Justin Taylor recently did a post by the same title which, not surprisingly, resulted in many Arminians emerging from the woodwork to attack Calvinism for implicitly or explicitly denying what the Arminians take to be true.
So we really have two different issues here. There’s the issue of how a Calvinist should answer that question. But this is also a question for Arminians.
Arminians think they can answer this question in the affirmative. Indeed, they think their affirmative answer is a primary reason to be Arminian rather than Reformed. But can Arminians honestly answer that question in the affirmative? Do their philosophical and theological precommitments allow them to consistently do so?
Arminians believe that human beings have freewill. And this is how they typically define freewill: it is possible for the same agent, in the same situation, to go either way. For example, it is possible for you do believe the Gospel, and it is possible for you to disbelieve the Gospel.
Arminians have quite a lot riding on this definition. For them, this is a precondition of moral responsibility. True love. Divine justice. As well as God’s sincerity.
But if it’s possible for you to believe the Gospel, and if it’s also possible for you to disbelieve the Gospel, then there’s a possible world in which you believe the Gospel, and another possible world in which you disbelieve the Gospel.
What is more, that libertarian freedom would apply to every human agent. That is what it means to be a free agent. To be a morally responsible agent.
But this also means there must be at least one possible world in which everyone freely believes the Gospel. A world in which it’s possible for everyone to freely believe the Gospel.
In that case, if God really wanted to save everyone, he could have done so by choosing to make the possible world in which everyone freely believes the Gospel. He could do so without having to violate anyone’s libertarian freedom. For it’s libertarian freedom which makes this scenario possible in the first place.
All God would be doing, in that event, is to actualize their free choices.
So how can Arminians stay true to their definition of freewill and also say that God really wants to save everyone–when human freedom is no impediment to that outcome, yet God has chosen, instead, to make a world with so many hellbound men and women?
I recently had this conversation w/ a friend of mine. Bottom line, yes, salvation is available for all men b/c Christ died for all men b/c he loves all men.
ReplyDeleteAlso, if God wanted all to be saved, why has he not seen to it that all hear the gospel? Also, why has he not given all an equal chance for it?
ReplyDeleteAlso, what about the Arminian belief in foreknowledge? Does God not know that A will not believe the gospel? And yet, does he not bring him into existence anyway?
Blessings,
Stephen
But, Wes, you also said, "Again, I'm sorry but I feel no need to defend a view of God that doesn't turn him into a capricious monster and upholds the loving kindness and patience displayed throughout the OT to many nations and people. Was all of that just a sham? A show to somehow bring himself more glory by essentially taunting the unregenerate people he never intended on saving even if they had wanted to turn to him for repentance?"
ReplyDeleteAnd yet, given the implications of libertarianism which I've drawn out in this very post, your own position makes God a "capricious monster" who taunts the lost by engaging in a "sham."
Steve, if you don't mind. By way of illustration using Craig's Molinism position to defend inspiration it seems universalism could also be supported.
ReplyDeleteJust apply Craig's same argument to salvation.
Wes said:
ReplyDelete---
Bottom line, yes, salvation is available for all men ...
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In what sense was salvation available to the Aztec warrior in 900 AD who was isolated across the ocean from anyone who knew the Gospel?
In what sense is salvation available now to the residents of Tehran who are trapped by an Islamic theocracy?
We can start there and move to your other errors later.
Craig does address objection here:
ReplyDelete"Notice, too, that I did not say, “There is no possible world inhabited by creatures with free will in which all persons freely receive Christ.” There is indeed such a possible world. What I said was that such a world may not be FEASIBLE for God to create. For the existence of such a world doesn’t depend just on God’s will; it also depends crucially on the free will of the persons in it. And it cannot be guaranteed that they will co-operate. If God were to try to actualize such a world, it may be that the persons in it wouldn’t go along and would abort God’s intention by freely choosing to disbelieve.
"This is the distinction you’re getting at when you differentiate between a possible world and an actual world. What you mean by “actual” is really “feasible.” In the terminology of possible worlds semantics, there is only one actual world, namely, the world we experience, the real world. The other worlds are possible but not actual. What you want to say is that not every possible world is a feasible world for God to create. So whereas in a purely theoretical possible world, one could posit that every creature will freely receive Christ, it may well be that the quality of free will makes any feasible world where creatures freely receive Christ also a feasible world where some do not."
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5958
Adam,
ReplyDeleteCraig's explanation seems to be a self-defeating proposition.
If *there is indeed such a possible world* where all are saved, but it *may* not *feasible* for God to create then how can the possible world exist at all? And why *may* it not be feasible for God to create?
Craig then goes on to show the God's actions are limited by man's will. However, the thrust of the self-refutation is that Craig has already admitted such a world exists. If such a world exists it can be actualized.
If this is not the case then it seems that the Molinist counterfactual has no true value as argued by it opponents.
I agree with Mark. Craig's counterargument is incoherent. He begins by admitting that there is a possible world inhabited by creatures with free will in which all persons freely receive Christ.
ReplyDeleteHe then contradicts himself by also stating that "it cannot be guaranteed that they will co-operate. If God were to try to actualize such a world, it may be that the persons in it wouldn’t go along and would abort God’s intention by freely choosing to disbelieve."
But if, per his original stipulation, there is a possible world in which all the inhabitants freely receive Christ, then there are no inhabitants of that possible world who freely choose to disbelieve.
There maybe inhabitants of other possible worlds who'd refuse to cooperate. But that's not the possible world which Craig stipulated at the outset.
Is not what Craig promoting consummate with Open Theism? Is not the whole freewill defense predicated upon the fact that God foreknows what men will believe? And if so, then could not God have created a world in which He foreknew that all men would choose salvation? Just ask'n.
ReplyDelete#JOHN1453 SAID:
ReplyDelete"Hays is confused about what possible world philosophy is and does, and about the difference between worlds that are logically possible and those that are feasible under a Molinist theory of God's knowledge."
To the contrary, I'd discussed the inadequacy of that dichotomy in this very thread, in reply to Adam Omelianchuk. As usual, "John" is way behind the curve. Would you like me to slow down so that you can try to catch up?