Perry Robinson has responded to Jason Engwer once again. Since much of what he says is relevant to my own position, I’ll weigh in.
I’d note in passing that Perry’s reply is larded with condescension. Critics often take exception to the tone of my writing, but when dealing with a polite and good-natured opponent like Jason, it doesn’t take long for them to emulate the demeaning tone they castigate in others.
“If you claim to teach things with the form of Scripture, then yes you do need such things, which is why you admit that someone can reproduce the teaching of God. But since your formal statements are revisable, they lack the form of Scripture, that is, its divine character.”
Unless I’m missing something, Perry only introduced this criterion (reproducing the formal character of Scripture) midpoint in the present debate. So it looks like he’s rebuilding his ship at sea.
“I am talking ex hypothesi so I don’t need to give a reason for thinking that the church is infallible at this point. I am just tracing out the logical consequences of different models. Hence your comment is a red herring. You need to figure out what “ex hypothesi” means.”
Notice the condescension.
“In any case, there is something more about divine statements than just being true that makes them unrevisable. Infallibility is more than just being true, which is why truth isn’t sufficient for unrevisability.”
But why should we accept this criterion?
“But since the raw data of the Bible teaches us nothing, but has to be constructed into a model to make sense out of it, that is, since we end up believing the formal teaching, if the formal teaching is revisable, then the concept is revisable since the formal teaching and the concepts are the same.”
i) The “raw data of the Bible teaches us nothing”? What a remarkable claim.
Propositional revelation teaches us nothing?
If the “raw data” of Scripture teach us nothing, then there’s nothing to formalize. Only if the Bible already makes sense is it possible for us to turn the “raw data” of Scripture into creeds.
ii) But, assuming for the sake of argument, that Perry’s claim is true, then Protestant theology does reproduce the formal character of Scripture. For if, in its original form, Scripture lacks the additional properties of an ecumenical conciliar statement, and if Protestant theology lacks those additional properties as well, which yield irreformable dogma, then it is the Orthodox model that is at variance with the formal character of Scripture, the Orthodox model which therefore drives a wedge between what God teaches in Scripture as God teaches it, and what the church teaches, whereas the Protestant model is continuous with Scripture as to its formal character.
“Formal doctrine isn’t a mere affirmation of a concept. Formal doctrine expresses and delineates the concept. All attempts to delineate and articulate the concept are formal.”
But why should we accept this criterion?
“If you are going to teach people the teachings of the Scriptures as the Scriptures teach them, that is with the character of Scripture, then the divine character is necessary. If not, you are giving them human teachings about God, and not the teachings of Scripture as Scripture conveys it.”
Aside from the problems with this claim which I just addressed, this disregards the concrete means by which God actually guided the covenant community during OT and NT times.
“I should think that it was obvious that God wasn’t equivalent to the Church. But the church does partake of the divine nature (2 Pet 1:4) And the church can never fail against the powers of darkness. And the church is sent out as Christ was. Etc. The church doesn’t have to be identical to God to have divine power/authority. The Apostles did and they weren’t identical to God. And the apostles pass on some of their ministry, spiritual power and authority to other ministers. (2 Tim 1:6, Acts 6:2, 6)”
Should we treat his interpretation of these verses as an ex hypothesi claim, or a factual claim? If they former, the n they are unproven; if they latter, then they are fallible.
“My point, which you ignored, was that Ecumenical Councils don’t just convey or pass along information, but define things formally, like the Trinity or the Hypostatic union. That was the point.”
Is his point an ex hypothesi claim or a factual claim?
“That was the point. Now, that formal definition is what you end up believing, not the raw data of marks on the pages of Scripture, because that has to be constructed into a coherent model. If the model isn’t formally equivalent to God’s intention, then the model doesn’t amount to divine teaching. The question isn’t whether they need to be identical or equivalent in every sense, but in this sense. You have argued that the mere reproduction of the conceptual content is sufficient. I have argued that there is no way to do that without formal doctrine, such that the conceptual content by your gloss isn’t divine, but human because its form or character is human. You have yet to even grasp the idea, let alone mount a successful counter-argument.”
Observe, in the course of this discussion, how he oscillates between “raw data” as “marks on a page” and “raw data” as “conceptual content” or “truth.”
But this is a blatant equivocation of terms. So which definition is his operating definition? He needs to pick one and trace out the ramifications of that particular position.
“No, my argument doesn’t equivocate, because I claimed in reference to FORMAL doctrine. Your comments are a straw man. If Protestants affirm that a doctrine is unrevisable, then they are speaking of the MATTER and not the form, but the FORMAL content is constructed by us, the concept is a construction of OURS to explain the MATTER. Hence when they say that there are some doctrines that are unrevisable, they are being sloppy because they are confusing form and matter. The doctrine isn’t the matter, the signs on the page, but the MEANING, which is the doctrine, the FORMAL model we construct. The syntax on the page isn’t sufficient to convey the semantical content. If it were, any competent user of a language would acquire it. This is why we employ extra-biblical terms to explain the data because the syntax isn’t sufficient. Nor is any system of rules combined with the syntax sufficient because natural languages do not function as a rule following practice. If anything perlocutionary speech acts show this to be the case.”
Perry will harp on the Searlean distinction between syntax and semantics throughout his reply. But how is that the least bit relevant to the Protestant rule of faith?
If you say the text of Scripture is nothing more than squiggles of ink, then the text of the Nicene Creed is nothing more than squiggles of ink. If you reduce the text of Scripture to mere syntax, then you reduce the text of the Nicene Creed to mere syntax. If you admit the semantic content of the Nicene Creed, then you must also admit the semantic content of Scripture.
“It is not banal, because lots of Protestants think that they can affirm both. You seem to think that you can do so because you think that you can have divine teaching by a mere re-utterance of the concepts. Of course you confuse the concepts with the matter rather than understanding that concepts are the form. Concepts aren’t on the page and they aren’t in your head either. Concepts are social, which is why there can’t be a private language. You have just recognized the obvious problem and retreated to a modified form of the position.”
There are quite a few things awry in this paragraph:
i) Perry his shifting gears from his original objection to a very different objection, although his reply contains residual elements for the former objection.
His original objection was that it is insufficient to reproduce the conceptual content of Scripture, insufficient to reproduce the truth of divine teaching.
Now, however, he denies the conceptual content or truth-content of Scripture altogether. Scripture merely gives us raw data which falls short of divine teaching since, in and of itself, it teaches us nothing whatsoever.
This is a seismic shift in Perry’s line of argument.
ii) As to the private language argument, this is quite controversial. Norman Malcolm, a disciple of Wittgenstein, deployed the private language argument to deny our dream life, while Daniel Dennett (with an assist from Gilbert Ryle) and the Churchlands take it a step further to deny consciousness altogether.
Since dream states and mental states are private rather than public, for they only enjoy privileged access, they are irreducible to a third-person description, and hence, on Wittgensteinian-cum-verificationist criteria, lack positive epistemic warrant.
It’s very odd of find Perry mix-and-match arguments from Searle with counterarguments from eliminative materialism. Perry’s worldview is such a patchwork quilt—a piece of Wittgenstein here, a piece of Searle there, a piece of Van Til here, a piece of Kuhn there.
iii) I agree with Perry that the meaning of “words” is socially assigned. Ordinary language is a code language for thought. As with symbolic discourse generally, the meaning which we assign to the linguistic token is an arbitrary social convention.
iv) But from this is hardly follows that they are not in our “head,” if by that he means to deny the mental constitution of concepts, and reassign them to an extramental language game.
Communication is a triadic relation. One mind communicates its ideas to another mind via a medium like language. This assumes a mutual understanding of the medium. Both speaker and listener (or writer and reader) must know the code language to decrypt the idea which is encoded in the linguistic tokens.
v) And yes, to the extent that an Evangelical creed is a successful re-utterance of a biblical concept, then it is equivalent to divine teaching.
“Yes I have and you have failed to grasp what a Transcendental Argument is. Here is the basic form.
1. Some undisputed phenomenon is possible only if some disputed phenomenon is actual.
2. The undisputed phenomenon is actual.
3. Therefore, the disputed phenomenon is actual.
What is under dispute by you is if the undisputed phenomenon (divine teaching) can be had without the disputed phenomenon (unrevisable formal teaching). Hence you are trying to form a tertium quid. I have shown why this doesn’t work and why a denial of the disputed phenomenon implies a denial of the undisputed phenomenon. The goal of a Protestant is to have access to and convey divine teaching. They can’t do that without formal doctrine. But divine teaching has a necessary component, namely infallibility, which Protestant teaching lacks. Protestant formal teaching lacks this necessary component, therefore Protestants do not convey divine teaching.”
In what sense is infallibility a necessary component of divine teaching? Perry is failing to distinguish between process and end-product.
The Bible is infallible because the Bible is inspired. Inspiration is the process by which God reveals his teaching.
Inspiration is a necessary condition to produce infallible teaching. But we don’t need to reproduce the original mode of transmission every time we transmit the result of the revelatory process.
If that were, indeed, a prerequisite, then nothing short of continuous, private, universal revelation would suffice.
“ Ironically enough, your view amounts to a kind of hermeneutical Pelagianism since by our efforts alone we are sufficient to reach up and grasp divine meaning without divine aid. The goal is to re-produce and convey divine teaching. If that isn’t your goal, then my point is made and my argument is successful-Protestants don’t convey divine teaching.”
i) One of Perry’s favorite sophistries is to classify a hermeneutical position as a Christological or soteriological heresy (“Pelagian,” “Nestorian”). This gimmick should be recognized for what it is. He tries to tar the Protestant position with all odium of an unrelated heresy through his tendentious game of guilt-by-association.
ii) For that matter, Perry says, a ways below, that no one who is not a professional patrologist is qualified to render an opinion on the teaching of the church fathers.
Well, if that is so, then no layman, whether Evangelical or Orthodox, is entitled to have an opinion about the original intent of Nicea or Chalcedon. So when the experts disagree, we must suspend judgment altogether.
iii) Perry also has a habit of speaking like a Deist. No, the Calvinist, for one, is not bootstrapping his way to divine meaning without divine aid. We believe in providence. God intends for his people to come to a saving knowledge of the truth. God supplies and satisfies whatever antecedent conditions are necessary to the furtherance of that end.
“It is irrelevant if God’s teachings have other properties. What is relevant is the NECESSARY properties that they do have. I have isolated a necessary property and shown that Protestant bodies are insufficient to have it. Second, I haven’t see any necessary property of God’s teachings that the Orthodox Church lacks so you need to give an example. And ex hypothesi, the very same reasoning won’t go through for the Orthodox Church because, ex hypothesi, the Orthodox Church has the necessary properties, namely infallibility. By contrast, ex hypothesi, Protestant bodies lack those necessary properties.”
i) How does Perry cash out his ex hypothesi claims about the Orthodox church into demonstrable claims? Is the exchange rate fallible or infallible?
ii) Once again, it’s trivially easy to come up with hypothetical defeaters for Orthodox ecclesiology. Suppose an ecumenical council was rigged? Suppose apostolic succession broke down?
How would Perry prove otherwise? Using probabilistic arguments?
“I haven’t moved at all, you just keep dancing around the argument. I assumed from the outset that divine teaching exists and is conveyed by the church. I also assumed that the teachings of the church only had to possess the necessary properties of God’s teaching.”
Are these assumptions ex hypothesi assumptions or demonstrable assumptions? And demonstrable to what degree?
“Protestant churches do claim to reproduce divine teaching. What I am pointing out is that they cannot do so without a necessary condition for some teaching to be divine. How do I know that churches are to teach unrevisably, on the assumption, per the argument form, that the church is to convey divine teaching.”
Is this assumption an ex hypothesi assumption or a demonstrable assumption? Which church are we talking about? Assuming a “true” church, identical with one visible organization on earth, how do we identify the true church? Are our selection criteria fallible or infallible? Is the application of our selection criteria fallible or infallible?
“But its status in the canon could, which is the point. Plenty of Protestant scholars for example deny that Romans is genuinely Pauline and therefore should be excluded from the canon. The question isn’t if the text has changed but if its formal status has and could.”
I’d like to see Perry name names. I don’t know of “plenty” of Protestant scholars who classify Romans as Deutero-Pauline. The Pastorals? Yes. The Prison Epistles? Yes. 2 Thessalonians? Yes. Romans? No.
“You seem not to have thought about what I wrote. Even if the Holy Spirit did aid one in leaping from the evidence to belief, the belief is still unjustified rationally speaking. Hence my point is untouched. Second, I don’t find appeals to subjective states relevant to the justification of beliefs, unless of course the belief in question is about a subjective state, which for example the belief in the Resurrection or the Trinity isn’t. In any case, the appeal to the Spirit shows that the arguments are inadequate to yield commitment and that the commitment is not grounded in reason. My point stands.”
Well, Jason will have to speak for himself, but from what he’s written elsewhere (in exchanges with Prejean), I think his point is merely that not everything which counts as evidence for why a particular person believes as he does is translatable into public evidence.
For example, I lived in the same area for forty years. In the course of that time it underwent a good deal of urbanization. Meadows turned into housing developments. Old buildings were bulldozed and turned into public parks, while other old buildings were replaced by newer buildings.
I remember how things used to look. I remember what was there. My personal memories are good evidence for what I believe. In many cases, there may be no corroborative evidence for what I remember.
Oral histories are often a valuable source of information for our knowledge of the past, but even if you were to discount such evidence, it may be good evidence for the individual who has a first-hand experience of the event.
In the nature of the case, the argument from religious experience is largely limited to insiders rather than outsiders. This doesn’t mean that an argument from experience is a mere makeweight.
“Are we to believe that monotheism and the resurrection are so easily established by argument that they are justified by reason alone? And is the absolute commitment of faith warranted by such arguments and reasons, which themselves do not yield absolute conclusions?”
See how Perry is now doing the very thing he accuses Jason of doing. Perry is going to make ecumenical councils a stopgap for the hiatus between the “raw data” of Scripture and irreformable dogma.
“I think you think that such issues are established much more easily. I suspect if you spent more time in the halls of academia you’d see that that such issues are far more complicated than the internet makes them appear.”
Note the condescension.
“Figuring things out isn’t as easy as just reading the Bible or reading some pop secondary literature.”
More condescension, and inaccurate condescension at that. As far as hermeneutics and exegetics are concerned, Jason and I are hardly reliant on “pop” secondary literature.
“Secondly, I am not an evidentialist so I don’t rely on probabilities apart from my worldview. Historical arguments won’t yield normative and absolute conclusions, but such things are necessary for faith to be rationally justified. Therefore something has to be added to the historical argument to yield such conclusions, analogous to grace being added to nature. This is where transcendental arguments do the requisite work because they yield normative and absolute conclusions. I don’t rely on probabilities to ground my worldview because my worldview is what grounds and justifies probability. My transcendental view has empirical or synthetic content and as such isn’t a rationalist argument while at the same time not an inductive argument as well. This is why I can give transcendental arguments for the Incarnation, the Resurrection, etc. See Bahnsen’s articles as to the appropriate use of probabilities, specifically as always used within a specific paradigm.”
Even if we were to stipulate to Perry’s theological criteria, he must still identify the organ of irreformable dogma with the “true” church on earth, which he equates with the Orthodox communion.
A transcendental argument will not yield a normative and absolute conclusion regarding the winning candidate for these abstract criteria.
“Hence you appeal to probability is an appeal to probability grounded in some other conceptual scheme or worldview and does nothing more than beg the question against mine. I think that your arguments for the Resurrection, the Trinity and such depend on Orthodox beliefs that are inconsistent to your Protestant and ultimately humanistic and Nestorian beliefs. You just aren’t epistemologically self conscious yet.”
Note the condescension.
“In any case, now you are talking about knowing and not about what is necessary for conveying divine teaching. I already addressed the issue of epistemology. Skepticism is relevant to knowing but not to being such a thing.”
True, but unless “being such a thing” is an object of knowledge, then questions of infallibility or irreformability are moot.
“The only relevance that skepticism has is to point out that one can produce skeptical hypotheses regarding fallible statements, but not infallible ones. Hence skeptical hypotheses aid us in figuring out which statements are which and consequently what is divine teaching and what is not.”
Depends on what he means. If you take infallible statements for granted, then, of course, you’ve peremptorily excluded them from the scope of skeptical hypotheses.
But why should we treat an infallible church as a given? It’s child’s play to produce sceptical hypotheses regarding any candidate for an infallible church.
“Uhm because the church gets its apostolic character from the Apostles. Do you deny this? Were the Apostles infallible with respect to divine teaching in any way?”
Uhm because Robinson begs the question of what lends a church its apostolicity.
“In other words, Protestantism is necessarily Nestorian..”
Is this an ex hypothesi claim or a factual claim?
“And infallibly guided church councils (Acts 15-16)?”
Notice how he sneaks in the plural form. We have one example of an infallible church council in the NT, and that’s Acts 15. A council headed by the Apostolate.
To extrapolate ecumenical councils from that singular and time-bound instance requires a considerable supporting argument, which is naturally not forthcoming from the pen of Perry Robinson.
“Are they fallible too? You pick out irrelevant examples where the analogy is weak or non-existent. The relevant function is picked out in people commissioned by God to teach God’s teaching as God would teach it. (Mark 1:22)”
Once again, this argument either proves too much or too little. In the Pastoral Epistles, teaching is a ministerial duty, Does this mean, according to Paul, that every pastor is inspired? That his teaching is infallible and irreformable?
“The point was that what a church teaches isn’t a simple regurgitation but an act of construction.”
Is this an ex hypothesi claim or factual claim?
“Your comments are a red herring.”
Is this an ex hypothesi claim or a factual claim?
“Non-sequitor. I don’t need an infallible interpret to know, because knowledge doesn’t require infallibility.”
That admission doesn’t favor Orthodox theology over Evangelical theology.
“To produce God’s teaching one has to be infallible. Second, your comment trades on a confusion between the matter of the Bible and formal teaching constructed from it.”
Perry is merely repeating himself here. His contentions have already been debunked.
“Third, my local priest doesn’t need to be infallible for me to know.”
Likewise, my local pastor doesn’t need to be infallible for me to know.
“A council does need to be infallible to define a doctrine, that is to produce divine teaching as divine teaching. I can misinterpret them to be sure, but that is a question of my knowing, not producing infallible doctrine.”
Is conciliar infallibility an ex hypothesi claim or a factual claim? One can posit, ex hypothesi, that an ecumenical council is infallible, but unless we can prove that hypothesis, the distinction between what is and what we know will not at all advantageous to Perry’s position.
“In Scripture you may have an infallible rule, but you have fallible judges applying the rule.”
That’s true, and in the divine economy, that is how God has arranged things.
At the same time, God has ways of guiding his without recourse to Perry’s expedients.
“To apply the rule and produce the same FORMAL entity as the matter, you need an infallible judge, otherwise the form is lacking. I already established this point.”
Yes, he continues to reiterate his oft-discredited point.
“I am making perfect sense. You just don’t know how a transcendental argument works. The undisputed phenomenon is that there is divine teaching and the church conveys it.”
See how he’s revising his argument. Before he only said that the undisputed phenomenon was divine teaching. Now he’s added the conveyance of the church to the undisputed phenomenon. Is that undisputed?
How does he define the church for purposes of his transcendental argument? Why is it necessary for the church to be the only instrument of divine teaching? Why couldn’t someone get that directly from reading the Bible for himself?
Again, what does he mean by the church? Does he mean that the church which conveys divine teaching is identical with one visible institution? Is that an “indisputable” phenomenon?
I suspect that Perry is frontloading his transcendental argument to shorten the distance between what is given and the desired conclusion.
“That it takes an infallible church to do so is the disputed phenomenon. I have shown that the disputed phenomenon is a necessary condition for the undisputed and therefore via reductio shown that there is an infallible church that conveys divine teaching.”
No, all he’s done is to mount an argument to that effect, an argument which is vulnerable to counterargument.
“Consequently, Protestantism is necessarily false.”
This is a very ambitious claim. Has he really presented an argument with that degree of formal logical rigor? No.
“Given the 2nd-3rd century literacy rates of about 10-20% tops, I don’t doubt lots of people had stupid ideas about icons, invocation of the saints and infant baptism, especially considering the fact that the church was composed by and large by the lower classes and didn’t make up more than 15-20% of the imperial population at any given time. So being “widely contradicted” doesn’t mean jack to me because the people doing the contradicting aren’t in a good position to know.”
i) The lower classes aren’t in a good position to know what? To begin with, illiterate men don’t write books. So when Jason is citing the church fathers, he is automatically taking his information from the educated classes.
ii) In addition, you can be illiterate and still be a perfectly competent eyewitness to the practice of your own day and age.
“When you have a degree in patristics from a reputable university, not a one room office like James White, then I’ll pay attention to your claims and your usage of scholarly material. Till then, I am simply unmoved by your spoof texting from scholarly sources, primary texts and the Bible. It is not just that I think you aren’t qualified to do so, its that your arguments are bad AND you are unqualified.”
I find it rather shocking that Perry would suddenly launch into this unprovoked attack on his one-time friend and compatriot, Jonathan Prejean.
I guess, though, that I should salute Robinson’s professional integrity. Since Prejean lacks a degree in patristics from a reputable university, is it any wonder that Jason is simply unmoved by Prejean’s spoof-texting?
Since Paul Owen is not a patrologist by training, is it any wonder that Jason is simply unmoved by Owen’s spoof-texting?
Since Perry lacks a degree in Bible studies from a reputable seminary, is in any wonder that Jason is simply unmoved by Perry’s spoof-texting from Scripture?
And while we’re on that subject, what gives Perry Robinson the right to be the front-man for Orthodoxy? He’s not a bishop, or even a priest. He’s not a seminary prof. at St. Vladimir’s. He’s just a layman. What official standing does he enjoy in his communion which authorizes him to be a spokesman or apologist for Orthodoxy? Shouldn’t he leave that task to his bishop?
Robinson is the stereotypical convert to the high-church tradition. He renounces free church ecclesiology, yet he can’t keep his mouth shut. He embraces a top-down polity, but can’t resist the temptation to make the case for the top brass. Did anyone in the Orthodox hierarchy delegate this duty to Robinson?
“I don’t care what ho polloi believed except as it functions as a clue as to what the church taught.”
Isn’t that exactly how Jason cites the church fathers? As a historical witness to period practice?
“Tertullian doesn’t deserve the kind of weight you are putting on him. Someone like Ignatius of Antioch is obviously in a better position as a witness or Ireneaus for example. They never became formal heretics and/or died for the faith. I don’t call Tertullian a Church father because he wasn’t one.”
One’s theological pedigree is irrelevant to one’s competence as a historical witness. Origen was heretical as well, but that does nothing to subtract from his historical testimony.
“Your control is irrelevant. What is relevant is that real official and widespread revision takes place in Protestantism. It is far from being implausible. It hasn’t happened once of twice but is practically a regular occurrence. Hence you miss the point.”
This is a very superficial analysis of what is taking place. For the most part, the only “revision” we have is conservative bodies of a former generation going liberal. When they go liberal, they deny traditional faith and morals.
In every generation we have liberals and conservatives. The conservatives continue to believe in traditional doctrine, while the liberals stake out the same liberal positions, rehashing the same liberal arguments. The players change, but the play remains the same. Same script. Same outcome.
“You are confusing the order of knowing with the order of being. The latter justifies the former. In any case, this is irrelevant to my argument about doctrine.”
The latter justifies the former as long as the latter is an object of knowledge. But we only know the order of being via the order of knowing.
This is the boundary condition which, try as he might, Perry can never get around. Our only access to the order of being is the order of knowing. So while Perry can make hypothetical claims about the order of being, as soon as he must make good on his claims, he’s thrown back fallibilism. Hence, it is entirely germane to his argument about doctrine.
He can make absolutist claims about what there is ex hypothesi, but unless he knows what there is, his claims are vacuous, and once he tries to demonstrate his claim, he has to lower the bar.
And in lowering the bar, other contenders can slide under as well. He has demoted himself to the same level as the Evangelical once he has to downshift from his ex hypothesi postulates to what is actually demonstrable.
“Ah, so when I make a claim about some Protestants, you retort that it isn’t true of all. And when I make a claim about all, you retort that it isn’t true of some. How convenient. In any case, it is irrelevant since the revisions are still actual, official and widespread. Again, the examples you give are hardly comparable. There isn’t the kind of doctrinal revision in Orthodoxy that there is in Protestantism.”
This comparison commits a level-confusion. The true point of comparison doesn’t lie between various denominations or theological traditions, but within various denominations or theological traditions.
There has, for example, been very little internal development within the Lutheran tradition.
“As to practices, absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence. You seem to be confusing these two. Your argument here would overturn every major Christian teaching. No Christian literature for the first 30 years of Christianity. No proof for the Trinity, Virgin Birth, Resurrection, etc, guess the Church didn’t believe in such things! How absurd.”
This is sophistical. The question is whether a writer is close enough to the status quo ante to be a reliable historical witness.
“This is the same paralogistic reasoning used by village atheists. (You need to figure out the difference between an argument being specious and a paralogism.)”
Note the condescension.
“Lots of people who were professing Christians contradicted the Trinity. Modalism was the majority belief among the laity in the 2nd and 3rd centuries. Do you think Modalism was the faith of the Church? You are cherry picking examples to suit your commitments because you lack a criteria to distinguish them. I have already dealt with these charges and attempts to take me down other rabbit trails. Your use of “widespread” is ambiguous as I noted. Popular belief doesn’t amount to church teaching. Non-sequitor.”
i) Except that, by his own admission, Perry is also “cherry-picking examples to suit his own commitments. He writes off the hoi polloi.
ii) In addition, cherry-picking is only illicit if you are making a general claim. Your sampling needs to be commensurate with the scope of your claim.
To demonstrate the universality of infant baptism necessitates unanimous testimony in its favor.
To disprove the universality of infant baptism only necessitates a few representative exceptions.
“Sure, both Rome and the Orthodox claim to be the true church. So do the Presbyterians, Lutherans and Baptists, and yet the all disagree. They don’t consider each other to be true churches, which is why they don’t take communion together.”
I attend a PCA church down the street. They observe open communion. The only condition of admission to the Lord’s Table is for the communicant to belong to an Evangelical church.
Lutherans do not observe closed communion because they regard other churches as false churches, per se,, but because they regard it as spiritually injurious to partake of the Lord’s Supper without discerning the true body and blood of Christ. That’s the rationale behind fencing the table.
“I say Rome is wrong and Protestants as illegitimate children of her are even more wrong. Yeah? So? And? If Rome is the whore, what does that make Protestants? The term “bastard” comes to mind. Who are your spiritual parents? Who’s your mama? (Gal 4:26)”
It’s quite true that Catholicism and Orthodoxy are mommy-centered religions. They have substituted a maternal model of the church for a bridal conception of the church. And there are, indeed, profound consequences in the outworking of this unbiblical substitution.
“Right, but the concept of sola fide is revisable on their very own principles. It can be rejected or re-defined. Just get enough votes on Protestant principles or just split to get the votes you need or just execute those who vote against you (as say Cromwell did with the Baptists) and you can revise any doctrine. The formal doctrine is the expression of the concept, alter the former and you alter the latter. People who reject infallibility most strongly are the ones who act most ardently as if they have it.”
The exact same thing could be said about ecumenical councils. And didn’t the Byzantine Empire persecute dissenters?
“Which concepts does Scripture convey infallibly? From God to us? So if you read the Bible the ideas get infallibly put into your head? What do you mean here? Are the ideas on the marks on the page? Are the ideas in the syntax? That confuses syntax with semantics.”
Once again, if this were valid, it would be valid against conciliar documents.
“Second, can you give me an example of a biblical concept apart from a formal statement or definition?”
We don’t need a formal statement or definition to have an example of a Biblical concept. The Bible abounds in propositions. If it didn’t, then there would be nothing to turn into formal statements and definitions.
“x hypothesi this is false. Because I don’t think anyone can revise a term legitimately any old way they like because they aren’t the judge. On your view, they are. Another straw man. Meaning is determined by communal use and in theology by the divinely authorized community. There is no such thing as a theological private language, which is why when Mormons try to say they are “Christian” and ask why do we get to define the term, they don’t understand how word meaning is established and passed on. Neither do you.”
Perry is repeating himself again. Repeating the same mistakes.
“OPC, PCA, LCMS, and definitely LCWS and the RPCNA. How about them for starters? We could toss in half a jillion Baptist bodies and house churches too. Given even the slightest suggestion that such and so doctrine may be wrong and POOF! You’re gone.”
This is the same insular reasoning we encounter among Catholic apologetes. Perry is tacitly setting up the Orthodox church as the standard of comparison. This is the one true church, over against the “jillions” of Christian sects.
But, of course, from an Evangelical perspective, Orthodoxy is only one among the jillions of Christian sects. It doesn’t rise above the throng. It’s just one more denomination or theological tradition. All that Perry has done here is to beg the question by elevating his own adopted tradition to a privileged frame of reference.
Every now and then I look at my site meter. It’s normally at the end of the day, when I’m about to start reading for the night. My favorite part of the site meter is the "referrals" section. This tells me who’s visiting my site, and where they are coming from. It’s fun to see which sites generate the most active links here. It also allows me to know whether or not folks are utilizing the links I myself have planted. For instance, I planted a link on the Puritan Board thread about Stauffer’s book to my critique of his work. Hopefully, that did not violate any TOS rules. So far, no moderators have objected. Because of my trusty site meter, I was able to find out how many people read my article (or at least went to the article) through the link I posted. Site meters are cool.
But what is really fun is to see how people stumble upon Veritas Redux by google. Someone might come by googling "Reformed exegesis of John 6" or "Calvinist blog" or "Veritas Redux" or sometimes even "Evan May" (the other night I noticed how many people who came by googling "Paul Manata." Congratulations, Paul). One really funny one (you need not be embarrassed if you are reading this; I have made no effort to find out who you are) was when someone googled "veritasredux.com." Now, if you already know that it is a ".com" why bother using google? Who knows…
The other night I noticed how popular the infamous Michael Dries has become, whether this be because of his staunch defense of KJV Onlyism or his outright calling Dr. James White a "witch" and a "devil priest." I’ve had several hits come to my critique of Dr. Stauffer’s work simply because people have googled “Michael Dries”! Thanks, Mr. Dries! Hope you don’t think I’m a "devil priest"…