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Ashamed of Their Ancestry
A while back, I was reading the idthefuture site, where I was referred to an article at an apologetics site on materialism. Joe Carter, in the article, "The Mystical Monkey Mind: Four Common Errors of Naturalistic Epistemology," presented a quote from Darwin which I saw pop up again the other day:
“With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has always been developed from the mind of lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”
It appears, at first glance, a serious problem: if our minds are "just" monkey brains, why do we trust them? But, as is attributed to Solomon as being said, "The first to present his case seems right, until another comes along to examine him." (Prov 18:17, NIV) Let us examine the argument posed by Joe, Paul Manata, and others.
First, should Darwin's opinion on the matter, without presenting any particular argument for support, hold any weight? Not really. After all, this seems quite self-refuting -- if the man who pieced together the case that we descended from great apes then concluded our minds untrustworthy for that reason, then his "case" is obviously imperiled. In fact, we might make a simple conclusion from this statement: it is self-refuting. Just like making the statement, "I always lie," there is no way to escape the circular destruction of this logic. If your mind's convictions are not trustworthy, how do you even convince yourself of, or trust in, the validity of that conviction?
http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2006/07/ashamed-of-their-ancestry.html
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Danny doesn’t understand what a dilemma is. Darwin’s argument is self-refuting in the sense that it poses a dilemma:
We rely on our minds to construct a philosophy of mind. But what if our philosophy of mind undermines rationality?
If our minds are reliable, then a philosophy of mind that undermines rationality is a self-refuting philosophy.
So the problem would not be with my mind, but with my philosophy of mind.
If, however, you’re going to stick with a philosophy of mind that undermines rationality, then that does, indeed, pose an intractable dilemma.
The fact that you are rational doesn’t prove that your philosophy of mind is equally rational.
The fact that Darwin was rational doesn’t prove that Darwinism is rational. Evolutionary epistemology could well be self-refuting.
“Also, this argument to reject the soundness of the human mind may be a variant of the genetic fallacy -- based on a categorical rejection of an argument or idea simply based on where it originated, rather than on sound reasoning.”
The genetic fallacy is not always a fallacy. If someone is psychotic, or if someone is high on acid, then we do discount his observation about pink rats running amok in the cellar.
Conversely, there can be a valid argument from authority if the expert witness is truly an expert in his field, and is speaking within his area of expertise.
“What intrinsic feature of monkeys, (apes, actually) or any other higher mammal makes their minds innately untrustworthy? In fact, we can take this a step further, given that Darwin's conclusion about the origins of man are correct, and claim that this actually substantiates the trustworthiness of our minds!”
That’s something of a red herring. The real issue is whether an unreliable process can yield a reliable result.
If natural selection was never designed to select for rationality, then why should we assume that a brain which is the incidental byproduct of natural selection enjoy a reliable purchase on the truth?
“I would argue that there are good reasons to trust ape minds -- they have survived the perils of nature for millions of years, and along the way, learned that they could trust the natural world around them to provide constancy. Those minds that were the brightest, that developed innovative methods for catching fish or making spears, were most likely to exist in a social structure in which this knowledge could be shared and propogate throughout their progeny.”
The problem with this argument is the absence of any connection between rationality and survivability.
Coach roaches survive just fine without higher cortical functions.
So what makes Morgan think that intelligence confers a survival advantage when so many species lack higher consciousness?
Of course, a Christian would attribute their survival to the rationality of the Creator.
“Because human beings are part of the natural universe, and are products of that universe, they will always be limited in their perspective on certain features of the universe. That warrants skepticism. It does not, however, warrant throwing out those things we have learned from nature, secrets that we have wrested away from the blind, mute, and uncaring universe.”
Danny is now begging the question by assuming that we’re rational. But is this confidence justified by his evolutionary worldview?
“Why should we abandon trust in the regularity and uniformity of nature, when it has brought us this far? Why should we relegate the method of testing and applying knowledge tentatively, until it proves itself (via the scientific method, or in pragmatic real life experience) enough for us to "trust" it, to the trash can? That method is what led to tools, and to skyscrapers. Its success is as apparent as our own existence, and with tangiable results that "trust" alone has never given us.”
All he’s done here is to assume that secularism is true.
How would a world characterized by divine creation, providence, and miraculous intervention be any less livable?
“Why trust a monkey mind? If we want to survive, we must trust our minds. If we do not want to be self-refuting, we must trust our minds.”
A man who’s high on acid has to trust his mind. It’s still the only mind he’s got, even if it’s delusional in its altered state of consciousness.
It would still be “self-refuting” for a man who’s too stoned to think straight to doubt his mental faculties.
Unfortunately, his self-refuting argument won’t cushion the fall as he leaps from a skyscraper.
“That said, need we trust its convictions as if they are representative of the permanance and inviolate laws of nature? Of course not. Don't trust it absolutely. Test its convictions against the sounding board of Nature.”
Poor little Danny never gets the point of the argument. If the rationality of an evolutionary brain is the very point at issue, then “testing its convictions against the sounding board of nature” is a futile exercise since we can only know if we pass or fail the test by assuming that our mind is reliable is a reliable instrument to tally the score. How can an incorrect mind correct a test?
A psychotic doesn’t know until he hits the pavement that he flunked the test, at which point it’s a little late in the game to cram for the next exam.
“I would flip the table on our special creationist friends and ask, if instead of the uniformity of nature, and the laws of physics, our minds were the products of some divine fiat or "poof" mechanism, why should we trust that?”
Ah, back to “poof.” Danny is Babinski’s loyal little parakeet. Babinski teaches Danny to say “poof” on cue, and so he does, time and again, as if his mastery of baby -talk were a substitute for rational discourse.
Let’s see: why would we trust a mind that’s the artifact of rational designer? Gee, I’m stumped.
“While we can know our universe to at least a limited extent, and recognize that its symmetry, its uniformity, and its material properties give rise to minds…”
Do material properties “give rise” to minds? Perhaps Danny can show us a slide set of material properties “giving rise” to mental properties.
What are we looking for? Swirls of smoke spelling the alphabet?
“We know nothing of ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’. We know nothing of what those substances are, how they contribute to mind, and what properties they would confer to mind.”
Danny’s like a man who can’t find his glasses because he’s wearing them. Wherever did he put them? He’s turned his apartment upside down, but he can’t find his glasses anywhere. He must have lost them on the bus. Or was it the locker room? Maybe the café? He does everything but look in the mirror.
Danny is a self-admitted know-nothing because he only studies one side of the argument. If he did some serious reading in philosophy of mind, he’d at least be conversant with the range of positions and their respective supporting arguments.
Although Danny is training to be a scientist, he lacks intellectual curiosity. Danny won’t debate the likes of me because I don’t “play by the rules.”
And it’s true that I won’t play poker with a card sharp.
Danny has been taught the rules, and he does what he’s told. One must never question the rules. The rules are immutable and indubitable.
The game may be out of touch with reality, but what matters is to play by the rules.
A tornado may rip away the roof of the casino, but the game goes on. The walls may be gone, but the game goes on.
The city may be leveled, but you must never take your eyes off the table.
That’s because there is no reality outside the game. The rules dictate what’s real. The rules erect their own walls to shield secular prejudice from falsification.
Poor little Danny never gets the point of the argument.
ReplyDeleteAnd poor little Steve should note that I laid aside the question of soul/spirit (and thus whether or not God was involved) to make this simpler. The point is -- what part of "poof" is more reason-conferring than descent with modification (if telic)?
We rely on our minds to construct a philosophy of mind. But what if our philosophy of mind undermines rationality?
The origin of our mind is not the same thing as a philosophy of mind.
If our minds are reliable, then a philosophy of mind that undermines rationality is a self-refuting philosophy.
Fine. So now, it is time to present a "philosophy of mind" which undermines rationality as an example, rather than simply leaving an open and presumed connection between evolution and some reason-nullifying philosophy of mind that necessarily follows.
The fact that Darwin was rational doesn’t prove that Darwinism is rational. Evolutionary epistemology would well be self-refuting.
But if Darwin's mind, and all of ours, are rendered by their creative process irrational, then it does prove that every "conviction" / theory we have developed with our minds are indeed irrational as well. No product of a completely irrational mind can be rational, can it? You seem to be looking into the barrel of the gun when you consider the converse.
That’s something of a red herring. The real issue is whether an unreliable process can yield a reliable result.
Is it? The trainability of dogs and other mammals is quite reliable. Their minds are the result of solely natural processes (versus a soul, or spirit, right?). If their minds perform reliably, how is that a red herring to insist that evolution need not produce unreliable minds?
How can a process which solely confers selective advantage for survival be considered "unreliable"? The mechanism of random mutation isn't "reliable" in the sense that "you never know what you'll get", but natural selection certainly is -- you'll always get populations of organisms which confer survival-advantageous traits to their offspring.
If natural selection was never designed to select for rationality, then why should we assume that a brain which is the incidental byproduct of natural selection enjoy a reliable purchase on the truth?
You're taking this a bit far. The "convictions" in the quote only refer to a degree of reliability in their perceptions. I admitted "degree" when I said skepticism is warranted.
The issue here is not whether the mind can be trusted. It must be. It's how far.
Part of how this ties into survival is in whether or not our sense perception, and how our minds interpret our senses, function in a "trustworthy" manner or not. We develop convictions from these most basic of mental functions. Survival certainly depends upon them. So it really isn't a question of whether or not we can trust our minds...but "how far?"
Coach roaches survive just fine without higher cortical functions.
So what makes Morgan think that intelligence confers a survival advantage when so many species lack higher consciousness?
I didn't say that survival depends on intelligence in all organisms, but certainly in those which have little or no natural defense capability, and whose offspring are extremely fragile, and who only reproduce at about 1/1000th the rate of cockroaches, must develop some offsetting survival mechanisms. Ours were tool-making and socialization, just like the other apes.
Do material properties “give rise” to minds? Perhaps Danny can show us a slide set of material properties “giving rise” to mental properties.
The rest of this is bunk. I simply meant that we know the brain, and we know that [in this universe] without a brain, there is no mind. Even you don't disagree with that as a dualist. We can point to neurons and watch them fire off and correlate that to mental activity. I'm not saying that this is "all there is to mind". I made it clear that I was trying to ignore the question of the existence of the soul/spirit, and focus on the process by which mind exists -- whether by divine fiat / poof, or by evolutionary processes. You have expended a lot of energy in ignoring this.
Let’s see: why would we trust a mind that’s the artifact of rational designer? Gee, I’m stumped.
Poor Steve. He's like a man who thinks he's lost his glasses, but has them on top of his head. It need not rule out a Creator to conclude that apes are our ancestors. Poor little Steve only sees things his way -- God "poofed" or God is not. Minds are "only matter" and evolved, or minds are "poofed" and divinely created in an instant.
The creation myth may be leveled, but you must never take your eyes off of the big picture, Steve -- your God is not a creation myth...right?
Thanks Triablogue for taking note at your blog of something I wrote concerning evolution and/or the brain-mind question. See also the list of resources and links I have compiled. (By the way I don't think you're being fair to Danny, you called him my "parakeet?")
ReplyDeleteI have been discussing brain-mind matters with the Christian philosopher Vic Reppert for years, even before his book was published and before he began his blog. See Vic's blog, named after his book, "C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea." I am a fan of Vic's expertise and composure, including his acknowledgment of arguments contrary to his philosophical and theological opinions. There is agnosticism mingled with his Christian faith--a healthy proportion--so far as I can tell. But that comes from his willingness to remain informed by all sides and to remain aware of unanswered questions and uncertain variables.
One might take note especially of some comments made by Vic concerning intellectual performances by freethinkers Drange (arguing against a proponent of Bahnsen's views) and Parsons in debates with Christian philosophers. Apparently Vic and even the younger Christian philosopher, Jason, have been impressed by some points freethinkers Drange and Parsons have raised.
Vic also admits that there are a variety of views held even by Christian philosophers regarding the brain-mind question, including pro-physicalist views. See also the Christian debate book published in May 2005, In Search Of The Soul: Four Views Of The Mind-body Problem, published by Inter-Varsity (the same Christian press that published Vic's book, C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea, two years previously) there are some “physicalistic” views represented. See also this book published Jan. 2006 Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Current Issues in Theology) And Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature And Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate
My own comments can be found at Vic's blog and in a few articles at my website.
I’d sooner give science at least a couple more centuries of patient investigation of the brain-mind before coming out with premature proofs or disproofs. I also suspect that brain-minds do not come together all at once, but that just as the brain develops, a mind also take time and a wealth of experiences to develop and incorporates more sensory input and data each second than any of us are consciously aware of, and that even at the moments of creation of memories of the untold numbers of things we each experience, we are probably unconscious of all the initial connections between each memory that happen at their creation inside our brain-minds, and all the thoughts we later take for granted and the connections they have with reality are likewise taken for granted as something automatic, but in fact it all took a lifetime to build up.
There is also the question of "commonsense" responses to the brain-mind question, and of "commsense" itself, as elucidated in an article in The Philosopher's Magazine by David Papineau, Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College, London and author of The Roots of Reason and Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford University Press). Papineau's article is titled, "The Tyranny of Commonsense," and in it he says, "Everyday thinking embodies a rich structure of assumptions about the mind, and it is by no means clear that all these assumptions are sound. In particular, there are many recent scientific findings that cast substantial doubt on our intuitive view of the mind. For a start, take Benjamin Libet's work on the genesis of actions. Libet's experiments indicate that, at least when it comes to basic bodily movements, our conscious choices occur a full third of a second after neural activity in the brain begins to prompt the behaviour. This certainly casts doubt on our intuitive conviction that our actions are instigated by our conscious choices. Again, the work of David Milner and Melvyn Goodale on the separation of the dorsal and ventral streams in visual processing (the “where” and “what” streams) suggests that our basic bodily movements aren't guided by our conscious visual awareness but by some more basic mechanism. And then there are the many experiments on “change blindness.” These show that we often fail to see large visible changes occurring right in front of us, and so question the intuitive compelling idea that we are aware of pretty much everything within our field of vision. However, when philosophers come across this kind of work, they don't view it as an exciting challenge to the everyday view of the mind. Rather, their first reaction is to distrust the interpretation of the scientific experiments. In their view, there is no way that our everyday view of the mind can be threatened by scientific findings. Our intuitive conception of the mind is sacrosanct, so there must be something wrong with scientific arguments that cast doubt on it."
See also the book, The Illusion of Conscious Will, which has generated plenty of controversy. (Perform an exact match in google)
Speaking of my own view, I happen to agree that there is something to the view that the brain-mind involves a form of "emergence" since surprising phenomena do occur if and when certain things are aligned in certain ways, as the Christian brain physiologist (also a founder of the journal, Experimental Brain Science) D. M. MacKay pointed out in his book The Clockwork Image (Intervarsity Press), in which he argued that an immaterial soul might not be true, but instead recreation by God into another matrix after death). "Emergence" was also championed by a non-Christian philosopher of brain science, Roger Sperry. Studying “emergence” scientifically will take quite some time. There’s much left to explore and consider.
Andrew M. Bailey, a young philosopher at the Christian college of BIOLA lists some reasons he too is attracted to physicalism (of an emergent yet non-reductive sort), adding in his blog that “substance dualism remains a (miniscule) minority position among philosophers of mind, despite the traction that more modest forms of dualism have recently found. Substance dualists like J.P. Moreland (and the rest of the Biola crew) [not to forget Platinga] do not yet have reason for triumphal celebrations.” See also here and here.