Evidence Below The Surface

People often say they're familiar with an issue, even to the point of being weary of hearing about it, when they're actually significantly ignorant about the subject. What they've heard a lot of is introductory information about the topic or some of the more advanced information about it without having heard about other information of a more advanced nature. Their knowledge is partial and often misleading.

For example, they've heard a lot about gospel authorship in the sense that they've heard many introductory or intermediate discussions of Papias, Irenaeus, and other sources. But there are other lines of evidence they have little or no familiarity with.

That's one of the dangers involved in addressing topics in a shallow way. You give people the impression that there's less involved, often far less, than is actually there. Christians should keep maturing in their understanding of issues and keep trying to get other people to mature. Take different approaches toward a subject on different occasions. Mention that there's more evidence involved than what you're bringing up, and direct people to resources that provide that other evidence.

Missing The Prophetic Forest For The Trees

Discussions of prophecy fulfillment often get overly focused on a certain aspect of a passage to the neglect of others. A lot of attention will be given to how to render verse 16 in Psalm 22, but other parts of the psalm that are significant will be ignored. Or whether verse 6 in Isaiah 9 is identifying the figure in the passage as God will be debated while other parts of the passage that are important don't get discussed.

Arguing For Resurrection Accounts

We should argue for Jesus' resurrection by appealing to multiple lines of evidence, including the general credibility of the sources. One of the approaches we can take, among others, is to argue for individual accounts. Argue for Matthew's credibility in general, as I've done here, for example, but also argue for the resurrection account in Matthew 28:9-10. Argue for Luke's credibility in general, as I've done here, for instance, but also argue more narrowly for the material on the appearance to Paul in Acts. Argue for the general credibility of Paul, such as his willingness to suffer and die as a Christian, which gives us reason to trust what he reported about the resurrection appearance to James in 1 Corinthians 15:7. But we should also argue more narrowly for the appearance to James.

Categories Of Prophecy To Cite As Evidence For Christianity

You can find a collection of links to many of our articles on prophecy issues here. But I want to provide a few examples of categories of prophecy that are good to cite as starting points for making an argument from prophecy fulfillment.

In a post late last year, I discussed some examples of prophecies fulfilled by the Roman empire.

Another post addressed prophecy fulfillments accomplished or corroborated by non-Christian sources more broadly.

That post includes prophecies fulfilled in the modern world, which is another category that would be a good starting point.

Here's something I wrote about a geographical argument for prophecy fulfillment.

And here's something Steve Hays wrote about the fulfillment of non-Messianic prophecies.

You Can Emphasize The Resurrection Without Isolating It

Follow Peter's example in Acts 2, where he highlights Jesus' resurrection while also addressing prophecy fulfillment, Jesus' miracles other than his resurrection, and the miracles of the apostles. And Jesus, the prophets, and others did the same before Peter. Make much of Jesus' resurrection, but bring up other lines of evidence for Christianity as well.

To boldly go where no one has gone before

My aim is to preach the gospel where Christ has not been named, so that I will not build on someone else's foundation (Rom 15:20 CSB).

I appreciate the apostle Paul's attitude about his ministry of missions, church-planting, evangelism, apologetics. He wants to go where no one has gone before with the gospel. He wants to go to those people who have never heard the good news. He wants to be the first in a mission field. The first to share the gospel with a people in a place that hasn't heard about Jesus. That's a noble desire.

I think what the apostle Paul said could be taken on as a kind of principle by other Christians too. Let's consider apologetics. Apologetics paving the road for evangelism or used in concert with evangelism. Of course, there are many commonly used arguments in defense of Christianity and/or in order to critique other worldviews. Nothing necessarily wrong with a Christian apologist using these bread and butter arguments.

However, it likewise would be a good idea for Christian apologists to develop novel arguments, develop novel approaches to old arguments, revitalize retired arguments, and so on. For example, Jason Engwer and Steve Hays have done significant apologetic work involving the occult. Another example is Tim and Lydia McGrew have revitalized the argument from undesigned coincidences. These are the sorts of thing I have in mind.

Of course, what those arguments might be could vary depending on where or when one is ministering. The apologist needs to know their audience, as it were. The apologist needs to be like "the Issacharites, who understood the times and knew what Israel should do" (1 Chron 12:32). Arguments involving science and religion might better suit a secular college student on a typical US campus. Arguments involving fulfilled messianic prophecies might better suit an orthodox Jewish friend. Arguments about Jesus' power over evil spirits might better suit Papua New Guineans. Arguments involving the historical Jesus might better suit Muslims. And there's tremendous room for creativity within these classes of arguments.

Point being, I guess I'm not really saying much in my already long-winded post, only that it's good to use commonly used apologetic arguments, but it's also good to push boundaries (within orthodoxy) in developing new arguments, honing old arguments, etc. We can advance the kingdom of God in terms of apologetics too, I think. At least, those promoting other worldivews don't usually stand still, neither should we.

How To Argue For Prophecy Fulfillment

In a post last year, I outlined how I think we should address issues of prophecy fulfillment by starting with the common ground we have with skeptics. Begin with fulfillments that are accepted by both sides. You could also grant much of what critics say about a prophecy for the sake of argument, such as that the passage isn't Messianic in its original context, but argue that Jesus' alignment with the passage in a typological or secondary manner is evidentially significant. And much of Jesus' alignment with the relevant passages comes from facts widely accepted even among non-Christians. I cited Isaiah's Servant Songs as an example of a good place to start. What I want to do here is discuss another approach that can be taken within the same framework.

Instead of using passages, like the Servant Songs, organize your material around topics. That allows you to appeal to material from more than one passage or series of passages. It's also easier in some ways for people to understand and remember the material involved if you take a topical approach. Here are some examples of the topics that could be used:

Does Presuppositionalism Confuse Ontology and Epistemology?

"Does Presuppositionalism Confuse Ontology and Epistemology?" (James Anderson)

Principles For Evaluating Prophecy

Here are some examples of what we should take into account (and see here for more):

- In the abstract, how likely is it that the prediction would be fulfilled by normal means?

- How many examples are there of the prophecy being fulfilled historically? Let's consider the Servant Songs of Isaiah, for example. We could begin with the abstract question mentioned above. Before we consider named historical candidates for fulfillment, how likely does it seem upfront that any entity would fulfill the predictions in question, such as those in the Servant Songs? We could then move on to the historical question of whether any entity has fulfilled the prophecy and how many have done so. For example, "Christians claimed that the facts of Jesus' life were proclaimed beforehand in the Jewish prophecies, but [according to Celsus] in fact the 'prophecies could be applied to thousands of others far more plausibly than to Jesus' ([Origen's Against Celsus] 2.28)." (Robert Wilken, The Christians As The Romans Saw Them [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984], 115) Celsus' claim is absurd, and he never backed it up. But there's an element of truth in the underlying reasoning, namely that we should apply this historical test I'm referring to. If a skeptic is going to claim that there's nothing significant in how Jesus' life lines up with a prophecy or series of prophecies, yet he can't name anybody else whose life lines up comparably or better, that's significant. Critics like Celsus should be asked to name names and provide the relevant documentation.

Arguing For Jesus' Self-Perception

Hawk recently started a thread that was partly about how to argue for and from Jesus' self-perception. Did he view himself as God? If so, what are the implications? How should we go about arguing for and from our answers to these questions? And so on.

One of the issues that came up was the validity of arguing for the historicity of Jesus' identity claims based on the general reliability of the documents that report the identity claims. And that is a valid approach and one that's sometimes neglected.

But we can, and sometimes should, appeal to more than the general reliability of the documents. We should be open to using every argument we have, though there's no need to use every argument on every occasion. It often makes sense to be selective, even highly selective (e.g., because of time constraints).

One question to ask, then, is what lines of evidence we have for Jesus' self-perception that meet multiple standards of evidence simultaneously. The more, the better. There's no need for the evidence we cite to meet multiple standards, but it is helpful.

I discussed an example in a post late last year. We have many, often significantly independent, lines of evidence that Jesus viewed himself as the messianic figure of Isaiah 9. And I've argued elsewhere (linked in the article cited above) that the figure in Isaiah 9 is God. The evidence for Jesus' identifying himself as that figure comes from all four gospels, both from Jesus' words and his deeds, in both subtle and explicit forms, with partial corroboration from early non-Christian sources, with partial corroboration from non-conservative modern New Testament scholarship, etc. I've written a lot about Isaiah 9 over the years, and I'll be discussing it further during the upcoming Christmas season. But even if we just take into account what I've already posted, I think there's a strong case that the figure of Isaiah 9 is God and that we have many, highly varied, and highly reliable lines of evidence that Jesus identified himself as that figure.

I encourage people to research the issues surrounding Jesus' self-perception, and develop arguments about the subject, in ways that take the multifaceted nature of the evidence into account. Don't just look at Jesus' words. Look at his deeds as well. Think about the Old Testament backdrop of his life and other relevant contexts. Look at the subtle assumptions and allusions in his other comments, not just his comments you're most focused on. Ask yourself if there are some ways in which the evidence is corroborated by ancient non-Christian sources or modern non-conservative scholars, for example. There will be different degrees of evidence for different conclusions, and you'll have different degrees of confidence accordingly. But it's important to gather a large amount of evidence, even if the levels of probability vary a lot.

Part of what's so significant about approaching the issues in this manner is that the cumulative effect adds to the credibility of the argument. If Jesus perceived himself in a certain way, especially if that self-identification was of a more central nature, there's a better chance accordingly that his identifying himself that way will be reflected in more places and more often. It doesn't follow that we can dismiss a claim about his self-image if there's only one line of evidence for it, it's only reflected in a couple of places, or something like that. For a variety of reasons, even the features of Jesus' alleged self-perception that are less evidenced can be credible (people aren't equally revealing of every aspect of their self-perception; our historical records are so partial; etc.). But there's especially good reason for accepting and arguing on the basis of portions of Jesus' self-perception that are evidenced in the sort of multifaceted manner I'm focused on here.

How To Begin To Argue For Christianity

Christians who are involved in apologetics are often overly defensive and don't go on offense enough. They're familiar with some or all of the broad outlines of the evidence for Christianity, but don't know much about the details or how to prioritize them.

There are a lot of approaches that can be taken. Different ones are better in different circumstances, and we don't have to take only one approach toward a given individual. I want to recommend several approaches, among others that could be used, with links to relevant posts.

Just as there isn't any easy way to answer every objection to Christianity, there isn't any easy way to argue for the religion as a whole. The same is true of other worldviews. There is no easy way to answer every objection or argue for your beliefs as a whole if you're an atheist, Muslim, or Hindu. About a decade ago, this is how I began my contribution to an e-book written by a few of us on the Triablogue staff:

We live in a complicated universe. No worldview has an easy answer for every question. There are advantages to complexity, though. The depth of human relationships makes life more enjoyable in some ways, but more difficult in other ways. The complexities of language are an advantage in some contexts and a disadvantage in others. Life involves a lot of tradeoffs. One thing is gained at the expense of something else. Any belief system can be made to look bad by inordinately focusing on some elements of it while neglecting others. (The Infidel Delusion, 5)

Having said all of that, we need to make decisions about where to begin in a discussion with a non-Christian. I can't cover all of the ground here, but I want to recommend some resources.

If you're interacting with an atheist or agnostic, for example, you could appeal to philosophical and scientific arguments for God's existence. You could also appeal to video evidence for miracles, especially if you're interacting with somebody who claims that there is no such evidence or that such evidence would be significant to him. To make a case more specifically for Christianity, you should familiarize yourself with the reasoning behind the traditional Christian arguments for the religion and be prepared to provide an overview to others. See here. You can appeal to prophecy fulfillment based on common ground with the non-Christian, namely evidence from the modern world and evidence from the ancient world that non-Christians often accept. You can also argue for Jesus' resurrection from non-Christian sources, in the sense of either people who were non-Christians prior to seeing Jesus risen from the dead or people who remained non-Christians, but corroborated the resurrection to some extent.

Those are just several examples. You can find more in our archives. And we have a lot of material that can be used to go beyond the earliest steps in arguing for Christianity. See here, for example, on arguing for the superiority of the Christian system of miracles over competing systems.

Don't play fetch the ball

Recently I saw a site that lists 2431 objections to Christianity. Of course, nobody has time to respond to 2431 objections. Indeed, that's the point of the site.  

Instead of fielding a hugely padded list of objections, why not focus on the evidence for Christianity? If you have sufficient evidence that something is true, you don't need to answer any objections.

It's not a Christian responsibility to perform an impossible task. We can't play fetch the ball with an unbeliever–where we have to chase the ball wherever he throws it. If you have sufficient evidence that something is true, you can leave puzzling objections unexplained. 

If unbelievers refuse to appreciate that fact, then that's their problem. There's no reason to feel desperate because they make unreasonable demands on us. There are limits to what Christians can do. The Christian is safe in the boat while the unbeliever is drowning. If he refuses to take your hand, he's the one who has everything to lose. It's a pity, but he created that predicament for himself. We can't help those who refuse help because the insist that we only provide a certain kind of help which isn't reasonable or feasible.

When someone says I won't believe unless you refute 2431 objections, that's a stalling tactic. What he's really saying is that he will never believe, by erecting an endless set of barriers. Even if you answered 2431 objections, he next move would be to challenge each answer. So it constantly multiplies.

Strategic priorities in apologetics

These can each be resolved by simply setting aside Biblical inerrancy.1 A saved liberal Christian is better than nothing, so reserve the above sub-topics for later.

Let me add that you have a virtual responsibility to ensure that your interlocutor knows that one can be a Christian while accepting evolution.

https://beliefmap.org/apologetics-guide/strategic-priorities

1. This reflects an unfortunate trend among some younger generation apologists. They don't think like theologians. Yet Christianity is a religion, so it's necessary to think like a theologian. 

2. Although the Bible contains many historical narratives, the Bible is divine revelation. It's not just a historical record of events, but theologically interpreted events. God raises up prophets and apostles to speak to and through them. A supernatural process. Consider the altered conscious states of seers like Isaiah, Ezekiel, Zechariah, and John the Revelator. Or consider the theological interpretations of Paul, the author of Hebrews, &c. Or how the Gospels integrate history with theological interpretation. 

3. Is there such a thing as "saved liberal Christian"? Or is that someone with a fundamentally unmodified secular outlook who's tacked on some Christian sentiments? 

How is that better than nothing rather than worse than nothing? If he's satisfied with a bad answer, a wrong answer, he has no incentive to seek a better answer. He took a wrong turn and keeps going in the wrong direction. It's not as if a "saved liberal Christian" is doing God a favor. 

4. Many unbelievers will rightly see it as intellectually evasive when Christian apologists duck objections to the inerrancy of Scripture. That doesn't mean a Christian apologist is obligated to individually run through every objection to the Bible. There are lots of good resources we can point a critic to, viz., Craig Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the New Testament (B&H Academic, 2016); D. A. Carson, ed. The Enduring Authority of the Christian Scriptures (Eerdmans, 2016); James Hoffmeier & Dennis MaGary, eds., Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith? (Crossway 2012); Kenneth Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Eerdmans 2003); John Oswalt, The Bible Among the Myths (Zondervan 2009); Vern Poythress, Inerrancy and the Gospels (Crossway 2012); Peter Williams, Can we Trust the Gospels? (Crossway 2018). If the critic is one of those frivolous people who recycles canned objections but is too apathetic to examine the answers, that's not the responsibility of a Christian apologist. 

5. If evolution is contrary to the Biblical revelation of organic origins, a Christian has no duty to say one can be an inconsistent Christian. While it's possible to be an inconsistent Christian, there's no obligation to commend or recommend intellectual or theological inconsistency. It's not as if a "saved liberal Christian" is doing God a favor. 

A Christian apologist lacks the authority to tell people what biblical teachings they must believe and which they are free to disregard. There can be debates about what Scripture teaches, but the principle is to accept all of divine revelation. 

Is it improper to argue evidentially for the Resurrection?

A friend asked me to comment on an old article by the late Greg Bahnsen:

https://answersingenesis.org/apologetics/the-impropriety-of-evidentially-arguing-for-the-resurrection/

However, a serious difficulty arises when the epistemological significance of the resurrection is separated from its soteriological function. It is correct to hold that God’s raising of Jesus from the dead saves us both from sin and agnosticism, but it would be mistaken to understand by this that the epistemological problem could be handled independently of the (broader) moral problem which is at its base. It is with regret that one notices neo-evangelicals severing the justifying efficacy of Christ’s resurrection from its truth-accrediting function. In reality, the latter is dependent upon the former. Only as Christ’s resurrection (with its ensuing regeneration by the Holy Spirit of Christ) saves a sinner from his rebellion against God and God’s Word, can it properly function to exhibit evidence for God’s truthfulness.

i) The significance of the Resurrection is multifaceted, so it's a question of which facet it is deployed to prove. It has an soteriological value but also evidential value. By raising Jesus from the dead, the Father vindicates the mission of Jesus, confirming who he claims to be. If Jesus was a false prophet, God would leave him to rot in the grave.

ii) The reversal of death is an overwhelming phenomenon, in addition to the implicit promise of immortality. 

Evangelicals are often prone to generate inductive arguments for the veracity of Christianity based on the historical resurrection of Christ, and such arguments occupy central importance in this apologetic. It is felt that if a man would simply consider the “facts” presented and use his common reasoning sense he would be rationally compelled to believe the truth of Scripture. In such a case the evidences for Christ’s resurrection are foundational to apologetical witnessing, whereas their only proper place is confirmatory of the believer’s presupposed faith. There is a certain impropriety about attempting to move an opponent from his own circle into the circle of Christian belief by appealing to evidence for the resurrection, and there are many reasons why the evidentialist’s building a case for Christianity upon neutral ground with the unbeliever ought to be avoided.

i) Bahnsen never says what he means by "neutral ground." Presumably the point of contrast is "All facts are created facts which can be properly understood only when given the interpretation the Creator intends"

ii) Due to common grace, some unbelievers are more reasonable than others. They retain more common sense. 

Adopting classical/evidentialist arguments

An issue in apologetic methodology is whether it's consistent for a presuppositionalist to adopt arguments from classical or evidential apologetics. That depends in part on whether we define presuppositionalism as an apologetic methodology that only deploys transcendental arguments. I think that's an unduly narrow. One role of presuppositionalism is to take advantage of what had been a neglected type of argument for theism: transcendental arguments. But that doesn't mean other types of arguments should be excluded.

One issue is whether criteria are worldview dependent or worldview independent. Classical and evidential apologists accuse presuppositionalists of vicious circularity. Classical and evidential apologists try to isolate and identify a set of general criteria that can be used to evaluate any competing worldview. 

If, however, there's only one God and one reality, then ultimately our criteria derive from that reality. Criteria must match reality. At that level, criteria are bound to a particular worldview–the true worldview.

A Christian apologist can't just play the rules of the atheist (or Buddhist). Those may be arbitrarily restrictive and slanted. Sometimes a Christian must challenge the criteria of the atheist. Or explain that his criteria require a more robust worldview that's at odds with naturalism and physicalism. It isn't necessarily possible for Christians and atheists to arrive at a common set of rules. 

This also goes to the question of how much is riding on God's existence. In addition to contingent facts, presuppositionalists think logic, mathematical truths, moral realism, and possible worlds are grounded in God's existence. If so, our criteria can't be independent of God's existence because they derive from God's existence. (According to natural law theory, there's a sense in which moral realism is a contingent fact, based on God's design for human creatures.)

However, that's viciously circular only if there's no way to demonstrate the claim. If, though, it's possible to formulate arguments which demonstrate that logic, morality, modality, and math require God's existence, then it's not viciously circular. By process of elimination we rule out naturalistic explanations. But that's philosophically demanding, painstaking process. A work in progress. 

It's consistent for a presuppositionalist to adopt arguments from classical and evidential apologetics so long as we acknowledge that those are worldview dependent.  

Should a Christian debater bracket his beliefs?

A recent exchange I had with a fellow Christian apologist:

Rob

It is, of course, possible that one or more of the Gospels is mistaken in this matter. 

Hays

Have the two positions evolved and diverged to the point where presuppositionalism is defined in part by commitment to inerrancy while evidentialism is now defined in part by lack of commitment to inerrancy?

Rob

When I say that it is "possible," I am speaking hypothetically and not about my own view. 

That having been said, if we are to engage skeptical views of the Bible honestly, we must be ready to acknowledge that in some instances there might be a plausible argument for an error in Scripture. As an evangelical, I maintain that if we knew enough about what was going on in problematic passages we would see that there are no errors, but that's different from claiming that we always have enough such information to show decisively that there are no errors.

Hays

i) It's true that inerrancy doesn't require us to have a solution at hand for every difficulty. I think some inerrantists try too hard to explain how apparent errors/contradictions aren't really erroneous or contradictory. The effort can backfire if it the explanation looks strained, ad hoc, and desperate.

Much better to say it's unreasonable to expect that we should have an explanation for every obscurity in Scripture, given our distance from the events. 

ii) That said, I'm somewhat unclear on how your statements go together. On the one hand you indicate that as an inerrantist, you don't actually think it's possible that one (or more) of the Gospels is mistaken on this point.

On the other hand, when you tell the skeptic that, hypothetically, it's possible that one (or more) of the Gospels is mistaken on this point, as a persuasive apologetic strategy (assuming that's what you mean), it suggests that you yourself think is wrong. But presumably the job of a Christian apologist is to defend and promote what he thinks is really the case. Our beliefs should map onto reality. We don't want to offer the skeptic an alternative that's not really the case, do we? We don't want to propose, as a fallback position, a falsehood as a substitute for reality. If the Bible, as the word of God, shares in God's infallibility, then our job is to defend that reality, and not an unreal substitution.

Rob

It is a perfectly understandable feature of rational discourse to state that something is 'possible' that one happens not to think is actually the case."=

Hays

But inerrancy derives from a doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration. While the dictionary definition of "inerrancy" is without error, the actual concept is infallibility, by virtue of inspiration. I think "inerrancy" has edged out "infallibility" in common usage because it has fewer syllables, which makes it easier to say. But the traditional orthodox concept is to be without possibility of error.

Rob

When speaking in the context of discussing the historical reliability of the text of an historical narrative in Scripture, where other participants in the discussion do not accept the divine inspiration of Scripture (and certainly not its inerrancy), to say that it is "possible" that a text is in error is to be understood in that context in which no commitment is being assumed with regard to the inerrancy of the text. I'm just not going to be so pedantic as to repeat "If we don't assume biblical inerrancy" before every comment on an apparent problem in Scripture.

Hays

i) Even when–or especially when–dealing with skeptics, it's important for them to understand what the Christian position represents. An apologist is a Christian spokesman, explaining the Christian position. An apologist ought to have a commitment to orthodox Christian theology. That's a given. That's understood. Skeptics should expect that from a Christian apologist.

ii) Of course, that's not their own viewpoint, but that doesn't mean he should accommodate their viewpoint. Rather, he should argue for his own viewpoint. No commitment should be assumed in the sense that he can't expect them to grant inerrancy. And he can't merely assert it to be the case. Likewise, inerrancy/inspiration needn't be the first stage of the argument. Rather, it can be the goal of the argument. The final stage he's aiming for and working towards. 

iii) It's not begging the question for a Christian apologist to operate with that presumptive commitment–inasmuch as he does have reasons for that commitment. It's not a bare or sheer assumption, but a well-grounded commitment.

Rob

Even if my immediate purpose is to defend the inerrancy of the Bible, doing so in a way that precludes a priori even considering the possibility of an error is unlikely to be a persuasive strategy. We will come across as refusing to consider any potential contrary evidence to our dogma. I don't think that's a winning approach.

Hays

i) The primary obligation of a Christian apologist should be to uphold and defend theological reality. He ought do his best to make a rational case, but representing and defending Christianity can't be hostage to the plausibility structure of the unbeliever. By definition, the unbeliever is unreasonable to some degree. In many cases, intransigently unreasonable.

ii) The standard of comparison must always be reality–including theological reality–and not what the unbeliever is prepared to accept. In a debate with a Hindu or Buddhist philosopher, is a Christian apologist suppose to bracket empirical evidence just because an Indian philosopher may regard the sensible world or physical universe as illusory or delusive (Maya)? No, you have to stand your ground and defend reality rather than offering him a substitute for reality, an option that doesn't square with what the real world is like. 

Consider a debate with an eliminative materialist. Is no commitment to be assumed with regard to consciousness in a debate between a dualist and an eliminative materialist? Hardly. The dualist will argue for his side of the position. He won't bracket consciousness to accommodate the eliminative materialist.

iii) We can acknowledge prima facie evidence against our position. But that in itself doesn't concede the possibility of error. After all, many things are true that may appear to be false. So that by itself creates no presumption that something is false.

Inerrancy and evidentialism

It's not uncommon for competing theological traditions to evolve and become increasingly divergent over time. For instance, there are now options in "evangelical" freewill theism that used to be considered liberal or out-of-bounds in the past, viz. purgatory, annihilationism, open theism, evolution, universalism, inclusivism, homosexuality. 

We may be seeing the same development in apologetics. There's an emerging pattern where, as evidentialism and prepositionalism continue to evolve and diverge, presuppositionalism is defined in part by commitment to inerrancy while evidentialism and classical apologetics are now defined in part by a noncommittal position on inerrancy. To some degree this seems to reflect a generational shift from old-guard evidentialism/classical theism. 

I wonder how characteristic this will become moving forward. Will presuppositionalists be the only defenders of inerrancy as a matter of principle, while the rival schools regard that as expendable or a drag factor we're better off without?

I am struck by the casual way in which traditional evangelical commitment to inerrancy is being sidelined, as though revelation and inspiration are unimportant to the nature of the Christian faith.

Knowing more than we can prove

A reponse I left on Facebook

1. Most Christians aren't intellectuals (like most humans generally–including most atheists). They are not able to make a philosophically rigorous case for Christianity.

So if Christianity is true, God must have a way of making known to garden-variety Christians that this is something they are supposed to believe. And this typically involves certain kinds of religious experience. Growing up in Christian communities (e.g. church, Christian family). God cultivates faith in Christianity through sociological means (among other factors).

They may just find the Bible compelling. And the Bible does contain evidence for its own veracity, even if they lack the sophistication to tease that out.

There may be other aspects of religious experience like a recognizable answer to prayer, an uncanny auspicious providence, an overwhelming (albeit temporary) sense of God's presence, or in some cases a miracle, that undergirds their faith.

We need to distinguish between raw evidence and formal argument. In addition, the "internal witness of the Spirit" can be a label or placeholder for variations on religious experience, some of which are probative. Having good reasons for what you believe, and the ability to articulate your reasons, are not to be confused.

2. I assume that you are in part alluding to this post:

http://www.craigkeener.com/epistemology-and-historical-arguments-a-few-thoughts/

I generally agree with what Keener says in that post.

3. There's the question of what the "inner testimony of the Holy Spirit" meant in historical theology. 

4. Speaking for myself, I'm not equipped with an internal detector that clues me into which reported biblical incidents are fictional or factual. I don't appeal to the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit in that sense. 

5. I agree with the principle that one way to evaluate the historicity of particular reports is not based on direct evidence for each report, but corroborative evidence for the source. The cliche argument is that if the source is reliable in cases where we have corroborative evidence, then there's a presumption that it's reliable in cases where we don't have corroborative evidence. Especially for ancient documents where only a random sample of confirmatory evidence survives. We don't require corroboration for every individual report. We only require enough corroboration to demonstrate the document is generally trustworthy. As think that's a valid principle as far as it goes. 

But while that provides warranted belief, it's weaker than what NT faith obligates. So it needs to be supplemented. Or perhaps that's a supplement to other things. 

6. As you know, there are multiple lines of evidence for the Gospels. There's the kind of archeological evidence recently marshaled by Peter Williams. There's the argument from undesigned coincidences which the McGrews have refined and expanded. There's Lydia's more recent argument from unnecessary details. There's the argument from prophecy.

7. I also think the argument from religious experience is germane to the credibility of the Gospels. My personal experience and experience of other Christians I know. In other words, evidence that we live in the same kind of world as the world depicted in the Bible. Not just public evidence. 

8. How do you understand and integrate passages like Rom 8:16, Gal 4:6, Jn 10:27, & 1 Jn 2:20,27 into your evidentialist epistemology?

Fisking Fesko (Transcendental Arguments)

https://www.proginosko.com/2020/01/reforming-apologetics-transcendental-arguments/

Errata

in my "Color-coded Bible," a friend pointed out that I left out my name at one point, making it look like Lydia was still speaking. It materially changes the sense. I've gone back an edited the post. I pick up here:

steve

To generalize, presuppers have a more theological orientation whereas evidentialists have a more historical orientation. By that I mean, evidentialists approach the Bible as historians–in contrast to presuppers who approach the Bible as a religious document (as well as a historical document), so that, as a matter of principle, presuppers treat Christian theology and Bible narratives as a unit–rather than an assemblage of separable parts, to be individually reaffirmed or discarded. (Which doesn't mean presuppers, or at least the most intelligent representatives, are unconcerned with the value of corroborative evidence, where available.)