Monday, December 17, 2007

Me, Myself, and I, part 4

{Part one here}

{Part two here}

{Part three here}

Ethical Egoism EE teaches that man has the moral duty to act in his sole self-interest. He must be the beneficiary of his actions. We might express EE's theory of what makes actions right or wrong thusly:

* An act A is right iff A was in my best (long term) interest.

** An act A is wrong iff A was not in my best (long term) interest.

*** An act A is morally permissible iff A is neither in my, or not in my, best (long term) interest.

What about conflicts of interest (ethical dilemmas?)? Baier (among others) brings this up in his book The Moral Point of View. A conflict of interest C might be something like this:

[C] Moral agent 007 needs a kidney. Moral agent 008 needs a kidney. There is one kidney that is a match for agent 007 and agent 008. Both 007 and 008 are ethical egoists. Who should get the kidney?

What is the morally right (or correct) action to take in C? (This isn't hard to see. We make ethical decisions like this all the time. We would all agree that the 18 yr. old kid who suffers from a rare kidney disease through not fault of his ownshould get a kidney over the 90 year old man who drank alcohol like a fish for 75 of his 90 years.)

Since moral principles are supposed to serve as action-guides for the right (or wrong) way to act in situations, what principle should the 00's espouse?

It would seem that 007 should say that the right thing to do in this situation is to secure the kidney for himself.

He should prescribe that 008 has a moral duty to act in 007's best interest.

(As an aside, this is a prime example of the critique that EE should not teach its ethical theory as the correct theory. If 007 was an egoist, it would have been best for him had 008 been an austere altruist. Moral principles serve as action guides that inform us how to act in situations. Moral precepts should be teachable. Teach others how to act (this would be a necessary but not sufficient feature, character/virtue ethics and teleological ethics would also need to be included). Publicized so that others are morally informed agents. But if Ethical Egoism were true, not only would it be unwise for me to teach it, it just might be immoral for me to teach it. Teaching others to be egoists could easily turn out to be not in our best interest.)

007 should prescribe that 008 has a duty to give 007 the kidney. But 008 is an egoist and thinks that he has a moral duty to secure the kidney for himself.

Thus 008 has the moral duty to give 007 the kidney and to not give 007 the kidney.

This seems like an inconsistency.

EE may say that 008 only has the duty to act in 008's best interest.

Thus 008 does not have the moral duty to give the kidney to 007.

But then why should an EE prescribe a principle that is not in 007's best interest.

It would seem that if 007 prescribed that 008 had a moral duty, and this was the correct moral duty, to secure the kidney for himself, then this would conflict with *. Why should 007 prescribe that 008 should act in 008's best interest and not 007's?

If 007 thinks that 008 has the moral duty to secure the kidney for himself (008) then this will harm 007's self-interest. Thus according to ** to prescribe this would be to prescribe something morally wrong.

Stopping 008 would be in 007's best interest, it would be the right thing to do.

But if 008 has an objectively right moral duty to secure the kidney, and if 007 has an objectively right moral duty to stop 008 from getting the kidney, then 007 has the objectively right moral duty to stop 008 from doing the objectively right moral duty. Something has gone wrong. Any ethical theory that prescribes actions whereby one agent has a moral duty to stop another agent from doing their moral duty seems implausible.

But the Egoist can say that it isn't problematic to stop someone from doing his/her duty. For example, soldiers have duties to stop other soldiers from doing their duty. We can separate beliefs from desires, it is claimed. So, a soldier A believes that another soldier B has a duty to his country to make it across enemy lines and plant a bomb at enemy headquarters (A's). But A can desire that B fail. We can just extrapolate to the "kidney war." In other words the belief that 008 ought to get the kidney does not imply that 007 wants 008 to get the kidney.

Two problems, right off the bat: [1] We are talking about objective right and wrong. Applying that to the war, if there is a just and an unjust side, then one is objectively right and the other is objectively wrong. Say soldier A is on the just side. A does not have to believe that B has a duty to get across enemy lines (A's lines) and plant the bomb. A doesn't because A doesn't believe people have duties to commit immoral acts. [2] piggy-backs off of [1]. Any moral theory that implies that you actually want people to commit an immoral act (or that you don't want them to do a morally right act) seems to suffer immediate intuitive problems. There are certainly times that we don't want the morally right side to win. To prevail. But surely we would call this a defect in our character, wouldn't we?

A virtuous person has their duties in line with their desires. I think most agree that there is a moral difference between these two cases: a person who did a right act (did her duty), and did it because she sincerely wanted to do the right thing (her desires); and a person who did a right act (his duty) but did so dragging his feel and moping about it (he didn't desire to do it). An improperly functioning moral agent would be an agent who believes one thing about moral duties, but desire an altogether contrary thing. People who believe that other people have the objective duty to do the immoral thing seem to be impotent in laying blame at the feet of others. If someone is subjectively rational in his moral ideas, then some culpability is avoided.

Another response is one that James Rachels gives in his book Elements of Moral Philosophy (p.83).

Rachels says that the above critique works if one assumes the moral principle it appeals to. Rachels says that the Moral Principle appealed to is this:

[MP] When a moral conflict arises people have the duty to find a solution such that everyone involved can live harmoniously.

Thus the above dilemmas will be resolved "not by application of an ethical principle but by one of them winning the struggle" (ibid).

This seems odd since ethical theories purport to tell us the right way to act in situations. They do this by offering principles which serve as action-guides. In this case, EE fails the determinacy test (see Timmons, Moral Theory, pp. 13-14). No action-guides are offered, rather, do what you have to do to win is the action-guide. This is vague, and so we don't know what to do. If asked "What is the correct answer to a moral dilemma?", the response would be, "Whoever wins the struggle." In this case, what makes an action right would vary from case to case. This fails the theoretical test (see Timmons, ibid, p. 13). Furthermore, the way the argument was set up above is not what is stated in [MP]. The solution is to find the right course of action to take. The duty is to do the right thing, for the right reasons, and out of the right character. This may be harmonious for all involved, but this is simply a by-product of doing the right action. If we are morally virtuous people, then we should all accept the right answer to the question, and thus live in harmony over the decision. But, this need not happen. From a Christian perspective it is right that all people serve and love God rather than, say, money. In this postlapsarian world, this may not get a harmonious response. The point is, the main goal isn't harmony, but harmony would be a by-product if the people were comprised of morally virtuous agents who desired and believed that the right principles should be offered for moral dilemmas.

19 comments:

  1. If it feels good, do it.

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  2. Excellent morality anonymous!

    I think it would feel really good to strap you to the bottom of a lowrider and drive over a speed bump or two.

    Thanks for the permission!

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  3. What kind of lowrider?

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  4. “This seems odd since ethical theories purport to tell us the right way to act in situations. They do this by offering principles which serve as action-guides. In this case, EE fails the determinacy test (see Timmons, Moral Theory, pp. 13-14). No action-guides are offered, rather, do what you have to do to win is the action-guide. This is vague, and so we don't know what to do. If asked "What is the correct answer to a moral dilemma?", the response would be, "Whoever wins the struggle." In this case, what makes an action right would vary from case to case. This fails the theoretical test (see Timmons, ibid, p. 13).”

    Does even Christian ethical theory definitively tell us how to act in *every* situation? What rules does one apply to firmly establish, say, the morality of cloning, or the difference between a birth control pill that that thwarts a pregnancy one nano-second before vs. one nano-second after conception, or the justness of a military strike?

    I find it hard to see how any ethical theory (atheistic or theistic), can be considered absolutely definitive in the sense you seem to require. It seems to me that person-to-person (dare I say subjective) variables come into play even when well meaning Christians weigh moral choices.

    You’ve shot holes in atheistic moral principles because they fail as recipes for proper actions in *all* cases; what alternative theistic moral principle would you offer that is foolproof in all cases? And if you can’t find something that is foolproof (works definitively in all cases), why require the same from the atheist before you’ll grant that he’s arrived at a legitimate secular ethical system?

    Thanks,

    Andrew

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  5. Hi Andrew,

    I never mentioned "*difinitive*" nor "*every*" in my critique.

    These critiques are also not unique to Christian theism. These are some of the standard critiques in the literature.

    I also don't "require" an ethic to be "absolutley dinfinitive" in telling you how to act in "every" situation.

    And, I also agree that different details in different situations affect the actions required in those situations, for the most part. Hence I don't think that lying is always wrong. For example, it would not be immoral if you were to lie to a mad man who was looking for someone you were hiding in your house and tell him that they went the other way.

    So, I'd say that your response is way off base, and, you assume a lot about me and my views on ethics in it.

    My critique of EE was a bit more robust than you make it out to be. And, the main critique wasn't even what you quote. Furthermore, my point was that a principle purports to tell us what to do in a situation. It serves as an action guide. My complaint with Rachels' egoist telling us that dilemma are resolved *without* principles. The point is that if one gives a principle one is intendeing to provide an action guide. My critique was that the EE in Rachels' book (Rachels is not an EE, by the way, so he critiques them as well) gave a "principle" that didn't serve as an action guide.

    I also made a point about the *theoretical* aspecty of a moral theory (the last sentence you quote from me) which is *different* than the "action-guide" critique. Since you didn't offer comments on that, I'm not sure why you included it in your comment.

    You asked, "what alternative theistic moral principle would you offer that is foolproof in all cases?"

    I don't think there is "a" principle that provides the relevant information needed to know what to do in every moral principle.

    Part of the problem is that too many ethical theories focus on one slice of the whole. There are valid points in consequentialism, deontologism, and virtue ethics. But when one focuses on just one, the ethical theory will falter. Indeed, some theories that are very detailed, give precise and detailed action-guides, are knows as being very relevant but lack authority. So, the response there is, "Who says." So, Confucious can make a list of almost every situation and say, "Confucious say, X," and the response is, "Yeah, so what? Buddah say, Y."

    And so we'd need to include a standard, a consequence, as well as a motive/character account into our evaluation of ethical situations. Into our account of principles that serve as action guides.

    For example, one that would need to be included in the "intention" aspect is:

    1 Corinthians 10:31
    So whether you eat or drink or whatever you do, do it all for the glory of God.

    Most ethicists break up intention and character so they have 4 compartments of ethical evaluations. I don't mind putting 3 and 4 together into one "existential" compartment. Thus intent is part of it but this needs to flow from a good character. This can only be acheived by the regenerateing work of the Holy Spirit. "For it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:12).

    That's not enough. The goal needs to be a good goal as well. Good acts actually do good. Here the glory of God and human flourishing will be good results acheived. The proclmation/defense of the gospel, etc.

    One also needs a norm or a standard that serves as the normative standard that is objectively the right thing to do and is also universalizable. That is, all people in relavantly similar situations must adhere to the norm.

    Of course this is a very sketchy and mountain-top vista of my position. if you'd like to get a more thorough view of where my sympathies lie (with a few disagreements here and there) then I'd like to point you to what will make up Frame third entry of his Doctirine series:

    http://theologica.blogspot.com/2006/01/frame-doctrine-of-christian-life.html

    Anyway, my answer was probably too rough for you, so that's why I included the link to the book (it hasn't made it to the printing press, yet). My main point is that I think you misunderstood the nature of what I was saying, and also made some conjectures regarding what my position entails. I'd add that the secularists who give these same types of critiques don't think you have to have a "definitve answer for ever situation," yet they still make the critiques. So perhaps you have gone too far?

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  6. "Our God is in the heavens; He does whatever He pleases" Ps. 115:3

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  7. arb said...

    "Our God is in the heavens; He does whatever He pleases" Ps. 115:3

    12/18/2007 6:32 AM

    **********

    Leviticus 11:45
    I am the LORD who brought you up out of Egypt to be your God; therefore be holy, because I am holy.

    Genesis 18:25
    Far be it from you to do such a thing—to kill the righteous with the wicked, treating the righteous and the wicked alike. Far be it from you! Will not the Judge of all the earth do right?"

    Hebrews 6:18
    God did this so that, by two unchangeable things in which it is impossible for God to lie,

    Yes, God does as He pleases, but he is constrained by his holy and just nature.

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  8. Andrew said,

    "You’ve shot holes in atheistic moral principles"

    Let me add that, even though I don't agree with this, many atheists and Christians, even, have said that the Bible teaches egoism. So, it isn't *clear* that this is an "atheistic* morality.

    In fact, many atheists (and others) would say that Psychological Egoism is true, and so Ethical Egoism should follow.

    Psychological Egoism (and a couple of other brief points) will make up my next, and final, entry on egoism.

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  9. Manata says:

    "I don't think that lying is always wrong."

    HA!!!! That isn't a shock to long time TBlog readers.

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  10. Almost as shocking as the value of anonymous comments.

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  11. Manata "Yes, God does as He pleases, but he is constrained by his holy and just nature."

    Either God does as he pleases (as the Scriptures say), or he doesn't. There's no "but" about it.

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  12. believer, another way of saying what Paul said is that, God does as He pleases, and what pleases him will be in accord with his holy and just nature.

    Or, is there no "and" about it? It is best to get past words and get the the meaning of the words. Same with sentences (i.e. get to the propositions). It's even better to not make sophistic comments.

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  13. Perhaps I have over-reached in my interpretation of your post. Still, I have trouble reconciling a statements like these:

    “I never mentioned ‘*difinitive*’ nor ‘*every*’ in my critique"

    and

    "I also don't ‘require’ an ethic to be ‘absolutley dinfinitive’ in telling you how to act in ‘every’ situation”,

    as well as,

    "I don't think there is 'a' principle that provides the relevant information needed to know what to do in every moral principle."

    With your subsequent statement:

    “One also needs a norm or a standard that serves as the normative standard that is objectively the right thing to do and is also universalizable.”

    How does one establish the objectivity and universality of an ethical standard if it isn’t definitive in its application?

    Thanks for the link, by the way. Maybe it’ll clear-up my confusion…Andrew

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  14. Hi Andrew,

    "How does one establish the objectivity and universality of an ethical standard if it isn’t definitive in its application?"

    I meant by "difinitive" and "every" that there was *one* norm that applied to *every* circumsatnce. So, there are norms that are difinitive action-guides for *particular* circumstances. Truth telling may be the definitive norm in situation A, but not B.

    Egoism is a brand of ethical monism - one general norm that is supposed to cover *every* circumstance. I think this is flawed. That's why they ran into problems and their norm didn't do what it claimed. Morality is more complicated, so a plurality of features must be brought into account.

    So, standard must be taken into account, but so must motives and goals. Principles must be had, but situations must be looked at too. A principle is the correct principle for certain situations, not others. They are universalizable in that for all *relevantly similar situations* that principle would apply. That doesn't mean that we universalize the principle to situations relevantly *different* that the one we were looking at.

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  15. believer said...
    Manata "Yes, God does as He pleases, but he is constrained by his holy and just nature."

    Either God does as he pleases (as the Scriptures say), or he doesn't. There's no "but" about it.

    12/18/2007 7:23 PM

    **********

    Caleb already answered you.

    God does what he pleases, correct... BUT he has a nature that constraines what he pleases.... SO you can't take that verse to imply that God could, say, sin...SINCE there's a limit set on what he can please to do...THUS it is true that God does what he pleases but this doesn't lead to arbitrainess as your enthymeme suggested.

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  16. “Egoism is a brand of ethical monism - one general norm that is supposed to cover *every* circumstance. I think this is flawed. That's why they ran into problems and their norm didn't do what it claimed. Morality is more complicated, so a plurality of features must be brought into account.”

    But you wouldn’t mean to say that an ethical system is definitive just in case the correct plurality of individual ethical systems are adjoined under the rubric “universally correct ethical system”, since such a collection would still constitute an ethical system and would thereby be subject to the same sort of critique you’ve been leveling against EE.

    Rather, you seem to wish to avoid committing yourself to any predefined ethical system altogether, since such systematization will invariably lead to failures under certain circumstances. I empathize with that impulse, but I also see it as precluding universalization of any ethical system. I mean, to universalize and objectify moral norms, wouldn’t I need to define them exhaustively and up front?

    “So, standard must be taken into account, but so must motives and goals. Principles must be had, but situations must be looked at too. A principle is the correct principle for certain situations, not others. They are universalizable in that for all *relevantly similar situations* that principle would apply. That doesn't mean that we universalize the principle to situations relevantly *different* that the one we were looking at.”

    In line with the above comments, I guess the question would be, what hope is there in establishing a universal and objective ethical system unless there is some *definitive* method for establishing what all the “relevantly similar situations” are?

    Andrew

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  17. Tuesday, December 18, 2007

    Touchstone said....

    Great Moments in Calvinist Apologetics #239

    Paul Manata in the comment stream of this post:

    "God does what he pleases, correct... BUT he has a nature that constraines what he pleases.... SO you can't take that verse to imply that God could, say, sin...SINCE there's a limit set on what he can please to do...THUS it is true that God does what he pleases but this doesn't lead to arbitrainess as your enthymeme suggested."

    So, who sets this "limit", Paul? Did God please to set his own limit, or has God submitted to external limits?

    Classic!

    **********

    His nature sets the limit. As I said above:

    "but he is constrained by his holy and just nature."

    Let me give Touchstoner an analogy. Touchstone can do a lot, but he can't bear children. Why? Because his nature limits that sort of thing.

    Or, for example, he can't trun into a non-person. Why? Because by nature he is essentially a person.

    Let's see what Touchstner has said on his Evangolutionist blog:

    "As a Christian, I’m committed to the authority of the Bible as God’s special revelation to man."

    http://evangelutionist.com/blog1/about/

    So, the Bible is *authoritative.*

    So, Ps. 115:3 is "God’s special revelation to man."

    So, God told Touchstoner that "He can do whatsover he pleaseth."

    Now, there are two options: either the "whatsover" is a universal quantifier, or it isn't.

    If it is, does Touchstoner think that if God pleased to kill himself, to end his existence, he could? Or, how about if it pleased him to lie? Or, how about making 1+1=500? Or, if he pleased to make a square circle, could he?

    If he can't do those things, then he is "limited." So, Touchstoner, what limits him? Did God please to set nhis own limit, or is it external?

    Classic!

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  18. Hi Andrew,

    "But you wouldn’t mean to say that an ethical system is definitive just in case the correct plurality of individual ethical systems are adjoined under the rubric “universally correct ethical system”, since such a collection would still constitute an ethical system and would thereby be subject to the same sort of critique you’ve been leveling against EE."

    It wouldn't be subject to the same critique I subjected EE to. I suggest you read my post again (and, as I said, the main critique I offered wasn't the one you're bringing up, but that's fine).

    I wouldn't say that one should "join" all the various systems into one giant system. Id' go along with what was proposed in the link to the book I gave you. It's not just a "collection" of various ethical systems, though it does bear some similarities. Furthermore, just a point of logic, that *each individial* system may falter that doesn't mean that *combined* systems would falter. That's the fallacy of composition.

    "Rather, you seem to wish to avoid committing yourself to any predefined ethical system altogether, since such systematization will invariably lead to failures under certain circumstances."

    I gave you a book thnat I said I was for the most part committed to.

    "In line with the above comments, I guess the question would be, what hope is there in establishing a universal and objective ethical system unless there is some *definitive* method for establishing what all the “relevantly similar situations” are?"

    I guess I don't know what you mean. For example, a man's skin color isn't a relvant dissimilarity. So, why think I can tell him a non-truth because he is purple, say? On the other hand, a man looking to kill his wife, whom I am hiding, seems to be a morally relevant dissimilarity. I gues if you don't think it is, then you can make that case. Or, take the law in the Bible about putting a fence around your roof? Am I bound by that law? No. It seems to me that there is morally relevant information that makes that *specific* law invalid - such as no one parties a top houses any more. But, the principle: take procautions to protect innocent life from being taken at your property can serve as an action guide, viz., fence around swimming pool, fix the broken step, cover electrical sockets.

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  19. Sounds like Touchstone is obsessed with you guys, his blog posts are childish, petty rants that offer absolutely zero intelelctual stimulation. In other words, he's simply making an ass of himself. I suggest you guys don't even bother with his picayune comments. That's just my opinion.

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