Christianity & Libertarianism

I propose three brief arguments against the conjunction of some fairly basic, historic, and (mainly) uncontroversial Christian doctrines with libertarian free will. Some of the cash value of these arguments can be applied to the current debate both Hays and I have been engaged in with Victor Reppert. Given his statements on freedom and moral responsibility, some highly problematic propositions follow. Propositions Reppert wouldn’t, apparently, want to jettison.

I’ll quote some claims Reppert has advanced or agreed with in the context of our debate.

“By libertarian freedom is meant freedom such that the agent who makes a choice is really able, under exactly the same circumstances, to chose something different from the thing that is in fact chosen [...,] this means that there is nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made, until the creature is actually placed in the situation and makes that decision” (Hasker, Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ibid, 219, emphasis original).

And:

“Determinism: For every event which happens, there are previous events and circumstances which are its sufficient conditions or causes, so that, given those previous events and circumstances, it is impossible that the event should not occur” (Reppert quoting Hasker).

And:

“if determinism is true everyone's actions are the inevitable result of causes outside the agent's control, and that if this is so, it is unjust to treat agents as if they were responsible for those actions in the final analysis” (Reppert).

And:

“In the cases given [cases whether someone is morally responsible], isn't it the case that you could have chosen otherwise” (Reppert)

I also assume that because of his endorsement of Hasker’s definition of “determinism” Reppert would endorse Plantinga’s definition of “significant freedom.” Significant freedom involves the agent being free to perform or refrain from an action because no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine what the agent will do.”

I will also assume that Reppert’s claims about moral responsibility do not just attach to blameworthy actions but praiseworthy actions as well. Just like someone cannot be blamed for doing what they were determined to do, they could not be praised, either. So, “moral responsibility” should be read in this wide sense.

Pretty clearly, then, Reppert holds to libertarian freedom such that “nothing whatever that predetermines which choice will be made,” and this kind of freedom is required “to treat agents as if they were responsible for those actions,” because to be held morally responsible for your actions it is “the case that you could have chosen otherwise.”

With these reasonable assumptions in mind, I’ll now offer three critiques.

I. God’s Freedom

Almost all Christians have agreed that God is perfectly good. When the question is posed to Christians as to if God could command that, say, rape is good, the response is that he could not because that would be contrary to his nature. When asked if God could sin, the answer is that he could not because he is necessarily good. The Bible even indicates that it is “impossible” for God to lie (Heb. 618). The Bible tells us that God is love (I John 4:8, 16). Universalists have stressed this so much (even minimizing other attributes) that God cannot not love anyone.

Christians have agreed with premises that have been used to make up an Ontological Argument (even if they disagree with the argument as a whole). For example, many Christians agree that:

[1] A being has maximal greatness in a given world only if it has maximal excellence in every world.

[2] A being has maximal excellence in a given world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfections in that world.

(Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, p. 108).

Victor has objected to the Calvinist’s God on “moral grounds.” Such that a being who did the things we say God did (and does), could not be good. And, since God is necessarily good, he could not do those things. If he did, he would not be God but he would be an “Omnipotent Fiend.”

Reppert has written,

“God, by definition, is a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. A being who predestines people for everlasting punishment doesn't meet the third requirement, and therefore isn't God.”

Pretty clearly, a long standing and accepted view of traditional theism is that “it is impossible for God, in virtue of his nature, to sin. But this means that his nature determines that in moral matters he has only one option; he must always choose the good” (Feinberg, No One Like Him, p.730).

The problem that arises should be self-evident by now. How does God bear moral responsibility? That is, how is he a subject of ascribing blame or praise? Indeed, since God cannot do otherwise that good in moral matters, then he cannot be morally responsible in the broad sense where praise can be given to him for his actions. Furthermore, since his nature determines his actions, then he does not have libertarian freedom (at the very least when it comes to matters of morality). If we knew what the good choice was in any given situation, we could, without fail, predict what God was going to do, every time. Would Victor call a human who did what he could not but help to do, good? Can we predict, without fail, the choices of an agent who had libertarian freedom? If something determined that I helped old ladies cross the street, Victor would not call me good. Would not see me as a subject worthy of praise (or blame if I did something wrong).

Thus Victor’s infatuation with libertarian freedom has severe implications for holding to a God who is essentially good, who’s nature makes it impossible for him to sin or be the actor who commits evil.

But all of this is absurd. Christians, like Victor, all agree that God is worthy of praise. That we can praise his good acts. Call him morally good. That when he doesn’t lie he’s not like a robot, but a free agent. That when he sends his son to die for people, he’s not acting as a robot, or a puppet. He is acting good, and can be praised for that action. This implies that a human can be held morally responsible, a subject of ascriptions of praise or blame, even if he could not do otherwise. If not, why the ad hoc move when it comes to God?

Victor has claimed that if a belief interfered with his strong belief that God is good, or that God deserves praise from the heavenly choir, he would drop that belief. He would be ready to drop the belief in the inerrancy of Scripture, even. Therefore, he should, to be internally consistent, drop his belief in the necessity of libertarian freedom for free will or for moral responsibility.

II. Jesus’ Morally Exemplarily Life

This argument is fairly simple. Much of the leg work was done above. It is the predominate view that Jesus was impeccable. This means that Jesus was unable to sin. Jesus deserves all praise and honor (Rev. 5:13). He is to be commended for withstanding Satan’s temptation (Matt. 4:1-11; Heb, 2:18, 4:15). Jesus was truly human. As human as you or I (but without the taint of, or ability to, sin). Clearly, then, given the above constraints on morally responsibility and freedom, Jesus was not a morally responsible agent (or free, at least with respect to moral actions). He is not a fitting subject for praise or blame. But this is absurd. So if Jesus, a true human, can be held morally responsible for his actions (his perfect righteousness, law-keeping, role as the second Adam), even though he couldn’t do otherwise, then so can we. Thus there is not a problem of accepting moral responsibility and denying PAP within the Christian worldview. Indeed, it looks as if that constraint may be false given the truth of some basic and fairly uncontroversial historic Christian teaching.

III. The Perfection of the Saints in Heaven

It is standard fair to say that Christians will be unable to sin in heaven. That there is not a possibility of a second fall, as it were. We will never choose evil. This is certain. Out of two options, a good one A and an evil one B, choosing B will be impossible. There is no alternative possibility. No chance a sinful choice can be instantiated in the new heavens and earth.

Given the above, it is fairly obvious what follows. Since we are morally responsible subjects in heaven, and we may properly be commended for our righteous behavior, and we will not be able to sin, and we will be free, Reppert’s necessary and sufficient conditions for what counts as freedom and moral responsibility do not fit within the Christian worldview.

The Heavenly Doorman

Genesis 20

Abraham and Abimelech

1 From there Abraham journeyed toward the territory of the Negeb and lived between Kadesh and Shur; and he sojourned in Gerar. 2 And Abraham said of Sarah his wife, "She is my sister." And Abimelech king of Gerar sent and took Sarah. 3 But God came to Abimelech in a dream by night and said to him, "Behold, you are a dead man because of the woman whom you have taken, for she is a man’s wife." 4 Now Abimelech had not approached her. So he said, "Lord, will you kill an innocent people? 5 Did he not himself say to me, 'She is my sister'? And she herself said, 'He is my brother.' In the integrity of my heart and the innocence of my hands I have done this." 6 Then God said to him in the dream, "Yes, I know that you have done this in the integrity of your heart, and it was I who kept you from sinning against me. Therefore I did not let you touch her.

Trying to draw more out of this passage.

Last time I tried to show that it appeared that the passage presupposed that blame could have been (read counterfactually) ascribed to Abimelech even if God had "kept him" from not sinning. And, secondly, the passage assumed Abimelech's freedom by referencing that he should not be blamed for what he did, even though out of the two paths, to sin or not to sin, one was closed off to him. Thus he was a morally responsible agent, who did what he did out of the integrity of his own mind, while having one of the options, out of two, closed off to him and thus no genuine alternative possibility.

But what of this notion of being "kept from" doing something. I think the Calvinist notion of decree fits best here.

If we do not assume that God had decreed Abimelech's actions from the foundation of the world, then perhaps God, in this case, was something like a bouncer in front of a door.

Abimelech could go into either door. The sin door or the not-sin door. If he tried to go into the sin door, God, the bouncer, would "keep him" from getting in. In this case Abimelech would have both, following Fischer, regulative and guidance control.

If this metaphor of God "keeping" Abimelech is close to the mark, then Abimelech retains his libertarian freedom. If the "keeping" takes the form of antecedent the divine decree, and if Abimelech is morally responsible, then he does not have libertarian freedom.

The problem I see it is that Abimelech says that he is "innocent" and has acted in an upright and morally virtuous way.

Now, perhaps he is wrong. He is fooling himself. The problem here would be that God agrees with Abimelech's judgment.

Since God does not praise or encourage mere moral formalism, why would he intimate that Abimelech was innocent? Would Abimelech really be innocent had he tried with all him might to enter the sin door only to be stopped after a struggle with the bouncer?

Continuing with the bouncer analogy. Say you had a hard day at work and you want to go out for a beer after work, before you go home. Enjoying a nice ale is just the thing you need before you go home and to your real job---that of husband and father! Now, you happen to run into some of your fellow construction workers at the bar, 'One More That's It,' is the name. You don't have too many beers, but enough to get a buzz, say, 4. Now, you inform your buddies that it's time for you to go home. After some slight ribbing about being whipped, they let you go. Now, on your way to your car you notice a strip club (no, not a steak house!). You have a moment of weakness (replace the story about the construction worker with a philosopher instead and you would call it 'akrasia'). You debate it with yourself for a couple of minutes and you convince yourself that it would be just the thing you need to forget about your worries (perhaps you're behind schedule and the foreman is really pushing you). (How to get the perfume off your close doesn't cross your mind at the time, chalk that up to the 4 beers.) So off you go.

When you get to the door the bouncer informs you that the club is at full capacity. You query as to why. He informs you that Misty Mountains is there, everyone wants to get in. You remember that before you got married you had quite the thing for Misty, but marriage, kids---not to mention that alter call you went down for at last year's rally at the stadium when you and 500 other people stood crying in front of the preacher who pulled all the right heart strings---had turned you around. Your wife would kill you. And you promised her you would never do anything like this. But it would be just a peak, you tell yourself. You had to see Misty. So, you formulate a plan. As soon as the bouncer turns his back you will try to do a low crawl into the building, bypassing the bouncer. The time comes and you go for it. The bouncer hears some scraping and shuffling down below, turns around, and sees your sorry self trying to commando crawl into the building. He picks you up by your belt and tosses you into a row of trash cans. Since he outweighs you by about 75 pounds, and you don't feel that tough with coffee grounds in your hair and a banana peel on your lap, you decide to go home. After you arrive home you wife asks where you've been, you simply tell your wife that you went out with some of the guys. She knows the pressure you're under, and fully understands. She tells you to sit down, put your feet up, and she'll get your dinner. She’s a good wife, what were you thinking, you say to yourself. So you resolve to keep her in the dark. No harm no foul. And besides, it would only hurt her. You technically didn't do anything wrong, you tell yourself. You strengthen your resolve. This will never happen again, you tell yourself.

It is three weeks later and you barely remember what happened. You take your wife out to dinner and a movie. Your mom is watching the kids. As you're out with your wife a couple of guys walk by and start laughing. They try to give you a high five. They're obviously drunk. You don't have a clue what's going on, and your wife looks a bit uncomfortable. They kept saying, "Dude! That was awesome. You made my night. That was the funniest thing I'd seen in a while." Just then a light goes on, you have a pretty good idea what they're referring to. You just hope they leave, playing dumb in from of your wife. She then begins to talk, you cringe. She asks them what they're talking about. One guy says, "This guy tried to sneak into a strip club a few weeks ago to see Misty Mountains. The bouncer totally trashed him. [Group laughs] Trashed him! Threw this guy [points to you] into the street and into a row of trash cans." "We got to hand it to you though," he turns to you, "that was one of the most daring moves I've seen in a while. Chopper, the bouncer, is a maniac. You're lucky he didn't gut you!" They laugh and walk away. Your wife stares at you. "What!?," she asks. "Is this true?" The rest of the story gets R-rated from here! Hell hath no furry, 'n all.

Given the above scenario, would the wife have felt better if you had said, "Yeah, but did you hear those guys? They said that the bouncer 'kept me' from getting in. I didn't see a stripper and therefore I'm innocent." Seems to me that doesn't make the man innocent of all charges. Thus we cannot view Abimelech or God this way.

The position that best makes sense of the Biblical data here is that of the Calvinist. God decreed what would happen, thus not allowing for for alternative possibilities, while Abimelech was a morally responsible agent. If only in this one instance we can have determination and moral responsibility, then the Christian libertarian's case crumbles. I say 'Christian' because I don't see this passage convincing atheistic libertarians, at least pre-consummation.

So, we cannot have God "violating" Abimelech's freedom since that wouldn't get a verdict of innocence if Abimelech had tried to sin yet was strong armed from accomplishing his task (similar to the question: Would Eve still have sinned if she had not eaten the fruit out of desire to keep her figure? The answer is: Yes). We have Abimelech as morally responsible, the subject of moral praise or blame. We have only one option as a live possibility for Abimelech (he was "kept from" the other), thus not allowing alternative possibilities to become geneuine. The "keeping" that God does is best seen as his prior, eternal decree which determined all events which take place in the actual world (possible worlds are different ways God could have decreed the events). I find this the most satisfying reading.