You’d think that Arminians could at least agree on the definition of “choice.” After all, that’s a central plank in their belief-system. More so considering the fact that Dan has put so much weight on the correct definition of “choice” (and “choosing”). Yet over at Dan’s blog, major disagreements have repeatedly broken out over this key concept. If Arminians can’t agree on the fundamentals of their system, including the definition of choice, then it’s hard to see how they’re in much position to attack the Reformed definition of choice. Let’s take a few examples:
Arminian said...
Robert,
I disagree strongly with your argument for being able to make a choice when not having a choice. If we do not have a choice, then we obviously cannot make a choice IMO. What one merely believes does not matter; reality is what matters.
Let's analyze your example:
"Say I am considering going to a movie: so when I get to a theatre and purchase my ticket, I believe that I could choose to go and see either Movie A or Movie B. I then make the choice of movie A, though unbeknownst to me, there is some sort of mechanical malfunction with the projector that was going to show Movie B, so seeing Movie B was not an available and actual alternative. Did I make a choice? Yes. Did I have a choice with respect to being able to see either of those two different movies in that context? No."
***One huge problem with your example is that it does not fit Calvinism's exhaustive determinism (ED). You would have to adjust the example significantly, something like this: Add that every decision you make in the example is caused by someone who has given you a drug that renders you only willing to do whatever he tells you; call this person the controller. But you don't know it. The drug blinds you to his presence and makes you think the things you think are your own thoughts. So you go the theatre and buy your ticket. You believe that you could choose to go and see either Movie A or Movie B, because the controller has made you believe this. Then you decide to see movie A because the controller makes you decide on A, though unbeknownst to you, there is some sort of mechanical malfunction with the projector that was going to show Movie B, a malfunction also caused by the controller. So seeing Movie B was not an available and actual alternative. But neither was anything that you did. There was no alternative at all in anything, for someone else made every decision and caused you to do it. Did you make a choice? No; a choice is selecting from available alternatives. The Controller made all choices and caused you to carry out his choices. So you neither had a choice nor made a choice.
It is not necessary to take this further because the issue is whether the concept of choosing is compatible with ED, but I think your example fails even apart from considerations of ED, i.e., even if LFW be allowed to operate in the example. I believe you are being too vague with what choice one has and makes. In your example, you actually had a choice of A or B. You could have chosen B, but then you would have found out that you could not actually see the movie. But you still had a choice of selecting A or B. What you need to make your point is an example in which someone does not have a choice, but makes a choice. Perhaps the simplest way of naming your problem here is that you seem to be conflating making a choice and carrying out the intended outcome of the choice made (e.g., there is a difference between choosing to watch the movie and actually watching it, but you seem to be conflating these at times; when LFW is allowed, if one think he has a choice about watching a movie that he can't actually watch, he does indeed have a choice about the movie and can make a choice in favor of the movie, only then to find out that he can't carry out the itneded outcome of the choice).
Godismyjudge said...
Dear Robert,
Determinists can say they "make a choice", only by using speciallized definitions and avoiding common sense ones. If choices involves possible alternatives, then they neither have or make them, since determinism rules out possible alternatives.
Does your understanding of "make a choice" include possible alternatives?
God be with you,
Dan
Arminian said...
Robert,
I left a long, almost point by point response to you and was posting it when you posted your response to Dan. Now I believe Dan skewered your whole argument with one simple, straightforward question, which makes a point I made a number of times in my repsonse, that in an ED world there are no alternative possibilities, and choosing means selcting between alternative possibilities. Therefore, ED is incompatible with choosing (we already all agree that ED os incompatible with having choices).
Now, you seem to try to explain how we can have access to alternative possibilities in an ED world. But you seem to take refuge in the vagueness of the language Dan used (choices involving alternative possibilities). But the issue is that in ED, there is never such a thing as an alternative possibility for human beings. We never have a choice about anything. And what we do has been irresistibly predetermined so that there is ever only one course of action that we can enact.
Here is a critical point in which you define "alternative possibilities" invalidly, and in such a way as to make your view correct by definition. But again, the problem is that your definition is invalid. You define alternative possibilities like this: "Alternative possibilities are the different options the different possibilities *that we believe that we could choose* when we make our choice" (emphasis mine). But an alternative possibility is not defined by whether we believe it is possibile, but whether it is possible. Something can be described as possible if it is possible--a self evident truth. But it cannot rightly be described as possible if it is impossible. One's belief about whether it is possible or not neither makes it possible or impossible. Your use of this definition confirms some of my critique of your position: in an ED world, people might believe they make choices, but they never really do. Just like they only think they have choices, but it is an illusion, as you readily admit, so they think they make choices, but it is only an illusion. For they never actually select from possible alternatives, but only act as they have irresistibly been made to act.
Your message to Dan also continues another problem that I identified in my last post: you must assume LFW in order to ry and make your point. But the isue is whether the concept of choosing is compatible with ED. It is not, as your reliance on LFW to try and make youre point at times shows. In fact, I think my last post addressed most if not all that you say to Dan. So I'll just leave it there.
arminianperspectives said...
Robert,
I must admit that it seems like you are playing semantic games here (though you probably do not intend to).
Here is how I see it:
Alternative possibilities = alternatives that are possible = possible alternatives. It is exactly the same thing. It is like saying that, "You are talking about brown dogs, but I am talking about dogs that are brown. Everything you say is true of brown dogs, but I am not talking about brown dogs, I am talking about dogs that are brown, so what you say about brown dogs does not apply to what I am saying."
There really is no difference between AP's and PA's anymore than there is a difference between brown dogs and dogs that are brown.
Perhaps you should drop AP's and go with PAP's (perceived alternative possibilities). That might make some sense. Maybe it would even be better to just speak of perceived alternatives since they are not really possible (though alternative implies possibility, so that might not really help). But trying to cling to AP's or trying to say that AP's and PA's are very different seems like semantic games (though I assume you are just trying to be clear, but IMO you are just adding to confusion by clinging to terms that do not seem to apply and drawing what appears to be invalid distinctions).
So from where I am sitting you hold to perceived possibilities and perceived choices. But neither the possibility nor the choice is real (i.e. grounded in reality).
But still, there is an undeniable connection between having and making choices. Even if we imagine that we "make" a choice in our minds we must first imagine that we "have" a choice to make. So if you own "making" choices in regards to perception only, then you must own "having" choices with regards to that same perception. If you deny one, then you deny it on the grounds of it's connection with reality, and in doing so the other follows. They must stand or fall together.
If you do not really have a choice than you cannot really make a choice and if you only believe you make choices, then you must also believe you have choices to make. So we cannot make a real choice unless we have a real choice. If we do not have a real choice then it is nonsense to say we make a real choice, and irrelevant to say we make an unreal (or illusionary) choice (which is really no different than not making a choice at all since the choice isn't real but illusionary- an unreal choice is not a choice).
But as has been demonstrated, even your imagination is predetermined and necessitated in an ED world, so even your "perceived" choice is not a choice, because you can only imagine one way, the predetermined and necessitated way.
God Bless,
Ben
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=1914765915950240855&postID=1715303408525953722
And that's just a sample of the entire exchange. And here's another thread in which they go round and round on the true meaning of choice:
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=1914765915950240855&postID=4503630676606449655
"You’d think that Arminians could at least agree on the definition of “choice.” After all, that’s a central plank in their belief-system. More so considering the fact that Dan has put so much weight on the correct definition of “choice” (and “choosing”).
ReplyDeleteBoy, Steve. How many of the exact same things could we say about Calvinists? Just seems like disagreements between people who hold to a similar system is a weak thing for Calvinists to attack.
Feel free to cite a direct, specific parallel.
ReplyDeleteSupralapsarianism and infralapsarianism: Calvinists disagree on when God actually reprobated people.
ReplyDeleteCalvinists also disagree on the extent God ordains sin or whether He simply permits it.
http://www.reclaimingthemind.org/blog/2008/09/taking-calvinism-too-far-rc-sproul-jr’s-evil-creating-deity/
Wrong...these are not specific parallels.
ReplyDeleteThe order of decrees is not central to Calvinism in the way that the order of decrees is central to Arminianism or the concept of libertarian freedom (and therefore "choice") is to Arminianism.
Indeed, the order is logical not temporal, since we agree that God is timeless...so "when" isn't even an issue, for "when" infers time.
The extent to which God ordains sin is a question of modality. It too is not central to Calvinism in the way the concept of choice is central to Arminianism.
And lest you think the concept of LFW/choice is not central to Arminianism, I suggest you read Miley who said that very thing. When we say that the concept of choice is central to Arminianism, we are simply taking your own representative theologians at their word. Please find us Calvinist theologians who cite the items you cite as central to Calvinism.
It's not enough to cite disagreements, rather one needs to cite disagreements that are central to Calvinism in the way that LFW/choice is central to Arminianism.
Dear Steve,
ReplyDeleteI am guessing the difference here isn’t the definition of choice, but rather in understanding (and expressing) determinism. I have noted that you and Paul express yourselves differently on this same issue.
Steve:All you’ve done in this case is to impute your libertarian definition of freedom to the determinist, then conclude on the basis of your libertarian definition that if determinism is true, we never have a choice.
Surely you don’t think such a blatantly fallacious objection advances the argument, do you?
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/04/ice-cream-parlor-at-edge-of-alternate.html
Paul: 1. I've already discussed the distinction between having and making choices. Given this, the above definition is vague. I do make choices out of a pile of things - the alternatives. But, this does not mean that all the alternatives are possibilities I have, where 'have' means each is a genuine alternative possibility I could instantiate.
2. Though I have no problem dissing "can do otherwise," Dan should know that classical compatibilists would take issue with his question begging epithet here.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/01/underwhelming-response.html
Additionally you accused me of equivocation on “can do otherwise”; implying there’s a sense in which determinists affirm we can do otherwise.
So Paul sees the compatibilist sense of “have a choice” and can do otherwise”, but doesn’t really like them, whereas it seems your more comfy with them.
Probably you and Paul have some real differences here: compatiblism vs semi-compatibilism, accepting vs. rejecting Van Inwagen's "have a choice" consequence argument… But I doubt that’s enough to truly ground this difference. In the end, isn’t it just the way you like to express yourselves?
God be with you,
Dan
It's not enough to cite disagreements, rather one needs to cite disagreements that are central to Calvinism in the way that LFW/choice is central to Arminianism.
ReplyDeleteWho said that was the center of Arminianism? And are you just making up rules as you go along? :)
ReplyDeleteWho said that was the center of Arminianism? And are you just making up rules as you go along? :)
Apparently you haven't done much reading from your own side of the aisle:
John Miley (Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, 275)
"freedom is fundamental in Arminianism," therefore, "the [Arminian] system holds accordingly the universality of the atonement and provisory nature of the atonement, and the conditionality of salvation.
Care to try for more quotes? I'll be happy to provide them going as far back as Episcopius.
Apparently you haven't done much reading from my side of the aisle.
ReplyDelete"Myth4: The Heart of Arminianism Is Belief in Free Will
The true heart of Arminian theology is God's loving and just character; the formal principle of Arminianism is the universal will of God for salvation." Roger Olson (Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities, 97)
"One of the more controversial Arminian theologians of the nineteenth century was Methodist systematician John Miley...Miley introduced a somewhat liberalizing tendency into Wesleyan Arminian theology..." Roger Olson (Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities, 26)
Meaning classical Arminians would distance themselves from him on several issues.
However, election and reprobation are certainly key in reformed theology. And whether God causes sin or not seems like a pretty big deal to me. Much bigger than the precise definition and all its implications of the word "choose."
Apparently you haven't done much reading from my side of the aisle.
ReplyDeleteApparently, you are unaware that I have read Olson, and Manata reviewed the book.
Indeed, all your selected author has done is discount Arminians who prove what Calvinists have stated all along. That's a classic case of special pleading, by calling them Arminians of the head, not the heart. In other words, to quote the review:
Olson frequently claims that Arminianism has been misrepresented because some key Arminians have said that they don’t believe such and such. Though Olson touches on it, he doesn’t lay enough blame at the feet of Arminians. And, when “Arminians” like Limborch, Vorstius, Finney, later Remonstrance, Miley, Cottrell, &c. say things that show Calvinist complaints to be money; these men do not represent what Olson calls “real” Arminianism. It starts to look all too convenient. Olson also stresses that Arminianism believes that “faith is a gift” (more on this below); however, just today I saw a website dedicated to defending Arminianism claim, “I find no biblical evidence to support the teaching that faith is a gift from God … ” Olson also says that the question of perseverance was “open” for Arminius (32). Though I don’t think it is logically open to hold to perseverance, Olson never indicates the subtleties and confusions offered on behalf of Arminius. Arminius claimed in his Declaration of Sentiments that he never taught “that a true believer can either totally or finally fall away from the faith, and perish” (Works, 1977, 1:254). Arminius also makes some subtle remarks about distinguishing between elect and believers. But even the staunchest Calvinist admits that professing Christians can fall away. So, Arminius may have been guilty for perpetrating “myths.” The book sometimes comes off as wherever it is good, it is real Arminianism; bad – phony Arminianism.
That's mighty convenient. Indeed, you asked me "Who said that was the center of Arminianism?" I gave you a direct quote from one of your own theologians. Now, you're backing away and trying to call him a "liberal," by appealing to Olsen who is clearly engaging in special pleading.
Do you consider Episcopius not be a classical Arminian? Do you even know who Episcopius was? Have you even read him? Shall I reproduce verbatim quotes from him that emphasize the conditional "if man uses his reason/will" repeatedly. Oh, he was just a "liberal." Uh-huh a liberal who was there for the Remonstrance.
Or, alternatively, we can just start quoting from Free Will Baptist Confessional Documents, even those after the New Connexion.
I tell you what, why don't you try to do Arminianism without reference to Libertarian Freedom/the concept of choice. Yes, let's see how far that actually gets you.
You were challenged to cite a "direct, specific parallel" to disagreements over the meaning of "choice." You have yet to do so.
The two issues you selected aren't parallel in any way. You simply can't "do" Arminianism apart from LFW/choice.
However, election and reprobation are certainly key in reformed theology.
ReplyDeleteYes, they are - in Reformed Soteriology, not Reformed theology as a whole*, but the logical order of decrees is not. Citing Infra/Supra isn't citing a central issue.
*Election and Reprobation are not central planks to Reformed Theology qua theology. These ideas are pretty far down the tree.
Arminianism, by way of contrast, makes the will/choice so very central that you find references to it all over the place. Like I
Arminianism, by way of contrast, makes the will/choice so very central that you find references to it all over the place
ReplyDeleteWell, it doesn't. Choice becomes an aspect in Arminian soteriology where man must accept the gift of God offered to all through faith, but as Olson rightly says the will of man is not the central aspect of our theology. Without God's grace the will of man can do nothing.
The biggest differences between our two theologies happen to reside in the soteriological aspects of the two. We would agree on many other aspects.
ReplyDeleteWell, it doesn't
So, you haven't read Episcopius.
but as Olson rightly says the will of man is not the central aspect of our theology
1. What qualifies Olson to say this and not Miley? Put another way, why should I trust Olson over Miley.
The best you can hope for is the demonstration of more items Arminians can sort out - and not just over the meaning of "choice" but the very centrality of choice...and the very man you cite is just engaging in special pleading for his own position. Thanks for proving the underlying theme about which Steve wrote.
2. You're getting your theology from Olson, not your representative theologians. According to Mueller, Olsen misreads the the very documents he cites.
"Olson's work, it needs be noted, is not a scholarly essay but a form of popular theology that often misreads the documents it cites, fails to grasp the significance of confessionality in the 16th and 17th centuries, and dismisses the centrality of soteriological monergism in the confessional churches of the reformation. What little there is of history in his claim that Arminius ought to be viewed as Reformed is derived from [Carl] Bangs" -
Muller, Richard A. (2008) 'Historical and Theological Studies: Arminius and the Reformed Tradition', WT Journal vol. 70; p. 21 n. 10
And who here said it is "the" central plank of your theology? It is a central plank. Take it away, and Arminianism crumbles. By way of contrast, we can "do" Calvinism without addressing the Supra/Infra debate.
Take away election and Calvinism crumbles. The debate isn't whether 1) the "choice" aspect of Arminian theology or 2)what the logical progression of God's elective decisions in Calvinism are important or not, it is whether they are key and central to the theologies. I would say neither are central or key, but both branch off of the key aspects.
ReplyDeleteMy point was to show that Calvinists disagree on aspects of their belief systems, just as Arminians do. Disagreements among adherents to the systems by no means degrades either system as a whole. Leave that up to the systems themselves. It's not a huge issue what two lay-Arminians disagree on. It's probably a case of talking past each other to a large degree. This is why Arminians don't go after Calvinist's internal dispute about the lapsarianisms.
Arminians hold to the freedom of the will not simply to hold to it in and of itself, but because it is displayed in scripture and because if the will of man isn't free, the character of God is diminished. As I have said, the character and righteousness of God is what is central to my theology, and is displayed in Arminian theology in general. Quote mining and yanking things out of context doesn't change that (although it seems to amuse you).
I will leave it up to people whether to listen to an Arminian or a Calvinist that practices polemics against Arminianism constantly on what Arminians actually believe. And with Muller and Olson, you have two scholars arguing with each other apparently. Olson happens to be an Arminian, and Muller is a Calvinist. The latter seems to have an agenda to promote his own scholarship over others. Not really sure why you quoted Muller honestly. It seems like two fallacies in one; a red herring to lead us off into another discussion and an appeal to authority to try to discredit Olson.
As is common on Triablogue, assertions are made and the hope is that people will believe the assertion based on the sheer number of times it is asserted. Doesn't matter. You've got Arminians rejecting your assertion, which clearly says something.
The ironic thing is I, an Arminian, am telling you what I believe and quoted a top Arminian theologian who agrees with me. You, a Calvinist, are asserting what I actually believe and quote a top Calvinist theologian who agrees with you. You can assert all day long. Perhaps I will break under all this assertion.
So, you haven't read Episcopius.
No, but if he's anything like Arminius (which he almost certainly is being his student and all) I'm sure his conclusion that the will of man is free stems from his view of the character and righteousness of God.
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
ReplyDelete“I am guessing the difference here isn’t the definition of choice, but rather in understanding (and expressing) determinism.”
The have/make choice distinction involves a definition of choice as well as a particular understanding of determinism. So your statement presents a false dichotomy.
“I have noted that you and Paul express yourselves differently on this same issue.”
You need to explain how the quotes from Manata and myself present contradictory models of choice. That’s hardly evident from the quotes themselves.
“Additionally you accused me of equivocation on ‘can do otherwise’; implying there’s a sense in which determinists affirm we can do otherwise.”
How would commenting on your own usage imply anything about my own position?
“So Paul sees the compatibilist sense of ‘have a choice’ and can do otherwise”, but doesn’t really like them, whereas it seems your more comfy with them.”
On what basis do you say that I seem more “comfy” with them?
“Probably you and Paul have some real differences here: compatiblism vs semi-compatibilism.”
What makes you think my position differs from his in that respect?
“Accepting vs. rejecting Van Inwagen's ‘have a choice’ consequence argument…”
You’re making a series of assertions without adequate supporting material, or any supporting material whatsoever. Where are these conclusions coming from, anyway?
bossmanham said...
ReplyDelete“Supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism: Calvinists disagree on when God actually reprobated people.”
No, both supras and infras believe that reprobation is an eternal decree.
“Calvinists also disagree on the extent God ordains sin or whether He simply permits it.”
All Calvinists believe that God foreordained whatever comes to pass.
We can get into philosophical debates about how the decree is providentially implemented.
“And whether God causes sin or not seems like a pretty big deal to me.”
According to Arminianism, there’s an obvious sense in which God “causes” sin. He causes the existence of sinners.
“Much bigger than the precise definition and all its implications of the word ‘choose’.”
The Arminians I’ve been dealing with think the precise definition and logical implications of “choice” is a pretty big deal.
“Meaning classical Arminians would distance themselves from him on several issues.”
I comment on disputes between Arminians over the definition of choice. You respond by citing yet another dispute between Arminians (Olson v. Miley). That doesn’t rebut my point. Rather, that amplifies my point.
“As is common on Triablogue, assertions are made and the hope is that people will believe the assertion based on the sheer number of times it is asserted.”
For Gene to quote Muller is hardly an “assertion.” Helm has also pointed out the revisionist character of Olson's theology.
We can get into philosophical debates about how the decree is providentially implemented.
ReplyDeleteThank you for agreeing with me, Steve. This was exactly my point. Adherents to a certain system of theology can disagree on aspects within that system.
God bless, guys.
BOSSMANHAM SAID:
ReplyDelete"Thank you for agreeing with me, Steve. This was exactly my point. Adherents to a certain system of theology can disagree on aspects within that system."
I didn't agree with you. Try to pay attention. It's good mental discipline. A philosophical disagreement is not the same thing as a theological disagreement.
Arminians hold to the freedom of the will not simply to hold to it in and of itself, but because it is displayed in scripture and because if the will of man isn't free, the character of God is diminished.
ReplyDeleteReally? This seems at odds with what representative Arminians have stated. For example Walls and Dongell are very clear that LFW is not exegetical. It's a philosophical position. We've had Arminians on this blog who say it is assumed in Scripture...get a clue, if it's an assumption in Scripture, then its something one brings to Scripture.
Perhaps you know something they don't. Where can we find libertarian action theory in Scripture.
Olson happens to be an Arminian, and Muller is a Calvinist. The latter seems to have an agenda ro promote his theology over others.
1. Olson is a popularizer. He's hardly a "top" Arminian theologian.
2. Muller's speciality is historical theology. Who is more qualified to talk about historical theology?
3. You left this out: The former seems to have an agenda: to promote his version of Arminianism over others.
4. To whom is Muller "promoting" his theology. Given that appeared in the WT Journal, he's speaking to the choir. That's hardly "promoting" this theology.
My point was to show that Calvinists disagree on aspects of their belief systems, just as Arminians do.
Which doesn't touch Steve's point. You were asked to provide a particular sort of parallel. The difference between supras and Infra's, as we have both explained, isn't about reprobation/election itself, rather it's about the logical order of the decrees. That's not like LFW in Arminianism, where LFW is central to the system. You really just don't get it, do you?
Not really sure why you quoted Muller honestly. To try and educate you about what Olson stands for. He's a historical revisionist.
You, a Calvinist, are asserting what I actually believe and quote a top Calvinist theologian who agrees with you No, I quoted a historian, not a theologian.
I also quoted an Arminian theologian who disagrees with you. I also pointed out that this position goes well back to the time of the Remonstrance.
And, for the record, Episcopius would be somebody whom Olson would rule out...which is further evidence you have to indulge in special pleading to make your case.
It seems like two fallacies in one; a red herring to lead us off into another discussion and an appeal to authority to try to discredit Olson.
Wrong on both counts. I'm the one sticking to the issue. My posts are pegged directly to yours, addressing you on your own terms. No red herrings. I quoted Muller because you quoted Olson. I can quote Helm too. But I anticipated your move by quoting Miley. By quoting Olson, you engaged in special pleading.
Hi Steve,
ReplyDeleteMe: I have noted that you and Paul express yourselves differently on this same issue.”
Steve: You need to explain how the quotes from Manata and myself present contradictory models of choice. That’s hardly evident from the quotes themselves.
Oh, I doubt you and Paul have different models of choice; at least not materially different or different in a way relevant to the question at hand. All I am noting is that you did express yourselves differently; which the quotes I provided demonstrate. I can only guess as to why you did so and my guess is it comes down to taste, rather than something substantive.
Me: “Additionally you accused me of equivocation on ‘can do otherwise’; implying there’s a sense in which determinists affirm we can do otherwise.”
Steve: How would commenting on your own usage imply anything about my own position?
Because equivocation, in this case, would involve at least two valid meanings of “can do otherwise”.
Me: “Probably you and Paul have some real differences here: compatiblism vs semi-compatibilism.”
Steve: What makes you think my position differs from his in that respect?
Your approach to my argument involved hypothetical compatibilism and his did not. But that said, a man is his own best interpreter. Are you a compatiblist?
God be with you,
Dan
“Because equivocation, in this case, would involve at least two valid meanings of ‘can do otherwise’.”
ReplyDeleteThat doesn’t follow. His usage is inconsistent, that’s all. It says nothing about whether his usage is even valid. Moreover, if A accuses B of equivocation, that says nothing about A’s own position. It’s simply a question of semantic (or conceptual) clarity.
“Are you a compatiblist?”
Actually, I’ve never felt inclined to classify my position philosophically. When Arminians raise philosophical objections to Calvinism, I present counterarguments which are sufficient to parry the objection.
Steve wrote,
ReplyDeleteFeel free to cite a direct, specific parallel.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/06/divided-front-libertarians-at-odds-with.html#comments
In the comments Peter Pike and Paul Manata disagree over the meaning of freedom, the meaning of being able to do (or choose) otherwise, and what constitutes the necessary conditions for responsibility (among other things). I would think that Calvinists would be united, at least over what it means to be able to "do otherwise" since that is such a common point of criticism shot towards LFW proponents.
A few other interesting tid bits in that meta,
1) Paul seems to defend his position in part by way of appeal to "intuition" and what is "self-evident" to him.
E.g. “If your position allows the mentally insane to be acting of their own free will when yelling the primes all day long while urinating on themselves, I guess I don't have much more to say. Seems to me that that's self-evidentaly false.”
“As to me holding the two to be flip sides, it just seems intuitive.”
Interesting, considering that Calvinists often criticize LFW proponents because of appeals to intuition, etc.
2) Paul has apparently changed from a classical compatibilist view to a semi-compatibilist view, for reasons that seem to amount to the force of arguments against classical compatibilism that LFW proponents have made for ages (e.g. arguments against the appeal to a distinction between "moral" and "natural" inability as a way to explain responsibility in a deterministic frame work- looks like critics of compatibilism have made some solid points after all).
3) The disagreement is surprisingly civil and irenic (which proves that both Peter and Paul know how to disagree with each other without resorting to childish rhetorical tactics as are so often employed by them against non-Calvinists).
continued in next post...
continued...
ReplyDeleteThe disagreement between Robert, Dan, Arminian and me (that’s 3 against one, BTW, which doesn’t mean Robert is wrong, but does highlight that there was only one Arminian with a different view. He was the only one among the four of us who had a problem seeing a necessary connect between having and making choices), really does nothing to falsify Dan’s arguments. There is a standard definition of choice that most people work with, even if some people disagree at points.
Dan’s argument was what the common man tends to understand as implied in having and making choices. This was based on common understandings and standard definitions. No offense to Robert, but he is not the “common man”, since he is very much involved in the philosophical subtleties of the free will debate. Robert, like Manata, has been influenced by Fischer, and finds him convincing on being able to make choices in a deterministic framework. It's not surprising that someone might be persuaded by a slick philosopher to take a different view than one would normally hold, but it is the view that one normally holds prior to such influences that represents Dan’s main point. So citing four people arguing (when three of the four actually still hold to the “common man” view against the “Fischer” view), who have spent quite a while thinking about these issues in a more philosophical sense, does nothing to falsify Dan’s point that the “common man” (i.e. those who would hold to a common/standard definition of choice), prior to being influenced by such philosophies, would tend to see choices as selecting among possible alternatives, etc. (and also see such language as “select” and “options” as plainly implying real possibilities and/or alternatives).
Also, the point of contention really boiled down to the transition from having a choice to making a choice. Robert agreed with us on the basic meaning of choice, but seemed to us to be inconsistent when then shifting the discussion to making choices. The point was not differing definitions of choice, but being consistent in that definition whether talking about “having” or “making” choices. Robert makes this same point in Dan’s thread,
We do agree on the definition of choice (i.e. choosing is making a selection from alternative possibilities). It should also be noted that we agree that a person is acting freely only when they have a choice and then make a choice. That is not where we disagree.
The disagreement concerns whether or not we make choices in a fully determined world. We disagree about the “Fischer distinction”. I agree with Fischer that in a fully determined world while we would be ***making*** choices we would not ***have*** choices. Some others (including Dan) believe that we cannot make a choice unless we have a choice. So they believe that since in a fully determined world we would never have choices, therefore they conclude that we would not be making choices either in that determined world.
For Steve Hays to take our disagreement about the “Fischer distinction”, about whether or not we make choices in a FULLY DETERMINED WORLD, as evidence that we disagree about the meaning and nature of making a choice in this world or in general, is not accurate.
http://www.arminianchronicles.com/2009/07/rabbit-trail-on-pap-and-frankfort.html?showComment=1247934764356#c1765886392566100116
AP wrote:
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In the comments Peter Pike and Paul Manata disagree over the meaning of freedom...
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Paul's and my disagreement is a semantic one, not a conceptual one (we both agree on the concept; namely, that insane people are not responsible for their actions). So this is not a parallel.
Still, I will listen to Filter's "Nice Shot" in your honor :-D
Paul's and my disagreement is a semantic one, not a conceptual one (we both agree on the concept; namely, that insane people are not responsible for their actions). So this is not a parallel.
ReplyDeleteJust so you know, I read the entire exchange, and it was far more than what you seem to be making it out to be (there were certainly conceptual elements being discussed, though I suppose we could get into a semantic argument over what constitutes a conceptual argument).
I would just direct the reader to the exchange and let them decide for themselves if my comments were accurate. No reason to try to sway anyone one way or the other since the exchange is there for anyone to read. I still think it serves as a pretty good parallel.
God Bless,
Ben
BTW, even the section I quoted in my initial post seems to undermine your claim,
ReplyDeletePaul wrote:
“If your position allows the mentally insane to be acting of their own free will when yelling the primes all day long while urinating on themselves, I guess I don't have much more to say. Seems to me that that's self-evidentaly false.”
That is not sematics, but an issue of differeing conceptions of what free will entails.
I would also note that you quote me on freedom and then shift the focus to responsibility when commenting on it and saying there is no parallel. Maybe the (...) was intended to include what I said about a disagreement on responsibility as well, but it is still strange that you would leave that part out (and instead only quote the first part that speaks of freedom), when your comment has everything to do with responsibility.
Anyway, as I already said, the exchange is there for anyone to read and make up their own mind about it. It seems that your mind and mine are already made up.
I was going to write a long response, but I believe this will work better.
ReplyDeleteIf Paul and my position is so radically different, can you tell me what the practical difference between our position is after it's cashed out?
In other words, given that insane person you referenced in Paul's quote, how would Paul's position treat him differently than my position would?
If our position is more conceptual than semantics, then it should be simple for you to show how radically different our views are, no?
So have at it :-D
Paul writes to Jugulum,
ReplyDeleteMentally insane people choose "what they desire," yet I wouldn't call them free or responsible (at least civically responsible. Responsible before God would entail a larger story, Adam, the fall, headship, so forth).
Paul seems to very clearly state that simply choosing according to one’s desire does not constitute free will.
Peter quotes Paul,
Mentally insane people choose "what they desire," yet I wouldn't call them free or responsible (at least civically responsible. Responsible before God would entail a larger story, Adam, the fall, headship, so forth).
And then replies,
Just to show that not all us T-bloggers are in lockstep.....
I would disagree in that I WOULD call such actions "free." However, I would agree that an insane person would not necessarily be "responsible."
This now seems to be a clear disagreement over what constitutes free actions. Paul said such actions would not be free, and Peter disagrees. For Peter freedom is tied up in acting according to our desires, and for Paul freedom and responsibility is bound up in “guidance control” (which he believes insane people lack).
Paul writes,
Sure, the mentally insane person does what he or she wants to do, but the control and reasons-responsive mechanism make this useless for freedom (at least any freedom worth having).
Another point of disagreement that quickly comes up is whether or not freedom and responsibility is necessarily connected. Paul sees freedom and responsibility as two sides of the same coin (as I already quoted in my fist post- and btw, that initial quote comes from near the end of this very long exchange, proving that even after a great deal of discussion, they still disagreed over the connection between freedom and responsibility).
Peter says responsibility is not necessarily connected to freedom,
In other words, I simply don't view freedom and responsibility as going hand-in-hand. I believe you can be responsible for something you have no freedom in, in other words.
Paul disagrees,
Finally, I view freedom and moral responsibility as flip sides of the same coin. If an agent S, did some action, A, freely, then S is morally responsible for A. Likewise, if S is morally responsible for A, S did A freely.
Peter then seems to agree in a general sense, but does not believe such a connection is necessarily present,
I will grant you, however, the general case that freedom and responsibility tend to be flip sides of the same coin, but with the caveat that there are very important (and, IMO, relevant) instances where this is not the case.
Paul responds,
My claim was that a mentally insane person was not free or responsible. You said he was free but not responsible. It seems, though, that you now agree with me about the specific case I brought up.
And on and on they go, continuing to disagree over what constitutes freedom and what constitutes the necessary pre-conditions for responsibility, among other things (just as I originally pointed out). These are not just disagreements over the meaning of words, but disagreements over concrete concepts.
continued in next post...
continued...
ReplyDeleteAgain, I would just direct anyone to the thread to see for his or her self the nature of the disagreement. It is really goofy to expect me prove somehow that there is a conceptual disagreement (enough already has been produced to show that). I don’t need to show a “radical” difference (in Peter’s and Paul’s views) to establish a parallel, since my main point is that the disagreement between Robert and the other Arminians at Dan’s site was not a radical disagreement.
The disagreement over the necessary connect between freedom and responsibility actually serves as an excellent parallel to the disagreement among Robert and the rest of us over the necessary connect between having and making choices.
For instance, look at these comments by Peter,
I guess I would just sum up my own view as reiterating once again that freedom and responsibility, in my position, are not always flip sides of the same coin, whereas in yours they are. Which is why I think you say that freedom needs more than just acting according to desires, because you have freedom linked to responsibility.
Peter thinks freedom and responsibility are not necessarily linked whereas Paul thinks they are linked. Robert does not think that having and making choices is necessarily linked (he thinks you can make a choice you don’t have), while the other three Arminians think that having and making choices are linked (you can’t make a choice you don’t have, i.e. you can’t choose if you having nothing to choose from). That’s a pretty tight parallel in my opinion (Therefore, if Peter wants to say that his disagreement with Paul was trivial then he needs to likewise admit the disagreement among the Arminians at Dan’s site was trivial, and hardly worth the attention Steve has given it).
However, a difference would be that Robert and the rest us agreed on what constitutes having choices (though differed on making choices), while Peter and Paul do not agree on what constitutes freedom or how responsibility is connected to freedom.
I think it is “self-evident” that the disagreement between Paul and Peter is very much analogous to the disagreement between Robert and other Arminians at Dan’s site. The only difference would be that Peter and Paul seem to disagree over more things than the Arminians at Dan’s site.
So I think Steve’s initial challenge, “Feel free to cite a direct, specific parallel”, has been effectively answered. I don’t feel like I need to put a lot of effort into proving what is so strikingly obvious. Anyone can read the entire exchange between Paul and Peter, compare it to the exchange between Robert and three other Arminians, and decide for themselves. I trust that anyone who does that will see that Steve’s challenge has been sufficiently and easily met.
You've missed the point of why I asked you to show the radical disagreement. Paul and I disagree about the term "free", but not on the concepts involved beyond it; that is why I maintain that it's primarily a semantic issue. Concepts that Paul includes with the term "free" I include in the term "responsibility" so we balance each other out in the end, merely calling it by a different term. (Hey, that sounds like the definition of a semantic quibble.)
ReplyDeleteAnd for the record, you are imputing an Arminian notion of "free will" when you think that my disagreement on the term "free" itself is directly implied to the scope of "free will." This is obviously the case when you see that I agree completely with Paul that an insane person would not be held accountable for his actions. We agree on the reason why, but we apply a different label to it.
I think this is clearly seen when I point out that I agree with Paul in general as to the responsibility-freedom link. And really, this is why our disagreement is not that conceptual. Paul includes in his definition of "freedom" concepts of responsibility, whereas I separate them BUT NEVERTHELESS view the insane person under both "free" and "responsible" filters.
In other words, Paul and I view the same man in the same way because Paul includes responsibility already in the term "free" while I include both "free" and "responsbile" concepts in making my determination. Thus, while I distinguish between the two, I nevertheless hold that both must be used in rendering judgment. Paul syntesizes the two, and therefore holds both in rendering judgment too.
So again, I ask: can you tell me what the practical difference between our position is after it's cashed out? We agree 100% on how to treat the insane person, don't we? How would Paul's position treat him differently than my position would?
Also, I should point out that my separation of "free" and "responsible" and not treating them as flip sides of the same coin has more to do with tactics than anything else. That is, if we separate the two, it is easier to explain certain other concepts, especially regarding Total Depravity.
ReplyDeleteBut of course having a difference in the ease of explaning a concept is not the same thing as disagreeing on the concept.
Finally, whether this is equivalent to Robert or not is something I don't really care about. For all I know, the reason that Steve asked for a specific parallel in the first place was just because BSman never does his own homework, so when he makes a charge Steve just wants him to back it up. Which he never did, instead relying upon you to do it.
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