't relevant. After all, suppose that unbelievers only have morally relevant, but not significant, freedom - they can do nothing that is morally right, though they can freely choose from amongst "competing" evils. This already is incompatible with Pike's conclusion. "Softer" views, which allow morally significant freedom even for unbelievers, will of course be incompatible with that conclusion as well.
On (b) - I don't think God's exhaustive foreknowledge is logically incompatible with the existence of free will. I myself go in for something like an Ockhamist view (say, Plantinga's version of it), I suppose. Super quick version: S does A at t2, but S could have done B at t2, despite God's infallibly believing, at t1, that S does A at t2. How so? Well, had S done B at t2, then God would have believed differently than He actually did. That's no violation of omniscience, infallibility, or libertarianism. There's a sense in which God's beliefs supervene on that which He believes, and not vice versa. But again, I haven't tried to argue for any of these theses here, since they aren't relevant to an assessment of Pike's argument, which is my concern here.
I don't want to hijack Peter's thread either, so I'll briefly respond. ;)
ReplyDeleteViz. a) your position, while somewhat confusing (I find Plantinga confusing also :)), might be valid. However, I would say that any morally significant freedom is tainted by original sin, such that it is not possible for the tainted creature, absent a change in nature, to do something good for the right reason, i.e., love of God and His eternal law.
As for b) you have a dilemma: either you make God's "foreknowledge" contingent upon the acts of the creature (which is logically incoherent unless you presuppose Open Theism), or you do it the other way 'round, which is indistinguishable from compatibilism, which is my position.
Peter wrote:
ReplyDelete"Even if this [uranium's radioactive decay] is a non-determined action, I still maintain that it is random. So I disagree that it fits the NN-NR mold, because at best it would be NN-R....
I likewise doubt you would insist that uraniam has free will. Uranium doesn't choose when to decay. Uranium is not a willful agent."
We agree here, but I think you missed the point of my reference to uranium. Here's what I said:
"Lumps of radioactive uranium are clear counter-examples: they have a created nature, but their "behavior" is not determined by that created nature (though it's certainly constrained by it: there are limits to the kinds of things that lumps of uranium "do.") Now, to restate the obvious, that doesn't show that uranium "acts freely." But it does show that your claim, that if X is created with nature D, then any event involving X must be determined by D, is false.
I've bolded the especially relevant part: I didn't suggest that quantum-mechanical events were examples of NN-NR events, but that they are counter-examples to the idea (from your argument) that if something is created, then its activity must be determined by its design. Even created things can be indeterministic - their natures can allow more than one possible outcome at a given time, holding fixed the past and the laws. (Obviously - to repeat my repetition from above - that wouldn't be sufficient for, nor show the possibility of, human free will; it simply undermines one part of your argument, the part to which my quoted comment above was a reply.)
As for your interesting speculation that perhaps what we regard as genuinely indeterministic (e.g. at the quantum level) will turn out, on further investigation, to be chaotic but determined behavior: though that's incompatible with the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, I'll leave that to the side. What's interesting is that people have run your argument in reverse: perhaps, given highly unstable chaotic systems, the "quantum randomness" at the micro level can be amplified up to the macro level. That seems to be the idea behind Schroedinger's Cat (and, indeed, behind anything strapped to a Geiger counter, like Feynman's suitcase bomb, and so on). So it's not at all clear that all "macro" objects are completely - or even nearly - deterministic (or at least that they need to be).
(Incidentally, Robert Kane is one libertarian theorist who has tried to employ at least some aspects of indeterministic physical processes as crucial parts of his theory of free action (see, for instance, his book "The Significance of Free Will," esp. Chapter 1). He of course tries to show how this kind of indeterminism would not just amount to randomness, but would instead allow the agent to have control over the action; and his detractors, naturally, raise problems for his account precisely because it isn't clear how the agent could maintain control if quantum randomness is being "magnified" to the macro level. Still, it's an ingenious theory, worth reading.)
I'll have to reply to your next post later...
"I don't want to hijack Peter's thread..."
ReplyDeleteFeel free (pun intended) to do so, as long as it's an interesting hijacking.
I have a busy morning today, but I will try to respond throughout the day.
Disregard my comments on God's free will being incommunicable, I don't like them anymore. :-) However, it's not clear that pointing to God as a being who makes NN-NR free actions means that there is no problem with humans making the same. For it may be due to other factors, factors unique to God, that God escapes randomness objections.
ReplyDeleteBrian said:
ReplyDelete---
Even created things can be indeterministic - their natures can allow more than one possible outcome at a given time, holding fixed the past and the laws.
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This is actually why I brought up (in the previous thread) time's arrow, and the fact that an electron and a positron are identical if the positron is seen as an electron moving backwards through time. This is also why I mentioned that if we view a simplified universe as only having these two particles, it is impossible to say which one is the positron and which one is the electron, because that would require us to know the direction of time's arrow already.
In QM, particles and anti-particles seem to be created all the time; they exist for a moment, then collide and obliterate each other. Since they always come in pairs like that, there's debate as to why the universe is composed of so many particles instead of having obliterated long ago. It's not necessary to go into those details at this point, although I find it quite interesting.
More to the point, however, is that if anti-matter really is regular matter going backwards in time, then the stability of the past seems to say that, while these actions are indeterminate from the perspective of one who doesn't yet know what will happen, they are determinate in the sense that they will always behave the exact same way given the same laws and starting positions. That is, if a particle has a 10% chance of decaying at any given amount of time, and that time loops, then 10% of the loops ought to have that particle decay. Given all matter in the entire universe (that we know of, anyway) is composed of quantum particles, then it would seem likely to me that this sort of thing would be noticeable as a changing of the past. And by that, I mean such things as one day you see a rock on the ground, and the next day it's simply gone because of some chain of events leading backwards in time, then it's back again. While any one particular event would be rare, you have so many lumps of matter that it could happen to and that it WOULD happen to eventually, that, as I said above, I think we would have noticed this by now.
So it seems to me that either anti-matter is not really matter moving backwards in time (although why the mathematical model should line up so well would be difficult to explain), or else these "possible" alternatives aren't really possible.
Peter wrote:
ReplyDelete"So with that in mind, we see Brian's statement:
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If an entity is created, then its nature is unchosen
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This is wrong. If an entity is created, then it's nature is chosen--it's chosen by its creator."
You're right, my mistake - by "unchosen" I meant "unchosen by that entity."
I think I can agree with all of your major distinctions in that post - human ontology not being necessitated while God's is; God choosing humanity's nature, but not vice versa; human nature being dependent, while God's isn't, etc. Obviously, there are some deep dissimilarities between humans and God. No argument here. But you use this to conclude:
"And it seems to me that if you establish that some entity that has nothing else like it has a certain property, the fact that nothing else is like that entity mitigates against the possibility that others have that same property."
I just don't see how this is supposed to follow from the foregoing distinctions. I also echo Skarlet's question about the significance of God's will being sui generis. Surely it isn't sui generis in every respect. Surely the conclusion "humans cannot have property P" does not follow from the premises "God has property P" and "Nothing (including humanity) is like God." It's easy to think of a host of properties shared by both God and humans (just as it is easy to think of a host of properties had only by God and not by humans). So, given that God's ontological uniqueness doesn't entail that every property had by God is had only by God, what's the reason for thinking that, of logical necessity, the property of being able to act in an NN-NR fashion falls under the "uniquely had by God" category, rather than the "shared by God and other entities" category? The fact that God's will is "sui generis" doesn't do the trick here. (How would the argument go? "God's will is sui generis in some respects. God's will is NN-NR. Therefore, human wills are not NN-NR" - clearly invalid. So maybe: "God's will is sui generis in all respects..." - already unsound!)
To be clear (yet again), none of what I just said establishes the positive thesis that human beings do in fact have LFW, or even the thesis that it is possible that humans can engage in NN-NR actions. But that's irrelevant; that isn't the dialectical burden the libertarian has to meet in this context. The libertarian (well, me) is simply responding to your argument for the thesis that human LFW is logically impossible in virtue of having the property "being created." Your objection has it that NN-NR actions are unique to God. Perhaps that's true: but that conclusion doesn't follow from the fact that God's will is in some sense sui generis, or from the fact that God is ontologically unique, or from any other fact thus far adduced. That's what I've been pressing for: how do facts about God's nature or about the nature of created beings make even a prima facie case for the very strong conclusion that LFW in created beings is a logical impossibility?
The libertarian grants that "being created" means that the constraints on the created being's range of actions are not freely chosen by it, and that its nature determines the scope of its actions. But why think that its nature entails - in virtue of being a created nature - that in every given circumstance, there is only one action that is possible? This just doesn't follow: not from the meaning of the terms involved; not from the fact that God's will is sui generis; not from the fact that human wills have constraints; not from the fact that, for all we know, radioactive decay might be deterministic; not from the fact that God is ontologically unique. So where's the contradiction? That's what I'm not seeing.
Brian,
ReplyDeleteIn all honesty, I am having difficulty grasping just what an NN-NR thought would be. Now I certainly understand what each of those entail apart from the other. I know what non-necessitated actions are, and I know what non-random actions are. But I've been trying to put them together, and I've been playing with different concepts in my mind, but I honestly cannot "see" what a non-necessitated and non-random choice or object would be (and as I've mentioned already, I don't think quantum mechanics is an example of such an object, for the reasons I've given).
In fact, after further deliberation, it seems to me that an NN-NR thought, if it did exist, must be the definition of an uncaused thought.
And if NN-NR is uncaused, then it is certainly possible that God *may* have that ability, since He is uncaused, but I do not see how that would transfer to us, as we *are* caused.
Or is there some way that you can show how something can be NN-NR and still caused?
Peter said:
ReplyDelete"...but I honestly cannot "see" what a non-necessitated and non-random choice or object would be"
It's a common complaint. I'll try to show how libertarians typically make conceptual room between "undetermined" and "random" (though keep in mind that if you want to show that LFW is logically impossible, then even if the libertarian says nothing here, the burden still rests with you to exhibit the contradiction to which they are committed). No guarantees this will clarify everything, but here's a shot:
Given that (most) libertarian theories make much of the requirement of indeterminism (so as to allow for, among other things, the kind of alternative possibilities they believe underwrite ascriptions of moral responsibility), the "NN" part just means that it is not the case that the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature entail every future state (including my actions). The worry: if something is undetermined, how can it be other than chance or random or fortuitous or capricious or chaotic or arbitrary?
One way to approach an answer is to probe for the source of the belief that "undetermined" must mean, or entail, "chance." And a common source for this belief is the conjunction of (1) a conflation of causation with determinism, and (2) the belief that an uncaused event is a chance event. Notice that if to be undetermined means, or entails, that it is uncaused, then, given (2), NN entails chance. So my first question: are you perhaps thinking that "undetermined" means or entails "uncaused"?
If so, I'd refer you to an early post of mine in which I gave arguments for the distinction between causation and determination. Feyman's suitcase bomb is one example (notice that it requires not that radioactive decay is actually indeterministic, but only that it is logically possible that it is indeterministic). There are others: if the laws of nature are incomplete, in the sense that they do not "cover" every kind of phenomenon, then a causal relation might obtain that isn't deterministic. The key here, again, is that causation, on this view, has to do with producing or bringing about an event; but that's conceptually distinct from the notion, associated with determinism, that the relation between cause and effect is one of necessity. X might produce or bring about Y (Y might "derive from" X in a causal way), and yet the occurrence of X did not entail or necessitate the occurrence of Y.
If that's right, then there can be indeterministic causation (as I mentioned, this claim is widely accepted). But then an event's being undetermined doesn't entail being uncaused. And indeed, some libertarians affirm a causal - though indeterministic - relation between antecedent events and free actions. So the charge of "randomness" wouldn't apply if you're thinking that undetermined actions must be uncaused, and for that reason are random.
(cont'd...)
(cont'd from above)
ReplyDeleteBut some libertarians affirm a wholly non-causal relation between antecedent events and free actions - they do indeed claim that some crucial element of free actions are wholly uncaused (by prior events, at least). These libertarians are likely to respond to the "chance" objection by claiming that, while some aspect of free actions are uncaused, they aren't inexplicable, and for that reason are not random or chance. On this view, an event is chancy if it has no explanation. But, they insist, free actions do have explanations. Here again theorists differ about the precise nature of the explanation(s): some say that there is a causal explanation to be given, though not an event-causal one (it is agent-causal instead); others will focus on the rational explicability of free actions - the fact that they can be explained by the reason(s) for which the agent acted; still others will point to teleological relations that obtain between an agent (and/or her actions) and the reasons for which she acted, where this relation is not reducible to causal relations.
So my second question: are you perhaps thinking that "undetermined" means, or entails, "unexplained/unexplainable"? And for that reason, undetermined events must be random, since to be random just means/entails to be inexplicable?
If so, then the previous paragraph will be relevant. An action could be undetermined, since the circumstances at the time of decision, plus facts about the agent's character and nature, don't entail just one possible action; and yet this action would not be random (they will say), since it admits of explanation. If we can explain why the event occurred, why think it is "just chance"? It can be rationally, (perhaps) teleologically, (perhaps) causally explained - how could that be random in the way that quantum events (which don't admit of such explanations) are random? And yet what rules out, by logical necessity, that these actions might be undetermined by prior events? That's the typical line a libertarian is likely to offer.
Perhaps there are other options for what "chance/random" means - what did you have in mind?
You go on to say:
"And if NN-NR is uncaused, then it is certainly possible that God *may* have that ability, since He is uncaused, but I do not see how that would transfer to us, as we *are* caused."
Just quickly: while human agents were (and remain) caused to exist, it doesn't follow that every event involving human agents must be caused, or at least it doesn't follow that every event involving human agents must be deterministically caused. (Again, the logical possibility - if not actuality - of indeterministic quantum events shows that "being caused to exist" doesn't entail "having all of its activity determined." And some pre-emption: what distinguishes undetermined human actions from undetermined quantum events is that the former, but not the latter, have explanations, causal, teleological, rational, or otherwise, and so they are not random.)
So do you see your puzzlement over how NN events could nevertheless be NR as arising from concerns about causation, or explanation, or something else? Again, armed with distinctions between partial vs. sufficient causes; indeterministic vs. deterministic causes; and explanations of a causal, teleological, and rational sort; the libertarian would want to hear more about what would make an event random or chance in a way that undermines freedom or responsibility, or why merely being undetermined (and created?) entails such a thing. Does that help at all?
For it may be due to other factors, factors unique to God, that God escapes randomness objections.
ReplyDeleteMaybe, maybe not...maybe is as maybe does. ;-)
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Very interesting conversation. No surprise that I think Brain has sufficiently demonstrated that Pike's argument fails to meet the burden of proof required for it to be cogent in many respects.