Thursday, May 21, 2009

A quick note on a quick note by TF

TF has done a peculiar post on the Clarkian/Van Tilian debate:

http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2009/05/quick-comment-on-van-til-gordon-clark.html

“There is an odd artifact I've noticed in discussions between followers of Van Til and those of Clark. For some reason, those in the camp of Van Til take great delight in pointing out that Clark used the term ‘know’ to refer to what we would call ‘know with absolute certainty.’ As such, Clark did not ‘know’ that the woman with whom he was living was his wife. Endless merriment such comments make, particularly when the quotation marks around ‘know’ are removed!”

i) To begin with, I’m not attacking Clarkian epistemology on Van Tilian grounds. That’s a separate issue. I don’t have to be a Van Tilian to find fault with Clarkian epistemology.

ii) In addition, there’s a fundamental difference between knowing something and knowing something with “absolute certainty.”

Certainty and knowledge are two different things. Certainty involves a second-order belief about a belief. To know something, and to know that you know it (i.e. to be certain of what you know) are not interchangeable. And conflating the two is one of the many problems with Scripturalism.

“But why? Is it just to goad on the followers of Clark? Is it simply for the pleasure of hearing the sound of ‘you don't know that I am even real’ or is there a deeper reason?”

i) I find it puzzling that TF would pose this question. It’s not as if Sudduth, or lesser beings like Manata and I, have to have an ulterior motive. We’ve stated on multiple occasions why we raise this objection.

ii) Apropos (i), we’re answering Clarkians on their own grounds. Surely TF doesn’t think there’s something underhanded about answering an opponent on his own grounds.

If that were the case, then TF would need to delete about 90% of his posted critiques of Roman Catholicism since, much or most of the time, TF prefers to attack Roman Catholicism on its own terms. He judges Roman Catholicism by its own standards, and finds it wanting by its own standards.

“Surely the reason cannot be that the followers of Van Til think that Clark was wrong, and that Clark could know with absolute certainty that the woman he was living with was his wife. After all, it's imaginable that his parents-in-law had identical twins, one of whom was given up at birth. By chance, this twin sister discovered her long separated twin, murdered her in a jealous rage, and took her place. We could think of even more implausible options, but this relatively simple account provides one way that a person might be mistaken about such an important issue. Is it probable? No, it's not (though, of course, Clark was justifiably uncomfortable with such a concept), but the issue is certainty, not probability.”

i) To begin with, does Scripture say a man can’t know if the woman he’s sleeping with is own wife rather than his neighbor’s wife?

If, ad arguendo, all knowledge comes from Scripture, then shouldn’t a Scripturalist begin by asking if Scripture itself denies the possibility of knowing which woman is your own wife.

ii) There’s a twofold problem with TF’s hypothetical regarding mistaken identity:

Here are two different propositions:

a) I can mistakenly believe that a woman who is not my wife is my wife.

b) I can mistakenly believe that a woman who is my wife is my wife.

These are not interchangeable propositions. How does the possibility that I might entertain an ignorant (false) belief that an imposter is my real wife entail that I also can’t know if a woman who is my wife is my wife?

The fact that I didn’t know the imposer was my wife doesn’t imply that I can’t know if my real wife is my wife.

iii) This, in turn, goes to the aforesaid distinction between knowledge and certainty.

I think what TF is really getting at is that if mistaken identity is possible, then I can’t be certain that the woman I take to be my wife is really my wife. For there’s the hypothetical possibility that my belief could be erroneous.

TF then assumes that if I can’t be certain of something, I can’t know it. But that’s an assumption he needs to defend, not take for granted.

On TF’s view, I can’t hold a true belief unless I can also hold a true belief about my true belief. But why does he think that first-order knowledge is contingent on second-order knowledge?

Because human beings have finite minds, our conscious knowledge is finite. There’s not much we can be simultaneously aware of at any given time.

So most of our knowledge is tacit. Some of our tacit knowledge is available to us. We can pull it out of the archival subconsciousness. Some of our subconscious knowledge is irretrievable.

That’s in part because we consciously form some of our beliefs, but subconsciously form other beliefs. If we subconsciously form a belief, then we are not aware of having formed that belief in the first place. In which case we were never conscious of having that belief.

While some associations enable us to retrieve subconscious beliefs, other subconscious beliefs remain subliminal in the absence of a suitable event to trigger that association.

For example, we all have buried memories which we can’t retrieve at will because we didn’t register them at the time. And unless some event happens to trigger that association, there’s no occasion to remember it. It remains inaccessible.

And some of these beliefs involve knowledge. True beliefs formed by a reliable cognitive process.

It’s possible to doubt what you know. To entertain false doubts. To suffer from artificial uncertainties because you can imagine the abstract possibility of being wrong–even though you’re not actually mistaken.

TF’s example is a good example. Does a thought-experiment about mistaken identity mean I can’t know who my real wife is? But in most cases, this hypothetical is counterfactual.

How does the counterfactual possibility that the woman I take to be my wife is really an imposter mean I can’t know who my real wife is in all those other cases where the woman I take to be my wife is, in fact, my wife?

Even if these imaginary scenarios rob me of certainty, do they thereby rob me of knowledge? Unless belief in my wife is accidental, then in what sense does my belief not count as knowledge? Was my belief the result of an unreliable process? If so, where’s the argument?

“In the end, Clark is right in saying that the only things we can know with absolute certainty are those things that are revealed to us by God (whether through general or through special revelation). The only way to be absolutely sure about something is to obtain that knowledge from an absolutely reliable source.”

i) On the face of it, Scripturalism rejects general revelation. General revelation would constitute extrascriptural information. And Scripturalism, by definition, demotes extrascriptural information to opinion or ignorance.

ii) To the extent that Scripturalism violates its own embargo on contraband sources of knowledge by smuggling innate knowledge past the checkpoint, Scripturalism ceases to distinguish itself from alternative epistemologies.

iii) If you reject memory or sensory perception as sources of knowledge, then you can’t know for sure what God has revealed–since you can’t know at all what God has revealed.

Although first-order knowledge is not dependent on second-order knowledge, second-order knowledge is dependent on first-order knowledge.

If we define certainty as knowing what you know, then if you can’t know something in the first place, you can’t very well know that you know it.

At best, “certainty” would merely refer to a psychological sense of certitude–equally consistent with true or false beliefs.

iv) Appealing to a reliable source of information is futile if you repudiate the ordinary conduits of knowledge by which we access the source.

42 comments:

  1. This paper by Sudduth is helpul in this context:

    http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/CertaintyandIrrevisability.htm

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  2. My own post certainly wasn't intended to be aimed directly at Steve or Paul - although, of course, I have been observing your interactions with Mr. Gerety.

    I'm not insisting that Van Tillians must refrain from internal critiques of Clark's position.

    I agree that there's a fundamental difference between knowing something and knowing something with “absolute certainty.”

    I would not agree with someone who insisted that Clark conflated those two. I don't know if you intend to do that with your comment about "Scripturalism." In any event, the issue over whether the term "know" should be used in the sense you use it or in the sense in which Clark frequently used it is really a semantic question - a trifling quibble, not a serious disagreement.

    With respect to the motives, attempting an internal critique would be the "deeper reason," I guess. I suppose my words sounded a bit sinister, but I didn't mean to convey a malacious sense. Nevertheless, as set forth above, I would respectfully insist that such comments are not internal critiques of Clark's view.

    As to the cross-examination portion:

    "i) To begin with, does Scripture say a man can’t know if the woman he’s sleeping with is own wife rather than his neighbor’s wife?"

    Are you using the word "know" in terms of absolute certainty?

    If so, I think Clark would answer the question in the affirmative.

    "If, ad arguendo, all knowledge comes from Scripture, then shouldn’t a Scripturalist begin by asking if Scripture itself denies the possibility of knowing which woman is your own wife."

    I notice you said "Scripture" whereas I (and Clark) would say "revelation", assuming we are talking about certainty.

    Your two different propositions argument seems to employ a form of equivocation (although I cannot think of the name of that particular species), because in the problem I had posed it is unknown (at least with certainty) whether the situation is that one believes the woman is wife rightly or wrongly (or doubts the woman is his wife rightly or wrongly), where right and wrong are defined in terms of the objective fact of her identity.

    Your response seems to take the form of saying: you've illustrated a situation in which one could think one's wife was one's wife when she is not, but you haven't addressed a situation in which the woman is the wife. No, of course I have not. Let me provide a further example to illustrate why I have not.

    Let us suppose that you will concede that a stopped wristwatch (one of those old fashioned ones with hands that respectively spin round once per hour and twice per day) is not reliable source of knowledge about what time it is.

    However, of course, it does happen to be right twice a day. As a matter of objective fact, if you happen to look down at it at the right time, you'll get correct, true information about the time, whereas the remaining 1438 minutes a day you will not.

    [Part 2 follows, due to length restrictions on comments]

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  3. [continuing from the previous part]

    If I were trying to demonstrate that a broken wristwatch doesn't provide infallible certainty as to the time, I think most people would consider it sufficient to demonstrate how it could be that one might look during the 1438 minutes and get the wrong answer from the watch.

    The fact that occasionally (about 0.14% of the time) the watch is right is really irrelevant to the point, just as it is irrelevant that usually one's wife is one's wife (assuming, for the sake of the argument, that we could know this). Those situations where one relies on a less than perfect source of knowledge and obtains true information is irrelevant to the fact that the source of knowledge is imperfect. After all, the claim is not that one's wife is never who she seems to be, nor that a broken watch is always wrong.

    Steve wrote: "On TF’s view, I can’t hold a true belief unless I can also hold a true belief about my true belief."

    That's not a fair representation of my view. You can look at your broken stop watch and believe it, and (if you do so often enough) you will hold a true belief just under 0.14% of the time. The percentages (let's assume we can figure them out) are much better for marital identity, but they are still just percentages.

    As for the remaining stuff about Scripturalism, to the extent that you've demonstrated that Scripturalism is inconsistent with the statement I made, I think you've demonstrated that Scripturalism is not Clark's position.

    The final lowercase roman number 3 is actually the crux of one of the arguments to be made - or points to be clarified. Clark does so at great length, explaining the difference between the proposition and the medium of its communication.

    -TurretinFan

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  4. TF,

    The position we are attacking on this blog is the one explicated by Gerety and Robbins and Crampton (and even Cheung), who then turn around and tell us what they are claiming is Clark's position.

    Now, here's their claim:

    >>For any proposition, p, to rise to the level of knowledge, p must either be a proposition in Scripture, or deducible from such a proposition.<<

    Like we've said to others, you're free to set forth what you take to be Clark's views. But when you comment on how Van Tillians interact with Clarkians, the above is to be taken into account. We're only going off what the putative "best" expositors of Clark are claiming for his position.

    So, Robbins himself has set beliefs into three camps: (1) opinion, (2) ignorance, (3) and knowledge.

    In camp (3) are only those beliefs that meet the above marked out strictures (scripture or so deduced). So, what you call "lesser knowledge" is not a class of theirs. What you call "knowledge" they call "opinion" or "ignorance" (and we've been citing them ad nauseum, so I'll assume you're granting that all the putative Clark experts disagree with you).

    So, Robbins admits that he doesn't know he's a man, not that he doesn't know for certain. Indeed, if this were all the debate was about, we'd be ridiculous for chiding them for not knowing with epistemic certainty that they are men. So, there's no staggered class of "know" among the Scripturalist we're dealing with.

    Okay, so, since that is so, we ask them how they know that p when p is clearly not a deliverance of Scripture, or so deducible. That forces them to admit that they are only giving their opinion. So, that means that their critiques of, say, empiricism, Van Tillianism, etc., are only opinions--not instances of "knowledge."

    However, the problem now is, since their view of justifiecation is that for any belief B to be justified, B must either be Scripture or so deducible from. When talking about beliefs that are not Scripture or so deducible, we can now ask if they have any positive epistemic status for the Scripturalist (cf. the Sudduth post a few back). Now, since B is is clearly not a deliverance of Scripture, or so deducibel, this means B is unjustified, and known to be unjustfied. That makes it look like on Scritpuralist terms there is no reason for Scripturalists to continue to have a positive cognitive attitude about such propositions.

    So, the Scripturalists we are dealing with let only certain beliefs rise to the level of knowledge, the rest are opinion or ignorance. Opinions make poor arguments (they stink...you know the story), and opinions you hold which your system deems lack positive epistemic status, should be dropped. Hence, roughly 99% of the comments Scripturalists make should rightly be ridiculed and spot lighted for what they are on the Scripturalists terms.

    I believe that you can now see that our tactic against the Robbins' the Cheung's and the Gerety's, have been spot on. If you have another model of Scripturalism that isn't as obviously absurd, then present it. Perhaps it will be something that we find we don't even need to refute as it's not making any interesting epistemological claims.

    (P.S. re: certainty, I'd read the sudduth paper I linked to above).

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  5. "The position we are attacking on this blog is the one explicated by Gerety and Robbins and Crampton (and even Cheung), who then turn around and tell us what they are claiming is Clark's position."

    Maybe I'm wrong, but I thought that one of Gerety's points (over and over again) is that you are not attacking his position.

    -TurretinFan

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  6. "Perhaps it will be something that we find we don't even need to refute as it's not making any interesting epistemological claims."

    I haven't needed to spell it out for precisely that reason. That way, we both save time. And no one has to read uninteresting claims. :-)

    -TurretinFan

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  7. TF,

    Here's what I said Scripturaists held to:

    >>For any proposition, p, to rise to the level of knowledge, p must either be a proposition in Scripture, or deducible from such a proposition.<<

    I also said that they call those things you call "uncertain knowledge," simply "opinion."

    Now you claim,

    "Maybe I'm wrong, but I thought that one of Gerety's points (over and over again) is that you are not attacking his position".

    So let me quote Gerety and others, then:

    *********

    Robbins summarizes his and Clark’s position: “Epistemology: The Bible tells me so… Scripturalism does not mean, as some have objected, that we can know only the propositions of the Bible. We can know their logical implications as well… Now, most of what we colloquially call knowledge is actually opinion: We “know” that we are in Pennsylvania; we “know” that Clinton - either Bill or Hillary - is President of the United States, and so forth. Opinions can be true or false; we just don’t know which. History, except for revealed history, is opinion. Science is opinion. Archaeology is opinion. John Calvin said, “I call that knowledge, not what is innate in man, nor what is by diligence acquired, but what is revealed to us in the Law and the Prophets.”

    Sean’s Scripturalist friend on the puritan board: “Yes, from a Scripturalist worldview, if a proposition can not be deduce from Scripture, then we can’t “know” if it’s true or false.”

    Gerety says knowledge is limited to: “that which can be known to Scripture and all those things necessarily deducible from Scripture.”

    Vincent Cheung: “”All knowledge comes from biblical propositions and their necessary implications”

    Gary Crampton in his review of Reymond shows his disagreement: “And more than once he refers to knowledge being justified by means of history and experience (478, 678), whereas Scripture alone is the sole means of justifying knowledge,…”

    **********

    Hence, it's clear that I'm not misrepresenting anyone. Gerety, however, can't raise good objections and all he has is labeling to fall back on. He's incompetant, and you should take all his claims with that in mind (as I've just demonstrated).

    "I haven't needed to spell it out for precisely that reason. That way, we both save time. And no one has to read uninteresting claims." :-)

    FYI, "uninteresting" isn't meant to connote anything pejorative, it's a technical point.

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  8. "Now, most of what we colloquially call knowledge is actually opinion"

    Right... Robbins is setting up a semantic domain:

    Colloquial | Philosophical
    ---------------------------------
    Knowledge | Opinion

    Ignorance | Ignorance

    Certain Knowledge | Knowledge

    Adequate Justif. | Strong Opinion

    Perfect Justif. | Justification

    ***

    Something like that. If your argument is that you don't like his semantic domain, I don't see how the issue is a very important one.

    "FYI, "uninteresting" isn't meant to connote anything pejorative, it's a technical point."

    Understood. And, as I've indicated above, I think that a big chunk of the discussion is (sadly) merely semantic and consequently uninteresting.

    The whole "Clark doesn't know if he's sleeping with his wife," thing is essentially a semantic game, but I think it is symptomatic of a tendency to dwell too much on trying take back the word "know" from the Clarkians, as though they were insisting that one could not speak colloquially of knowledge in a non-technical sense - or as though there were a requirement for us to "know" (in the strong sense) things like whether our wives are who they seem to be.

    -TurretinFan

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  9. TF,

    Good, then you see that our arguments against Sean, Robbins, Clark et al have been spot on. When an oponent admits that all his critiques of your position are mere, unjustified opinions, he's lost. Imagine a Catholic telling you, in a public debate, that his belief in Rome's doctrine of justification is a mere, unjustified, opinion. He'd get laughed off the stage.

    Now, make sure to re-read what I said in my initial point re: the Scripturalist problem when they admit that 99.9% of everything they say is mere, unjustified, opinion.

    Sincerely, I must be lost, I don't see how you don't see that your admission isn't epistemically devastating.

    Here's a sample dialogue:

    Scripturalist: Van Til was a heretic.

    Van Tillian: Do you know that?

    S: No, it's my opinion.

    V: Is it justified?

    S: Oh, sorry, it's a mere, unjustified opinion.

    V: Okay. Say it louder next time, that's all.

    Or:

    Scripturalist: Empiricists cannot know that empiricism is true.

    Empiricist: Do you know that?

    S: No.

    E: What positive epistemic status does your belief have.

    S: None, actually, it's a mere, unjustified opinion.

    E: Oh, well, I can have knowledge on empiricism.

    S: Prove it.

    E: Okay,

    [1] Ice cream cones don't have bones,

    therefore,

    [2] I can know with my senses.

    S: That argument doesn't support it!

    E: And you know that?

    S: Oh, well, I guess not. But I opine it.

    E: What's the epistemic status of your opinion?

    S: Mere and unjustified.

    E: Oh, okay, well then I proved it and you can't say boo.

    -Paul

    P.S. If you agree with the men I cited above, I wouldn't let it get out. Scripturalism cuts the ground out from any apologetic argument whatever.

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  10. And to cap it off TF, if your claim is that "knowledge" in the philosophical sense is only that which is in Scripture or can be deduced, then you can't know that claim in the philosophical sense. Scripturalism rests on an opinion. The axiom of opinion.

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  11. TF,

    I have several basic problems with your response:

    1. You seem to distinguish between degrees of knowledge. There's certain knowledge and uncertain knowledge.

    I think that's confused. To me, knowledge doesn't come in degrees. You can have degrees of belief or certitude, not degrees of knowledge.

    And I don't regard certainty, in the sense of knowing that we know p, as a higher degree of knowledge than knowing p. Rather, I regard that as an additional piece of knowledge. To know p, and to know that we know p are two different items of knowledge.

    2. Apropos (1), while Clarkians distinguish between opinion and ignorance on paper, they can't distinguish between those two states in practice, for Clark rejects probabilities. In another post I quote him on that. He says a probability is an approximation to the truth, but unless you already have the truth, you can't compare the approximation to the truth–in which case you can't probabilify opinions.

    But if you can't rank opinions according to their probable truth or probable falsehood, then opinion and ignorance are functionally equivalent. They are equally likely or unlikely.

    So it's very far from being a "semantic quibble."

    3. You’re in no position to stipulate a disjunction between certain knowledge (which you reserve for general/special revelation) and uncertain knowledge, for unless your disjunction is, itself, a revelatory stipulation, it can’t be an item of certain knowledge. So what you’ve actually give us comes down to an uncertain stipulation about the limits of certainty. Explain how you escape self-refutation?

    4. As to whether Manata and I are misrepresenting Clark or Clarkians, here’s a representative statement of the opposing position:

    ****************************************

    Clark’s consistently Christian rejection of sense experience as the way to knowledge has many consequences, one of which is that the traditional proofs for the existence of God are all logical fallacies. David Hume and Immanuel Kant were right: Sensation cannot prove God, not merely because God cannot be sensed or validly inferred from sensation, but because no knowledge at all can be validly inferred from sensation. The arguments for the existence of God fail because both the axiom and method are wrong – the axiom of sensation and the method of induction – not because God is a fairy tale. The correct Christian axiom is not sensation, but revelation. The correct Christian method is deduction, not induction.

    There are three sorts of cognitive states: knowledge, opinion, and ignorance. Ignorance is simply the lack of ideas. Complete ignorance is the state of mind that empiricists say we are born with: We are all born with blank minds, tabula rasa, to use John Locke’s phrase. (Incidentally, a tabula rasa mind – a blank mind – is an impossibility. A consciousness conscious of nothing is a contradiction in terms. Empiricism rests on a contradiction.) At the other extreme from ignorance is knowledge. Knowledge is not simply possessing thoughts or ideas, as some think. Knowledge is possessing true ideas and knowing them to be true. Knowledge is, by definition, knowledge of the truth. We do not say that a person "knows" that 2 plus 2 is 5. We may say he thinks it, but he does not know it. It would be better to say that he opines it.

    http://www.vincentcheung.com/2005/07/14/an-introduction-to-gordon-h-clark/

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  12. "Good, then you see that our arguments against Sean, Robbins, Clark et al have been spot on. When an oponent admits that all his critiques of your position are mere, unjustified opinions, he's lost. Imagine a Catholic telling you, in a public debate, that his belief in Rome's doctrine of justification is a mere, unjustified, opinion. He'd get laughed off the stage."

    That's the sort of equivocation between the colloquial and the philosophical domains that I think is uncalled for unless your point is simply to poke fun rather than meaningfully engage.

    I don't see any deeper meaning to that sort of comment - it's not an internal critique - it doesn't even play one on TV.

    -TurretinFan

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  13. Question on the statement that Van Til was a heretic; couldn’t that be more than mere opinion if the ones making the charge uses Scripture to deduce it?

    Now of course you could say that they could not be certain that he was a man or anything like that, but if they can show that his “beliefs” are not Scriptural by using Scripture would it not be justified knowledge?

    Being the simpleton that I am I do not see anything wrong with the idea that I can “know” things and believe them, but the only thing that is absolutely true is what is revealed in Scripture. So while I can “know” my wife is my wife I can not be absolutely certain of that since that is not in Scripture, but if I believe her to be my wife than I must do all that Scripture commands a husband to do and be.

    I’ve always thought that most Reformed Christians were Scripturalist in the sense that they take the Scriptures as their only source of knowledge. By that I mean that if someone were trying to state some new trendy view of Christianity that the Scripturalist would use Scripture to prove that this new trendy view is un-scriptural. That could just be my ignorance showing though.

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  14. "I think that's confused. To me, knowledge doesn't come in degrees. You can have degrees of belief or certitude, not degrees of knowledge."

    That's the semantic debate that's really not interesting to me. We do need defenders of the English language, but I'm not willing to spend time trying to assess who is right so that I can join your side or Robbins' side.

    -TurretinFan

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  15. "And to cap it off TF, if your claim is that "knowledge" in the philosophical sense is only that which is in Scripture or can be deduced, then you can't know that claim in the philosophical sense. Scripturalism rests on an opinion. The axiom of opinion."

    Even assuming this is true (for the sake of the argument), that's only problematic if the opinion is a wrong opinion. And it only sounds bad because one's mind jumps to the colloquial sense of "opinion" - which gets us right back to the semantic issue that doesn't interest me, even if it did Robbins.

    I understand that it can be fun to say things like "You cannot know that 'x' is true ..." using Clarkian definitions for "know," but it's only fun because of the implicit equivocation going on. Who cares that we don't have absolute certainty about lots of things?

    -TurretinFan

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  16. TF said:
    ---
    Who cares that we don't have absolute certainty about lots of things?
    ---

    It's only a problem when it's viciously circular and cuts one's own argument to shreds. It is self-refuting, just as much as if I said:

    1. "What can be known is only what can be experienced."

    2. The statement "What can be known is only what can be experienced" cannot be experienced.

    3. Therefore, # 1, if true, is false.

    In the same way, if I said:

    1. "You can only know what you can deduce from Scripture."

    2. The statement "You can only know what you can deduce from Scripture" cannot be deduced from Scripture.

    3. Therefore, # 1, if true, is false.

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  17. "And I don't regard certainty, in the sense of knowing that we know p, as a higher degree of knowledge than knowing p. Rather, I regard that as an additional piece of knowledge. To know p, and to know that we know p are two different items of knowledge."

    I see your comment as distinguishing between:

    a) basic knowledge

    I know that proposition X is true.

    b) meta knowledge

    I know that proposition Y is true, where proposition Y is a proposition of basic knowledge (i.e. Y is the proposition: "I know that proposition X is true")

    But that's not quite how certainty relates to the issue. Certainty is a quality of knowledge (or more properly of the person who has the knowledge - along the lines, at least to some extent, that Paul mentioned above).

    -TurretinFan

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  18. This comment has been removed by the author.

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  19. 1. "What can be known is only what can be experienced."

    2. The statement "What can be known is only what can be experienced" cannot be experienced.

    3. Therefore, # 1, if true, is false.

    That's faulty logic.

    The correct conclusion is therefore #1, if true, cannot be known.

    -TurretinFan

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  20. I want to make a couple things clear: I have no great respect for Mr. Cheung's philosophical work: I appreciate his guts, but I think his understanding of philosophy is severely lacking.

    On the other hand, while I *think* I follow the true Clarkian way (and no other self-professed Clarkian has tried to disabuse me of this), I do have high respect for the folks here at Triablogue and for their abilities to engage deeply in the topics.

    What will no doubt turn into me leaving with many items on the plate shouldn't be suggestive of any lack of respect for their skill or a negative statement on the merit of their arguments.

    -TurretinFan

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  21. That's easy enough to fix, and actually helps with the concept of Clarkianism.

    1. "I know that whatever can be known must be deduced from Scripture."

    2. The statement "I know that whatever can be known must be deduced from Scripture" cannot be deduced from Scripture.

    3. Therefore, if #1 is true, it is false.

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  22. Further to my correction of Mr. Pike's first syllogism, the proponents of Clark's position (whether or not I agree with their arguments) do not concede the minor premise.

    -TurretinFan

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  23. TF said:
    ---
    Further to my correction of Mr. Pike's first syllogism, the proponents of Clark's position (whether or not I agree with their arguments) do not concede the minor premise.
    ---

    In which case they ought to be able to show simply how the minor premise does, indeed, flow from Scripture. Which is all that Paul and Steve have been asking for Sean to do... :-)

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  24. In the revised form:

    3. Therefore, if #1 is true, it is false.

    Or ... to avoid the absurdity of a self-contradictory conclusion ...

    Therefore, if #1 is true, then #2 is false.

    Or simply it cannot be both ways. Someone who holds to the idea that the only way we can know something is if we deduce it from Scripture, can only know that if he can deduce that from Scripture.

    -TurretinFan

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  25. "In which case they ought to be able to show simply how the minor premise does, indeed, flow from Scripture. Which is all that Paul and Steve have been asking for Sean to do... :-)"

    Well - it's not quite all that folks do, as I've pointed out in my post. Sometimes folks poke fun a bit.

    Nevertheless, I agree that if Sean wants to claim that he knows that the only way to know something is to deduce it from Scripture, he must also deduce that from Scripture.

    But Sean could simply assert that it is true that the only way to know something is to deduce it from Scripture, which is a lesser claim. If that's his claim, then he doesn't have to deduce it from Scripture, since he simply claims that it is true, he does not claim that he knows it.

    That sounds a bit confusing because of the odd shift in semantic domains.

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete
  26. TURRETINFAN SAID:

    “That's the sort of equivocation between the colloquial and the philosophical domains that I think is uncalled for unless your point is simply to poke fun rather than meaningfully engage.__I don't see any deeper meaning to that sort of comment - it's not an internal critique - it doesn't even play one on TV.”

    “That's the semantic debate that's really not interesting to me. We do need defenders of the English language, but I'm not willing to spend time trying to assess who is right so that I can join your side or Robbins' side.”

    i) Frankly, you’re the one who’s being intellectually frivolous at this point, not us.

    There is a quite meaningful distinction between probable and improbable beliefs. And the “colloquial” usage of “knowledge” takes that distinction for granted. Ordinary folks don’t think all beliefs are equally likely or unlikely. That is not how they use the word “know.”

    If you can’t probabilify beliefs, then you can’t distinguish between “knowledge” and ignorance. If there’s no meaningful distinction between “knowledge” and ignorance, then the “colloquial” use of “knowledge” is synonymous with ignorance. That’s nonsense however you cut it.

    ii) Moreover, this is not a debate about the meaning of words, but about the meaning of concepts.

    You’re the one who brought up the issue of certainty. You can’t introduce the concept of certainty while refusing to address the concept of probability.

    However, Clark and Clarkians (who follow him at this point) repudiate probability. Therefore, they can’t draw a principled distinction between the concept of opinion and the concept of ignorance.

    So, yes, this is very much an internal critique.

    iii) Furthermore, as I’ve documented repeatedly, a Clarkian can’t have “certain knowledge” about anything whatsoever given the dual fact that:

    a) He restricts “certain knowledge” to Scripture.

    b) He can only access Scripture via “uncertain knowledge” or “colloquial knowledge.”

    It’s deceptive of you to oversimply the issues when these have been carefully distinguished and documented.

    “I understand that it can be fun to say things like ‘You cannot know that 'x' is true ...’ using Clarkian definitions for ‘know,’ but it's only fun because of the implicit equivocation going on. Who cares that we don't have absolute certainty about lots of things?”

    i) To say we do it because it’s “fun” to do is quite condescending on your part, and it’s a condescension which isn’t justified by the level of your performance in this particular debate.

    I’ve been respectful to you. You need to be respectful in return and not caricature the opponents of Scripturalism.

    We’re the one’s who are offering blow-by-blow critiques.

    ii) The issue is not whether we lack “absolute certainty on lots of things.

    Rather, the question at issue is whether Clarkians can be “absolutely certain” of anything at all given their rejection of sensory perception and memory as sources of knowledge. Indeed, all their beliefs are reducible to ignorance.

    Why do you keep oversimplifying and misrepresenting the point at issue?

    I’ve raised other objections to Clarkian epistemology as well–which you’re choosing to ignore as if it all boils down to colloquial v. technical usage.

    If you want to back out of this debate, fine. But don’t cover your tracks by making us look bad in the process. That is not an honorable way of breaking off the discussion

    ReplyDelete
  27. TF said:
    ---
    If that's his claim, then he doesn't have to deduce it from Scripture, since he simply claims that it is true, he does not claim that he knows it.
    ---

    In which case I would ask, "Why should I accept it as true then?" In short, if we grant all that you've provided for Sean in the above just to spring him from the logical trap, then I do not see what teeth his argument has.

    In other words, when Sean talks about something be "knowledge", "opinion", and "ignorance"--that whole structure is irrelevant because it is *SEAN* who engages in equivocation there (again, assuming he would take the path you've laid out for him above; he is free to offer an alternative). This knowledge is a pointless knowledge. It's knowledge that relies on a faith-based unknowable statement in the first place. In short, when Sean says that he knows the propositions of Scripture, that knowledge is not the foundational at all. Indeed, his foundation is an unknowable (on his grounds) fideistic concept.

    Which makes me ask, if the basis of his epistemology is fideism, then why should he concern himself with knowledge at all? Why be concerned with saying that knowledge is only that which can be deduced from Scripture, when in fact he believes that things that are unknowable are in fact in primacy to Scripture? Rather than elevating Scripture, as would be the vernacular use of "knowledge," he actually lessons Scripture to something that can be known. Knowledge isn't the primary facet of such a system; the unknowable hold the primacy for it is that which is unknowable that enables knowledge in the first place.

    In other words (and I hope I'm at least semi-clear here, as I'm typing fast), I fail to see what benefit there would be to holding Sean's view on knowledge--if it did boil out the way you've presented above. Under that system, who cares about knowledge and ignorance? Opinion hold primacy.

    ReplyDelete
  28. "i) Frankly, you’re the one who’s being intellectually frivolous at this point, not us."

    Am I? I haven't been persuaded that this is so. I'm not sure how my unwillingness to argue over the semantic domain of words demonstrates intellectual frivolity, but I'm willing to listen.


    "There is a quite meaningful distinction between probable and improbable beliefs. And the “colloquial” usage of “knowledge” takes that distinction for granted. Ordinary folks don’t think all beliefs are equally likely or unlikely. That is not how they use the word “know.”"

    Agreed (assuming I've correctly understood what you're saying).

    "If you can’t probabilify beliefs, then you can’t distinguish between “knowledge” and ignorance. If there’s no meaningful distinction between “knowledge” and ignorance, then the “colloquial” use of “knowledge” is synonymous with ignorance. That’s nonsense however you cut it."

    a) Right in part (I think) - if one cannot probabilify beliefs, and if the definition of knowledge and ignorance depends on such computation, then the distinction is lost.

    b) However, an alternative is that such distinction is actually based on intuition not computation, and that consequently the distinction remains (with some asterisks of course).

    ***

    "You’re the one who brought up the issue of certainty. You can’t introduce the concept of certainty while refusing to address the concept of probability."

    I agree with Clark's basic argument that you cannot know the probability if you don't know the numerator and the denominator.

    The alternative, however, as I've noted above, is that probability is really just a foil for intuition.

    ***

    iii) Furthermore, as I’ve documented repeatedly, a Clarkian can’t have “certain knowledge” about anything whatsoever given the dual fact that:

    a) He restricts “certain knowledge” to Scripture.

    b) He can only access Scripture via “uncertain knowledge” or “colloquial knowledge.”
    This is slight variation on the Peter Pike fallacy above. Sean (will pick on him for no good reason) can have certain knowledge of the propositions in Scripture if it is true that one can have certain knowledge of what Scripture says (and further of things deduced from Scripture). It is not necessary that Sean have certainty that he has certainty for Sean simply to have certainty about the truths that Scripture teaches.

    *** [end of part 1 ... length of post was too great to be accepted]

    ReplyDelete
  29. [beginning of part 2]

    To say we do it because it’s “fun” to do is quite condescending on your part, and it’s a condescension which isn’t justified by the level of your performance in this particular debate.

    I’ve been respectful to you. You need to be respectful in return and not caricature the opponents of Scripturalism.

    We’re the one’s who are offering blow-by-blow critiques.
    I did not intend it to be condescending, and I apologize for the offense caused. You have been providing more detailed critiques than I have, and I do respect you (as I noted above your post).

    ***

    "Rather, the question at issue is whether Clarkians can be “absolutely certain” of anything at all given their rejection of sensory perception and memory as sources of knowledge. Indeed, all their beliefs are reducible to ignorance."

    I hope that my penultimately previous discussion in this comment addresses that.

    "Why do you keep oversimplifying and misrepresenting the point at issue?"

    It's surely not intentional on my part. I think it is probably motivated by my hopes that it is largely just a semantic issue of no great importance that has been overblown. I may well be wrong about that. I'm not trying to misrepresent - and if I simplify it is because I am pressed for time (which is just a reason, not an excuse for lackluster arguments).

    "I’ve raised other objections to Clarkian epistemology as well–which you’re choosing to ignore as if it all boils down to colloquial v. technical usage."

    It seemed to me that the other objections you raised (in this thread, at least) hung from the semantic issues.

    "If you want to back out of this debate, fine. But don’t cover your tracks by making us look bad in the process. That is not an honorable way of breaking off the discussion"

    I'm certainly not trying to make you guys look bad: you guys are one of my favorite blogs - and I think that (in general) you do a great job. I've got practically nothing for praise for you, and my original post wasn't really meant to offend and upset you. I hope it has not.

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete
  30. "In which case I would ask, "Why should I accept it as true then?" In short, if we grant all that you've provided for Sean in the above just to spring him from the logical trap, then I do not see what teeth his argument has."

    a) I'm not 100% what Sean's argument for his position has been. I don't pretend to speak for Sean.

    b) Obviously, you and I both accept things as true without having absolute certainty about them. So, Sean's inability to demonstrate the truth of his position with absolute certainty shouldn't be an automatic bar to your acceptance.

    "In other words, when Sean talks about something be "knowledge", "opinion", and "ignorance"--that whole structure is irrelevant because it is *SEAN* who engages in equivocation there (again, assuming he would take the path you've laid out for him above; he is free to offer an alternative)."

    I don't know about that. I haven't followed Sean closely enough to see if he's clearly defined his terms.

    "This knowledge is a pointless knowledge."

    Which knowledge? The absolutely certain knowledge? Surely that's not pointless. Perhaps you mean the knowledge of which Sean cannot be absolutely sure. But you don't usually think that knowledge of which you cannot be absolutely sure is pointless, so I'm not sure this is legitimate objection.

    "It's knowledge that relies on a faith-based unknowable statement in the first place."

    Only "unknowable" in the "strong" sense - same comment as previously.

    "In short, when Sean says that he knows the propositions of Scripture, that knowledge is not the foundational at all."

    let's say this is so (for argument's sake)

    "Indeed, his foundation is an unknowable (on his grounds) fideistic concept."

    Fideistic is so pejorative. But even if that's so - just because something is not knowable in the strong sense ... see above.

    "Which makes me ask, if the basis of his epistemology is fideism, then why should he concern himself with knowledge at all? Why be concerned with saying that knowledge is only that which can be deduced from Scripture, when in fact he believes that things that are unknowable are in fact in primacy to Scripture?"

    Well - the frustratingly simple answer is that Scripture clearly teaches that we should be interested in what Scripture says.

    The issue of the knowledge being in some sense subordinated to opinion is really only problematic if the opinion is false.

    "Under that system, who cares about knowledge and ignorance? Opinion hold primacy."

    See above.

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete
  31. TF,

    Re your last post to me.

    Just a quick note. I see now that you see the problems with Gerety's expression of Scripturalism.

    If he claims to know it, he's offering a self-referentially incoherent claim.

    If he chooses to assert it, he's offering what he consideres to be a mere, unjustified opinion.

    I quoted him above, in the post I did on the propriety of asking Scripturalists how they know, as saying "I think we should try to give an account (i.e., deduce from scripture) everything we believe is true.

    So, Sean doesn't have that out.

    Bottom line is, the Scripturalists have no positive epistemic status for their beliefs that aren't in the Bible or deducible.

    So, there's no *reason* to be a Scripturalist. Neither I, and certainly not atheists, are going to take their (what they tell us is) mere, unjustified opinions on the matter.

    Thus, Scripturalism undercuts the very faith it tries to defend.

    ReplyDelete
  32. TURRETINFAN SAID:

    “However, an alternative is that such distinction is actually based on intuition not computation, and that consequently the distinction remains (with some asterisks of course)… The alternative, however, as I've noted above, is that probability is really just a foil for intuition.”

    That’s not a genuine alternative to the position that Clark rejects. The question at issue is not whether we can tally the odds like a game of roulette. This isn’t a question of formal quantification v. a hunch.

    A merely intuitive sense of which possibilities or explanations are more likely or less likely would still fall afoul of Clark’s strictures. His objection to probability is that probability is an approximation of the truth, but if we don’t know the truth, we don’t know which explanation is closer to the truth–if any. That objection, if valid, would be equally valid against an intuitive sense of the relative likelihood of a given explanation or hypothetical possibility.

    Put another way, Clark rejects verisimilitude–or degrees of verisimilitude. For Clark, either you know the truth or you don’t. There is no middle ground in terms of knowing or not knowing something to be the case.

    If, by contrast, you’re offering intuition as an alternative source of knowledge, you can go that route–but not within the confines of Scripturalism.

    ReplyDelete
  33. Paul,

    you wrote: "If he claims to know it, he's offering a self-referentially incoherent claim."

    Sean's position (I think) is self-referentially incoherent if (and only if) the following:

    1) He claims that knowledge is only obtained by means X.

    2) He claims to know 1.

    3) He admits he cannot obtain 1 by means X.

    That is the trap into which empiricists fall, normally. They claim that knowledge can only be attained through perception. They claim to know this. But they have to admit that they cannot obtain this from perception.

    If Sean's position is that "means X" is "reading and deducing from Scripture" and then claims to know this and finally admits that he cannot get that from Scripture, then his position is self-referentially incoherent.

    Now I have not been paying as much attention as I ought, but I don't think Sean has admitted that.

    "If he chooses to assert it, he's offering what he consideres to be a mere, unjustified opinion."

    I'm not sure that this is a particularly severe problem given how broad the category of opinion is (It includes things like one's knowledge ("opinion") of one's name and one's current location). In other words, if he can only be as sure about the correctness of his position as he is that his name is Sean and he's sitting in front of his computer, I'm not sure that we have a big problem.

    "I quoted him above, in the post I did on the propriety of asking Scripturalists how they know, as saying "I think we should try to give an account (i.e., deduce from scripture) everything we believe is true." So, Sean doesn't have that out."

    I assume then that Sean also thinks he has given an account for the idea that we should try give an account for everything we believe is true. If so, then his position is internally consistent (even if you hold that objectively he has erred in his account).

    "Bottom line is, the Scripturalists have no positive epistemic status for their beliefs that aren't in the Bible or deducible."

    Some things that Clark's followers have said would tend to make one think that. However, I am pretty sure that is not what Clark taught and I'm pretty sure that it is not what at least some of his disciples have argued.

    The point is not that "opinions" have "no positive epistemic status" but that they have a greatly inferior epistemic status, as far as I know. But perhaps I am not familiar enough with the material.

    "So, there's no *reason* to be a Scripturalist. Neither I, and certainly not atheists, are going to take their (what they tell us is) mere, unjustified opinions on the matter."

    I think this may be a conflation of "reason" and "proof."

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete
  34. I had written: “However, an alternative is that such distinction is actually based on intuition not computation, and that consequently the distinction remains (with some asterisks of course)… The alternative, however, as I've noted above, is that probability is really just a foil for intuition.”

    Steve wrote: "That’s not a genuine alternative to the position that Clark rejects. The question at issue is not whether we can tally the odds like a game of roulette. This isn’t a question of formal quantification v. a hunch."

    I answer: I don't know if I would agree. I think Clark consistently pointed out to folks that they could not provide probabilities, only hunches.

    Steve wrote: "A merely intuitive sense of which possibilities or explanations are more likely or less likely would still fall afoul of Clark’s strictures."

    I think that really depends on what you mean. As noted above, one of Clark's points is that what we call "probability" is often just hunches.

    Steve wrote: "His objection to probability is that probability is an approximation of the truth, but if we don’t know the truth, we don’t know which explanation is closer to the truth–if any."

    I think there may be a slight conflation here. Clark does address two things that are related:

    1) The argument that Science is getting closer to "the truth" requires that we know what "the truth" is.

    2) The argument that we know a probability means we know a fraction including a numerator (times right) and a denominator (total times). However, without a knowledge of what is right, probability cannot be determined.

    One goal of Clark seems to be to push folks to recognize that things like a convergence toward truth hypothesis for Science is a hunch, and that techniques like's Occham's razor are similarly hunches.

    Steve wrote: "That objection, if valid, would be equally valid against an intuitive sense of the relative likelihood of a given explanation or hypothetical possibility."

    To the extent that the objection would say that a hunch is a hunch, so what?

    Steve wrote: "Put another way, Clark rejects verisimilitude–or degrees of verisimilitude. For Clark, either you know the truth or you don’t. There is no middle ground in terms of knowing or not knowing something to be the case."

    Yes, of course. That's the nature of the law of the excluded middle. But suppose that Clark KNOWS (in the strong sense) that intuition provides useful information? Then, while strong opinion is still not knowledge, it might still be useful. In other words, suppose that non-knowledge can (in some cases) also be useful. If so, I'm not sure that any problem remains.

    Steve wrote: "If, by contrast, you’re offering intuition as an alternative source of knowledge, you can go that route–but not within the confines of Scripturalism."

    Bear in mind that I don't think "Scripturalism" (as you all have defined it) aligns with Clark's position (as I see it).

    Further, I think Clark recognized that there is helpful/useful belief founded on intuition, even if that belief did not rise to the level of knowledge.

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete
  35. TF,

    Self-referential incoherency doesn't result if and only if the expounder of the incoherency finally cries uncle.

    So, you need to change your set from this:

    "1) He claims that knowledge is only obtained by means X.

    2) He claims to know 1.

    3) He admits he cannot obtain 1 by means X"
    .

    To this:

    1) He claims that knowledge is only obtained by means X.

    2) He claims to know 1.

    3*) He doesn't know 1 by means X.


    So, I claim (3*), and have not been refuted and, in fact, I take it that (3*) is obviously true.

    It doesn't matter that Sean won't cry uncle, that's because he's pig-headed and just refuses to admit he's lost.

    "I'm not sure that this is a particularly severe problem given how broad the category of opinion is (It includes things like one's knowledge ("opinion") of one's name and one's current location). In other words, if he can only be as sure about the correctness of his position as he is that his name is Sean and he's sitting in front of his computer, I'm not sure that we have a big problem".

    It is a problem. And, BTW, let's use "opinion" for opinions and lose the "knowledge" in parenthesis.

    Now, on what basis can Sean be "sure" what his name is? All he can say is, "I believe it." Or, "I strongly believe it." But so what? A kid could say that about Santa Clause. Are you saying Sean's position boils down to the psychological, subjective state of how "sure" he "feels?" It's at the level of a kid's belief in Santa? He certainly can't provide anything that would like like a justification for believing that his name is Sean, or any other truth-indicating feature; that's because he's told us that the only thing that fits that bill is Bible or Bible deductions.

    Again, there is ZERO positive epistemic status for he beliefs. I'd ask you lay out, precisely, what the positive epistemic staus it has given the confines of Scripturalism. For you see, on Scripturalism, his belief that his name is Sean is unjustified. So, it's an unjustified opinion. He has no reason to believe it. I mean, on this score, the empiricists and rationalists will say that they are "rational" for believing their positions because they "feel" that it is correct, yet they don't know it. Would any self-resepcting Scripturalist apologist let that slide? No! They'd point out the utter bankruptcy of such a position. In fact, it is almost a universally held belief, by Christian and secularist alike, that if a position is reduced to just anouncing that it is an opinion, while having no justification or positive epistemic status (while it may give psychological comfort, or serve some pragmatic end), then it's removed itself from the playing field. It needs to go sit in the bleachers while the others play.

    "The point is not that "opinions" have "no positive epistemic status" but that they have a greatly inferior epistemic status, as far as I know. But perhaps I am not familiar enough with the material".

    No, the point is that they have NONE, and we have been begging Scripturalists to tell us what the positive epistemic status could be. Not to be disresepctful, I'd say you're unfamiliar with the material, both on the Scripturalist side, and cntemporary epistemology.

    I said: "So, there's no *reason* to be a Scripturalist. Neither I, and certainly not atheists, are going to take their (what they tell us is) mere, unjustified opinions on the matter."

    You responsed: "I think this may be a conflation of "reason" and "proof".

    No, it's my position that there's hardly a "proof" for any interesting philosophical claim. So, I meant what I said. There's no reason for accepting Scripturalism, other than, perhaps, it makes you feel all warm and fuzzy and pious inside, but now we're equivocating on "a reason".

    ReplyDelete
  36. "Self-referential incoherency doesn't result if and only if the expounder of the incoherency finally cries uncle."

    Some kinds of self-defeating claims don't require the person to cry 'uncle,' but some do.

    If a person says:

    1) The path to knowledge is X.

    2) I know [1].

    3) I got [2] via X.

    Then the claim is self-consistent. Only if the person admits he doesn't get [2] via X does the set of propositions start to unravel. And, of course, even if [3] is false, that only implies that at least [2] is false - it says nothing about [1].

    Now, [1] could be wrong - but that's an issue for external criticism.

    Same for your comment about [3]. Your assertion that [3] is wrong is an external critique, not an internal critique - and it is not an especially helpful critique, unless defeating [2] is your goal. However, as I've already shown, even if you defeat [2], that doesn't address the truth of [1], which is probably where the external critique should have begun.

    The remainder of your discussion seems largely focused on the fact that you feel you've defeated [3], and that consequently [2] is false. As I note above, however, that doesn't mean [1] is false.

    You raise the issue of "opinion" but do you seriously contend that those who follow Clark view all opinions as equal? If not, then your claim seems to be another attempted external critique, but not a very well constructed one (by that I mean, not very formal - not that I am accusing you of making mistakes).

    Your comment: "There's no reason for accepting Scripturalism, other than, perhaps, it makes you feel all warm and fuzzy and pious inside, but now we're equivocating on "a reason"."

    That's what I think I claimed myself, that you've equivocated over the word "reason" because apparently you haven't considered something a "reason" unless it leads to certainty - i.e. unless the reason is proof. The "warm and fuzzy" stuff is pejorative, but people really do operate on intuitive strength of opinions (even in the colloquial sense).

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete
  37. TF,

    You're wrong. Self-referential incoherency is about *propositions* not people (nevermind Clark called people propositions :-)


    Now, about how followers of Clark view opinions, again, you're talking about howe *they view them*. I concerned with the logic of their position, you're concerned with their warm fuzzies.

    I could care less that they want to view opinions as unequal. The question remains, *can they do so given their position*. I have given arguments that they cannot. You have not refuted those arguments but, rather, told me that they don't like where the logic leads. Well, that's too bad.

    I do not consider something a reason only if it leads to certainty. I do not see you as having the desire to represent my arguments correctly, and it seems you are unfamiliar with some rather elementary distinction in epistemology.

    I see no fruit coming of this. I've made my case, you've made yours, let's let others judge for themselves.

    ReplyDelete
  38. On truth-indication and epistemic justification and positive epistemic status:

    According to BonJour, what separates epistemic justification from other sorts of justification that a belief might have (pragmatic, moral, religious) is “its essential or internal relationship to the cognitive goal of truth” (Bonjour, Epistemic Justification p. 113).

    "Unlike pragmatic justification, epistemic justification is meant to have some close connection with truth" (Hetherington, Knowledge Puzzles, 22)

    "Some reasons to believe, the justifying reasons, are also called the epistemic reasons, because, as noted above, they have some connection to truth or likelihood of truth" (Source)

    "Epistemologists are concerned with the kind of justification that is indicative of truth" (Swinburne, Epistemic Justification, 1).

    I could keep going.

    Now, Sean Gerety holds that the only thing that is a justification is a Bible verse or a deduction from a Bible verse. We can therefore see, based on the above, that 99% of his beliefs have no positive *epistemic* status, no epistemic *reason* for holding them to be the case. Gerety can have moral or prudential reasons and justifications, but that is NOT an epistemic justification, and therefore, according to Gerety's own view, his belief in Scripturalism, Van Til's wrongness, Clark's greatness, empiricism's futility, his manhood, etc., are all unjustified opinions with no positive epistemic status and thus no reason to believe them to be true; and certainly no reason for others to believe the opinings of Scripturalism.

    Ready to cry uncle? :-)

    ReplyDelete
  39. Yes, of course, self-referential incoherence is about the propositions, but the propositions are bundled by the person advocating them.

    If you say that you know the capital of France is Paris and I say that no one can know anything about France, that's not a self-referential incoherence situation.

    So too, just because you think Gerety should have in his system [3]* doesn't make that his actual system. Accordingly, to create incoherence you've illicitly added to the bundle.

    ***
    As to the last item, I'm going to post a new blog item that's a bit tangential, but I think comes close enough to your points to address the underlying need for positive epistemic status.

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete
  40. TF,

    >[1] A statement can be known to be true IFF it is found in Scripture.
    >
    > [2] I know [1] to be true.
    >
    > These statements are not SD. If > [2] is true, then there is no >problem. If
    > [2] is false, then [2] is false > but even still [1] may be true.
    > Alternatively, if [1] is false, then [2] is also false.


    If [2] is true, then he knows [1] is true. But [1] isn't found in
    Scripture. So it follows from this 'situation' that he knows a
    proposition that (i) is not found in Scripture, but which says (ii)
    all known statements must be statements found in Scripture.

    What am I missing here? This is self-defeating.

    You can see, clearly I hope, that Gerety;s position is self-defeating. Now, he can always try for that deduction, which we've begged, but, as I said, I think it is *obviously* false that "A statement can be known to be true IFF it is found in Scripture."

    ReplyDelete
  41. Paul wrote: If [2] is true, then he knows [1] is true. But [1] isn't found in Scripture. So it follows from this 'situation' that he knows a proposition that (i) is not found in Scripture, but which says (ii)
    all known statements must be statements found in Scripture. What am I missing here? This is self-defeating.
    I answer:

    It's not self-defeating - it's by-Manata-defeated. When you say, "But [1] isn't found in Scripture," this is an external critique. I do think that the "debate" (such as it is) should focus on this, and not get sidetracked with the other things. To the extent that we've correctly characterized Sean's position, by the [1], [2], and [3] above, the entire house collapses if [1] is taken out.

    Paul also said: I think it is *obviously* false that "A statement can be known to be true IFF it is found in Scripture."And again, I think it is only "obviously" false in that one's sense of obviousness attributes the ordinary (colloquial) sense of "know" to the word "know" in the proposition you gave.

    But obviously false or only false after careful study, if it is false, that is an important point in the debate with Sean.

    -TurretinFan

    ReplyDelete
  42. "When you say, 'But [1] isn't found in Scripture,' this is an external critique."

    Wrong again. There's a reason that Scripturalism dubs itself Scripturalism. It claims to restrict knowledge to the explicit or implicit teaching of Scripture.

    Therefore, it would be in the nature of an internal rather than external critique to point out that a Scripturalist is violating his own rule of faith.

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