<< And again, it doesn't matter whether either Thomism or Molinism is true in the present context. << Just to clarify a point: Steve, you suggest that I have misunderstood your "satire," and made the error of taking it literally. Well, yes, I did take it basically literally (with the exception of the literary device of having "God" do the talking) because it is expressing the very same point you made throughout the post. To wit: "Yet there is no place for predestination when the creature can negate the plan of God. Indeed, there is no room for foreknowledge when the creature can either say 'yes' or 'no' to God."
Is _that_ passage meant satirically? >>
No, that passage is non-satirical. There I’m speaking seriously.
Of course, satire is a humorous way of making a serious point through hyperbole. But what you quote is non-satirical. No exaggeration intended.
<< I'd invite your readers to revisit the original post if they have any doubts. But here you claim. without ambiguity, and quite literally, that Chaput's claim about Mary's possible "no" forces him to reject both foreknowledge and predestination. It does neither, since either a Thomist or a Molinist acceots both, and still endorses the claim that Mary could have said no. Steve, you are simply not being honest. >>
Well, you and I evidently have a different definition of honesty. I regard it as dishonest to constantly say someone is dishonest, but never show that they are dishonest. You repeatedly level this charge, but never do the intellectual spadework to prove your point. In my book, that’s dishonest.
It is perfectly honest for me, from my philosophical standpoint, which does take into consideration the opposing views, and finds them wanting, to say that Chaput’s statement implies a denial of foreknowledge and foreordination alike.
You seem to be confusing intent and implication. I don’t know what he intended. I do know what his statement entails.
BTW, there is nothing especially unusual about people saying things which carry unintended consequences--precisely because they didn’t think through all the ramifications of what they said before they said it.
And there is nothing improper about drawing forth the logical implications of a statement, whether the speaker meant it or not. Indeed, one way to make someone change his mind is to point out that a position he has chosen to take logically commits him to a conclusion that he did not intend, and which he would find unacceptable, once you point it out to him. I’d have no right to carry on this way if someone drew my attention to something I said, which went beyond what I wanted to claim. Rather, I’d have reason to thank him.
Again, it is quite possible for a man to have an inconsistent belief-system, to sincerely hold conflicting beliefs, knowingly or unknowingly. It may be unconscious, or it may be conscious—but he excuses it on the grounds that it’s all a big warm-and fuzzy mystery.
<< And again, it doesn't matter whether either Thomism or Molinism is true in the present context. You've asserted that Chaput's claim about Mary entails some further claims (i.e., no foreknowledge, no predestination). That's a purely logical matter. The question just is, _assuming_ for the sake of argument that Mary could have said no, does that commit one to openism? The answer is no. Whether one actually ought to believe what one has granted ad arguendum is an entirely different question. >>
It may not matter to you, but it matters to me. The fact that you would prefer to cast this in ad arguendum terms doesn’t mean that your concern should substitute for my concern.
There is a broader context here, which I noted in my essay. Mary is the exemplar of synergism in Catholic dogma. It is not, therefore, illogical for Chaput to state that Mary was in a position to say “no” to God.
And that makes this a test-case or paradigm-case for synergism generally. For the free choices of some individuals would be more consequential than the free choices of others.
Frankly, it looks to me like you’re trying to play both sides of the fence:
<< But here you claim. without ambiguity, and quite literally, that Chaput's claim about Mary's possible "no" forces him to reject both foreknowledge and predestination. It does neither, since either a Thomist or a Molinist acceots both, and still endorses the claim that Mary could have said no. >>
<< << And again, it doesn't matter whether either Thomism or Molinism is true in the present context. >>
To say that, due to two available theories of providence, his claim does not force him to reject both foreknowledge and predestination, would most certainly depend on whether one of those theories is true. The truth of the conclusion is predicated on the truth (or falsity) of the premised theory of providence. Inference and content cannot be kept apart in this context.
And as a defense, not only of the generic claim, but of his claiming it, he would need to hold the true theory.
In addition, even if either Thomism or Molinism were true, it doesn’t follow that one or the other will validate this particular claim. You would have to demonstrate that this case is a special case covered by the general principle. That’s a separate step in need of a separate argument.
<< Your readers think you're a pretty philosophical guy, but this is really very basic stuff you're failing to grasp. >>
It’s always possible that I have a blind-spot, yet if I did, I’d be blind to it. But I can only call ‘em as I see ‘em.
Your charge is like the charge that all white men are racist. When we deny the charge, we’re told that this just proves the charge because we’re so racist that we’re not even conscious of our deep-seated racism. It’s a subliminal thing, you know, so the absence of evidence is the most damning evidence of all.