Enloe said:
<< You're asking the question about ministerial authority the wrong way. Ministerial authority (even when in an ancient document) is personal, not abstract, and we don't deal with persons like we deal with geometry textbooks. There is no way to give you a "detailed theory" of when a person should heed and when a person should reject ministerial authority. There are, to be sure, historical examples from which we can draw instruction, as e.g., Athanasius vs. the Arians, Luther vs. the popes of his day, and Machen vs. Liberalism. But all of these things were personal conflicts dealing with incarnated reality, not abstract propositions residing in books. Flesh-and-blood reality cannot be reduced to propositions, much less to axioms, so your question is misconceived. Submission is more of a wisdom issue than a logic issue. >>
This is a half-truth. Ministerial authority may be personal, but revealed truth is propositional and abstract.
Luther, Machen, and Athanasius were acting on their understanding of certain abstract propositions revealed in Scripture. They were opposing true propositions to false propositions.
Either they were right, or they were wrong. Either their beliefs were true, or they were false.
They were persons acting on propositions. So truth is prior to belief, and belief is prior to behavior.
Yes, submission is a question of personal discretion, but that, in turn, is a question of where we think the truth lies. We act on our understanding, or misunderstanding, of the truth.
No, there is no algorithm for how or when to apply the rule of faith (sola Scriptura). But that is distinct from the rule of faith itself. Our rule of faith is susceptible to a “detailed theory.”
<< I continue to deny your demand that I provide some kind of explanation or alternative theory to the 1982 Chicago Statement. That Statement is simply not the necessary benchmark for orthodoxy that you seem to take it to be, so it's not incumbent on me to provide you with a detailed counter-theory. Christians were faithfully confessing the inerrancy of the Scriptures for many centuries before the rise of 19th century Presbyterian Baconianism that, through many twists and turns, gave birth to some of the categories that ultimately informed the Chicago Statement. Why can't I simply rest content in the corporate confession, without having a mechanical theory? The burden of proof is actually on you to explain why I OUGHT to have a mechanical theory. >>
i) To repeat myself ad nauseum, you were the one who originally introduced the Chicago Statement as a point of reference, not me.
ii) You also seem to be giving different, and not entirely consistent, answers for why you won’t respond. One answer is that it’s been so long since you’ve studied this issue that you’re not prepared to venture an opinion.
But, then, in this latest reply, you present a very distinct point of disagreement. For you regard the Chicago Statement as heir to a “mechanical” theory of inspiration, which is, in turn, heir to a Baconian epistemology.
Other issues aside, I don’t know why you attribute a mechanical theory of inspiration to 19C Presbyterian theology. Warfield, for one, was a champion of the organic theory of inspiration. Do you not know that? The organic theory is also on display in article 8 of the Chicago Statement.
iii) In addition, the larger issue is not what causal model we posit for inspiration, in terms of the precise relation between the divine and human agents.
Rather, the larger issue is the effect of whatever causal model we posit. For example, does our theory affirm or deny the self-witness of Scripture?
Does our theory affirm or deny the plenary verbal inspiration of Scripture? Does our theory affirm or deny the constantive character of Scripture? Does our theory affirm or deny the presence of historical and scientific errors in the teaching of Scripture?
<< As for how we subjectively enjoy access to "objective" reality, my basic answer is that we only enjoy that access subjectively. We are creatures. We cannot transcend created finitude and see things the way God does (i.e., timelessly). Our access to "objective" reality is always conditioned by our incarnated situation. Some sloppy thinkers like to claim that this makes "truth" impossible, but really all it does is uphold a facet of the Creator / creature distinction by reminding us of who and what we are. It doesn't make epistemology relativistic; it just makes epistemology messy. >>
This is a false antithesis, for the question is whether God has entered into our subjectivity. No, we cannot reproduce the divine mode of knowledge. But if Scripture is divine revelation, then Scripture does afford us a partial, God’s-eye glimpse of reality.
Likewise, the subjective dimension is not a God-free zone, but is under the same providential control as the objective dimension.
This is going to get really hard to keep track of if you keep making new posts to deal with every comment that occurs on an older post. But oh well, it's your blog, so you can do as you wish.
ReplyDeleteMy brief responses to your post; again, your words in italics:
(1) This is a half-truth. Ministerial authority may be personal, but revealed truth is propositional and abstract.
Not all revealed truth is propositional and abstract. Jesus Christ, the Word made Flesh, is not a proposition nor an abstraction. But that's an easy one that nobody would even think of disputing. For more examples of non-propositional, non-abstract revealed truth, see the historical and poetical books of the Old Testament, or the apocalyptic of the prophetic books. There are propositions contained in these books, but the form of the revelation in these books is not itself propositional. I.e., narrative and verse are not propositions. In the world that God made (as opposed to the world that the Greeks wished the gods had made) "truth" simply is not confined to propositions, but takes all kinds of other forms as well. In particular, it takes forms that relate to beauty and goodness, and the trio thus make up "the three faces of culture."
(2) Yes, submission is a question of personal discretion, but that, in turn, is a question of where we think the truth lies. We act on our understanding, or misunderstanding, of the truth.
No, this is not always the case. Many times we act out of trust or lack of trust of people. Even if or when the basis of authority is an abstract proposition (which is not always, as I've said) it is acted on by people. Propositionas cannot be RIGIDLY separated from people. This is an implied endorsement of gnosticism in the sense of the elevation of "more important mind" (or "spirit") over "mere matter." That's the problem with all the proposition-talk in Reformish circles: it's not that there are no propositions in Christianity and that they aren't important, it's just that Christianity isn't REDUCIBLE to propositions.
(3) i) To repeat myself ad nauseum, you were the one who originally introduced the Chicago Statement as a point of reference, not me.
ii) You also seem to be giving different, and not entirely consistent, answers for why you won’t respond. One answer is that it’s been so long since you’ve studied this issue that you’re not prepared to venture an opinion.
Your nausea aside I once again repeat that the ONLY reason I introduced the Chicago Statement was because I knew I had readers whose minds are so small and rigid that they would have missed all the most important points of the articles to which I linked because ALL they would see was "Gasp! This person denies inerrancy!" Which, even if it was true (it's not true in my case, but I don't know about Hunter's) would not materially impact the REST of the articles. But Fundamentalists generally don't know how to read past things that offend their shallow and delicate sensibilities, so I tried to head them off at the past.
I'm not going to play games about "consistency." No one is ever fully consistent all the time, and in fact, ordinary discussion ordinarily has all kinds of facets and angles to it that PREVENT total consistency. To you I'm being "inconsistent", but to me, regarding the angle of being prepared to directly quote the Chicago Statement and engage it exegetically I'm not prepared, while regarding the angle of being able to generally see the reasons why Hunter brought the Chicago Statement into the picture, I am quite prepared. Two different angles on the same question. "Consistency" simply isn't a factor here.
(4) But, then, in this latest reply, you present a very distinct point of disagreement. For you regard the Chicago Statement as heir to a “mechanical” theory of inspiration, which is, in turn, heir to a Baconian epistemology.
Other issues aside, I don’t know why you attribute a mechanical theory of inspiration to 19C Presbyterian theology. Warfield, for one, was a champion of the organic theory of inspiration. Do you not know that? The organic theory is also on display in article 8 of the Chicago Statement.
I think you misunderstand my reference to "mechanism." I am aware of distinctions between the "mechanical" theory of inspiration (i.e., the dictation theory) and the "organic" theory of inspiration (i.e., as in Article 8). In fact, against your friends James White and Eric Svendsen I have often deployed Warfield's illustration of revelation being like light poured through stained-glass windows as proof that their rather odd concept that mediating factors on our thinking such as history and culture make knowing truth and doing exegesis impossible. The distinction you're talking about is not the set of concepts to which I was referring by the term "mechanism." I don't have time to repeat myself on 19th century Baconianism. I've recently written several blog posts about the subject, so you can read them if you want to see something about what I mean by referencing "mechanism."
(5) Rather, the larger issue is the effect of whatever causal model we posit. For example, does our theory affirm or deny the self-witness of Scripture?
Does our theory affirm or deny the plenary verbal inspiration of Scripture? Does our theory affirm or deny the constantive character of Scripture? Does our theory affirm or deny the presence of historical and scientific errors in the teaching of Scripture?
I'm having trouble understanding why you're spending so much time on the issue of inerrancy relative to ME. I have already told you that I affirm the inerrancy of Scripture. It's a waste of time for you to try to debate the subject with me or make that subject a filter through which to examine my views. The benchmark of orthodoxy about Scripture simply isn't a provincial statement made by a sub-group of Evangelicals in the year of the Lord's incarnation one thousand nine hundred and eighty two. Lots of cool stuff about Scripture happened long before R.C. Sproul and the other men were ever born, and lots of cool stuff about Scripture will happen after we are all gone to be with the Lord. This provincial Evangelical doctrinal statement about Scripture just isn't the end-all be-all of discussion.
(6) This is a false antithesis, for the question is whether God has entered into our subjectivity. No, we cannot reproduce the divine mode of knowledge. But if Scripture is divine revelation, then Scripture does afford us a partial, God’s-eye glimpse of reality.
Likewise, the subjective dimension is not a God-free zone, but is under the same providential control as the objective dimension.
Well, it may be a false antithesis to you, because your view of the objective-subjective relationship might in fact be a lot more nuanced than that of other prominent Internet Evangelicals by whom I've been unfortunate enough to be repeatedly bludgeoned. I agree that because Scripture is divine revelation it does afford us "a partial, God’s-eye glimpse of reality"--that is, I agree in the sense that this is God telling us what He omnisciently knows we need to know for faith and life. But I will continue to resist any connotation placed upon "God's-eye glimpse of reality" which imagines that, say, by learning how to proficiently technologically-manipulate the Greek language, we can separate ourselves from our finitude and get at an absolutely unconditioned Platonic-Form like "Truth" that partakes of no mediating limitations because it is "purely" abstract and "merely" propositional. This sort of view is untrue to the form in which Scripture presents itself to us. Again, see the historical and poetical and apocalyptical genres, which, per Article 8 of the Chicago Statement must have been sovereignly used by God to convey truth that we can know--and that DESPITE the fact that all such non-propositional things are "biases" and involve quite a large bit of subjectivity.
Oops, aside from a couple of minor typos, I didn't finish one of the sentences. Here's the correction:
ReplyDelete"In fact, against your friends James White and Eric Svendsen I have often deployed Warfield's illustration of revelation being like light poured through stained-glass windows as proof of the falsity of their rather odd concept that mediating factors on our thinking such as history and culture make knowing truth and doing exegesis impossible. "