Monday, June 04, 2007

Well of Answers

MG has responded to something I wrote:

http://woq.blogspot.com/2007/06/response-to-steve-hays.html

“Personally I dislike the style of presentation being used by some of the Eastern Christians over there, and I hope that there can be more diplomatic tones in the future between the Calvinistic camp and the Eastern commenters.”

In that event I’d advise the other Orthodox commenters to steer clear of this particular thread so that MG can focus on the questions and answers of interest to him.

“No one can be certain of what they believe.”

i) I disagree. In fact, the statement is self-refuting. Are you certain that you can’t be certain?

ii) We need to distinguish between first-order knowledge and second-order knowledge. I can know something without proving it. Indeed, I can know something without being able to prove it.

So I reject an internalist constraint on knowledge, according to which I can’t know something unless I can prove what I know.

Rather, I’d distinguish between prereflective (i.e. intuitive, pretheoretical or tacit) knowledge and reflective (i.e. analytical) knowledge.

Even doubt presupposes belief. We may doubt something because it conflicts with something else we believe. So doubt does not exist in a vacuum. One thing is only doubtful in relation to something else which is not doubtful.

“The difference that I think exists between Orthodoxy and Evangelicalism is that one sees the authority of the New and Old Testament canons grounded in public, infallible, divine revelation (the Orthodox Church) whereas the other does not see the authority of the New and Old Testament canons being publicly revealed by an infallible authority. Neither side grants certainty, but the Orthodox side does seem to have a kind of authority behind the canon that is different. And I would say that this authority puts Orthodoxy in a better place in terms of being more consistent with basic Christian assumptions, ie. revelation is public and its truth based on infallible authority.”

i) Other issues aside, you seem to believe in continuous revelation, which amounts to an open canon. And this courts a regressive fallacy, because you are using ecclesiastical revelation to ground canonical revelation. So what grounds ecclesiastical revelation? If the church authorizes the Bible, what authorizes the church?

ii) What is the locus of infallible authority in the church? And how do you establish that claim?

“The issue of who speaks for Orthodoxy is an odd one. Its kind of like asking who speaks for Christianity.”

But evangelicals don’t make the same claims for our spokesman that the Orthodox make for theirs. Orthodoxy ascribes an institutional authority to certain representatives (e.g. patriarchs, metropolitans) that is not equivalent to the role of pastors or theologians or Bible scholars in a low-church polity. So it is certainly germane to ask, in a high-church polity, who speaks for the faith.

“The principle that I operated on when I was testing Orthodox claims (in my Protestant days of not-so-long ago) was the principle of generosity. What this basically means is ‘I should assume the best things—within reason—about my opponents and people I disagree with’.”

I don’t agree. I wouldn’t assume the best when dealing with Mormons or Moonies or Scientology. It depends on what we know about these movements or individuals.

“I also use this principle in dealing with Calvinists, Roman Catholics, and naturalists. This means, when translated to theological and philosophical argument, that I always assume ‘the most credible person/claim/belief/argument should be considered to represent the group that is presenting its claims’.”

I don’t disagree with this. The problem, though, is that you’re operating with an essentially Protestant criterion.

In a high-church polity, the individual who happens to be the best representative or most authoritative spokesmen for the faith is not the most intellectually competent spokesman, but the spokesman with a certain institutional standing.

You’re suggesting an intellectual meritocracy in which the spokesman with the best argument wins the argument. I’m very sympathetic to that approach. But it reflects a low-church, Protestant outlook.

A high-church polity is inherently authoritarian. It’s an appeal to authority rather than reason.

“If we wish to get at truth, it seems to make the most sense to do this. So I think that when we are in a position to assess which of several conflicting claims to correctly represent a tradition is the most likely correct representative, we should go with “whichever claim is the most favorable to that position being true’.”

The question of who is true to tradition begs the question in favor of tradition, and only pushes the question back step. I can be true to tradition without tradition being true.

“In light of all of this, I would say that we should assume that whoever speaks for Orthodoxy is whoever presents the most credible view/argument/claim. This doesn’t imply the person is an authority; it just forces us to deal with the best version/interpretation of a certain position.”

But that isn’t how Orthodoxy is set up. Orthodoxy is hierarchical. It is predicated on the principle of ascribed status rather than achieved status. The Patriarch of Constantinople enjoys a certain authority, not because of who he is, but because of what he is. He enjoys a measure of official authority—authority that comes with the office. It is the office, and not the official, which confers authority. The office confers authority on the office-holder, not vice versa.

Now, some hierarchs may be very gifted, and they may rise through the ranks due to their intellectual attainments. But that is not the source of their authority.

“For me, the question is not epistemic in the sense of a desire for certainty (the project of modernism) but instead is based on a desire for proper authority.”

This is a pomo caricature of modernism. The question for certainty antedates the Enlightenment. Scholastic theologians were concerned with certainty. Augustine was concerned with certainty. Plato was concerned with certainty.

“I’m not sure the issues you raise here are as serious as the issues in a Protestant view of authority. In Mark 16:17 Jesus says that the signs will accompany those who believe; but that doesn’t necessarily mean that this is meant in an unqualified way such that these signs necessarily accompany those saved and only if one can do these signs does that imply a person is saved. Why should we think Jesus means this in an unqualified way?”

i) We should think Jesus means this in an unqualified way because he speaks without qualification.

ii) But suppose, for the sake of argument, that we take it in a qualified way. Tell me what percentage or fraction of the Orthodox exhibit any of these signs. How common is exorcism and glossolalia in modern Orthodoxy? How common is faith-healing in modern Orthodoxy? How many Orthodox believers imbibe poison or handle venomous snakes?

“Again, what I’m not going for is certainty. Rather it’s a matter of public infallible authority: is divine revelation authenticated and taught by public infallible authority, or not?”

i) Isn’t this circular? If you need revelation to authenticate revelation, then where do you begin or end?

ii) Are you saying that the Bible has no inherent divine indicia? That, taken by itself, Scripture is on the same plane as the Wall Street Journal, Gospel of Judas, Book of Mormon, or Celestine Prophecy?

Are you saying that the only thing which distinguishes the Bible from these other works is the extrinsic authorization of the church? That, in principle, the church could just as well have canonized the Gospel of Judas or Book of Mormon?

“Regarding the issue of ecumenical councils, I don’t have any criteria for an ecumenical council that I can be absolutely sure of. It seems to me least arbitrary to think that if the Church has been given the Holy Spirit, and the Church as a whole seems to have made a certain decision (by the consent of the majority of the hierarchy) that the Holy Spirit has indeed led the Church to make that decision with authority. This may seem arbitrary to you; but it doesn’t seem arbitrary to me. This is at least one possible way of understanding how the Holy Spirit functions in the Church. It seems to me to provide a proper grounding for the truth of the biblical canon and the infallible, revealed status of doctrines such as the Trinity and Incarnation. Hence I think it’s a good model for delineating which decisions are ecumenical/authoritative.”

Several issues:

i) Where has the Holy Spirit been given to the church? Are you alluding to some verse of Scripture?

ii) If you’re invoking some Scriptural promise made to the church, then Scripture authenticates the church, not vice versa.

iii) To which ecclesiastical claimant does the pneumatic promise apply? How do you establish which church the Holy Spirit guides?

iv) You equivocate over the identity of “the Church.” In one sentence you go from “the church as a whole” to “the majority of the hierarchy.” But these are hardly convertible entities. At most, the majority of the hierarchy would only be a subset of the church as a whole.

v) Moreover, what about the Arian controversy, when the majority of the hierarchy were Arian while the majority of the laity were orthodox?

By your majoritarian yardstick (“consent of the majority of the hierarchy,” the council of Florence (1438-39) should be an ecumenical council. Is that your opinion? If not, why not?

“I don’t see any reason to think that either side by itself speaks for the whole Church. Individuals and sub-groups within the Church can be fallible and dead wrong, according to this understanding. It is the Church in ecumenical consensus that is infallible. These disputes don’t seem to mean much of anything in terms of the integrity of the Church as a whole.”

Sorry, but this is far too facile. What makes the Russian Orthodox church to be a true church? Apostolic succession, yes? It’s in valid succession to the Greek Orthodox church, which is in valid succession to the apostles. Isn’t that the basic argument?

So which claimant is in valid succession? Is it the Metropolitan of ROCOR or the Patriarch of Moscow? If you can’t answer questions like these, then apostolic succession is unverifiable.

“What I was specifically dealing with when I said ‘Can’t your argument be used to point out the vagueness of Christianity in general?’ was the issue of ‘who speaks for Christianity?’ Your response, however, did not explain why the question ‘Who speaks for Orthodoxy?’ couldn’t be applied with equal force to an evangelical in the form of ‘Who speaks for Christianity?’ This doesn’t directly have to do with the canon arguments that some Orthodox people have been making; it is rather a rebuttal to your point about the vagueness of Orthodoxy.”

From an evangelical perspective, the short answer is: whoever truly speaks for Scripture truly speaks for Christianity. It comes down to who has the right interpretation. And the best supporting argument for his position.

“Regarding what the alternative grounds are for establishing evangelicalism, could you summarize your approach, and explain in what sense the contents of the canon of the Old and New Testaments are considered to be public, infallible, divine revelation on your view?”

I’ve discussed this in some detail on various occasions. The evidence for the canon involves internal and external lines of evidence.

i) The self-witness of Scripture, in the form of authorial ascriptions as well as intertextual connections, constitutes the direct, internal evidence.

ii) Textual criticism and historical testimony constitute the external evidence.

iii) There’s also the argument from religious experience. Christians find the Bible believable.

Being an argument from experience, it’s limited to insiders rather than outsiders. So it will only work in defensive rather than offensive apologetics.

Also, spiritual experience is person-variable. Nonetheless, this is an important element in the case for canonicity, even if it needs to be supplemented.

“I am very aware of such arguments. I think that J. P. Holding’s exegesis is quite sufficient in showing that it is not necessary to infer Calvinism from Romans 9 (and you are very aware of Holding's exegesis).”

Sufficient for you, but not for me—since I’ve critiqued his “exegesis.”

“This becomes even more clear if you add on a couple more points from Forster and Marston’s God’s Strategy in Human History.”

I read this book years ago. It’s hardly a masterpiece of scholarship. For starters, just compare their treatment of the hardening of Pharaoh’s hard with Beale’s monograph or John Currid’s article.

“And Witherington’s Romans: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary,”

Once again, sufficient for you, but not for me—since I’ve critiqued his exegesis.

“And Brian J. Abasciano’s “Corporate Election in Romans 9: A Response to Thomas R. Schreiner” in the JETS. These are more than sufficient to answer the arguments of Calvinist exegetes such as the one you linked to, Schreiner, or Piper.”

I’ll deal with Abasciano in a separate post.

“Can you provide some of the background information on this? I have read a little bit about yada in the OT, but I was under the impression that it is rarely used to unambiguously mean ‘choose’ ‘chose’ etc. when talking about God and his people.”

Frequency is irrelevant to meaning. A rare meaning is still a real meaning.

For example, homosexual activists claim, using your statistical standard, that Gen 19 has no reference to homosexuality since, in the vast majority of its occurrences, yada simply means to “know.”

Yet, in context, yada clearly denotes sexual activity in Gen 19.

“Furthermore, the context within 1 Peter includes verses about prophetic anticipation of the future and God’s foreknowledge of Christ’s appearing. These can both be legitimately interpreted as teaching that foreknowledge involves cognitive awareness of truths about the future; I see no reason this could not also apply to 1 Peter 1:2.”

This is a circular argument because you’re assuming your “Arminian” interpretation of proginosko in 1:20, and then mapping that back on 1:2.

“And as Witherington would be quick to point out, God’s foreknowledge in Romans 11:2, if it does mean choice, did not preclude the apostasy of ethnic Israel. Foreknowledge, if taken to mean choice, would not necessarily require perseverance of the saints, and hence wouldn’t itself have to be unconditional election that can’t be reversed by human sin. (though because the election of Christians is different than that of Israel, perserverance is not precluded)”

Two problems:

i) In the passage, proegno functions as the antonym of aposato. Since the latter means “to reject,” the former means “to choose” (beforehand).

ii) Proginosko applies to the remnant. You and Witherington fail to distinguish between ethnic Israel as a whole and the remnant (v5). It is not the remnant that commits apostasy. To the contrary, the remnant is faithful.

“This may or may not be correct; it definitely assumes Christianity was on the more hardcore side in terms of predestinarianism in early Judaism. Can reasons be given independently of biblical evidence for assuming that Christianity was a more extreme predestinarian group? I thought that Christians would be more moderate, given their close relation to Phariseeism.”

My point is that in the contrast between Essene predestination and Sadducean libertarianism, Paul’s words would clearly range along the Essence end of the spectrum.

14 comments:

  1. I was talking with someone about the issue of the possibility of being certain about what they believe just yesterday.

    I think everyone, including the person who originally claimed it, that you can be certain about what you believe. But you cannot be honestly certain. Within the confines of human finititude, it seems rather obvious that no one is going to boast absolute certainity. How can a subjective agent receive an objective truth? That doesn't even seem possible.

    ReplyDelete
  2. There should be an "agrees" in that first sentence of the second paragraph. I think people can figure that out.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Anonymous said...

    "Within the confines of human finititude, it seems rather obvious that no one is going to boast absolute certainity."

    And is it "absolutely certain" that "no one is going to boast absolute certainity."

    "How can a subjective agent receive an objective truth? "

    And is the statement, "How can a subjective agent receive an objective truth? That doesn't even seem possible," itelf objectively true? Or is it a subjective statement about what is objectively impossible?

    ReplyDelete
  4. A few issues.

    As I pointed out for Henry, the argument for the doctrine of election that he (and Orthodoxy) espouses cannot be had from 1 Peter 1:2 for multiple reasons.

    First, there's the lexical meaning of "prognoskw." Look it up in BDAG. Is "prescience" given for this particular text? Remember, the article he mentioned argues AGAINST BDAG, the standard lexicon.

    Even if it was correct, the argument that, MG, you need to make is a clear argument that shows that the text teaches election based on foreseen faith. That is to say, you need a text that says that election is based on God "seeing down the corridors of history who will believe and not believe, and electing based on the faith of believers." In 1 Peter 1, faith is not mentioned until vs. 6. Where is the connection to election in that text? As I pointed out to Henry, you have to supply that connection by infering several factors, but where are those factors in the text?

    It's true that 1 Peter includes discussions about the return of the Lord. But is this about mere prescience of that day? Jesus Himself if foreknown, not facts about His return or the incarnation. 20For He was foreknown before the foundation of the world, but has appeared in these last times for the sake of you

    Isn't the Day of the Lord's return certain? Hasn't God planned it and set that day? Didn't God set the Incarnation in stone? Did He not set that day too? So, the only day of the second coming or incarnation or "these days" that can be discussed related to God's prescience is the very days and times He has Himself set and appointed.

    Even granting prescience in 1 Peter 1:20, where is it mentioned in relation to election and foreseen faith in 1 Peter 1:2?

    Respecting Romans 9 and Holding. Holding begs the question in his favor by invoking sociorhetorical theory, not the grammar of the text itself. I'd add that he has claimed Molinism. One thing about that. If God is ensuring that external factors ENSURE a particular result, then that's not a libertarian argument, but Molinism defends libertarianism. It's internally contradictory. Beware philosophical arguments that are secretly invoked when exegeting the text. Holding needs an exegetical argument for Molinism and libertarianism. He also needs something more than (obscure) sociorhetorical theory to back up his claims. How would a Roman recipient have any knowledge of that theory? And that's what it is, a theory.

    A few issues:

    1. Where can that be found in that text?

    2. How does it answer the question, "Why isn't God saving more Jews than Gentiles," which is the topic Paul is discussing. The answer given is that election is NOT based on genetics, merit, etc. Election is based on God's mercy. Election is not corporate, it is individual. Paul does not answer, "Because God is electing Gentiles." He answers, "Because God mercies who He will and who He won't."

    3. Corporate individual depends on individual election. You'd have to argue that God elects a group whose members are nondescript. But where is that in the text?

    4. God is foreknowing PEOPLE, not facts about people here. God foreknew Christ, for example.

    5. The argument for the lexical meaning of "prognosko" procedes from LXX usage, viz Amos 3:2.

    6. The Arminian interpretation is given to satisfy an ethical objection on their part, namely they believe God is "unjust" if He elects whomever He wants and leaves others in their sins.

    a. What biblical principle of justice does this violate?

    b. Paul's rhetorical objection "But who will reject His will..." is stated to anticipate the objection that election is unjust. So, Paul's objection doesn't make sense, since the Arminian is trying to level an ethical objection against this very injustice. Arminians are blunting the force of the objection; but Paul knows some will think this idea is unjust!

    7. Built into Witherington, Abasagnio, and Holding is a particular presupposition: Libertarian free will, but where can libertarian free will be deduced from Scripture? Libertarianism is functioning as a rationalistic presupposition in Arminianism around which they have constructed their soteriology. Why does A believe and not B, given the constraints of libertarianism?

    The bottom line here is that to get from God electing to a basis in "foreseen faith," the Arminian has to make connections that the texts they invoke do not support. Where is a text that says that God elects based on foreseen faith?

    Where election is mentioned in the OT, for example, Deut. 7 where is anything like that mentioned?

    6"For you are a holy people to the LORD your God; the LORD your God has chosen you to be a people for His own possession out of all the peoples who are on the face of the earth.

    7"The LORD did not set His love on you nor choose you because you were more in number than any of the peoples, for you were the fewest of all peoples,

    8but because the LORD loved you and kept the oath which He swore to your forefathers, the LORD brought you out by a mighty hand and redeemed you from the house of slavery, from the hand of Pharaoh king of Egypt.

    The only thing mentioned is his oath with the Patriarchs. God does not owe it to the people to redeem them, and the covenant made with the Patriarchs in Genesis is not dependent on them, but on His own name. All in all, God is saying, "I chose you because of my own name." It's as if He was saying, "I loved you because I loved you?"
    God chooses not because He owes something to man (Holding) but to HIMSELF, and this is precisely the Reformed doctrine of election. The atonement sets up a relationship in the Trinity by which, if the Spirit does not see to it that all of those the Father has elected are brought to faith, then the Father and the Spirit are seen to be unfaithful to their covenant with the Son.

    ReplyDelete
  5. Steve: And is it "absolutely certain" that "no one is going to boast absolute certainity."

    Me: Well, since it only takes one person boasting certainty to refute the claim that "no one would boast absolute certainty" I suppose that one ought not be absolutely certain about that. But I would like to redirect to the actual wording I used. It seems "rather obvious" that people will not boast absolute certainty, which is the generalization people would draw from the fact that it doesn't seem anyone is doing anything more than making their best guess in whatever their worldview is. Everyone reasons in some way to come to their conclusion, and some reasons are better than others, and eventually some positions might seem better than others, but still a person boasting to "completely know" that their position is true seems malapropos within the system. So there are no claims to absolute certainty within this position, just what would appear to be the case.

    Steve: And is the statement, "How can a subjective agent receive an objective truth? That doesn't even seem possible," itelf objectively true? Or is it a subjective statement about what is objectively impossible?

    Me: This doesn't help you. If I admit that the truth "subjective agents can't receive objective truths" is still only a subjective opinion, then that's still all we've established. I would still want for you to explain how it is that you are absolutely certain in a world where every worldview goes beyond the available evidence.

    Think about what it means to "know" something. You can have a great deal of confidence that what belief system you adhere to is true, and think you're saved, and see God work in people's lives, but that still isn't knowledge. Knowledge, in the strict sense I am referring to, would mean something like you literally seeing your name in the Book of Life.

    So if I admit that what I posted in my original comment is only very probably true, then how do you account for your certainty, since I am not making the same supposed mistake?

    ReplyDelete
  6. Anonymous said:
    ---
    Think about what it means to "know" something. You can have a great deal of confidence that what belief system you adhere to is true, and think you're saved, and see God work in people's lives, but that still isn't knowledge. Knowledge, in the strict sense I am referring to, would mean something like you literally seeing your name in the Book of Life.
    ---

    That's a bogus definition of knowledge.

    By the way, it's also self-defeating. You cannot know your definition of knowledge with that degree of certainty.

    This, once again, is an appeal to radical skepticism, which I recently dealt with.

    I reject your assertion that you have to know something with absolute certainty before you can "know" it as a self-refuting principal that, in order to be true, must be false.

    ReplyDelete
  7. By the way, our anonymous fellow is also making many objectivist claims, just as T-Stone did (this is due to the fact that pure subjectivism is, at root, irrational, and therefore unsubstainable by rational creations, and since everyone has to live in the real world no matter how much they may wish otherwise, objective reality will prevail).

    For instance, anonymous tells us:
    ---
    I would still want for you to explain how it is that you are absolutely certain in a world where every worldview goes beyond the available evidence.
    ---

    How does he know "every worldview goes beyond the available evidence"? Indeed, in making this claim, anonymous is actually claiming far more universal certainty than anything Steve has said yet! Anonymous is claiming absolute universal knowledge here! He is claiming to know what every single worldview is, and to know the evidence for every single worldview, in order to conclude that they all go beyond the available evidence (which also presupposes that he knows all the evidence in order to know the limits of it).

    Another example of anonymous's slip into objectivist territory (while denying objectivity):
    ---
    Everyone reasons in some way to come to their conclusion...
    ---

    He knows how "everyone" reasons too.

    This is very pecuiliar universalist language for someone denying the ability to know anything for certain.

    Thus I shall fall back to my oft repeated statement regarding pomos. If anonymous doesn't believe the tripe he pedals, why should we?

    ReplyDelete
  8. I've got my next response up. Unfortunately I won't be able to respond again for another three or four days; so there won't be a quick response to your quick response.

    ReplyDelete
  9. Peter: That's a bogus definition of knowledge.

    Me: Why is it bogus?

    Peter: By the way, it's also self-defeating. You cannot know your
    definition of knowledge with that degree of certainty.

    Me: Well, I was trying to explain what I believe is meant by the word "knowledge." If you think it means something different other than actually "knowing" something, then please point that out to me. This could possibly point out a great confustion. Perhaps you mean something quite different by being "certain" about your beliefs than I think you do, although the word's meaning seems pretty obvious.

    Peter: This, once again, is an appeal to radical skepticism, which I recently dealt with.

    Me: It isn't radical skepticism, just the normal kind. Don't you think that most people only believe in their beliefs with a degree of faith, and not with certainty? After all, if everyone is certain, isn't no one certain then? For how can two people "know" opposite things to be true?

    Peter: I reject your assertion that you have to know something with absolute certainty before you can "know" it as a self-refuting principal that, in order to be true, must be false.

    Me: It seems to me that having knowledge of something means you are certain of it. Can you have really *know* something while being less than certain of it? Does that make sense?


    Peter: How does he know "every worldview goes beyond the available evidence"? Indeed, in making this claim, anonymous is actually claiming far more universal certainty than anything Steve has said yet! Anonymous is claiming absolute universal knowledge here! He is claiming to know what every single worldview is, and to know the evidence for every single worldview, in order to conclude that they all go beyond the available evidence (which also presupposes that he knows all the evidence in order to know the limits of it).

    Me: Well this is just rather silly. Again, I'm using the same criterion over and over again when you guys assert that I am claiming certainty to something that I have stated because I have observed it. So, you can refute any of my "claims to universal knowledge" by simply pointing out a contrary example, e.g. the worldview that *doesn't* go beyond the available evidence. Which one is it? But so long as we cannot simply pull back the curtain and view metaphysical reality under a microscope, it doesn't seem plausible for you guys to say that there is a worldview that has all the evidence.

    But all of this dialogue here is sidetracking. And here's why:

    The things that you guys have tried to say I have asserted objectively are really only statements that are really generalizations based on trends I see in the world. People seem to reason. Worldviews seem to go beyond the available evidence, etc. That's the way I perceive these things to be.

    So I'm talking as a human on Earth that has noticed some things from my, yes, subjective perspective. That's not the point though.

    You guys are talking about a heavenly perspective. From the context of the post, it seems the author claims certainty that he is saved (i.e. his beliefs are true). This is very unlike the claims I have made. My statements were all Earthly ones, based on things I have seen. How do you know you are saved? What is your explanation for you certainty about heavenly truths from an Earthly perspective?

    If you look at the exchange, you'll notice Peter skipped this part of my last post. I ended with a question. How are you certain about such things as being saved? I really did not mean for this to be a debate. Pointing out that I made some claims that were posed in an objective form is not helping me understand your position at all, which is what I really want to do. You can point out flaws in me self-refuting position all day, but that sill won't explain to me how you know are certain that you are heavenbound.

    ReplyDelete
  10. Peter, Steve, and the rest of their ilk don't "know" they are saved....

    That is why they blather on and on and on all day, to try and convince themselves, so they don't have to lay huddled in a corner, weeping in fear of the great unknown....

    "SAVE ME LORD!!! OH, I'M SO SCARED, AND YOU'RE SO GREAT!!"

    ReplyDelete
  11. Why is it bogus?

    I don't know if I can attain to an understanding of your question that is more than subjective. There's no way to answer.

    what I believe is meant by the word "knowledge."

    Which is subjective. To me it's totally different. Maybe to Peter it's totally different. On what basis do you care?

    then please point that out to me.

    You'll just claim it's all subjective again, so why should Peter waste his time?

    the word's meaning seems pretty obvious.

    If it's all just subjective, it's obvious to YOU, but to me "knowledge" = green Jell-O cubicles.

    Don't you think that most people only believe in their beliefs with a degree of faith, and not with certainty?

    You mean kind of how you believe in your ridiculous beliefs about subjectivity and knowledge?

    For how can two people "know" opposite things to be true?

    Maybe I know and maybe I don't but to me, subjectively, it seems that you 5 space crawl telephone Wookiee booger cucumberize the melon patch.

    I'm using the same criterion over and over again

    You mean you THINK you are, subjectively. That doesn't mean that I should accept it as objective fact. I mean, come on - how can two people know opposite things to be true?

    it doesn't seem plausible for you guys to say that there is a worldview that has all the evidence.

    All this subjectivity has my head spinning when you make sweeping statements like this.

    How are you certain about such things as being saved?

    It might be similar to the way that you know that your words aren't literally WWF wrestlers tearing my house down brick by brick right now.

    You can point out flaws in me self-refuting position all day

    No offense, but it's not that hard.


    Peace, and turning from silliness, to you

    ALAN

    ReplyDelete
  12. I don't know if you guys work in a different way than I'm used to, but this is not working. Normally when I am in some discussing an issue with someone, I'll try to get their position as right as I possibly can, and see if it's true, and hopefully I'll try and draw the two views together so we can analyze them directly and who is right. In discourse, we should be trying to get to the heart of the problem. That's how, eventually, someone is shown to have the superiour position.

    But Steve, Peter, and Rhology: you guys have all done the exact same things to my comments, without answering the direct question I asked.

    So I am wondering: Eventually, is pointing a huge finger at my points and yelling "That's subjective too!" going to enlighten me in some way? After you do it for the ten millionth time, will I suddenly understand why you are certain you are going to heaven? Is that why you keep doing that instead of simply answering my straightforward questions?

    Rhology: Which is subjective. To me it's totally different. Maybe to Peter it's totally different. On what basis do you care?

    Me: The original post used the word knowledge in its discussion of being certain of his beliefs. Thus, the basis I care on is this: if what they meant by knowledge is not what I am thinking of, then I don't even need to dispute it. It could provide great clarity if they told me exactly what they meant by it.

    Rhoology: You'll just claim it's all subjective again, so why should Peter waste his time?

    Me: Perhaps you shouldn't put words in my mouth. I never said everything is subjective. I think that people's opinions about the infinite are ultimately unverifiable to the point of certainty, but that is a far cry from saying everything is subjective.

    Rhology: If it's all just subjective, it's obvious to YOU, but to me "knowledge" = green Jell-O cubicles.

    Me: Well then you're just retarded.

    Rhology: You mean kind of how you believe in your ridiculous beliefs about subjectivity and knowledge?

    Me: Why not just answer the question? Do you have problems with answering questions? Are you allergic?

    Rhology: All this subjectivity has my head spinning when you make sweeping statements like this.

    Me: "doesn't seem plausible" is not a sweeping statement. If I would have said, "There is no way you guys can think there's a worldview with all the evidence," then I would agree with you. But since that isn't the case, it seems like you really don't have much to say to the actual content of my statement and put down your obviously false assertion instead.

    Rhology: It might be similar to the way that you know that your words aren't literally WWF wrestlers tearing my house down brick by brick right now.

    Me: Well then how come I don't know I'm saved in the same way?

    You guys keep on doing what I call characterizing my arguments, by providing outside commentary on them and their nature, rather than actually answering them. I am a rather interested person that would like to hear what you have to say about being certain about one's faith. If you please, can someone answer my questions from my response to Peter?

    ReplyDelete
  13. Anonymous,

    Nice try, but it's a lie. You're not interested at all in the responses. You're interested in playing your little pomo game.

    I've dealt with enough pomos already. I don't seek out irrationality.

    Nevertheless, I will provide you with a little something. When you deny knowing truth because you're not 100% certain of the truth, you are irrational. Knowledge is not equivalent to 100% certainty. Knowing something beyond all reasonable doubt means that to deny the thing, you'd be unreasonable. Therefore, the reasonable thing to do would be to know it is true. This doesn't require 100% certainty, just reasonability.

    Now, fare thee well as you try to determine whether any of the above was an answer to you or just my recipe for clam chowder.

    ReplyDelete
  14. Thanks, Peter! That clears things up a great deal. Although don't be so sure when you tell yourself why I am commenting here. I have no ideology to advance. Questions with guesses are all I have. Seeya!

    ReplyDelete