Dan's grand switcheroo

Dan has responded to my reply:

http://www.arminianchronicles.com/2009/02/scripture-and-philosophy.html

I. Clearing the Deck

Let’s begin with a direct response to Dan:

“I am not opposing all philosophy; only the practice of reading technical philosophical definitions into scripture.”

Of course, a Calvinist isn’t reading technical definitions into Biblical usage.

“To show that I have no hard feelings towards setting up special definitions in philosophical discussions, I will call the practice of exchanging ‘You can choose X’ for ‘You can choose X if it’s your strongest desire’ ‘the switcheroo’ (since Steve doesn’t like the term ‘equivocation’).”

i) I have no problem with the term “equivocation.” Indeed, Dan is often guilty of that fallacy.

ii) Once again, Dan is unable to draw an elementary distinction between words and concepts.

iii) Take his illustration. “You can choose X” is a sentence, not a word. So, even at the semantic level, this is not a question of what the word “choice” means, but the meaning of the whole sentence. The sentence (“You can choose X”) expresses a concept.

iv) What he’s pleased to call “the switcheroo” expresses yet another level of confusion on his part.

a) A Calvinist doesn’t define the meaning of the word “choice” in terms “You can choose X if it’s your strongest desire.”

b) For that matter, a Calvinist doesn’t even have to define the concept of choice in terms of “You can choose X if it’s your strongest desire.”

The basic idea of choosing is simply to make a decision.

v) Where choosing “according to your strongest desires” comes into play is if you pose an additional question about the psychology of choosing. What lies behind the choice? What, if anything, causes us to choose. Do motives figure in the choice? Are motives necessary or sufficient conditions?

That’s not a question of how we define the word, or even how we define the basic concept. Rather, that’s a question of explicating the concept in light of further questions about the antecedent conditions of choice. It’s in answer to a request for an explanation of choice.

There’s no “equivocation” here. The answer varies according to the nature of the question.

vi) What is more, both sides do this. An Arminian has a theory of the will to back up his theory of libertarian freedom. If you ask the Arminian to explain the psychological dynamics of choice, he will go beyond the bare statement that “You can choose X” to unpack his full-blown action theory.

vii) In addition to the psychology of choice, both sides also discuss the metaphysics of choice. How does the world correspond to our choices?

Depending on the question, both sides will resort to a more complex formulation. Therefore, if Calvinism is guilty of a “switcheroo,” then Arminianism is guilty of a “switcheroo.”

viii) In some odd corner of his mind, Dan seems to think that when I read the word like eklegomai in the Bible, I think to myself, “choose according to the strongest desire.”

Where does Dan come up with such a nutty idea of how a Calvinist like me construes Biblical usage? When I see the word eklegomai in Scripture, I don’t annex an explanatory concept to the word. A definition is not an explanation. The ontological or psychological preconditions which make a choice a choice are completely extraneous to the meaning of the word.

ix) Apropos (viii), I think one of Dan’s basic problems is that he must be ignorant of the standard literature on lexical semantics. Because he doesn’t know enough to know what I’m talking about, my correction bounces right off him. It doesn’t’ make a dent. Because the significance of what I said didn’t registers the first time around, he simply repeats the same semantic fallacies in the next post.

“Steve correctly points out that the dictionary doesn’t engage in metaphysical analysis, but it does provide what would be the conclusion of such analysis by reporting common usage.”

It does nothing of the kind. In the nature of the case, “common usage” ordinarily is preanalytic. Most language users aren’t metaphysicians. They don’t use a word like “choice” with a lot of conscious, metaphysical baggage. Most folks aren’t conversant with modal metaphysics or Frankfurt examples.

“The only weight I am asking the dictionary to carry is to provide the common sense meaning of the term “choose”. Steve granted that determinists make use of the switcheroo.”

An utterly false characterization of what I said.

“But the dictionary doesn’t state ‘if it’s my strongest desire’, nor does it give Paul’s technical counter-definition.”

i) Sorry, but this continues to reflect Dan’s linguistic ineptitude. Naturally the dictionary isn’t going to define the word “choice,” according to a particular theory of the will, since the psychology of choice is irrelevant to the meaning of the word.

That is equally true on Arminian or Calvinist grounds. Both sides explicate the concept of choice according to their theory of the will.

ii) Dan is also acting as though, if a dictionary is silent on the ontology or psychology of choosing, that it must be opposed to a particular psychological or metaphysical theory which underwrites the act of choosing.

“In fact, based on the dictionary’s definition (selecting between possible alternatives), we can rightly say that man never actually chooses; because the alternatives are never actually possible.”

i) Of course, this fails to draw an elementary distinction between the mental act of deliberation, and the extramental configuration of the world.

The fact that in deliberating over a course of action, I may mentally review some hypothetical alternatives doesn’t begin go prove the extramental existence of alternate possibilities—much less their availability, even if they did exist.

Rather, all this bears witness to is a psychological process. Our imagination.

ii) And, at the risk of stating the obvious, I can imagine many “possibilities” which are impossible for me to realize.

iii) For that matter, we often make choices on the basis of what we thought were possible outcomes which, in hindsight, turn out to be beyond our reach.

I may decide to become a med student. At the time I think I can afford med school. But due to an economic crisis after I enroll, I’m forced to drop out of med school before I graduate.

I though that alternative was a live possibility. I was wrong.

“I reject the switcheroo as common sense, since it seems to be motivated by deterministic assumptions and it rules out some intuitive underpinnings of LFW. It may well be true that we don’t have imperial proof of libertarian freewill, but that doesn’t mean LFW isn’t intuitive. Normally we think we can choose the options we contemplate. Perhaps we are deceived and it’s an illusion, but believing so seems counter-intuitive.”

i) Like Arminians generally, Dan has a wonderful capacity to ignore the obvious. Surely the “common man” has extensive experience in overestimating his abilities. How many middle-aged men come to the uncomfortable realization that they will have to lower their expectations. That they will be unable to achieve all the goals they set for themselves when they graduated from high school?

And yet, at the time they were setting these goals, they honestly thought these were realistic objectives. That’s one of the humbling aspects of real life. The rude recognition that you’ll be unable to make good on all your ambitious plans.

If intuition is Dan’s criterion, then LFW is false since LFW is counterintuitive. Just ask the guy who’s having his midlife crisis.

ii) But while we’re on the subject of intuition, it’s counterintuitive to claim the future is indeterminate if the future is foreknown. The Calvinist, Thomist, and open theist all appreciate the force of that intuition. They relieve the tension by dropping one or another of the two propositions generating the tension.

If intuition were Dan’s criterion, then he’d either be a determinist (e.g. Calvinist, Thomist) or an open theist. So Dan is very selective in his appeal to intuition.

iii) Apropos (ii), Dan is also very selective in his appeal to common sense. When he and I had our previous debate over God’s knowledge of the future, he tried to distinguish between knowing the future in itself and knowing true future propositions.

But the common man wouldn’t draw that distinction. For the common man, knowing the future is synonymous with knowing what will happen.

iv) Let’s spend a little more time on this statement: “It may well be true that we don’t have imperial proof of libertarian freewill, but that doesn’t mean LFW isn’t intuitive.”

His denial must be the understatement of the millennium. The way he puts it, you’d think the only deficiency in the case for LFW lies in the fact (if it is a fact) that the evidence falls just shy of apodictic proof. No Dan, that’s not the problem.

a) To begin with, it’s not a lack of compelling or overwhelming evidence, or even a lack of preponderant evidence. Rather, it’s a total lack of any evidence whatsoever for LFW. Name me just one human being who just once in his life did otherwise. Name me just one human being who just once in his life successfully accessed an alternate possibility.

To my knowledge, there’s not a single instance of a single human being at any time in his life doing otherwise. Not for all the human beings who ever lived. Billions and billions of “free” agents (in the libertarian sense). Yet you can’t cough up even one example.

b) But, hey, let’s waive the past. Dan, why don’t you perform a simple experiment for us? If you say you can do otherwise, then do it! What could be more direct? What could be more convincing?

To use your example, why don’t you go to your local Baskin-Robbins. Take some eyewitnesses along with you. They can bring camcorders.

Then demonstrate your freedom to do otherwise. First you can choose the strawberry ice cream cone. Then let us see the same moment repeat itself, but this time we will see a chocolate ice cream cone in your hand where the strawberry cone had been.

That would at least furnish some prima facie evidence for your contention. If you can pull that off, we might ask you to repeat this feat under laboratory conditions.

Who needs to argue for LWF when you can show me how it’s done?

c) So, Dan, are you able to do that? You appeal to intuition. Well, it would be very counterintuitive to have an ability you’re unable to exercise. To say you can do something you can’t do.

Suppose a guru tells me that he can levitate. What’s the best way of proving to me that he can levitate? By levitating.

But for some strange reason, he does everything except levitate to prove to me that he can levitate. He assures me that he can levitate. He appeals to intuition. He appeals to common sense. He even comes of with an a priori argument for his power to levitate.

Now, maybe I’m too cynical in my old age, but I’d begin to suspect that the guru is bluffing. Stalling for time.

d) I hope you’re not going to tell me that it’s impossible to repeat the same moment in time, for if you really have LWF, then the structure of time ought to accommodate your counterfactual freedom. Isn’t that a presupposition of LWF? That the external world corresponds to your intuitions?

So, Dan, if you really do have the power to access alternate possibilities, then that ought to include access to alternate timelines. That’s what these alternate possibilities amount to, is it not? The power to actualize different possible-world segments?

Please don’t tell me that the actual world constrains your freedom to do otherwise. For the actual world is limited to the past and present. According to you, there is no actual future. The future lies in the realm of the possible. Many different possibilities. And it’s your freedom of choice that actualizes a possibility.

So, Dan, access the strawberry scenario, then access the alternate (chocolate) scenario. Repeat the same timeframe, but alternate the outcome. Alternate between one possible outcome and another.

After all, that’s what LWF is all about, right? The ability to do otherwise under identical circumstances.

“Further, it’s intuitive to think that ought implies can (i.e. we shouldn’t be held morally responsible for things predetermined before we were born).”

Dan is equivocating. There is more to his position than “ought implies can.”

Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that this slogan is true. According to the formula, I’m not responsible unless I can do it. And let’s grant that contention, for the sake of argument.

But there’s more to libertarian freedom then that. What’s the real principle?

Not:

i) I’m not responsible unless I can do it,

But:

ii) I’m not responsible unless I can either do it or refrain from doing it.

Dan himself defined choice in terms of “selecting between possible alternatives.”

So that wouldn’t be “ought implies can.” Rather, that would be “ought implies either can or can’t.”

Hence, Dan is pulling a “switcheroo.”

“Since these are common sense notions, and the switcheroo rules them out, the switcheroo contradicts common sense. I didn’t provide the common sense arguments to prove LFW, only that to demonstrate that the common sense notion of choice rules out determinism.”

They’re not common sense notions. Dan is trading on the ambiguity of “ought implies can.”

But the plausibility of that slogan depends on the specific illustration. Take two examples:

i) I’m not obligated to love my wife unless I can love my wife.

ii) I’m not obligated to love my wife unless I can hate my wife.

Now, even if you think that (i) is plausible, (ii) is not. Yet libertarian freedom doesn’t stop with (i). To be free in the libertarian sense, we must be free to do otherwise.

iii) Moreover, the plausibility of (i) turns on the details. Suppose we elaborate (i) as follows:

I’m not obligated to love my wife because I can’t love my wife. The reason I can’t love my wife is because I’ve fallen in love with a prostitute. As long as I’m smitten by this prostitute, I can’t feel the way I used to about my wife. And I can’t control my feelings. I just feel what I feel. Since I can’t feel the same way about my wife, I’m not obligated to love my wife.

“Nor is the question if there is a relationship between desire and choice. I don’t reject the phrase ‘choosing according to our strongest desire’, though I don’t use it because it’s gained a deterministic meaning.”

Dan isn’t paying attention to his own argument. Whether or not choice is constrained by our strongest desire is irrelevant. The truth or falsity of the claim is not at issue. Rather, the question at issue, as he himself chose to frame the issue, is whether or not that principle is commonsensical.

“As we contemplate our options our strongest desire seems to shift. If we think about strawberry ice cream, it may become our strongest desire at that time, but the same happens when our thoughts shift to chocolate. Choice resolves indecision. So as oppose to a determinative causal relationship between desire and choice, I see a definitional one, the choice defines the strongest desire just before the choice as ‘just before the choice’.”

Dan is confusing deliberation with decision. Deliberation is prior to decision. As I contemplate the different flavors of ice cream, I may change my mind. If so, why did I change my mind? Because, as I contemplate the different flavors of ice cream, I find the thought of chocolate more appetizing than the thought of strawberry. I didn’t choose to find one flavor more appetizing than other. Rather, as I contemplate the options, I remember that I like the flavor of chocolate better than I like the flavor of strawberry.

Deliberation is voluntary, but what I find appetizing is involuntary.

“Nor is the question if scripture uses anthropomorphisms or accommodated language. Steve brought up the fact that Mormons and Open Theists would find my approach to scripture too philosophical, since they take some statements literally, that I take as either anthropomorphic or ‘accommodated language’ (i.e. ‘the hand of God’ or divine repentance). But this is not an example of using philosophy to define scriptural terms; it’s an example of using philosophy to interpret scripture. The scripture is using ordinary language to describe something extraordinary: God. Literal interpretations are closed off by other truths found in other passages.___Rather the question is ‘is it OK to read technical philosophical definitions into the words of scripture, or should we stick to the common sense meaning of terms?’ To even ask the question is to answer it.”

i) This isn’t a question of Biblical usage. Consider Dan’s actual procedure. Did he consult Greek and Hebrew lexicons? No. He consulted English-language dictionaries.

So his appeal to Biblical usage is a complete charade. His argument isn’t based on Biblical usage at all. Do Greek and Hebrews lexicons define scriptural words for “choice” in terms of alternate possibilities? No.

To the contrary, Dan is guilty of the very thing he falsely accuses the Calvinist of doing. Dan is importing extraneous concepts into Biblical usage. He didn’t get this from a Greek or Hebrew lexicon.

ii) Moreover, Calvinism doesn’t reject the existence of alternate possibilities. The real question is whether we index alternate possibilities to the will of God or the will of man.

“When I approach scripture, I typically think in terms of at least two levels: ‘what it says’ and ‘interpretation’. Once I figure out what a text says, it still may be open to multiple interpretations; depending on the tightness of the wording and the specificity. Interpretation is selecting one of those meanings based on the context and truths discovered in other passages. Interpretation may make use of philosophy; especially to make distinctions and reconcile apparent discrepancies. For example, I typically use Occham’s razor to reconcile apparent discrepancies.”

i) Of course, Reformed theological method also interprets a particular passage in light of truths from other passages.

ii) If interpretation is determined, “not by what it says,” but by other Biblical truths as well as philosophical considerations, then, in principle, we could even grant, for the same of argument, that Biblical usage means exactly what the Arminian takes it to mean, but still interpret the passage Calvinistically in light of other Biblical truths as well as philosophical considerations.

“But while I may use philosophy at the interpretation level, I don’t use it at the “what it says” level; more to the point, I don’t use philosophy to define biblical terms.”

He uses English dictionaries to define Biblical terms. And even in that respect, he overinterprets dictionary usage.

“Doing so seems to leave the scripture open to almost an unlimited amount of interpretations (as opposed to just a few). This seems to deliver a deathblow to the clarity of scripture.”

Given the way in which Dan divorces the “what it says” level from the interpretive level, he leaves the interpretation of Scripture wide open.

“Further, it seems like a departure from the grammatical/historical analysis of scripture and philosophy informs scripture rather than the other way around.”

i) Dan isn’t using the grammatico-historical method. That would involve Biblical word-studies. An analysis of biblical usage based on comparative Greek and Hebrew usage in Scripture, as well as secular Greek and Hebrew or cognate languages (e.g. Ugaritic).

ii) Furthermore, “common sense” is irrelevant to the grammatico-historical method. Grammatico-historical exegesis isn’t based on what would strike a modern reader as commonsensical, but what would strike an ancient reader as commonsensical.

(And even then, Scripture sometimes challenges the “common sense” assumptions of the ancient reader, e.g. Rom 9:19.)

Same thing with popular usage. Yes, the Bible generally conforms to popular usage (although Scripture has some technical terms, and some Bible writers are more highbrow than others). But popular for whom? For the modern reader? No. For the ancient reader. “Popular” in terms of what was popular usage at that time and place.

“So to restate my argument, the common notion of choose is specific enough to rule out deterministic interpretations and the bible uses the common notion of choose.”

False, for numerous reasons (see above).

II. Interpretation

Let’s now apply Dan’s (allegedly) “intuitive,” “commonsensical,” “what it says” standard to a number of Bible verses:

Genesis 6:6

6And the LORD was sorry that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart.

By Dan’s yardstick, God had second thoughts about what he made. If, with the benefit of hindsight, he could do it all over again, God would not have made mankind in the first place.

Genesis 22:12

12He said, "Do not lay your hand on the boy or do anything to him, for now I know that you fear God, seeing you have not withheld your son, your only son, from me."

By Dan’s yardstick, God was in the dark about Abraham’s future actions. God is on a learning curve. He learns through observation.

Exodus 32:10,14

10Now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may burn hot against them and I may consume them, in order that I may make a great nation of you."…14And the LORD relented from the disaster that he had spoken of bringing on his people.

By Dan’s yardstick, God changed his mind. Moses talked him out of his original plan.

Numbers 14:12,20

12I will strike them with the pestilence and disinherit them, and I will make of you a nation greater and mightier than they."… 20Then the LORD said, "I have pardoned, according to your word.

By Dan’s yardstick, God once again changed his mind. Once again, Moses talked him out of his original plan.

Deuteronomy 8:2

2And you shall remember the whole way that the LORD your God has led you these forty years in the wilderness, that he might humble you, testing you to know what was in your heart, whether you would keep his commandments or not.

By Dan’s yardstick, this is another instance in which God is ignorant of the future.

1 Samuel 15:10-35

10The word of the LORD came to Samuel: 11 "I regret that I have made Saul king, for he has turned back from following me and has not performed my commandments."… 35 …And the LORD regretted that he had made Saul king over Israel.

By Dan’s yardstick, God had second thoughts about elevating Saul to the throne. If, with the benefit of hindsight, he could do it all over again, God would not have made him king.

2 Kings 20:1-7

1 In those days Hezekiah became sick and was at the point of death. And Isaiah the prophet the son of Amoz came to him and said to him, "Thus says the LORD, 'Set your house in order, for you shall die; you shall not recover.'" 2Then Hezekiah turned his face to the wall and prayed to the LORD, saying, 3"Now, O LORD, please remember how I have walked before you in faithfulness and with a whole heart, and have done what is good in your sight." And Hezekiah wept bitterly. 4And before Isaiah had gone out of the middle court, the word of the LORD came to him: 5"Turn back, and say to Hezekiah the leader of my people, Thus says the LORD, the God of David your father: I have heard your prayer; I have seen your tears. Behold, I will heal you. On the third day you shall go up to the house of the LORD, 6and I will add fifteen years to your life. I will deliver you and this city out of the hand of the king of Assyria, and I will defend this city for my own sake and for my servant David’s sake." 7And Isaiah said, "Bring a cake of figs. And let them take and lay it on the boil, that he may recover.

By Dan’s yardstick, this is another instance in which God changed his mind because someone talked him out of his original plan.

1 Chronicles 21:15

15And God sent the angel to Jerusalem to destroy it, but as he was about to destroy it, the LORD saw, and he relented from the calamity.

By Dan’s yardstick, God changed his mind at the last minute.

2 Chronicles 32:31

31And so in the matter of the envoys of the princes of Babylon, who had been sent to him to inquire about the sign that had been done in the land, God left him to himself, in order to test him and to know all that was in his heart.

By Dan’s yardstick, this is another case of divine ignorance. God doesn’t know what people will do until they do it.

Jeremiah 3:6-7

6The LORD said to me in the days of King Josiah: "Have you seen what she did, that faithless one, Israel, how she went up on every high hill and under every green tree, and there played the whore? 7And I thought, 'After she has done all this she will return to me,' but she did not return, and her treacherous sister Judah saw it.

By Dan’s yardstick, God was not merely ignorant of the outcome, but mistaken. God entertained a false expectation about the future. The outcome came as a surprise. Caught him offguard.

Jeremiah 7:31

31And they have built the high places of Topheth, which is in the Valley of the Son of Hinnom, to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire, which I did not command, nor did it come into my mind.

By Dan’s yardstick, not only did God utterly fail to anticipate the actual outcome, but he even failed to anticipate the possible outcome. God is not only ignorant of the future, but he’s ignorant of future possibilities.

Jonah 3:10

10When God saw what they did, how they turned from their evil way, God relented of the disaster that he had said he would do to them, and he did not do it.

By Dan’s yardstick, God had a change of heart.

Now, how does Dan actually interpret these passages? According to him:

“When I approach scripture, I typically think in terms of at least two levels: ‘what it says’ and ‘interpretation’. Once I figure out what a text says, it still may be open to multiple interpretations; depending on the tightness of the wording and the specificity. Interpretation is selecting one of those meanings based on the context and truths discovered in other passages. Interpretation may make use of philosophy; especially to make distinctions and reconcile apparent discrepancies. For example, I typically use Occham’s razor to reconcile apparent discrepancies.”

Two points:

i) In order to avoid a Mormon or neotheist interpretation, he must show in each case how the wording is sufficiently loose or general to avoid that interpretation.

Okay. What is there in the actual wording of these passages that leaves them open to multiple interpretations? If I consulted a Hebrew lexicon, would the semantic domain of a key word be sufficiently wide to free up room for multiple interpretations?

I’d like to see Dan walk us through the actual process, verse by verse.

ii) And even if he were successful on a purely semantic plane, he seems to think the “what it means” level of the text can still be trumped by other passages, or even by philosophical considerations.

But in that event, what does it matter how the text is worded? What does it matter which “intuitive,” “common sense” notions are asserted by the text?

III. Arminian Philosophical Theology

Let’s take some concrete examples of Arminian theological method in the person of Arminius himself.

“The will of God is both correctly and usefully distinguished into that which is antecedent, and that which is consequent.”

“Divine providence does not determine a free will to one part of a contradiction or contrariety, that is, by a determination preceding the actual volition itself; under other circumstances the concurrence of the very volition with the will is the concomitant cause, and thus determines the will with the volition itself, by an act which is not previous but simultaneous, as the schoolmen express themselves.”

“Hence, God is said to ‘know those who are his;’ and the number both of those who are to be saved, and of those who are to be damned, is certain and fixed, and the quod and the qui, [the substance and the parties of whom it is composed,] or, as the phrase of the schools is, both materially and formally.”

http://wesley.nnu.edu/arminianism/arminius/v.htm#2.%20ON%20GOD%20CONSIDERED%20ACCORDING%20TO%20HIS%20NATURE

“The mode by which God understands, is not that which is successive, and which is either through composition and division, or through deductive argumentation; but it is simple, and through infinite intuition.”

“He understands all things through his essence.”

“But the single and most simple knowledge of God may be distinguished by some modes, according to various objects and the relations to those objects, into theoretical and practical knowledge, into that of vision and of simple intelligence.”

“And therefore when sleep, drowsiness and oblivion are attributed to God, by these expressions is meant only a deferring of the punishment to be inflicted on his enemies, and a delay in affording solace and aid to his friends.”

http://wesley.nnu.edu/arminianism/arminius/i.htm#DISPUTATION%204

“One will of God is absolute, another respective. His absolute will is that by which he wills anything simply, without regard to the volition or act of the creature, such as is that about the salvation of believers. His respective will is that by which he wills something with respect to the volition or the act of the creature. It is also either antecedent or consequent.”

“God wills some things per se or per accidens.”

“Those attributes of God ought to be considered, which are either properly or figuratively attributed to him in the Scriptures, according to a certain analogy of the affections and virtues in rational creatures.”

“Those divine attributes which have the analogy of affections, may be referred to two principal kinds, so that the first class may contain those affections which are simply conversant about good or evil, and which may be denominated primitive affections; and the second may comprehend those which are exercised about good and evil in reference to their absence or presence, and which may be called affections derived from the primitive.”

“Of the second class of these derivative affections, (See Thesis 11) some belong to God per se, as they simply contain in themselves perfection; others, which seem to have something of imperfection, are attributed to him after the manner of the feelings of men, on account of some effects which he produces analogous to the effects of the creatures, yet without any passion, as he is simple and immutable and without any disorder and repugnance to right reason. But we subject the use and exercise of the first class of those affections (See Thesis 10) to the infinite wisdom of God, whose property it is to prefix to each of them its object, means, end and circumstances, and to decree to which, in preference to the rest, is to be conceded the province of acting.”

http://wesley.nnu.edu/arminianism/arminius/m.htm#DISPUTATION%2019

i) Compare all these scholastic terms and categories and distinctions with some of the populist rhetoric that Dan deployed against Manata:

“In response, first off quoting philosophers is helpful, but the dictionary is better at establishing the laymen, common sensical understanding of terms.”

“I also pointed out that the bible was written in common language, so using the exotic counter-definition was unbiblical.”

ii) Consider, moreover, the degree to which all these scholastic terms and categories and distinctions function as a hermeneutical grid. Not something Arminius simply derives from Scripture (which wouldn’t be easy), but something which Arminius would apply to Scripture, as an interpretive lens.