Midgets on stilts

DM: It's a bit more striking to see someone who is so utterly out of touch with reality. The next time you have a medical condition, I'd like to see where your skepticism and scientific anti-realism go...into the crapper.

SH: Danny, if you think for one moment that this is a defeater for my position, then you haven’t given it very much thought.

There are at least three things wrong with your comeback, of which I mention one right here and save the other two for later.

All we need for a scientific theory to work is for there to be a regular conjunction between one phenomenal event and another.

From this we ordinarily infer a cause/effect relationship, although that isn’t necessary.

And the appearances can be at several removes from the underlying and unobservable reality.

Unless you happen to be a naïve realist who believes that objects really are smaller at a distance, and oars really bend in water, then even you will have to admit a discrepancy between appearance and reality.

And the problem is that all we have are appearances to go by. We can artificially enhance our senses, but that merely introduces another filter. It presents us with just another appearance.

Danny’s position isn’t much different from the flat-earther. After all, the earth looks flat to the earth-bound observer.

DM: Call me a pragmatist about scientific methodology, seeing it as a tool. If it works to produce things for us that meet our needs (eg medicine), then we use it until better tools come along.

SH: Notice how Danny has retreated from his original position. His original position was predicated on the alethic progressivity of science: reliable “knowledge,” “falsifiable” and “unfalsifiable.

Now, however, the question of truth has suddenly dropped out of the equation.

To speak of the scientific method as a tool sounds a lot like instrumentalism rather than realism.

DM: So far, your theology and philosophizing has done squat for the human race as far as meeting needs and saving lives and mass-producing food and etc. etc. etc.

Even if that were the case, it’s irrelevant to the truth-value, or lack thereof, of scientific theorizing.

DM: Hardly. You don't know my views on the philosophy of science and demarcation. I haven't bothered to engage with you on it, as I stated long ago, since you're a scientific anti-realist.

SH: Actually, Danny has expressed a philosophy of science in the very course of this exchange.

DM: As I said there, why cast pearls before swine? Why get into contextual disputes with someone who doesn't subscribe to any of the contexts?

You always want to move the ball back into your court, because it's the only one with the 4' rim. Thus, making "slam dunks" on the court of scientific anti-realism is your bag.

SH: Danny’s persistent problem is that he thinks he can make a straight-line appeal to the scientific evidence without bothering to ask himself, much less answer for himself, what sort of cognitive access the percipient can have to the scientific evidence in the first place.

Before you can appeal to observables, much less unobservables (strings, elementary particles, the prehistoric past), you must deal with the observer. That’s why we can’t move on until this preliminary question is addressed.

DM: Why should I bother distinguishing Popper's change of views on evolutionary theory and falsifiability with someone who thinks that such knowledge goes through "too many layers" of perception to be real?

SH: Fine, ignore Popper and stick with the veil of perception. What’s your way around the veil of perception?

DM: As Calvindude has hinted at here, some theories are later found to be "false". What neither of you in your theorizing allow for is that when the prior theories are shown to be false (viz. creationism by evolution) the new theory must accomodate the observational data of the old, as well as provide a better explanation for other phenomena.

SH: A couple of problems with this claim:

1.It confuses the theory with the significance attached to the theory. Both Einstein and Bohr could agree on the nuts-and-bolts of quantum theory, but differ over its significance; both Penrose and Hawking could agree on the basics of cosmology, but differ over its significance.

You can assign either a realist or antirealist interpretation to the very same theory.

If you—as a realist—are going to say that a given theory is a true description of reality, then I—as an antirealist—will simply say that you attach a false significance to the theory.

2.You also sidestep the question of how, in the history of science, contradictory theories can both be successful. That’s a problem for realism.

DM: n this sense, scientific theories are evolving, but they are selected for by their utility and scope.

SH: Notice his choice of words. Selected for “utility” and “scope” rather than veracity.

DM: You spent a lot of time talking about your analogy between a CD's encoding of a live performance and the performance itself. The binary data in a CD is a language which can be correlated to the frequencies of the music. What strikes me as odd is that, as observations are made through layers of perception, you fail to argue that there is some fundamental disconnect between the "language" of perception and that of reality. You simply posit that these layers exist (which I don't deny), and that by their existence, a correlation to reality is somehow not itself dependable as knowledge.

SH: Nice try, but as usual I’m at least one step ahead of you since I’ve already addressed that line of objection on several occasions.

1.Yes, we use our senses to perceive our senses. That, of itself, doesn’t imply that our senses are reliable in a truth-conducive sense.

A color-blind man must rely on his defective sense of perception. That’s all he has to go by.

2.What you fail to see (pardon the pun) is that I’m critiquing scientific realism from within.

So, yes, for purposes of an internal critique, I assume a perceptual viewpoint. And given that very perspective, the ironic result is that indirect perception is the best that we can salvage by taking perception as our point of departure and point of reference.

3.Since, however, using the senses to perceive the senses is a circular exercise, then the illusory objectivity of such self-referential descriptions would not, when you make allowance for that imponderable, draw us any closer to reality in the raw, but removes us by yet another degree of separation from reality in the raw.

Like a man sewn into a VR suit, that’s his only frame of reference even if he knows it’s fictive. Subtract that and you end up with less rather than more.

DM: If our brains fundamentally change the nature of reality, there is absolutely no way for us to know it. Likewise, there is absolutely no way for us to prove it false. This is an unfalsifiable concept, like all of your 4' rim court abstractions.

SH:

1.I’m a dualist. I believe that dualism is demonstrable on introspective grounds. There is more to knowledge, including self-knowledge, than sensory perception.

2.There is no way for the percipient, left to his own devices, to escape his subjectivity and compare appearance with reality.

But divine revelation can supply an Archimedean point of comparison and contrast.

You, however, have sealed yourself away from that resource, like a clam. So you’re self-exiled to your epistemic shell. Hope you enjoy the view in the dark.

DM: To continue my tirade on the futility of philosophy, see Babinski's excellent collection of quotes here.

SH: Those who mock the philosophy of science are still operating with their own homegrown philosophy of science. The only difference is that theirs is a philosophically inept philosophy of science.

If a creationist were to talk in this country-bumpkin fashion, he’d be greeted with intellectual scorn.

But it’s okay to be a country-bumpkin just as long as you’re a Darwinian hayseed.

Prayer & providence

In response to something I posted yesterday, John Loftus linked to the following article of his:

***QUOTE***

Christians will assert that the “God of the gaps” epistemology doesn’t adequately describe their knowledge about God and his activity, since God is not just known in the gaps of our knowledge. But consider how science has filled in the gaps when it comes to prayer and healing.

When ancient people prayed for their “daily bread,” they did so because crops could sometimes fail in their local area, or a hunter may fail to bag a deer. Such disasters as these things could produce hunger, and possible starvation. Do Christians today have the same fervor when they pray for their “daily bread” as ancient Christians did? Many Christians in the industrialized West don't even pray before every meal, especially when they eat at a McDonald's. Many if not most all of the Christians in the industrialized West, take their food pretty much for granted.

When Christians are very sick, they will take a prescribed pill from the doctor and be confident they'll get better, even if they do pray. But in the ancient times when someone got very sick they could die. Christians in the ancient past had no choice but to depend almost completely upon God's help here. Are Christians saying they wrestle with God over sickness in prayer like the Christian people of old did? Or is their confidence more in the results of science and medicine, than in God? I know the answer. They just haven't admitted it yet.

As science helps Christians with their daily meals and with healing, they believe in prayer and in God’s help less and less, and they believe in science more and more. Say it isn’t so!

http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2006/01/prayer-healing-and-god-of-gaps.html

***END-QUOTE***

1.Loftus’ little piece is predicated on a half-truth.

In an age of affluence and modern technology, we may well be less aware of our dependence on God.

2.However, when preindustrial Jews and Christians prayed for their daily bread, they didn’t expect that manna from heaven was a permanent substitute for seedtime and harvest.

Biblical theology has always struck a balance between ordinary providence and miraculous provision.

It was never one or the other. At most, the only thing that’s changed is the emphasis.

3.In addition, many of the needs or predicaments which drive us to our knees are not and never will be soluble by the wonders of modern technology.

Indeed, modern technology can generate a new set of moral or practical conundra.

Bioethics is creating new moral dilemmas and borderline cases.

Technology can get us into trouble just as easily as it can get us out of trouble. How many employees have gotten into trouble because they accidentally hit the “send” button or inadvertently cc’d their email to the wrong party, viz. the boss?

4.Science does not fill the gaps of prayer and healing. Not only with respect to (3), but in another key respect as well, for the claim disregards the evidence of answered prayer.

Answered prayer is not a gap in our knowledge. To the contrary, answered prayer is positive evidence of God’s existence and providential care.

5.It is also beside the point to counter this with examples of unanswered prayer, for evidence and inevidence are not on an epistemic par.

A relative lack of evidence does nothing to negate the actual evidence for a given phenomenon. Your inexperience does nothing to erase my experience.

6.Finally, J. P. Moreland has an interesting little lecture on answered prayer, in which he supplies some general criteria as well as concrete illustrations from his own experience.

***QUOTE***

Most, if not all, of us wonder if God actually answers prayer. While remembering these answers can be accomplished through journaling, identifying them can be much more difficult.

The Discipline of Journaling

The last three articles have focused on the nature and importance of spiritual disciplines, and we have investigated some specifics about the disciplines of witnessing and solitude/silence. I want to close this series on spiritual disciplines by taking a look at the importance of identifying and remembering answers to prayer.

In my more than 35 years as one of Jesus' apprentices, I have experienced literally hundreds of specific, detailed answers to prayer which have strengthened my faith considerably. I, along with others, experience unanswered prayer as well, but in all honesty, I (and my family and close Christian friends) have seen enough specific answers to prayer that it is no longer reasonable for me to doubt that prayer actually works.

Of the two tasks — identifying and remembering answers to prayer — the latter is relatively easy to discuss, so I will spend most of my time providing ways to identify answers to prayer.

As for remembering answer to prayer, the most effective way that I have accomplished this is by keeping a prayer journal. The point of this journal has not been to write in it every day, but to record the content (and date) of important prayer requests. When I receive positive answers, I then note the date and circumstances associated with them.

Over the years, I have accumulated an incredible record of God's answers to my prayers, including those times when He answered me in ways different than what I had asked. From time to time, I will look back through this journal, and when I do, my faith is deeply strengthened. This record has been so crucial to me because, if I had never logged these incidents and the incredible, supernatural details surrounding them, they would have been forgotten, leaving me with a much weaker view of prayer's effectiveness.

Help from the Intelligent Design Movement

That said, let's turn to some reflections about recognizing answers to prayer. Interestingly, we can get help in this regard by insights derived from the Intelligent Design movement.

Recently, William Dembski has written a book in which he analyzed cases which validate the inference that some phenomena are the result of purposive, intelligent acts carried out by an agent.1 Among other things, Dembski analyzes cases in which insurance companies, the police, and forensic scientists must determine whether a death was an accident (no intelligent cause) or brought about intentionally (done on purpose by an intelligent agent).

According to Dembski, whenever three factors are present, these various investigators are rationally obligated to draw the conclusion that the event was brought about intentionally: (1) The event was contingent; that is, even though it took place, it did not have to happen, (2) the event had a small probability of happening, and (3) the event is capable of independent specifiability; that is, a number of features of the event are specified prior to and independent of the event itself taking place.

To illustrate, consider the game of bridge. Now imagine that one of the players is holding a random set of cards — let's call it hand A — while the dealer is holding a perfect bridge hand. Now if that happened, we would immediately infer that, while hand A was not dealt intentionally, the perfect bridge hand was and, in fact, represents a case of cheating on the part of the dealer. Is our suspicion justified? In order to answer this, let's apply the three factors cited above to the situation.

First, neither hand had to happen. There are no laws of nature, logic, or mathematics that necessitate that either hand had to come about in the history of the cosmos. In this sense, each hand and, indeed, the very card game itself, is a contingent event that did not have to take place.

Second, since both hand A and the perfect bridge hand have the same number of cards, each is equally improbable. So the small probability of an event is not sufficient to raise suspicions that the event came about by the intentional action of an agent.

The third criterion, however, provides the factor that does give us a sufficient reason to raise these suspicions. The perfect bridge hand can be specified as special independently of the fact that it happened to be the hand that came about, but the same cannot be said for hand A. Hand A can be specified as "some random hand or other that someone happens to get." Now that specification applies to all hands and does not mark out as special any particular hand that comes about. So understood, A is no more special than any other random deal. But this is not so for the perfect bridge hand. This hand can be characterized as a special sort of combination of cards by the rules of bridge quite independently of the fact that it is the hand that the dealer received. It is the combination of contingency (this hand did not have to be dealt), small probability (this particular arrangement of cards was quite unlikely to have occurred), and independent specifiability (according to the rules, this is a pretty special hand for the dealer to receive) that justifies us in concluding that this is most likely a case of intelligent design; the intelligence behind this design, of course, is that of the dealer.

So, how does this apply to identifying answered prayer?

Application to Recognizing Answered Prayer

Now the same thing takes place in specific answers to prayer. To illustrate, early in my ministry, while attending a seminar in Southern California, I heard a presentation on how to pray in a more specific way.

Knowing that in a few weeks, I would be returning to Colorado to start my ministry at the Colorado School of Mines in Golden with Ray Womack, a fellow Campus Crusade worker, I wrote a prayer request in my prayer notebook — a prayer which was known only to me. I began to pray specifically that God would provide for the two of us a white house that had a white picket fence, a grassy front yard, a close proximity to the campus (specifically, within two or three miles), and a monthly payment that was no more than $130.

I told the Lord that this request was a reasonable one on the grounds that (a) we wanted a place that provided a homey atmosphere for students, was accessible from campus and that we could afford, and (b) I was experimenting with specific prayer and wanted my faith to be strengthened.

I returned to the Golden area and looked for three days at several places to live. I found nothing in Golden and, in fact, I only found one apartment for $135/month about 12 miles from campus. I told the manager that I would take it and she informed me that a couple had looked at the place that morning and had until that afternoon to make a decision. If they didn't want it, then I could move in the next day.

I called late that afternoon and was informed that the couple took the apartment which was the last available one in the complex. I was back to square one. Now remember, not a single person knew that I had been praying for a white house.

That evening, Kaylon Carr (a Crusade friend) called me to ask if I still needed a place to stay. When I said yes, she informed me that earlier that day, she had been to Denver Seminary. While there, she saw a bulletin board on which a pastor in Golden was advertising a place to rent, hopefully to seminary students or Christian workers. Kaylon gave me his phone number, so I called and set up an appointment to meet the pastor at his place at nine the next morning. Well, as I drove up, I came to a white house with a white picket fence, a nice grassy front yard, right around two miles from campus, and he asked for $110 per month rent. Needless to say, I took it, and Ray and I had a home that year in which to minister.

This answer to prayer — along with hundreds of others that my Christian friends and I have seen — was an event that was (1) contingent and did not have to happen according to natural law; (2) very improbable; and (3) independently specifiable (a number of features of the event were specified in my prayer prior to and independent of the event itself taking place).

Meeting these three criteria are not necessary conditions for being judged to be an action by God (God can answer general prayers that are not too specific), but they do seem to be sufficient, and as such, answers to prayer in my life have increased the rational justification of my confidence in Jesus Christ. And by recording these in my prayer journal, they are an ever-present source of encouragement to me in my life as Jesus' apprentice.

http://www.trueu.org/Academics/LectureHall/A000000425.cfm

***END-QUOTE***

Now, what am I to make of Moreland’s testimony? What’s the most plausible explanation?

There are only three options: (i) he’s telling the truth; (ii) he’s a deceiver, or (iii) he’s self-deluded.

It’s hard to believe that someone of Moreland’s sophistication is self-deluded.

Could he be a liar? Well, anything is possible. But I have no reason to believe that he’s a liar.

And even if he were a liar, he is not a fool. Moreland is a high-profile apologist. That makes him a very inviting target to unbelievers.

If he were caught in a lie, it would destroy his reputation. And he doesn’t need to tell a lie to be a successful Christian apologist.

This leaves us with what is far and away the most plausible explanation: that there is a God who answers prayer.

Not every prayer. But some prayers. And that’s what Scripture would lead us to expect.

What part of Jew-hater don't you understand?

As of yesterday, Triablogue was blogspotted by Holocaust Controversies.

http://holocaustcontroversies.blogspot.com/2006/08/how-to-justify-genocide.html

One of the contributors by the name of Sergey Romanov didn’t like my post on noncombatants, which he chose to characterize as an attempt to justify genocide.

Holocaust Controversies seems to be a blogged devoted to exposing holocaust-deniers.

The ironies are rich and varied:

1.Sergey didn’t bother to explain what was wrong with my reasoning. He contended himself with an expression of disapproval and left it at that.

If, however, Sergey is either unable or unwilling to explain himself, then his own position has no more intellectual warrant than the position of holocaust-deniers.

You have to do better than an expression of personal disapproval. After all, the Nazis disapproved of the Jews. And the jihadis disapprove of the Jews.

2.Sergey sees a modern application to my piece about ancient Israel and her enemies. Although it wasn’t written with that in mind, it does, indeed, have some contemporary analogues.

3.Apropos (2), Sergey sets up a moral equivalence between ancient Israel and her enemies.

So, by parity of argument, he must be setting up a moral equivalence between the modern state of Israel and her current enemies.

That’s pretty ironic coming from a blog devoted to exposing holocaust-deniers.

Does Sergey believe that Israelis and jihadis occupy the same ethical niche? Are Israeli soldiers and suicide-bombers morally interchangeable parts?

4.Then there’s the sloppy way in which the buzzword “genocide” is thrown around. In OT holy war, the pagans weren’t targeted because they belonged to a particular race. They were no targeted because of who they were, but what they did. Behavior, not identity, was the criterion.

5.Moreover, the scope of OT holy war was geographical rather than ethnocentric. The heathen were to be banished from the borders of the holy land proper (Eretz Israel).

Holy war did not target every pagan at every place and time.

6.So here we have a blog (Holocaust Controversies), devoted to the debunking of holocaust-deniers, which is critical of another blog (Triablogue) because the other blog is defending the right of Israel to exist—be it ancient Israel or the modern state of Israel.

This is a painfully ironic example of the muddled morality which ensures as soon as Biblical values are jettisoned. Those who are unable to distinguish their friends from their enemies lack elementary survival skills—a deficiency which their enemies are only too happy to exploit.

Regeneration and the Flyswatter, Part 3: A.H. Strong and Louis Berkhof

Recently critics have tried to set up a competition between Louis Berkhof and A.H. Strong with respect to the axiom “regeneration precedes faith.” In this article, we will look at Drs. Strong and Berkhof. Are they really in vast disagreement?

Note at the outset that these critics have been consistently told that the order between regeneration and conversion (repentance and faith is logical and causal, not temporal).

Note this well.

When I say “regeneration precedes faith,” I am simply stating that their relationship causal and logical, if it is temporal it implies nothing of the interval, and I would affirm it in the limiting case of John the Baptist, but, by the same token I’m not completely convinced of the classic text for that. The ordinary means (that for adults and children of competency in understanding) always is via the accompaniment of the Word of God and the calling to mind of other circumstances. I agree with Boyce on this, except in his third and possibly his second limiting case. (http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/07/liar-liar_11.html)

I have consistently told these individuals that this is a logical, causal, not a temporal relationship (Hence their need to run off to talk about infant regeneration, but, even then, they drop all of the caveats that our Presbyterian friends offer), and one of my critics has wanted to talk about infant regeneration, viz. Berkhof and stated, to paraphrase, not give him any double talk about it being logical and causal and not temporal, so, by Charles' own admission, I have stated this.

These critics, further, explicitly say that Strong did not affirm that regeneration precedes faith. They write:

Here is what Strong taught -- and whether one agrees with him or not, he clearly is against the "born again before faith" idea:

>>
II. REGENERATION. Regeneration is that act of God by which the governing disposition of the soul is made holy, and by which, through the truth as a means, the first holy exercise of this disposition is secured.

Regeneration, or the new birth, is the divine side of that change of heart or which we call conversion if viewed from the human side. It is God’s turning the soul to himself, conversion being the soul’s turning itself to God; God’s turning it is both the accompaniment and cause. It will be observed from the above definition, that there are two aspects of regeneration, in the first of which the soul is passive, in the second of which the soul is active. God changes the governing disposition, in this change the soul is simply acted upon. God secures the initial exercise of this disposition in view of the truth, in this change the soul itself acts. Yet these two parts of God’s operation are SIMULTANEOUS. At the same moment that he makes the soul sensitive, he pours in the light of his truth and induces the exercise of the holy disposition he has imparted.
>>

By this statement within itself Strong refutes the "born again before faith" idea. The power that regenerates is God's power, and SIMULTANEOUSLY the sinner turns to God, accomplished "through truth as a means," according to Strong. "Simultaneous" means "at the same moment," so there is no "time" for "born again before faith."

The problem here is that nobody denies this, and this statement is ripped from its context. What did A.H. Strong actually state about the order? Contrary to the claims of these critics, Strong certainly and explicitly affirmed that regeneration precedes faith. How do we know this? The solution is really quite simple.

Under this head of Union with Christ, Regeneration, Conversion (embracing Repentance and Faith), and Justification. Much confusion and error have arisen from conceiving of these in chronological order. The order is logical, not chronological. “As it is only ‘in Christ’ that man is a ‘new creature’ or is ‘justified,’ union with Christ logically precedes both regeneration and justification; and yet chronologically, the moment of our union with Christ is also the moment when we are regenerated and justified. So too, regeneration and conversion are but the divine and human sides or aspects of the same fact, although regeneration has logical precedence, and man turns only as God turns him. (Systematic Theology, hereafter ST, 793)

So, from the beginning, we can see that these critics, who claim that Strong did not believe that regeneration precedes faith have either purposefully ignored what he has written or simply don’t know how to read. I’d further add that they have called this “nonsense.” Here is what they have stated:

Don't give me that nonsense about "The relationship is logical and causal, but not temporal."

How ironic that they have stated that this is “nonsense” and that A.H. Strong did not affirm the axiom “regeneration” precedes faith, all the while invoking him as representative of their own views, and, as we can see, A.H. Strong not only affirmed that regeneration precedes faith, but he also said that the order is logical and not chronological...but this just “nonsense,” right?

Now compare this with R.C. Sproul:

When speaking of the order of salvation (ordo salutis), Reformed theology always and everywhere insists that regeneration precedes faith. Regeneration precedes faith because it is a necessary condition for faith. Indeed it the sine qua non of faith. It is important to understand, however, that the order of salvation refers to a logical order, not necessarily a temporal order. For example, when we say that justification is by faith, we do not mean that faith occurs first, and then we are justified at some late time. We believe that at the very moment faith is present, justification occurs. There is no time lapse between faith and justification. They occur simultaneously. Why then do we say that faith precedes justification? Faith precedes justification in a logical sense, not a temporal sense. Justification is logically dependent on faith, not faith on justification. We do not have faith because we are justified; we are justified because we have faith.

Similarly when Reformed theology says regeneration precedes faith, it is speaking in terms of logical priority, not temporal priority. We cannot exercise saving faith until we have been regenerated, so we say faith is dependent on regeneration, not regeneration on faith. (R.C. Sproul, Grace Unknown: The Heart of Reformed Theology,, 2000 edition, 195).

How could anybody ever affirm that Strong denied that regeneration precedes faith? The only way, as we shall see, is to do as these critics have done and define the statement “regeneration precedes faith” as automatically disaffirming the use of means/instrumentality and the immediacy of conversion concomitant with regeneration and simply missing the obvious verbatim quote from his section on the ordu salutis.

Would these critics care to explain how Sproul is teaching something not held by Dr. Strong on this point? Yes, we know all about infant regeneration in Sproul’s theology, but that is not the same as regeneration in non-infants. In fact, Dr. Strong actually discusses regeneration in infants who die in infancy, which I would add is almost exactly my own position on infant regeneration!

He states that they are all in a state of sin, need to be regenerated, and can be saved only through Christ (ST, 661). They receive Christ if they die in infancy as certainly as they inherit sin from Adam (Ibid., 662) and then he states:

Since there is no evidence that children dying in infancy are regenerated prior to death, either with or without the use of external means, it seems most probable that the work of regeneration may be performed by the Spirit in connection with the infant soul’s first view of Christ in the other world. As the remains of natural depravity in the Christian are eradicated, not by death, through the sight of Christ and union with him, so the first moment of consciousness for the infant may be coincident with a view of Christ the Savior which accomplishes the entire sanctification of its nature.

On top of this, he even states, in a footnote that “Some persons are regenerated in infancy or childhood, cannot remember a time when they did not love Christ, and yet take long to learn they are regenerate. Others are convicted and converted suddenly in mature years.” (827). One supposes that our critics are either illiterate or are, yet again, misrepresenting facts. Note that I have already stated that these theologians, like Boyce for example, say the same thing, because of the same reason. Mrs. Ruth Graham is one such individual. I also cited this in the past. So, far from disagreeing with Strong myself, it appears that Strong and I agree wholeheartedly! So far, then, I have affirmed nothing about regeneration that Strong did not also affirm on the matters thus far discussed. I have already affirmed the use of instrumentality in another article, and I have affirmed that the relationship between regeneration and conversion is logical and causal, not temporal, and I have affirmed the immediacy of repentance and faith, so it seems that the critics have not found an advocate against my beliefs.

As I’ve already discussed Strong does not deny means, and neither does Berkhof, but I will revisit it here in brief. There are quite a few points where our interlocutors seem confused about Strong and Berkhof. Namely, both speak of regeneration in two senses. Berkhof states that at one level is “a hyperphyscial act directly upon the mind and the will itself, wrought only by the Holy Spirit.” This, he calls the most narrow usage of the term. On another it is a conscious event that includes the instrumentality of the Word of God. In fact, in his order, he places external call prior to regeneration and effectual call after regeneration. Moreover, he makes conversion the immediate result of the conjunction of those three, except in infants. He states the effectual call is

“a calling by the Word, savingly applies by the operation of the Holy Spirit...effectual unto salvation, and is never withdrawn.(400)

On speaking about the actual efficient cause of regeneration, both Berkhof and Strong use exactly the same headers. Berkhof (473) the human will, the truth, the Holy Spirit. He discusses the first two as erroneous and the third as the biblical and confessional one. Strong discusses the same two erroneous views on pages 817 – 818 of ST! The first regards motives as “mechanically constraining the will..indistinguishable from necessitarianism.” and then only the truth as loved (citing Finney here, just like Berkhof!), and then he ascribes regeneration to the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit!

Compare Berkhof and Strong here to see if there is any real difference:

In ascribing to the Holy Spirit, the authorship of regeneration, we do not affirm that the divine Spirit accomplishes his work without any accompanying instrumentality. We simply assert that the power which regenerates is the power of God, and that although conjoined with the use of means, there is a direct operation of this power upon the sinner’s heart which changes its moral character. Then in a footnote, which these critics have ignored, he goes further: In the primary change of disposition, which is the most essential feature of regeneration, the Spirit of God acts directly upon the spirit of man. In the securing of the initial exercise of this new disposition-which constitutes the secondary feature of the God’s work of regeneration-the truth is used as a means. On page 822, he says that regeneration, only so far as it secures an activity of man, is accomplished by the instrumentality of the truth.

Now, here is Berkhof: (a) Regeneration is a creative work of God, and is therefore a work in which man is purely passive, and in which there is no place for human cooperation. (b) The creative work of God produces new life; (c) two elements can be distinguished, “namely generation or the begetting of the new life and bearing or bringing forth.” Berkof calls the first element the narrow sense of the term’s meaning and the broader sense (465). He calls the most limited sense the term as used to denotes only the implanting of the new life in the soul, apart from first manifestations of life.(467)

Definition of regeneration: Berkhof uses a twofold definition, just I have been stating all along! In the strictest sense of the word we may say: Regeneration is that act of God by which the principle of the new life is implanted in man, and the governing disposition of the soul is made holy. But in order to include the idea of new birth as well as that of ‘begetting again’ it will be necessary to complement the definition with the following words, “and the very first holy exercise of this new disposition is secured.”

Strong says virtually the same thing here:

Quoting from Hovey, he agrees, stating,

Regeneration may be taken in a limited sense as including only the first impartation of spiritual life...or it may be taken in a wider sense as comprehending the whole of that process by which he is renewed or made over again in the whole man after the image of God, i.e. including the production of saving faith and union to Christ. Only in the first sense did the Reformers maintain that the man in the process was wholly passive and not active; for they did not dispute that, before the process in the second and more enlarged sense was completed, man was spiritually alive and active, and continued so ever after during the whole process of sanctification.(823)

Switching to Berkhof for a moment, he says: Regeneration in the strictest sense of the word, as the begetting again, takes place in the subconscious life of man, and is independent of any attitude he may assume with reference to it. The effectual call is inseparable from the instrumentality of the Word (471). This is the completion of the work of regeneration in the broader sense of the word, and the point at which it turns into conversion.

Moreover, as we have seen the external call, in Berkhof’s view is place prior to regeneration and regeneration is logically prior to the effectual call. It is, thus, difficult to see how he is denying instrumentality.

Is this temporal or merely logical? He writes,

“Now we should not make the mistake of regarding this logical order as a temporal order that will apply in all cases.” The new life is implanted in children (which he defines as covenant children only) long before they are able to hear the gospel; yet there are endowed with this life only when the gospel is preached. When Berkhof speaks of these, he is not stating that they live into adulthood unconverted. He is, rather, stating that they are converted when they come to the years of discretion. He writes: In the case of those who live under the administration of the gospel, the possibility exists that they receive the seed of regeneration long before they come to years of discretion and therefore also long before the effectual calling penetrates into their consciousness. It is very unlikely, however, that, being regenerated, they will live in sin for years, even after they have come to maturity, and give no evidences at all of the new life that is in them. On the other hand, in the case of those who do not live under the administration of the covenant, there is no reason to assume an interval between the time of their regeneration and that of their effectual calling. In the effectual call, they at once become conscious of their renewal, and immediately find the seed of regeneration germinating into the new life. This means that regeneration, effective calling, and conversion all coincide.

He says on 468 that it is an instantaneous change of a man’s nature, affecting at once the who man, intellectually, emotionally, and morally. It is in its most limited sense that a change occurs in the sub-conscious life. It is a secret and inscrutable work of God that is never directly perceived by man. The change may or may not take place with without man’s being conscious of it momentarily; though this is not the case when regeneration and conversion coincide; and even later on he can perceive it only in its effects. This explains the fact that a Christian may, on the one hand, struggle for a long time with doubts and uncertainties, and can yet, on the other hand, gradually overcome these and rise to the heights of assurance. Berkhof also states that, when discussing regeneration in the broader sense, the mind of man is active, because the effectual call is the external made effective. Strong too maintains these same distinctions.

Compare this with Strong:

It is an instantaneous change, in a region of the soul below consciousness, and is therefore known only in its results. Regeneration is not a gradual work. Although there may be a gradual work of God’s providence and Spirit, preparing the change...there must be an actual instant of time when, under the influence of God’s Spirit, the disposition of the soul, just before hostile to God, is changed to love. Any other view assumes an intermediate state of indecision which has no moral character at all, and confounds regeneration either with conviction or with sanctification. I would add that in his footnote on this point, he quotes WGT Shedd (another target of the critics) in support!

Strong states that at the time of regeneration the soul is both passive and active. At this subconscious level, he is passive; man is wholly passive with respect to the change of his ruling disposition (822). With respect to its exercise (conversion) he is active. Thus, once again, we find that Berkhof and Strong agree.

Berkhof states that the only adequate view is that of the Church of all ages, that the Holy Spirit is the efficient cause of regeneration. This means that the Holy Spirit works directly on the heart of man and changes its spiritual condition. There is no co-operation of the sinner in this work whatsoever. It is the work of the Holy Spirit directly and exclusively. Regeneration, then, is to be conceived monergisitically. God alone works, and the sinner has no part in it whatsoever. This, of course, does not mean, that man does not co-operate in the later stages of the work of redemption. It is quite evident from Scripture that he does. As we have already seen, Strong also says the same thing!

He then embarks on a discussion of means. He notes the real question is whether God implants or generates new life through the word of Scripture or preaching as an instrument of means. Strong simply says: The Scriptural view is that regeneration, so far as it secures an activity of man, is accomplished through the instrumentality of the truth. The two inferences about man being passive in one way and active in another thus flow from this (822).

Berkhof goes into more detail, because he is trying to navigate a particular controversy between those who would state that it is immediate only, without any instrumentality, and it is by instrumentality only, thereby failing to discriminate between the narrow and broad sense of the word itself and inferring sacramental regeneration thereby. He looks at considerations to the negative, citing the creative act itself and that regeneration is in the realm of the unconscious. Here, again, Strong agrees, “This change takes place in the region of the soul below consciousness. It is by no means true that God’s work in regeneration is always recognized by the subject of it.” (ST, 828).

Then Berkhof states, “The Bible distinguishes the influence of the Holy Spirit from that of the Word of God, and declares that such an influence is necessary for the proper reception of the truth. He cites John 6, Acts 16, James 1:18, the Parable of the Sower, and other Scriptures here.

Finally, he discusses the confessional standards, and notes that there are passages which seem to affirm regeneration in a broad sense others a narrow sense. In the Conclusions of Utrecht, we read:

As far as the third point, that of immediate regeneration, is concerned, Synod declares that this expression can be used in a good sense, insofar as our churches have always confessed, over and against the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic Church, that regeneration is not effected through the Word and sacraments as such, but by the almighty regenerating work of the Holy Spirit; that this regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, however may not in that sense of the word be divorced from the preaching of the Word, as if both operated separated from the other; for although our Confession teaches that we need not be in doubt respecting the salvation of our children which die in infancy, though they have not heard the preaching of the gospel (see Strong above too, as he mentions this!), and our confessional standards nowhere express themselves as to the manner in which regeneration is effected in the case of these and other children—yet it is, on the other hand, certain that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation for every one who believes, and that in the case of adults the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit accompanies the preaching of the gospel.

Further, compare this to R.C. Sproul:

God's call is made effectual by the Word and the Spirit. It is important to see that the Word and the Spirit are here conjoined as two vital factors of regeneration. The Holy Spirit is not working apart from the Word or against the Word, but with the Word. Nor is the Word working alone without the presence and power of the Spirit.


The call referred to in effectual calling is not the outward call of the gospel that can be heard by anyone within range of the preaching. The call referred to here is the inward call, the call that penetrates to and pierces the heart, quickening it to spiritual life. Hearing the gospel enlightens the mind, yet it does not awaken the soul until the Holy Spirit illuminates it and regenerates it. This move from ear to soul is made by the Holy Spirit. This move is what accompanies God's purpose of applying the benefits of Christ' work to the elect. (Grace Unknown: The Heart of Reformed Theology, p.190 -91, 2000 edition).

When, then, does a man convert after regeneration according to Berkhof?

We already know Strong states it follows immediately from regeneration, and is so close in time to be considered simultaneous. The only ones for whom he says that conversion is not immediate are infants, and in that respect, that only applies to the infants of covenant families, not all infants, and their regeneration will, on this view, manifest itself by the age of discretion, not adulthood, so, even on Berkhof's Dutch Reformed view, he is closer to the Princetonians here than he is to Kuyper.

In discussing the order of regeneration and effectual calling, he says the order is:

(1)Logically, the external call in the preaching of the Word (except in the case of children—defined by him as covenant children and, here, he stands in the Dutch Reformed, not the Princetonian tradition, so we cannot hold Sproul, Frame, et.al., nor James White and Founders to his view on that particular issue, since they derive their views from the Princtonians not the Kuyperians on this).

(2)Then by a creative word God generates the new life, changing the inner disposition of the soul, illuminating the mind, rousing the feelings, and renewing the will....This is regeneration in the most restricted sense of the word. In it, man is wholly passive.

(3)Having received the spiritual ear, the call of God in the gospel is now heard by the sinner, and is brought home effectively to the heart.

(4) This effectual calling finally secures, through the truth as a means, the first holy exercises of the new disposition born in the soul new life begins to manifest itself: the implanted life issues in the new birth.(471)

In discussing conversion, Berkhof sees it in two senses as well. If we take the word “conversion” in its most specific sense, it denotes a momentary change and not a process like sanctification. (485). Yet Berkhof sees it as a process at times, and he specifically says here that he talking about the psychological manifestation of the conversion event, which is always a moment, and not a process. He notes that older theology has always distinguished between conversion that is sudden and that which is gradual. The former occurs very commonly, particularly in times of great religious declension, and the latter occurs in times and environments where there is little such declension. Conversion encompasses both repentance and faith and is always a conscious act. When he speaks of it as a process, he is not stating people are unconsciously converted, nor is he stating that they are repeatedly converted. Rather, he is stating that they pass from death to life by regeneration through external and effectual calling and repent and believe but they simply do not experience a crisis moment, rather they naturally turn to the truth, as if it is a natural, organic, matter of factly appropriate response to what they have heard in the gospel call. They may not be able to point to a crisis event, but when asked, they will say that they know without a doubt that they are clinging to Christ, have forsaken their sin, and belong to him. I have a good friend who is an officer in his Baptist church who fits this description. This person naturally forsakes his sin and clings to Christ alone, but without the crisis so many in times of declension may experience. It does not mean he does not struggle with sin, for that will continue as long as we live. Conversion is the immediate effect of the effectual call.

These critics have called me a “novice,” yet it is now grossly apparent that they are simply unable or unwilling to represent the theologians they cite accurately. They have misread Louis Berkhof and A.H. Strong. Their assertions regarding the differences between these two theologians stands refuted. As we have seen, they agree on nearly every point, sometimes repeating nearly the same words. All one has to do is open up their theology texts and actually compare what they say to each other and then compare this to the inconsequential silliness being produced at the Calvinist Flyswatter.

Just one more note. A.H. Strong is believed to have laid the ground for universalism among Northern Baptists. It is truly amazing how certain critics invoking Strong, however, erroneously, will draw on Strong as if he is superior to Berkhof, because of allegedly erroneous views Berkhof held about infant regeneration, but not regeneration and conversion in non-infants. If it is illicit to agree with Berkhof because of his alleged errors with respect to infants and by extension paedobaptism, then why it is licit for these critics to draw on Strong whose universalistic language constitutes heresy far more worthy of damnation?

The usual suspects

Todd: Where did I say I was an atheist? Unlike you, I'm at least OPEN to the possibility that there MIGHT be (or MAY have been) a Being that poofed everything into existence. Evidence suggests, however, that He might have left for an extended vacation since then.

SH: So Todd’s an agnostic who’s open to the possibility of deism. That makes him a functional atheist. So I’ll treat him as an honorary atheist.

Todd: Do I have an "axe to grind"? Maybe. You wrap all of your theology in this flowery prose to hide the fact that it's foul.

SH: Actually, my critics don’t ordinarily characterize my prose-style as flowery. Rather, they find it overly polemical.

Todd: What evidence do I have (Steve)? Well, for starters, these ideas were powerful to allow John Calvin to stand and watch while Servetus screamed in agony as he burned to death for having the wrong ideas about God ... it was not a slow death, since it was reported that the winds carried the flames somewhat away from his body. He ended up roasting for hours.

SH:

i) One thing I’ve noticed is that Todd likes to change the subject. He’s strayed very far from the topic of the original post.

He raises one set of objections. When those objections are refuted, he moves on to another set of objections. When those are refuted, he moves on to another set of objections.

Now, a man of honor would withdraw his objections after they’ve been refuted and reexamine his operating premise.

ii) He then proceeds to wheel out the rusty cart of old chestnuts, viz. Servetus, the Inquisition, the Salem witch trials, ecclesiastical anti-Semitism, &c.

You know the joke about fruitcake. There’s only one fruitcake in the whole world. No one likes fruitcake, so everyone keeps exchanging the same fruitcake. When someone gives you a fruitcake for Christmas, you mail it off as a Christmas present to someone else the next year.

The moral objections to the Christian faith are fruitcake objections. Unbelievers keep recycling the same moldy old fruitcake.

iii) One initial question is I have is whether unbelievers want to be treated as halfway intelligent or not.

If they want to be treated with a modicum of intellectual respect, then it isn’t asking too much that they at least make the effort to raise logical objections instead of constantly resorting to selective guilt-by-association at ten degrees of separation from the source.

iv) Calvin was a man of the 16C. As such, he was, in some measure, a creature of his social conditioning. Persecuting dissenters of all stripes, whether political or religious, was standard operating procedure back then.

It was a stratified society. Every member had his place according to his social status, whether ascribed or achieved. If you chose to buck the system, you paid the price.

In fact, there are some rather backward parts of the world in which things haven’t changed very much—such as the average Ivy League university, what with its speech codes and all—or the bunker mentality of the evolutionary old guard.

v) Historically speaking, freedom of dissent is a rather novel idea. It owes a lot to the Reformation, with its belief in the right of private judgment and the priesthood of all believers.

Todd: These "great saints" like Chrysostom preached no less than seven sermons on the entire Jewish race with terms one would hesitate to use against an animal.

SH:

1.Greek Orthodoxy isn’t my bailiwick. Maybe Chrysostom was an anti-Semite and maybe he wasn’t.

Much depends on the historical context. Cf. R. Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews: Rhetoric and Reality in the Late 4th Century (Wipf & Stock Publishers (October 2004).

2.In any event, that’s ancient history.

I’m more concerned with contemporary anti-Semitism. And where we find contemporary anti-Semitism is not in Calvinism or Christian Fundamentalism, but in Islam and the Far Left.

Just consider the way in which the Far Left takes the side of suicide-bombers over against the state of Israel.

The time is past due to put your own house in order, Todd. We’ve already done our own spring-cleaning, thank you very much.

Todd: The early American settlers set people on fire and drowned them for being suspected "witches".

1.I happen to think that one bungled witch-hunt in 150 years of colonial American history compares very favorably with the routine miscarriages of justice in we witness in a judicial system dominated by the values of the Warren court, where habitual violent offenders are regularly acquitted on legal technicalities dispensed at the whim of tyrannical judges.

2.Speaking of judicial abuse, we can also thank the highly secularized psychiatric community for all of the lives ruined by the junk science of recovered memories.

And don’t take my word for it. Here’s a source from your side of the fence:

http://www.religioustolerance.org/rmt.htm

3.Not to mention the prosecution of peaceable prolife demonstrators under racketeering laws—only recently reversed.

4.Or what about all of those lovely show-trials during the halcyon days of Communism?

5.Not to mention the judical license to kill, c/o Roe v. Wade.

Todd: "In 1208 the Inquisition was established. Seven years afterward, the fourth council of the Lateran enjoined all kings and rulers to swear an oath that they would exterminate heretics from their dominions. The sword of the church was unsheathed, and the world was at the mercy of ignorant and infuriated priests, whose eyes feasted upon the agonies they inflicted. Acting, as they believed, or pretended to believe, under the command of God; stimulated by the hope of infinite reward in another world -- hating heretics with every drop of their bestial blood; savage beyond description; merciless beyond conception, -- these infamous priests, in a kind of frenzied joy, leaped upon the helpless victims of their rage. They crushed their bones in iron boots; tore their quivering flesh with iron hooks and pincers; cut off their lips and eyelids; pulled out their nails, and into the bleeding quick thrust needles; tore out their tongues; extinguished their eyes; stretched them upon racks; flayed them alive; crucified them with their heads downward; exposed them to wild beasts; burned them at the stake; mocked their cries and groans; robbed their children, and then prayed God to finish the holy work in hell" - (Ingersoll)

SH: Yes, it never takes long to get around to the Inquisition, now does it?

1.Once again, that’s not my bailiwick. Catholicism is an inherently authoritarian organization because it came of age during the Roman Empire. Its ecclesiastical polity is modeled on the imperial polity of the day.

2.But I’d add, in fairness to Catholicism, that Ingersoll is not exactly a church historian. And it says something about Todd and his ilk that they feel free to quote Ingersoll as if he were some sort of authority on the history of the Inquisition.

Ingersoll was a demagogue, not a scholar.

Todd: Are all Christians like this? Of course not. If you're telling me that believing in Jesus makes men "good", I'd humbly suggest you and I have very different definitions of "good.

SH:

1.Todd is now imputing to me a claim I never made, and then taking offense at his own imputation—like a cat clawing at its own reflection in the mirror.

2.Oh, and by the way, being a Christian was never about being a good person.

The basic difference between a believer and an unbeliever is that a believer is penitent sinner while an unbeliever is an impenitent sinner.

Scientific progress

Daniel Morgan said:

***QUOTE***

Do you agree or disagree that science is a tool whereby we establish reliable knowledge (although perhaps not absolute and universal)? If you agree, then it is rather clear that there is a fundamental disconnect between expressing trust that the method we rely on, which has proven itself so far, will continue to expand in scope and power (as it has shown itself capable of doing for generations now), and trusting in...trust itself.

When you say, "we'll find out an answer one day," you are not referring to a methodology by which you intend to show an answer will/can BE found, but rather, faith that somehow, someway, someday answers will just plop into our laps, or we will see God after death.

Teeny little difference, eh?

Also, a distinction ought to be made between the falsifiable and the unfalsifiable. I express no "faith" in the power of reason or science to give anyone answers [concrete ones] to the unfalsifiable. Luckily, the power of methodological naturalism extends far deeper than is required to form a coherent worldview [of naturalism].

***END-QUOTE***

Unfortunately for Danny, he continues to fluff off the metascientific debates within the scientific community itself over the question of whether science is, indeed, a progressive discipline.

It’s striking to see someone who is so utterly out of touch with his own field of study.

This is because, for Danny, science functions as just another faith-commitment or surrogate religion. In his apostasy, all he’d done is to exchange one absolute for another.

Here’s the side of the argument that Danny never bothers to acquaint himself with, much less engage:

***QUOTE***

The predominant view has been that scientific progress consists in advancement toward some goal: but much disagreement exists as to what that goal is. Major candidates for the (primary) goal of science include truth, simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power—none of the latter three necessarily entailing truth. An air of arbitrariness frequently pervades such contentions, it often being claimed that, whatever they are alleged to be, the goals are simply those we set up at the outset—as “founding intentions” (Gutting 1973, p.226) definitory of the scientific enterprise.

Views of the relation between progress and advance toward truth typify controversies regarding scientific progress. Popper maintained that science progresses by increasing approximation to truth, or “verisimilitude,” this being a function of the relative truth and falsity contents of the theories being compared. Severe technical flaws undermine his conception of verisimilitude (see VERSIMILITUDE), and in any case we have no way of counting the number of true and false statements in a theory. Those who retain the general notion are hard pressed to analyze truth approximation (Newton-Smith, 1981, ch. 8). Some writers speak of “convergence toward truth,” though Laudan argues that the notion that science converges toward truth is contradicted by the history of science.

The issue of progress is complicated by Kuhn’s contention that scientific change is not cumulative, in either the empirical sense (of a linear accumulation of facts) or the theoretical (that every later theory contains earlier ones as approximations). Kuhn describes revolutionary scientific developments as frequently regressive, answering fewer problems than their predecessors, and holds that we may have to abandon the notion that paradigm changes bring scientists closer to the truth. While there is “a sort of progress,” its ultimate criterion is the decision of the scientific group.

Like Toulmin and Kuhn earlier, Laudan claims that science (and being rational) is essentially a problem-solving activity. Progress is measured not by approximation to truth (which is improbable and uncertifiable in any case), but by problem-solving capability.

…Laudan’s view also fails to deal adequately with criteria of progress toward solving a problem, or with ways in which problems change over the history of science.

As opposed to those who interpret scientific progress as advancement toward some goal, some argued that progress consists in moving away from some kind of status, for instance in correcting old errors rather than arriving at new truths (Peirce, Reichenbach, Salmon).

W.H. Newton-Smith, ed. A Companion to the Philosophy of Science (Blackwell 2001), 418-19.

***END-QUOTE***

Along the same lines:

***QUOTE***

In the early twentieth century, analytic philosophers of science started to apply modern logic to the study of science. Their main focus was the structure of scientific theories and patterns of inference (Suppe 1977). This “synchronic” investigation of the “finished products” of scientific activities was questioned by philosophers who wished to pay serious attention to the “diachronic” study of scientific change. Among these contributions one can mention N.R. Hanson's Patterns of Discovery (1958), Karl Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) and Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Paul Feyerabend's incommensurability thesis (Feyerabend 1962), Imre Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970), and Larry Laudan's Progress and Its Problems (1977). Darwinist models of evolutionary epistemology were advocated by Popper's Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (1972) and Stephen Toulmin's Human Understanding (1972). These works challenged the received view about the development of scientific knowledge and rationality. Popper's falsificationism, Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions, and Feyerabend's thesis of meaning variance shared the view that science does not grow simply by accumulating new established truths upon old ones. Except perhaps periods of Kuhnian normal science, theory change is not cumulative or continuous: the earlier results of science will be rejected, replaced, and reinterpreted by new theories and conceptual frameworks. Popper and Kuhn differed, however, in their definitions of progress: the former appealed to the idea that successive theories may approach towards the truth, while the latter characterized progress in terms of the problem-solving capacity of theories.

A major controversy among philosophers of science is between instrumentalist and realist views of scientific theories (Leplin 1984; Psillos 1999; Niiniluoto 1999). The instrumentalists follow Duhem in thinking that theories are merely conceptual tools for classifying and systematizing observational statements, so that the genuine content of science is not to be found on the level of theories (Duhem 1954).

Hanson, Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend agreed that all observation is theory-laden, so that there is no theory-neutral observational language. Accounts of reduction and progress, which take for granted the preservation of some observational statements within theory-change, thus run into troubles. Even though Laudan's account of progress allows Kuhn-losses, it can be argued that the comparison of the problem-solving capacity of two rival theories presupposes some kind of correlation or translation between the statements of these theories (Pearce 1987). Various replies have been proposed to this issue. One is the movement from language to structures (Stegmüller 1976; Moulines 2000), but it turns out that a reduction on the level structures already guarantees commensurability, since it induces a translation between conceptual frameworks (Pearce 1987). Another has been the point that an evidence statement e may happen to be neutral with respect to rival theories T1 and T2, even though it is laden with some other theories. The realist may also point that the theory-ladenness of observations concerns at most the estimation of progress (EP), but the definition of real progress (RP) as increasing truthlikeness does not mention the notion of observation at all.

Even though Popper accepted the theory-ladenness of observations, he rejected the more general thesis about incommensurability as “the myth of the framework” (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970). Popper insisted that the growth of knowledge is always revolutionary in the sense that the new theory contradicts the old one by correcting it, but there is still continuity in theory-change, as the new theory should explain why the old theory was successful to some extent. Feyerabend tried to claim that successive theories are both inconsistent and incommensurable with each other, but this combination makes little sense. Kuhn argued against the possibility of finding complete translations between the languages of rival theories, but in his later work he admitted the possibility that a scientist may learn different theoretical languages (Hoyningen-Huene 1993). Kuhn kept insisting that there is “no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like ‘really there’,” i.e., each theory has its own ontology. Convergence to the truth seems to be impossible, if ontologies change with theories. The same idea has been formulated by Putnam (1978) and Laudan (1984a) in the so-called “pessimistic meta-induction”: as many past theories in science have turned out to be non-referring, there is all reason to expect that even the future theories fail to refer—and thus also fail to be approximately true or truthlike.

The difficulties for realism seem to be reinforced by the observation that measures of truthlikeness are relative to languages.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-progress/

***END-QUOTE***

Or, to take a more specific example:

***QUOTE***

A CONVERSATION WITH: JOHN HORGAN; A Heretic Takes On the Science of the Mind


By CLAUDIA DREIFUS
Published: September 21, 1999

The genial freelance writer greeting me at the door of his rustic home in Garrison, N.Y., on a warm August morning is John Horgan, 46, the unofficial bad boy of science journalism.

In 1996, Mr. Horgan, then a senior writer with The Scientific American, published ''The End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientific Age,'' a 281-page essay in which he argued that scientific inquiry has gone about as far as it can go and that the questions remaining are unanswerable. Many scientists were outraged, but the book sold nearly 200,000 copies.

This month, Mr. Horgan will no doubt be making a new set of enemies with the release of his latest work -- ''The Undiscovered Mind -- How the Human Mind Defies Replication, Medication and Explanation'' (Free Press, $25). ''I think of myself as a heretic,'' he says, ''who is challenging the central dogma that scientific progress is eternal.''

Q. Tell us how you got the idea for this new book.

A. It's really a follow-up to ''The End of Science.'' There were criticisms of my first book that I thought didn't have much substance, but one I thought was reasonable was that the science of the human mind, of all areas of science, had the most potential to be really revolutionary. So I wanted to see how far we had gotten with not just neuroscience, but psychology, psychiatry, behavioral genetics, the new Darwinian social sciences, artificial intelligence.

And what I found is that despite a lot of hype and despite some amazing instruments -- M.R.I.'s, PET scanners -- we seem to be spinning our wheels. We are not learning the kinds of things we want to learn. We aren't learning how matter can create a mind. We aren't even doing something practical like understanding schizophrenia. Or coming up with better treatments for it. Or even a cure. The practical issues are what people care about. On that, I've concluded, despite all the hype about psychopharmacology, especially, there has been very little progress in understanding mental illness and treating it.

Q. Why do you think we're not making any progress in understanding the mind?

A. I don't think that there's a mystical barrier. It's just the brain and the mind are fantastically complex.

Q. Sir Martin Rees, the Astronomer Royal of Great Britain, once told me that the understanding of outer space is relatively simple -- molecular biology was what was complex.

A. Yeah, and the brain! So he's agreeing with me that cosmology and particle physics are all wrapped up?

Q. I don't think so. He's simply saying one is a harder nut to crack than the other.

A. Oh, there's no question: particle physics is like a children's game compared to neuroscience. There are a handful of particles that behave according to fixed rules -- if you control the situation enough, you'll always know how those particles are going to act. With humans, you never know!

Q. Some would say that unpredictability is part of the mystery of what makes people human.

A. Except I don't think you have to resort to mysticism to talk about the limits of mind-related science. There's no mystical reason why we can't do these things. It's just turned out to be extremely difficult. There's no law of nature that says that just through sheer effort and will, scientists can solve every problem. People should at least consider the possibility that, in some respects, we might not solve this thing.

Q. Do you enjoy debunking ideas about scientific progress?

A. I think that ''scientific progress'' is idolized by people who think they are too rational to believe in a Christian God, or some form of religion . . . There's an almost worshipful belief that this extraordinary period of technological and scientific progress is just permanent, that it will continue as long as we have the will. I believe that science itself tells us that there are going to be limits to this process and that those limits are appearing right now. People refuse to acknowledge those limits because they have this faith that it can't end.

Q. What's your critique of most science reporting?

A. I have enormous respect for all my science-writing colleagues, but, in general, I'm distressed that science writers aren't more critical of science. We often don't get as much sophistication out of science writers as we do out of sports writers. Or political writers. Scientists are very good at intimidating science writers. They are always telling us you can't ''really understand'' science unless you are a scientist, which is absolutely absurd.

Q. When you were a staff writer at Scientific American, did you sometimes feel frustrated?

A. Actually, I was encouraged to write critical articles, but the fit became uncomfortable over time. I guess I became too critical. There were certainly some people who thought I was anti-science. There were some people at Scientific American who were horrified by my last book, by what it said and by the title. I was challenging the central dogma, this faith in scientific progress. I think it's fair to say that I left by mutual agreement.


http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9D05E2D91E3CF932A1575AC0A96F958260&n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fPeople%2fH%2fHorgan%2c%20John

***END-QUOTE***

Christian starter kit

This morning, coincidentally enough, I was asked by two Christians to recommend a set of must-read books for Christian laymen.

I’m skimpy on the creation/evolution debate because there’s so much information that’s available online.

My subject divisions are a bit arbitrary, but it’s better than nothing.

Okay, here goes:

I. APOLOGETICS:

David Baker, ed. Biblical Faith & Other Religions

Paul Barnett, The Birth of Christianity: The First Twenty Years

F. F. Bruce, The Defense of the Gospel in the New Testament

John Byl, God & Cosmos

_____. The Divine Challenge

Winfried Corduan, A Tapestry of Faiths

_____. Neighboring Faiths

Ed Komoszewski et al. Reinventing Jesus

John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God

Os Guinness, Long Journey Home

Gary Habermas & Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus

Paul Helm, The Divine Revelation

J. P. Moreland, Christianity & the Nature of Science

Victor Reppert, C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea

Ken Samples, Without a Doubt

Lee Strobel, The Case for Christ

Cornelius Van Til, Why I Believe in God (available online)

Kurt Wise, Faith, Form, and Time

E. J. Young, In the Beginning

II. BIBLE CRITICISM:

Gleason Archer, Encyclopedia of Bible Difficulties

Craig Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels

F. F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable? (available online).

Kenneth Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament

V. Philips Long, The Art of Bible History

John Walton, Ancient Israelite Literature in Its Cultural Context

III. BIBLIOLOGY

T. Desmond Alexander, From Paradise to the Promised Land

Gleason Archer, A Survey of Old Testament Introduction

Craig Blomberg, Jesus & the Gospels

D. A. Carson & Douglas Moo, An Introduction to the New Testament

Walter Kaiser & D. Garrett, eds. Archeological Study Bible

John Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as Narrative

IV. CANONICS:

Darrell Bock, The Missing Gospels

F. F. Bruce, The Canon of Scripture

David Trobisch, The First Edition of the New Testament

V. CHRISTOLOGY

T. Desmond Alexander, The Servant King

Paul Barnett, Jesus & the Rise of Christianity

Darrel Bock, Jesus According to Scripture

F. F. Bruce, Jesus: Lord & Savior

Edmund Clowney, The Unfolding Mystery

Murray J. Harris, Three Crucial Questions about Jesus

Leon Morris, Jesus is the Christ

Alex Motyer, Look to the Rock

O. Palmer Robertson, The Christ of the Prophets

B. B. Warfield, The Lord of Glory

N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God

VI. ESCHATOLOGY:

O. Palmer Robertson, The Israel of God

Vern Poythress, Understanding Dispensationalists

VII. HERMENEUTICS:

D. A. Carson, Exegetical Fallacies

Gordon Fee & Douglas Stuart, How to Read the Bible for All It’s Worth

John Frame, Doctrine of the Knowledge of God

Vern Poythress, God-Centered Interpretation

Kevin Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?

VIII. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology

John Frame, The Doctrine of God

Paul Helm, The Providence of God

Anthony Hoekema, Saved by Grace

Thomas Schreiner, Paul: Apostle of God’s Glory in Christ

Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology

IX. THEOLOGY 101:

John Frame, Salvation Belongs to the Lord

Paul Helm, The Beginnings; The Callings; The Last Things.

John Murray, Redemption: Accomplished & Applied

J. I. Packer, Concise Theology

X. COMMENTARIES:

Some books of the Bible are more foundational to Christian theology than others, so, for purposes of this “starter kit,” I’ll be selective:

GENESIS

John Currid

John Walton

Bruce Waltke

EXODUS

John Currid

Alec Motyer

Douglas Stuart

Then watch for the forthcoming commentaries by T. Desmond Alexander and Allen Ross.

JOB

John Hartley

Elmer Smick

Then watch for Tremper Longman’s forthcoming commentary.

PSALMS

Alas, we’re not ideally served on the Psalter at present. VanGemeren is the default choice.

My suggestion: Buy Geoffrey Grogan’s Prayer, Praise & Prophecy: A Theology of the Psalms.

Then wait for Gordon Wenham’s forthcoming commentary.

PROVERBS

Bruce Waltke

Then wait for Tremper Longman’s forthcoming commentary.

ECCLESIASTES

Derek Kidner

SONG OF SOLOMON

Tom Gledhill

ISAIAH

Alex Motyer

EZEKIEL

Actually, I think new Christians should steer clear of the apocalyptic books. But since that admonition will fall on deaf ears:

Daniel Block

Iain Duguid

DANIEL

Alas, we’re not ideally served on Daniel. By default selection would be Joyce Baldwin and Tremper Longman

Then watch for Terence Mitchell’s forthcoming commentary.

MATTHEW

Craig Blomberg

D. A. Carson

R. T. France

Craig Keener

France is also slated to do a bigger commentary on Matthew in the NICNT series

LUKE

Darrell Bock

JOHN

Several good choices. At a minimum:

F. F. Bruce

D. A. Carson

Craig Keener

Andreas Kostenberger

ROMANS

Thomas Schreiner

EPHESIANS

Harold Hoehner

Peter O’Brien

GALATIANS

We’re not ideally served on Galatians. My default choice would be F. F. Bruce and Philip Ryken.

Then wait for D. A. Carson’s forthcoming commentary.

HEBREWS

Alas, we’re not ideally served on Hebrews. My default choice would be F. F. Bruce and R. T. France (Ellingworth is good on Greek usage).

Then wait for the forthcoming commentaries by D. A. Carson and Peter O’Brien.

REVELATION

Gregory Beale

Vern Poythress

Then watch for D. A. Carson’s forthcoming commentary.

The Redux of Veritas Redux

Check it out. Be patient.

Evolution on the ropes

***QUOTE***

The Politically Incorrect Guide to Darwinism and Intelligent Design

by Jonathan Wells

In the 1925 Scopes trial, the American Civil Liberties Union sued to allow the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution in public schools. Seventy-five years later, in Kitzmiller v. Dover, the ACLU sued to prevent the teaching of an alternative to Darwin's theory known as "Intelligent Design" -- and won. Why did the ACLU turn from defending the free-speech rights of Darwinists to silencing their opponents? In The Politically Incorrect Guide to Darwinism and Intelligent Design, Jonathan Wells, Ph.D., reveals that, for today's Darwinists, there may be no other choice: unable to fend off growing challenges from scientists, or to compete with rival theories better adapted to the latest evidence, Darwinism - like Marxism and Freudianism before it -- is simply unfit to survive.

Dr. Wells, a biologist and senior fellow at the esteemed Discovery Institute, begins by explaining the basic tenets of Darwinism, and the evidence both for and against it. He reveals, for instance, that the fossil record, which according to Darwin should be teeming with "transitional" fossils showing the development of one species to the next, so far hasn't produced a single incontestable example. On the other hand, certain well-documented aspects of the fossil record - such as the "Cambrian Explosion," in which innumerable new species suddenly appeared fully formed -- directly contradict Darwin's theory. Wells also shows how most of the other "evidence" for evolution -- including textbook "icons" such as Peppered Moths, Darwin's Finches, Haeckel's Embryos, and the Tree of Life -- has been exaggerated, distorted . . . and even faked.

Wells then turns to the theory of Intelligent Design (ID), the idea that some features of the natural world, such as the internal machinery of cells, are too "irreducibly complex" to have resulted from unguided natural processes alone. In clear-cut layman's language, he reveals the growing evidence for ID coming out of scientific specialties from microbiology to astrophysics. And he explains why, since ID is not based on the Bible or religious doctrines, and doesn't draw any conclusions about who (or what) is the cause of design in nature, it is not a form of Biblical creationism or natural theology.

The collapsing case for Darwinism -- and the mounting case for Intelligent Design

* How, though Darwin is often credited with citing "overwhelming evidence" for his theory of natural selection, all he actually provided was "one or two imaginary illustrations" of how it might work

* Why many of Darwin's contemporaries regarded the same data he cited as evidence, not of common ancestry, but of common design

* One pro-Darwin science writer who candidly admits that the chain of fossil ancestry is "a completely human invention created after the fact"

* How, despite centuries of artificial breeding and decades of experiments, no one has ever observed one species turn into another ("speciation")

* Why most alleged instances of "observed" speciation are actually analyses of already existing species that show how speciation might occur -- but never that it has

* Darwin vs. Darwin: how he conceded that his theory was contradicted by known evidence (or lack thereof), though he hoped later findings would vindicate him -- which still hasn't occurred after 150 years

* How Darwin's "strongest single class of facts" -- the early vertebrate embryos -- shows the opposite of what he thought it showed

* The Cambrian Explosion -- aka biology's "Big Bang": how it contradicts Darwin's branching "Tree of Life"

* How science textbooks continue to feature "evidence" for Darwinism that has long since been proven fraudulent

* Why the clinical practice of medicine has no use for Darwinism, despite claims that it is impossible to practice medicine without applying its principles

* Evolutionary biologist: "Perhaps it would be easier, and in the long run more productive, to abandon the attempt to force the data . . . into the mold provided by Darwin"

* National Academy of Sciences member: "Darwin's theory ... serves no important role in guiding modern experimental biology. That branch of science simply makes no practical use of Darwin's theory"

* How Darwin's theory provided the pseudoscientific foundation for the Nazis' racial extermination policies

* How Haeckel's famous faked embryo drawings were widely used to promote abortion in late twentieth-century America by convincing people that human embryos were little more than fish

* How the most common definition of Intelligent Design in the news media is flatly incorrect

* How design can be inferred not only in living things but also in various features of the cosmos, such as gravity

* How the Earth itself seems uniquely designed not only for life, but also for scientific observation

* How Darwin changed the definition of "science" itself to mean providing materialistic explanations for everything

* How Darwinism is widely used in public education to discredit traditional Christianity and promote atheism

* How Darwinists have openly declared that they will destroy the careers of professors and students who criticize them or defend intelligent design -- and they're doing it

conservativebooks@hebookservice.com

***END-QUOTE***

The God-of-gap myth

One of the favorite objections to Christian theism is the so-called God-of-the-gaps fallacy.

This is based on the warfare modeling of the relation between faith and science popularized by John Draper and Andrew White back in the 19C.

Here’s a conventional statement of the argument:

***QUOTE***

The concept of the God of the gaps contrasts religious explanations of nature with those derived from science (see also Relationship between religion and science). It refers to a theistic position that anything that can be explained by human knowledge is not in the domain of God, so the role of God is therefore confined to the 'gaps' in scientific explanations of nature.

"God of the gaps" is often used to describe the perceived retreat of religion in the face of increasingly comprehensive scientific explanations of natural phenomena. An example of the line of reasoning starts with the position that early religious descriptions of objects and events (such as the Sun, Moon, and stars; thunder and lightning) placed these in the realm of things created or controlled by a god or gods. As science found explanations for observations in the realms of astronomy, meteorology, geology, cosmology and biology, the 'need' for a god to explain phenomena was progressively reduced, occupying smaller and smaller 'gaps' in knowledge. This line of reasoning commonly holds that since the domain of natural phenomena previously explained by God is shrinking, theistic or divine explanations for any natural phenomenon become less plausible.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_of_the_gaps#The_.22God-of-the-gaps_argument.22_in_modern_usage

***END-QUOTE***

On this characterization, science has Christians on the run. The inexorable progression of science carries with it the inevitable regression of Christianity. Every scientific advance marks another hasty retreat for Christian theism.

Unfortunately for the atheist, the aesthetic appeal of this symmetrical relation is founded on a systematic ignorance of Christian theology.

As usual, the atheist doesn’t know what he’s talking about. What we have, instead, is a secular wives’ tale.

A writer like Draper or White presents a catchy way of framing the debate. Atheist A quotes Draper. Atheist B quotes Atheist A. Atheist C quotes Atheist B, and so on, ad nauseum.

You end up with a free-floating tradition that never touches base with the primary sources of Christian theism in Scripture or historical theology.

Like the tall tale about the fish that got away, the secular legend grows with each repeated recitation.

For the God-of-the-gaps fallacy is, itself, a fallacy, predicated on the wholly ignorant belief that traditional Christian theology used to ascribe every event to the direct action of God.

Whenever science uncovers some underlying mechanism, then this discovery nibbles away at Christian theism until the original foundation is honeycombed with scientific potholes. Or so we’re told.

But the truth of the matter is that traditional theology never attributed every event to the direct agency of God.

Using a variety of nomenclature, historical theology has always distinguished between creation, miracle, and providence, or immediate and mediate creation, or primary and secondary causality, or creation ex nihilo and continuous creation.

If you acquaint yourself with the “prescientific” models of providence in Thomism and Calvinism, you’ll find these distinctions in place.

Cf. T. Tiessen, Providence & Prayer: How Does God Work in the World (IVP 2000), chapters 9 & 11.

And you don’t have to read very far in Scripture to find out that the Bible never said everything comes straight from the hand of God.

Food comes from trees. Rain comes from clouds. Babies come from wombs.

What we have in Scripture is a balance between creation, providence, and miracle. It is not a choice between a God who does everything and a God who does nothing.

There’s no essential tension between ordinary providence and miraculous action.

So the mere fact that science may be able to identify a “natural” case of a given event or a certain kind of event does nothing to dethrone God and banish him to the ever-shrinking gaps of scientific ignorance.

“Natural” causes do not imply naturalism. The existence of natural causes has always been a fixture of traditional Christian theology.