Sunday, April 24, 2011

Testimony

Brian Leftow argues:
Atheism is all the rage. It sells lots of books, and they are angry books. It is also close to being the majority creed of the UK. A recent survey has it that 28% of Brits believe in a personal God. Another 26% believe in "something," but do not know what (no mean feat). (Maybe it's a toaster.) By contrast, 26% believe in UFOs. 42% think religion is harmful, and I think it's a safe bet almost all of those are atheists. The new sort of atheist is aggressive. They would like to convert you. One move they all tend to make is to challenge you to prove God's existence, and claim that you're irrational or stupid to believe in God if you can't provide an argument that does so to their satisfaction. The criticisms they offer for standard arguments are mostly pretty poor. Alvin Plantinga reviewed Dawkins' book, and said that he'd call the philosophy in it sophomoric except that this would be too hard on sophomores. But the more basic idea the polemicists take for granted - that you need something like an argument for God's existence that would convince anyone to be rational believing it - is what I want to challenge.

To begin with, the atheist making this challenge suggests that if you can't convince anyone - i.e., in the circumstances, him - you shouldn’t be convinced yourself. The thought is that to be a rational religious believer, you would have to put yourself in the atheist's position, supposing only what he supposes, and argue yourself into theism, using only considerations that would convince anyone. But why? Why should the standpoint of the atheist or agnostic be the touchstone from which rationality is assessed? And the thought that only considerations that would convince any neutral observer are rational bases for religious belief is surely wrong. For religious experience is a sound basis for belief. It is rational to be convinced by your own experience. If it seems to you that God appears to you, or speaks to you, that is an excellent reason to think that God exists, as long as you know you weren't drunk etc. at the time. Prima facie, having God appear to you is as good a reason to believe in God as having a crested woodpecker appear to you is to believe in them. But the one who hasn't had this experience may legitimately be more skeptical. He may wonder whether it could have been as you say, whether your environment and background beliefs led you to misinterpret something, etc. You may legitimately not take these doubts seriously: you know what it was like. He doesn't, and so legitimately may. Which makes the point that not all rational bases for belief are person-neutral. People can rationally believe based on evidence others may rationally reject.

But you don't need experience to be rational in believing. Nor do you need philosophical arguments. I believe in God ultimately due to my acceptance of testimony on the subject. I'm going to suggest that testimony is enough.

I grew up believing that there was some sort of God because this was what the grownups told me. If this was irrational, then I ought also not to have believed that 2+2=4, that "dog" means dog, or that the Magna Carta was signed in England, because I believed these too only because that was what the grownups told me. I was not under a rational obligation to doubt their testimony. Nor was I under a rational obligation to investigate history and the set-theoretic foundations of mathematics for myself when I got older, to replace my testimonial basis for belief with some other sort. I was not required to look up my history teacher's university marks, or travel to England, to believe rationally. I still believe that the Magna Carta was signed in England for no better reason than that I was told it, others still tell me it, and I haven't come across anything that made me doubt it, or ought to have done so. And surely I am rational to believe it, and perhaps even know it. You might think that as a philosopher, I've learned some nifty arguments for God's existence, and these are now the supports of my belief. Well, yes, I've found arguments I find convincing. But the same arguments fail to convince people who come to them as atheists, and this rather suggests that other bases for belief are playing a large role in how I evaluate the arguments, and that I haven't really ultimately gotten away from testimony.

We learn most of what we know about the world by testimony. What you know about history, science, and mathematics came to you not because you did research or proofs. You simply accepted your teachers' words, as your teachers did for most of what they learned from their teachers, and their teachers for most of what they learned, and so on. If testimony were not a rational basis for belief, we could not rationally believe any of this. If accepting it were not on its own a sufficient basis for knowledge, you could not claim to know one bit of history, science, mathematics, or even current political events. (Newsreaders are giving testimony.) Either testimony is on its own sufficient to justify belief and render it rational, or no jury ever decides a case on the basis of rational, justified belief. And either testimony is on its own sufficient for knowledge or no one but a few archaeologists knows anything about ancient history.

I suspect that the only rational attitude is to give all testimony a prima facie pass. What this means is: suppose someone tells you something. There are things that should lead you immediately to doubt a story. Maybe he says that David Cameron is PM, but you've heard otherwise. (Notice, though, that it's what you've heard - testimony.) Maybe the story is simply crazy. (But could you judge it so without relying on beliefs you'd acquired by accepting testimony?) There are also things that should lead you to doubt a story's teller. Maybe he looks drunk. Maybe he has shifty, dishonest eyes. Maybe his friends call him Liar Joe. But if nothing like that is true, then the only rational attitude is to believe him, perhaps not with maximal confidence, but with confidence enough.

The reason is simple. If you did not do this, you'd be committed to one of two things: either finding some other principled basis to doubt the given story or teller, even though it "passes" the initial tests mentioned, or trying to sift all testimony as you received it - to try to accredit the witness, or test it for yourself, etc. But could you know enough to do this without accepting other testimony? Could you know what stories are crazy without relying on testimony? You can judge who's drunk easily, and maybe you've seen firsthand that drunks can get things wrong or perhaps reasoned this out on the basis of experience - but maybe even that is only something you've heard. The friends' calling him Liar Joe is testimony. You don't know whether Cameron is PM without accepting the testimony of newsreaders and reporters: you aren't going to get to see him to ask, and surely you don't have to do so to be rational in believing this. You couldn't speak a language without having accepted testimony about words. In most cases, you're not even in a position of knowing enough to do the relevant checks and tests without first accepting testimony. So: you can't sift testimony without relying on other testimony. And it's not clear that you can have a principled basis for deciding which testimony to take initially on sheer trust (given the initial "pass" of the speaker, as someone who does not seem untrustworthy). If that turns out true, the only rational choice is to take all testimony initially on trust if the teller seems trustworthy.

You may continue to be justified in believing the testimony even if you find things that make you doubt the story or the teller somewhat, or ought to do so. If the basis for doubt is considerable, perhaps you need to do something to allay it. But that's the most you need do. If you do it, your testimonial justification for belief remains undefeated and your belief is justified and rational.

And finally there is no non-question-begging basis for denying the same prima facie acceptance to religious testimony. If it is rational to accept a story about physics, given that you have no particular reason to doubt the teller, why not one about God? If all you need to do to remain rational is find a reasonable response to bases for doubts about physics, so too here. And whoever claims that we have an obligation to become skeptical about religious testimony, to investigate whether the sources are credible, etc., needs to explain why the same doesn't hold for scientific testimony (e.g. looking up your teacher's undergraduate marks). There is only one well-known argument about this, Hume's against believing testimony about miracles. But not all religious testimony concerns the miraculous. Some is just testimony to religious experience, or prophesied/fulfilled historical events. And in any case, Hume's argument is a bust.

It might seem that testimony to experience of God, or to miracles, should not get prima facie acceptance because it runs up against some of the barriers I mentioned earlier. It is rational to doubt testimony if the teller seems crazy - and perhaps Dawkins thinks that anyone who claims to have heard God's voice shows himself to be crazy. It is rational to doubt testimony if the story is literally incredible, or close to it - and perhaps Dawkins thinks that any miracle story is ipso facto incredible, and ditto any story about seeing a vision or hearing God's voice. But why?

It's probably craziness to seem to hear God's voice if it is very improbable that God exists - so perhaps Dawkins thinks that he has a good argument for this. (The absence of independent proof that God exists isn't an argument. We have no independent proof that North American woodpeckers exist, save that some people have seen them and reported it. If it's rational to believe them, other things being equal, it's just because there's no particular argument that they don't exist.) The only one out there is the argument from evil. And while that argument can impress, the truth of the matter is that there are pretty good answers to it out there. Of course, you know by testimony that some philosophers think there are, and some think there aren't. It's a peculiar fact about philosophy that an argument that seems crushing to some seems irrelevant to others. One thing you could do is examine the argument and the answers for yourself. But that's of limited value if you're not a philosopher: you should know that someone who spends more time on it might well see considerations you don't, and defer to some degree to expert opinion - which is divided. So what's the rational answer in the face of that, given that you're not a philosopher? I suggest that the absence of a consensus against God's existence on the basis of this argument, among people who've considered the question seriously, leaves you with little reason to think that people who think they've heard God's voice are crazy. That's not to say no reason, but if there are a fair number of people who seem otherwise sane who claim this, the craziness block on accepting testimony doesn’t seem to apply.

The theist's position may well be this. He believes in God growing up, because the grownups say so. As he grows, he learns that their testimony traces ultimately back to a book in most cases. There are in that book testimonies to religious experience he finds convincing - say, someone's account of a vision of a burning bush. On testimonial basis, he continues to believe. Someone who as a child or young adult simply believes what they hear is behaving perfectly rationally. And they may remain rational even after they come into contact with testimony to other religions, and critical discussion of testimony to miracles, and critical Scriptural scholarship where that exists: all they need is a sufficiently reasonable response to the problems raised, or a good reason to think that an expert has such a response. If someone is skeptical of your story about the Big Bang, to be rational in resisting his skepticism, you don't have to be a physicist. You need only have good reason to think a physicist could do it for you, and refer your inquirer to the expert. So too here: if you have reason to think someone can do the job for you, you can farm out the work. If the theist can rebut the atheist's case against his testimonially based belief, or believe rationally that others can do it for him, the theist is fully rational. Nothing more is required.

18 comments:

  1. "I was not required to look up my history teacher's university marks, or travel to England, to believe rationally. I still believe that the Magna Carta was signed in England for no better reason than that I was told it, others still tell me it, and I haven't come across anything that made me doubt it, or ought to have done so."

    Has anyone tried to sell you the Brooklyn Bridge ?

    You can go and read a copy of the Magna Carta.

    You can go and meet David Cameron.

    You could even check your teachers University marks.

    The fact that you choose not to does not invalidate the existance of your ability to do so.

    A large part of any sort of research is not accepting the account of someone else at face value.

    By the way, I have the really nice bridge in New York you might be interested in buying.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Paul Baird said:

    You can go and read a copy of the Magna Carta.

    Your reading comprehension is deficient. Leftow didn't say you can't go and read a copy of the Magna Carta. Rather he argued it's rational to believe the Magna Carta was signed in England based on testimonial evidence.

    It would be impossible to see this occur unless you plan to supply us with a time machine that'll take us back to the 13th century so that we can verify with our very own eyes that the Magna Carta was indeed signed in England (although technically it was sealed, not signed, but that doesn't detract from Leftow's argument).

    On a lesser note, you're also trying to sneak in the word "copy."

    You can go and meet David Cameron.

    Once again, you have deficient reading comprehension skills. Have you personally met David Cameron? If not, then how do you know he's the PM? Or what about the person who has never met Cameron? How would he know Cameron is PM? That's the point.

    The fact that you choose not to does not invalidate the existance of your ability to do so.

    This wasn't part of Leftow's argument. He didn't make either "the existance [sic] of your ability" to choose or your exercising or not exercising it part of his argument. You're just trying to divert attention from his actual argument.

    Leftow is using the signing of the Magna Carta, meeting David Cameron, and so forth as illustrations of a larger argument. Namely that it's rational to believe in God ultimately based on testimonial evidence. So even if you could defeat these examples, which you haven't done, it's possible for someone to pick other examples which wouldn't change Leftow's essential argument.

    A large part of any sort of research is not accepting the account of someone else at face value.

    Sad to say yet again but your reading comprehension is deficient. Or I suppose it's possible you didn't even bother to read what Leftow wrote in the first place, which would mean you're trying to criticize something you haven't read, which in turn would mean you're behaving unreasonably and unfairly. Take your pick!

    At any rate, Leftow didn't say we should accept testimonial evidence "at face value." He didn't say we should never doubt testimonial credibility. Try re-reading what he wrote. Of course, if you do have deficiencies in your reading comprehension, then I'd suggest you let someone know so they can spell it out for you in simpler terms which you can hopefully better grasp.

    Has anyone tried to sell you the Brooklyn Bridge? . . . By the way, I have the really nice bridge in New York you might be interested in buying.

    Well, if we apply your own criterion here, I suppose I might believe it if I could see you jump off it with my very own eyes! :-)

    ReplyDelete
  3. Sorry Patrick, but I can go and 'see' David Cameron - the live version, in full technicolor, every Wednesday at 12.30 during PMQs (when the House is sitting) from the Strangers Gallery in House of Commons or I can wait for him to visit MK again (he's been here several times already).

    You can do the same too. :-)

    The key point is - you DON'T have to take my word for it. You can check the facts yourself.

    The Magna Carta - see http://www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/basics/basics.html

    There are two 'copies' extant in that location. The train fare is £20 off-peak so I might go and have a look over the holidays.

    The key point is - you DON'T have to take my word for it. You can check the facts yourself.

    You amended your comment and removed the bit about the University grades - good. They are very checkable in the UK.

    Anyway, onto the gist of Leftow's argument now that I've shown his examples to be plain silly.

    "Namely that it's rational to believe in God ultimately based on testimonial evidence."

    No it isn't. The argument falls down because it's indiscrimate - Which God ? Whose testimony ?

    "Well, if we apply your own criterion here, I suppose I might believe it if I could see you jump off it with my very own eyes! :-)"

    You still don't get it - I can travel to New York and see that bridge and even walk across it. I don't have to accept your word for it's existence.

    What Leftow seems to be advocating is that evidence for God should be acceptable at a much lower level than Atheists are demanding, yet that's on a par with the xamples he's supplied us with.

    Perhaps he should use different examples.

    Nice use of sarcasm in your reply (all five attempts) by the way.

    :-)

    ReplyDelete
  4. Paul Baird said:

    Sorry Patrick, but I can go and 'see' David Cameron - the live version, in full technicolor, every Wednesday at 12.30 during PMQs (when the House is sitting) from the Strangers Gallery in House of Commons

    Gee whiz, Paul - I guess that means you must be "accepting the testimony of...reporters" like Leftow pointed out! :-)

    or I can wait for him to visit MK again (he's been here several times already).

    Sure, and like I asked you, have you actually met him in person? Or is this just something you plan to do in the future? If you haven't actually met him in person, then how would you know whether he is or is not? Does he exist or not exist? Is he PM or is he not? That is the question! Ay, there's the rub, dear bard - er, I mean, Baird! :-)

    The Magna Carta...There are two 'copies' extant in that location. The train fare is £20 off-peak so I might go and have a look over the holidays.

    So would this include a time machine to the 13th century since that's the example Leftow gave (and I already pointed out) when he talked about the signing of the Magna Carta? :-)

    The key point is - you DON'T have to take my word for it. You can check the facts yourself. . . . Anyway, onto the gist of Leftow's argument now that I've shown his examples to be plain silly.

    Well now, Paul! Such a perspicacious, deeply incisive analysis of the flaws in Leftow's argument honing in on "check[ing] the facts for yourself" (since this was evidently part and parcel of Leftow's core argument) ought surely to give Leftow pause for the endeavor if not outright bring him to hang his head in shame!

    ReplyDelete
  5. No it isn't. The argument falls down because it's indiscrimate - Which God ? Whose testimony?

    Whoa! Stop the presses! I did not know that Leftow's argument could be so easily defeated simply because it's "indiscriminate"! Surely you've stumbled upon something large, very large, Paul. I mean, yes, it's true Leftow framed the argument in terms of theism and not a particular version of theism like Judaism or Christianity or Islam. Hence it is, I suppose, "indiscriminate" as you say. But who knew the fact that Leftow framed his argument to apply "indiscriminately" to theism generally rather than a particular version was indeed a defeater for his entire argument? Certainly no one with reason would've expected that, but I suppose that's why it takes someone deficient in reason like Paul to point it out! :-)

    You still don't get it - I can travel to New York and see that bridge and even walk across it. I don't have to accept your word for it's existence.

    You still don't get it - given that you haven't traveled to NYC before (at least you've not said so), you haven't seen the bridge. So how do you currently know it exists?

    What Leftow seems to be advocating is that evidence for God should be acceptable at a much lower level than Atheists are demanding, yet that's on a par with the xamples he's supplied us with.

    Alas! It appears the spirit of deficient reading comprehension haunts you, Paul! 'Tis a dark and abiding specter, methinks. I'm not sure whether you'll be able to ever shake it. But do try, please! I fear the worst but hope the best for you, Paul.

    But, no, you're quite wrong. What Leftow is arguing is that it's rational for a theist to believe in God based on testimonial evidence. Or to look at it another way, Leftow is providing a counterargument to the argument that someone needs a persuasive argument for God's existence in order to rationally believe in God.

    Perhaps he should use different examples.

    Perhaps you should re-read what Leftow wrote since it's utterly obvious to everyone but you that you don't understand his argument.

    Nice use of sarcasm in your reply (all five attempts) by the way.

    No problem, Paul. Sarcasm is the best thing ever! :-)

    ReplyDelete
  6. Comedic stuff, Patrick, comedic.

    I'll just copy your responses into my blog and let them speak for themselves Prat-rick, sorry Patrick (yeah it's a bit juvenile but it's the sort of nonsense that seems to float your boat).

    :-)

    ReplyDelete
  7. The argument wasn't that hard to catch, was it?

    Wouldn't it be more interesting and productive to actually deal with the argument present in the post?

    ReplyDelete
  8. True dat, Mr. Fosi. For whatever reason(s) Paul Baird missed the argument. I think it's either because he didn't read it in the first place (or maybe he just quickly skimmed it) or because he didn't understand what he read if he did read it. I think it's the latter.

    And, of course, one must understand an argument before one can reasonably criticize it. But since Baird doesn't grasp what Leftow is arguing in the first place, his "criticisms" (such as they are) fall flat.

    I agree it'd be more interesting to tackle Leftow's argument though. It's not necessarily without its flaws.

    ReplyDelete
  9. Let me see if I get this,

    Brian Leftow: You can be rational in believing a proposition based on testimonial evidence, without checking all the facts.

    Paul Baird: But you can check a lot of facts.

    Patrick Chan: But Leftow's point was you can rationally believe something from testimony alone.

    Paul Baird: But you can check a lot of facts.

    Patrick Chan: But you're still relying on testimony.

    Paul Baird: Ha ha!

    ReplyDelete
  10. Although there is nothing wrong with the principle per se that it is rational to believe on the basis of testimony alone, there is more to the equation here than that.

    Certain kinds of testimony can have shown themselves in the past to be so unreliable that it would irrational to believe them just on the basis of the testimony alone.

    And religious experience falls into this category: most people who have religious experiences are either charlatans (Joseph Smith, Todd Bentley, Benny Hinn, L. Ron Hubbard, etc.) or kooks (Gail Riplinger, Harold Camping, etc.), and we'd say that the vast majority of their followers (who accept based on testimony) are gullible.

    Another reason such testimony is unreliable is because of the nature of the thing it points to: religious experience seems to be biologically based, and can be induced by electrodes or drugs. It does not point to something solid that could ever be verified in principle, such as a claim that such and so is President or that a particular math equation is true.

    So in the first instance, religious testimony is analogous to an individual who has shown himself to be unreliable in the past (because he has lied, misinterprets what he perceived, etc.) in which case it would be folly *not* to doubt his testimony if that's all the support there was for a particular proposition.

    In the second, religious testimony is like an "invisible gardener" claim. It can never in principle be verified empirically like other testimonies can, and I think it's obvious that unverifiable claims (about which the claimant might be mistaken) have less merit when it comes to the question of whether we should believe testimonies of them.

    ReplyDelete
  11. See? Now that was certainly more interesting and productive.

    ReplyDelete
  12. Although there is nothing wrong with the principle per se that it is rational to believe on the basis of testimony alone, there is more to the equation here than that.

    Did you read the article? Brian Leftow himself indicates this when he says we should give testimony "a prima facie pass.... There are things that should lead you immediately to doubt a story.... There are also things that should lead you to doubt a story's teller" (emphasis on "prima facie" removed).

    So, I don't see you adding anything to Leftow's basic proposal. You want to say all religious testimony should not get a prima facie pass. All religious testimony should lead you to doubt. Your claim is that "Certain kinds of testimony" should be met with prima facie doubt. But Leftow even hints at the possibility of this route when he says: "It might seem that testimony to experience of God, or to miracles, should not get prima facie acceptance b/c it runs up against some of the barriers I mentioned earlier. It is rational to doubt testimony if the teller seems crazy- and perhaps Dawkins thinks that anyone who claims to have heard God's voice shows himself to be crazy."

    So, really, the only thing you add to the discussion here is that this prima facie doubt should arise from the fact that persons giving this kind of testimony in the past have been found untrustworthy: if enough persons giving said kind have "shown themselves in the past to be so unreliable that it would irrational to believe them just on the basis of the testimony alone."

    Now, this may be a reasonable proposal if we could show that the kinds of persons giving the kind of testimony have a tendency to be crazy or not functioning properly cognitively. But all you give us is a handful of names out of millions of people who have religious experiences. Leftow also said we take the testimony "on trust if the teller seems trustworthy." Well, we have reasons to think people like Joseph Smith are not trustworthy, but we don't have reasons to think religious persons per se are untrustworthy. Or at least you haven't given us anything that would lead us to say religious persons per se are untrustworthy. Leftow never said testimony was indefeasible. Furthermore, we may even have reasons to distrust the majority of testimony in a certain field, but it doesn't follow that this gives us reason to prima facie doubt *every* testimony in that field. For instance, I may have prima facie reasons to doubt whatever a car salesman tells me. Yet this prima facie doubt would carry over to my car-salesman father. I may have good reason to think my father will not be untrustworthy with me when telling me about the value of a car on his lot.

    ReplyDelete
  13. So while you find Leftow to be too simplistic (because I think you haven't read him carefully enough), I find your objection to be too simplistic.

    You offer a second reason in that "religious experience seems to be biologically based, and can be induced by electrodes or drugs." I'm not sure this is the case, but even if we can induce religious experiences through natural means (drugs or electrodes) it doesn't follow that all religious experiences have natural origins. But this gets into causal closedness and other issues I don't feel like diving into.

    So in the first instance, religious testimony is analogous to an individual who has shown himself to be unreliable in the past (because he has lied, misinterprets what he perceived, etc.) in which case it would be folly *not* to doubt his testimony if that's all the support there was for a particular proposition.

    But this is only true of particular persons. I don't see how you can generalize it unless you first demonstrate that the experience is a symptom of some disorder.

    In the second, religious testimony is like an "invisible gardener" claim. It can never in principle be verified empirically like other testimonies can, and I think it's obvious that unverifiable claims (about which the claimant might be mistaken) have less merit when it comes to the question of whether we should believe testimonies of them.

    From what you said, I don't see how it follows that religious testimony *in principle* cannot be verified empirically. In some sense, in principle, you cannot empirically verify any historical event (including this morning's historical events). (I assume we don't have in mind the naive, relic of positivism in mind when we talk about "verify.")

    ReplyDelete
  14. Correction:

    This: "Yet this prima facie doubt would carry over to my car-salesman father."

    Should read: "...would *not* carry over..."

    ReplyDelete
  15. Perhaps that's why they call them "professors".

    ReplyDelete
  16. Apologies, I've been attending to several school related items. But it looks like Jonathan has already responded well.

    I'd just tack onto Jonathan's fine response the following:

    And religious experience falls into this category: most people who have religious experiences are either charlatans (Joseph Smith, Todd Bentley, Benny Hinn, L. Ron Hubbard, etc.) or kooks (Gail Riplinger, Harold Camping, etc.), and we'd say that the vast majority of their followers (who accept based on testimony) are gullible.

    Although this takes us somewhat afield of Leftow's direct argument, presuming the theist possesses properly functioning cognitive faculties and so forth, it's rational for the theist himself to believe his religious experience is veridical.

    Another reason such testimony is unreliable is because of the nature of the thing it points to: religious experience seems to be biologically based, and can be induced by electrodes or drugs. It does not point to something solid that could ever be verified in principle, such as a claim that such and so is President or that a particular math equation is true.

    Let's agree for the sake of argument there is indeed a neurophysiological process which produces a religious experience and presumably belief as a result. The fact that there is a neurophysiological process doesn't in itself necessarily discredit the veridicality of the religious experience and subsequent belief. It could be God created us in such a way that we would come to have knowledge of him via these neurophysiological processes.

    ReplyDelete