“James White discussed Molinism on a recent dividing line. (link) His two primary criticisms of middle knowledge (God's know what you would do under any circumstances) were 1) it doesn't accomplish God's goal of giving man freewill, which makes man robots and doesn't escape unconditional election and 2) middle knowledge removes God's sovereignty and places too much in the hands of man's autonomous freewill, thereby limiting what God can do with His creation and robbing God of His glory. Awkwardly for Dr. White, sometimes he would raise both objections in the same train of thought - seemingly unaware of how at odds these to claims are to each other. Both cannot be problems at the same time. Nor were his objections based on two distinct aspects of Molinism; they were both based directly on the idea that God knows what you would do under any circumstances. It's odd that those objecting to Molinism's consistency use such inconsistent approaches such as this.”
If Molinism is a compromise position which tries, unsuccessfully, to harmonize conflicting aims or opposing principles, then it’s internally inconsistent. It that case, a critic of Molinism can consistently raise inconsistent objections to Molinism. For the mutually inconsistent criticisms have their basis in the mutually inconsistent implications of the position under review. It’s odd that Dan Chapa overlooks that elementary point.
Inconsistent objections would be a problem in case the critic were judging a position by his own criteria. Inconsistent objections are not a problem in case the critic is judging a position by its own criteria. For in that event, the inconsistency is generated by the incoherence of the position itself.