Saturday, February 02, 2008

The Garden of forking paths

Libertarians generally define freedom of choice in terms of freedom of opportunity: the freedom to do otherwise. This is then cashed out in terms of possible worlds semantics: alternate possibilities. Here are a few standard definitions:

Many do not follow Fischer here, however, and maintain the traditional view that the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility does indeed require that the agent could have acted differently. As Aristotle put it, “…when the origin of the actions is in him, it is also up to him to do them or not to do them” (1985, Book III).[3]

Incompatibilists think that something stronger is required: for me to act with free will requires that there are a plurality of futures open to me consistent with the past (and laws of nature) being just as they were. I could have chosen differently even without some further, non-actual consideration's occurring to me and ‘tipping the scales of the balance’ in another direction. Indeed, from their point of view, the whole scale-of-weights analogy is wrongheaded: free agents are not mechanisms that respond invariably to specified ‘motive forces.’ They are capable of acting upon any of a plurality of motives making attractive more than one course of action. Ultimately, the agent must determine himself this way or that.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. She is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.

Finally, the plurality conditions require that, whichever choice is made, there have been at least one alternative choice that the agent was able to make such that, had she made it, it too would have satisfied the previously stated conditions.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/

There are other versions of libertarian freewill, but since this is the basic version which is deployed against Calvinism, this is the version which I’m going to examine. Let’s play along with this version and see how far it will take us when we try to take it to its logical extreme.

1.Let’s say I want to buy an Alfa Romeo. So I stroll through the car lot, scoping out various models. I’ve narrowed my choices down to either the red Alfa Spider or the red Brera.

According to our operational definition, each choice represents a possible world-segment. There’s a possible world in which I buy the Alfa Spider, and another possible world in which I buy the Brera.

For that matter, there’s a possible world in which I buy both, as well as a possible world in which I buy neither.

2.But this, in turn, generates certain metaphysical entanglements. For the car is not a discrete object, existing in a physical or metaphysical vacuum. The car is of a piece with the car lot. And the dealership. And the salesmen. And other customers—in time and place.

The car lot is of a piece with the town, while the town is of a piece with the earth, and the universe. So, in choosing a car, I’m not just choosing a car. I’m choosing everything else that goes along with the car, metaphysically speaking. The past. The whole causal matrix.

I’m instantiating an alternate possibility in which a particular car is a part of a larger package of things. And I am bringing that well-furnished possibility into being by my particular choice.

3.This ascribes a remarkable degree of control to the free agent. The individual agent is responsible for instantiating big chunks of reality.

Not only that, but he has control over other free agents. By choosing the Brera, I instantiate the alternate possibility in which those salesmen exist. I bring them into being. I make them actual. They now exist in the world-segment I chose for them (by choosing the Brera), and they exist in that world-segment, rather than some other (as abstract possibilities), because I chose it.

If I buy the Brera, then they exist in the world where I buy the Brera, rather than the world where I buy the Alpha Spider. And if I bought the Alpha Spider instead…but you know the drill by now.

4.But how is it that one free agent has that much control over another free agent? Wouldn’t the entanglement of my choices with their choices work both ways?

How can my choice commandeer them into existence when they are making choices which likewise affect or even effect the world segment to which I belong?

Suppose a salesman buys a snack at the vending machine. While I deliberate between the Brera and the Alpha Spider, he deliberates between the popcorn and the candy bar.

So whose choice selects for the other agent’s choice? Does my choice of the Brera in turn select for a world-segment in which he chooses the popcorn? Does his choice of the candy bar in turn select for a world-segment in which I choose the Alpha Spider?

5.Since not all possibilities are compossible, wouldn’t all these metaphysical entanglements generate a state of metaphysical gridlock? How can I, by my choice, drag you kicking and screaming (as it were) into my possible world-segment when you, by your choice, are hauling me into your possible world-segment?

If each choice corresponds to an alternate possibility, and each choice is a subset of a larger, possible world-segment, then my choices are tangled up with your choices. Yet each choice represents a different possibility. And differing possibilities cannot be simultaneously realized.

6.It will hardly do to say that God is harmonizing and coordinating our respective choices, for—according to libertarianism—God either cannot or will not force us to agree. For that would be oh-so coercive, ya know. Hence, I must have the freedom to make choices which are incompatible with the choices you make.

7.Suppose two customers want the same car. There is only one red Brera on the lot, and both of us want to buy it. But we can’t both have it. So only one customer ends up buying the car.

But how is it that one customer is able to access the alternate possibility in which he buys the car at the expense of his rival? How can he prevent me from accessing the alternate possibility in which I buy the car?

Why do some free agents enjoy greater metaphysical access than others?

8.Or, to approach our scenario from a different angle, why do we even need to fight over the same car? After all, there is yet another a possible world in which the car lot has two red Breras for sale. Why am I stuck with the range of options I see in the car lot?

I hope the libertarian won’t try to tell me that the real world imposes certain limitations on my freedom of opportunity. For, if this version of libertarianism is true, then the real world is largely the sum-total of all those compossible world-segments which free agents individually realize.

That’s the whole point of libertarianism. The real world is not a fait accompli. The world is what we make it—literally!

So don’t turn around and tell me that the real world infringes on my freedom of choice when you are also telling me that free agents are creating the real world as they go along, moment by moment, by which possible-world segments they instantiate.

Logically, the only restriction on my choice would be your contrary choice. And that results in gridlock. Your choices block my choices. Your world-segment can’t coexist with my world-segment.

24 comments:

  1. This is more like a strange meditation (a new type of philosophical poetry) than something that proves your case by necessity, but it's interesting.

    likewise affect or even effect I hate when people get these two mixed up! Thanks for being able to distinguish between the two.

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  2. A while back I was arguing with you about libertarianism, but since then, partly because of the arguments on this blog, I've become a five point Calvinist.

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  3. Anonymous said:

    "This is more like a strange meditation (a new type of philosophical poetry) than something that proves your case by necessity, but it's interesting."

    Precious few philosophically interesting propositions can be proved by necessity.

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  4. That's great news, Mark!

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  5. Dear Steve,

    I am not sure where to start, but I will start with the thought that choices are not physical. The will isn't part of the body, but rather it's part of the immaterial soul. Sure, there is some type of brain/soul interface, but the will itself is part of the soul.

    So what our will (which is part of our immaterial soul) is able to do is either choose A or B, but not both. The choice (somehow) interfaces with the brain and get's things going in the physical world. The brain talks to the muscles, which makes us reach for the cookie... But it starts with the soul.

    Something in the physical world could impede our choice from accomplishing our intended result. Much of what we are doing when we contemplate what choice to make is projecting (albeit imperfectly) what the outcome of this or that choice would be. But again, something could stop the choice from accomplishing what was intended. I am reminded of the 50 soldiers who when to take Elijah in to the king, but Elijah called down fire from heaven. They made a choice to go get Elijah, but never got to physically act out the choice.

    So coming around to the point. My choice (which is immaterial) cannot conflict with your choice (which is also immaterial). The outcomes of our choices could conflict, but the choices can't.

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  6. Dan said:
    ---
    My choice (which is immaterial) cannot conflict with your choice (which is also immaterial).
    ---

    Why would the fact that they are immaterial neutralize the conflict?

    I can imagine a black triangle, or I can not imagine a black triangle. I cannot imagine both at the same time, therefore option A ("black triangle") is in conflict to option B (non-"black triange"). Yet both A & B are immaterial, no?

    That's not to let you off the hook for other things. For instance, you claim:
    ---
    The will isn't part of the body, but rather it's part of the immaterial soul.
    ---

    A) How are you defining soul?

    B) What is the difference between mind and soul in your beliefs?

    You also said:
    ---
    The choice (somehow) interfaces with the brain and get's things going in the physical world.
    ---

    This is rather ad hoc. If you are going to make this claim, shouldn't you proivde some kind of reasoning for it? In other words, it looks like you have your conclusion in mind (LFW) and have decided that because it must be true, then there must be some method of going from immaterial to material via a black box, and the contents of the black box (which you do not know) are what diffuses the contradiction. Forgive the skeptics for not being convinced on that evidence.

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  7. Dear Peter,


    You said: “Why would the fact that they are immaterial neutralize the conflict?

    I can imagine a black triangle, or I can not imagine a black triangle. I cannot imagine both at the same time, therefore option A ("black triangle") is in conflict to option B (non-"black triange"). Yet both A & B are immaterial, no?”


    Steve post seemed to be dealing with a different conflict than the one you are. He was talking about a conflict between two people’s choices, not the two alternatives one person can choose from. As to your point, options are mutually excusive. We are able to choose either alternative, but not both.

    You asked:

    A) How are you defining soul?

    B) What is the difference between mind and soul in your beliefs?

    Tough questions. As for A, I would say that the principle faculties of the soul are consciousness, reason and volition. As for B, I think the mind is part of soul. The difference I was talking about was the difference between our brain and our soul. Does this really matter for the LFW debate?

    Me: The choice (somehow) interfaces with the brain and get's things going in the physical world.


    Thee: This is rather ad hoc. If you are going to make this claim, shouldn't you proivde some kind of reasoning for it? In other words, it looks like you have your conclusion in mind (LFW) and have decided that because it must be true, then there must be some method of going from immaterial to material via a black box, and the contents of the black box (which you do not know) are what diffuses the contradiction. Forgive the skeptics for not being convinced on that evidence.

    Actually my statement should be relatively uncontroversial among Christians. It’s materialist that would have a problem with it. LFW vs. Compatibilism really isn’t a factor. Let me test my theory. Do you agree we have souls? If a mad scientist dissected someone, would they find his will?

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  8. Dan,

    i) I don’t have a problem with dualism, but I don’t see how that is relevant to my post. To begin with, I’m not discussing whether the same agent can simultaneously realize alternate possibilities. I have discussed that elsewhere, but not here.

    Rather, I’m dealing with the metaphysical entanglements which are generated by two or more free agents, if we define libertarian freedom vis-à-vis alternate possibilities.

    ii) Moreover, the physical world should not pose a barrier to the instantiation of one possible world-segment or another, for, according to libertarianism, the physical world is, largely realized by the choices which free agents make—choices which convert abstract possibilities into concrete realities.

    No, the choices aren’t physical. Rather, the choices effect physical states.

    iii) No, the choices don’t conflict of you limit your definition of choice to a mental resolution. But that is hardly adequate to the demands of libertarianism—which requires freedom of opportunity: the freedom to *do* otherwise, not merely to *choose* otherwise.

    Always nice speaking with you, though.

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  9. Dear Steve,

    iii) No, the choices don’t conflict of you limit your definition of choice to a mental resolution. But that is hardly adequate to the demands of libertarianism—which requires freedom of opportunity: the freedom to *do* otherwise, not merely to *choose* otherwise.

    Glad you agree that choices themselves don’t collide. I suppose my view of LFW is less exciting. Maybe your argument will force LFW adherents to be a bit more precise, but maybe you’re right that there are different flavors of LFW. The last LFW definition you provided seems to be talking about the ability to choose otherwise, not do otherwise. As a Molinist, I have no problem with the thought that God fits all the pieces together the way He wants, through middle knowledge, permission/prevention and concurrence.

    Always nice speaking with you, though.

    Likewise.

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  10. Godismyjudge said:

    "As a Molinist, I have no problem with the thought that God fits all the pieces together the way He wants, through middle knowledge, permission/prevention and concurrence."

    i) I've never seen a Molinist successfully rebut the grounding objection, and I've been involved in some high-level debates.

    ii) I also think that Molinism is unscriptural, for reasons I've given elsewhere.

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  11. Dear Steve,

    I searched this blog for comments on Molinism and came up with this post you wrote.

    Steve on Middle Knowledge

    WCL said: “In the second moment, God possesses knowledge of all true counterfactual propositions, including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. That is to say, He knows what contingent states of affairs would obtain if certain antecedent states of affairs were to obtain; whereas by His natural knowledge God knew what any free creature could do in any set of circumstances, now in this second moment God knows what any free creature would do in any set of circumstances. This is not because the circumstances causally determine the creature's choice, but simply because this is how the creature would freely choose.”

    You said: i) One problem with this framework is that it’s either Platonic or viciously circular.

    On the one hand, it looks like possibilities inhere in some autonomous, free-floating plenum. God is free to choose which possible world to instantiate, but the possibilities in and of themselves are ontologically independent of God.

    Since I assume that Craig subscribes to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, he cannot very well affirm the existence of some coeternal substance or absolute alongside God.

    If, on the other hand, the possibilities are constituted by the divine mind, a la Leibniz, then it’s viciously circular to say that God is choosing in accordance with what the human agent would do, for whatever properties the hypothetical agent would have are due to God’s mentally and freely assigning a certain set of properties to the hypothetical agent in the first place.

    ii) Another problem with Craig’s construction is his failure to explain how God could know what a free agent would do if free agency is defined in libertarian terms.

    At most, God would know every possible outcome.

    iii) Related to (ii), to say that God knows what contingent states of affairs would obtain if certain antecedent states of affairs were to obtain is only cogent if the antecedent state of affairs is a sufficient condition of the subsequent outcome. But that would be deterministic (pace libertarianism).

    iv) Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Craig’s framework is cogent, middle knowledge would be causally dependent on the creature (i.e. on what the creature would do). If so, then we must jettison divine aseity.


    My thoughts….

    i) The possibilities are contemplated by God and do not independently exit. Since God gives LFW, what we can do and what we would do depends on God’s being able to and hypothetically giving us LFW. Thus within both natural and middle knowledge there are logical orders in which first God gives LFW, then we can or would do this or that.

    ii) God’s knowledge of what we would do corresponds to what we would to. To ask “why we would freely do A not B?” is to beg the question against LFW. To ask “how God knows the hypothetical?” is to question God’s essential omniscience. To ask “in what sense the hypothetical exists” is a fair question. Its “existence” is within God’s mind in which He contemplates what a creature would do, if He gives them LFW in a given circumstance.

    iii) See ii

    iv) I think divine concurrence preserves divine aseity, in that God and us immediately cause a given effect by means of the same action.

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  12. “God’s knowledge of what we would do corresponds to what we would to.”

    That’s a necessary, but insufficient condition of knowledge. Yes, to count as knowledge, a belief must correspond to the object of knowledge. But that leaves unanswered the question of how God subject of knowledge is in a position to know the object of knowledge.

    Given that his knowledge corresponds to the objection, how is that the case? What enables God to be in that cognitive state?

    “To ask ‘how God knows the hypothetical?’ is to question God’s essential omniscience.”

    Which is a valid question to pose in relation to Molinism.

    “Its “existence” is within God’s mind in which He contemplates what a creature would do, if He gives them LFW in a given circumstance.”

    If God gives the human agent LFW, then the human agent could do otherwise under the very same circumstances, in which case, what he would do is unknowable in advance of the fact.

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  13. See the following exchange (to which Dr. Welty also chimed in):

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/09/providence-and-prayer.html

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  14. I might add that Molinism can't substantiate itself by Scripture:

    1. Dan, where does Scripture argue for LFW?

    2. Please show us examples of Middle Knowledge from Scripture. It's not enough to show us where God possess counterfactual knowledge. We have no problem with that.

    Also, since God instances this world and no other, isn't that an implicit defeater for LFW? No other world will ever obtain. At best the freedom of opportunity would be illusory.

    In addition, if God actually interferes in this world to make, for example, circumstances affect the agent so that a particular outcome obtains, that seems to be a defeater for LFW on two grounds:

    1. The outcome is determined by something other than the agent.

    2. If an outcome can be determined,then that seems to presume that the choices that the agent who is being influenced are caused by something like his own desires, not only that,those desires are sufficient causes, which is a proposition LFW denies, for that means that choices are deterministic, not indeterministic.

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  15. Dear Steve,

    Still reading through some of the comments in the article. I am not sure I fully understand Tiessen’s view. But my first reaction is that natural knowledge, in Tiessen’s view, isn’t of “complete” possible worlds. Hence middle knowledge isn’t in the middle of God’s knowledge of possible worlds and the world that will be.

    But I need to keep reading, because perhaps I am missing something.

    In your post you asked how God knows the future. I must admit I don’t know. I do think He knows it, but I don’t know how. That’s part of God’s unique relationship with His creation.

    The view that God knows His plan today for tomorrow doesn’t give an answer either. For the Calvinist and Molinist the plan will happen, but for the open theist it might happen. But this only gives indirect knowledge of the future. The tricky question is how He knows the future itself.

    If God gives the human agent LFW, then the human agent could do otherwise under the very same circumstances, in which case, what he would do is unknowable in advance of the fact.

    While a person can do otherwise than what he would do, he wouldn’t. The person’s hypothetical actions in a circumstance and his actions in the circumstance logically correspond.

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  16. Dear Gene,

    where does Scripture argue for LFW?

    Genesis 1:1. God created the world without a preceding cause. This passage establishes that LFW is a logical concept. As for us, the bible says we have wills and make choices. Since compatiblism is incoherent, and hard determinism denies choice, LFW is the only option.

    It seems fairly obvious that the ability to freely choose A is incompatible with being determined to do B, such that we can’t do A. How are we able to do something we can’t do? Determinists try to rescue freedom, but in doing so they commit the error of context dropping. They remove “the ability to freely choose A” out of the context of being determined to B (but that’s the element in the context which is supposedly compatible with freedom!) and move into the context of actions with or without compulsion.

    The retreat positions of either hypothetical or illusory “ability to freely choose” don’t square with the bible which says we can choose.

    Please show us examples of Middle Knowledge from Scripture. It's not enough to show us where God possess counterfactual knowledge.

    Take the CF passages + LFW as argued above.

    Also, since God instances this world and no other, isn't that an implicit defeater for LFW? No other world will ever obtain. At best the freedom of opportunity would be illusory.

    The issue related to LFW is not what will happen, but rather what can happen.

    In addition, if God actually interferes in this world to make, for example, circumstances affect the agent so that a particular outcome obtains, that seems to be a defeater for LFW on two grounds:

    1. The outcome is determined by something other than the agent.

    2. If an outcome can be determined,then that seems to presume that the choices that the agent who is being influenced are caused by something like his own desires, not only that,those desires are sufficient causes, which is a proposition LFW denies, for that means that choices are deterministic, not indeterministic.


    God not only knows what would happen, but how it would happen (i.e. via LFW). So when He actualize the world, it happens as He knew it would (i.e. via LFW).

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  17. “In your post you asked how God knows the future. I must admit I don’t know. I do think He knows it, but I don’t know how.”

    That’s because you’ve removed the only available explanation: God foreknows what God foreordains.

    “But this only gives indirect knowledge of the future. The tricky question is how He knows the future itself.”

    There’s no problem with God having an indirect knowledge of the future via his plan for the future.

    “While a person can do otherwise than what he would do, he wouldn’t. The person’s hypothetical actions in a circumstance and his actions in the circumstance logically correspond.”

    No, according to LFW, the hypothetical range of actions are wider than the actual range of actions. And while, as a matter of fact, a person wouldn’t do otherwise, what he would or wouldn’t do, a law LFW, can’t be an object of knowledge until the rival options is foreclosed by his temporal action, in which he selects for just one of the alternatives available to him.

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  18. Dear Steve,

    There’s no problem with God having an indirect knowledge of the future via his plan for the future.

    I am not quite ready to give up on the idea that God knows the future directly, even if indirect knowledge is available to Molinists, in that God foreordains the future.

    No, according to LFW, the hypothetical range of actions are wider than the actual range of actions. And while, as a matter of fact, a person wouldn’t do otherwise, what he would or wouldn’t do, a law LFW, can’t be an object of knowledge until the rival options is foreclosed by his temporal action, in which he selects for just one of the alternatives available to him.

    I don’t think so. The knowledge would be available for the knowing logical (not temporally) a hypothetical (not actual) person hypothetically (not actual) given LFW by God, and is hypothetical (not actual) is run through a scenario by God, within God’s mind.

    The result of the scenario are not:

    1) true before (logical) the scenario
    2) Nor could it happen without God’s giving LFW
    3) Nor could it be true without God’s hypothetical concurrence
    4) Nor is it causally related to what we will do
    5) Nor does it “exist” outside God’s mind.

    The results of the scenario are:

    1) True logically after the scenario
    2) True based on God’s giving LFW
    3) True after God’s concurrence
    4) Logically related to what we will do
    5) “Existing” within God’s mind

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  19. "I don’t think so. The knowledge would be available for the knowing logical (not temporally) a hypothetical (not actual) person hypothetically (not actual) given LFW by God, and is hypothetical (not actual) is run through a scenario by God, within God’s mind."

    This is an assertion instead of an explanation. God can know all the possible things that a libertaria agent *could* do, but God cannot know which possibility the libertarian agent *would* opt for.

    If libertarianism is true, then hypotheticals are reducible to possibilities, nothing more.

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  20. Our current choices do not determine the past. My posting a response to your post is not the cause of your creating the post in the first place.

    Of course you might say that I have no choice but to write the sentences above, because I have no choice (free will). If so, why do you post blog entries? Are you trying to convince people of something(s)? What does it mean for someone to be convinced ( change their mind, etc. ) if they do not have free will? How would you describe your own actions given that you do not have free will?

    Regards, Jason

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  21. Jason said:
    Our current choices do not determine the past. My posting a response to your post is not the cause of your creating the post in the first place.

    Of course you might say that I have no choice but to write the sentences above, because I have no choice (free will). If so, why do you post blog entries? Are you trying to convince people of something(s)? What does it mean for someone to be convinced ( change their mind, etc. ) if they do not have free will? How would you describe your own actions given that you do not have free will?

    ******************

    These are stock objections to determinism, repeatedly addressed in the literature on compatibilism. Why don't you acquaint yourself with a philosopher like John Martin Fischer.

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  22. Dear Steve,

    Yes, I was making an assertion as to what grounds middle knowledge. It was intended to be a replacement to your assertion of what must be the grounding for knowledge of LFW. At this point I must admit I am quite confused as to what your object is, but some of this might be due to the high level of abstraction in the discussion. I was wondering if you had any suggestions regarding a thoughtful work written from a Calvinist perspective on foreknowledge in general and the grounding objection in particular. Perhaps going over the issues step-by-step would put me in a better position to discuss this with you.

    God be with you,
    Dan

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  23. Here's a place to start:

    http://www.amazon.com/Divine-Foreknowledge-Views-Gregory-Boyd/dp/0830826521

    Followed by:

    http://www.amazon.com/Perspectives-Doctrine-God-Four-Views/dp/0805430601/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202314013&sr=1-2

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  24. Dear Steve,

    Thank you for the dialog and the recommendations. I think I will bow out for now, but fair warning, I am like a bad penny!

    God be with you,
    Dan

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