A variation of this kind of objection is to allege that a Biblical source is too similar to an extrabiblical one. Old Testament passages must have been derived from similar ancient accounts in other cultures. Claims made about Jesus in the New Testament are too similar to ancient pagan mythology. And so on.
A lot can be said about such objections. For example, the largeness of life and the largeness of the literature and other sources we can draw from to find parallels make it less significant accordingly when parallels are found. And the alleged parallels often aren't as significant as the critic makes them out to be (e.g., paralleling baptism to some sort of interaction with water that doesn't have much similarity to baptism, comparing a resurrection to something that doesn't have much similarity to a resurrection). Or it can be pointed out that some parallel accounts postdate or have a significant chance of postdating the Biblical sources in question. We can provide potential reasons why history would repeat itself on some occasions. If there's a personal agent involved with the sort of attributes God is believed to have, then it makes sense that there would be patterns in the way he directs history, that he would give people opportunities to learn from their predecessors' mistakes and to handle similar situations differently, etc. We can explain why one author might accurately report two similar events while another author only reports one of them. Even when people experience similar miracles more than once, they can be surprised, unprepared, and such when that sort of miracle occurs a second time or more. It's not as though everything the person reacted to the first time the miracle occurred would necessarily be resolved by the time the second one happened. The experiencer could be more accustomed to the miracle the second time it occurs without being fully accustomed to it. It's still unsettling to some extent. There may be a gradual process of adapting to a miraculous experience, which ranges across a spectrum for different experiencers and different types of experiences. And critics often overlook or underestimate some of the factors involved in determining how people react to parallel events (e.g., how Jesus' negative reaction to the first crowd he miraculously fed may have led his disciples to doubt that he'd do that sort of miracle again [John 6:26-27]; how often Jesus didn't miraculously feed the crowds he addressed, which would affect the disciples' expectations).
But it's good to supplement responses like the ones mentioned above with historical precedents. Give the critic examples of parallels that he already accepts, should accept, or whose rejection would cost him a higher price than he has to pay for rejecting the Biblical incidents. What I want to do in this post is provide such precedents, including ones involving the supernatural, some of which I haven't discussed before. These are just several examples among many more that could be cited.
Andrew Wallace-Hadrill wrote, concerning Suetonius:
Any author who looks back to the past is liable to find reflected in it the present he knows. If he looks for lessons or exempla, they will be ones with relevance for his contemporaries. This indeed was a justification Romans conventionally offered for the writing of history….There might too be quite irrational echoes, when the past proved to anticipate and foreshadow current events or personalities.
Such echoes have been detected in the Caesars [a work written by Suetonius]. In particular it is tempting to catch fleeting glimpses of Hadrian behind Suetonius' descriptions of his predecessors. There are striking similarities….
The links even extend to the coincidental: if Augustus' life was threatened by a demented camp-follower in Illyria, at loose with a hunting knife, Hadrian for his part narrowly escaped an onslaught by a demented slave with a knife in a garden at Tarraco.
From the coincidental to the controversial, any of these points and more may have struck the Hadrianic reader of the Caesars. It is possible too that the author was aware of them, and even intended to make his readers aware. But their interpretation is another matter - whether to see in such parallels signs of loyal support, of malice, or of a gradual movement from one to another. Intriguing though such speculations are, the safest course is to abstain. Some coincidences may be the product of life itself, not of the writer's eye.
(Suetonius [London, England: Bristol Classical Press, 2004], 198, 200)
Here's a short video by Mike Licona that provides some examples from American history.
And here's an article I wrote that addresses other examples from both ancient and modern history.
I want to close this post with a discussion of a paranormal case I've studied in a lot of depth, the Enfield Poltergeist, which involves some events that are highly similar to each other in some relevant ways. Because that case is so recent, involves so much documentation (a triple-digit number of hours of audio recordings, dozens of signed witness statements, etc.), and involves multiple sets of events that are highly similar in relevant ways and seem to be paranormal, it's especially pertinent to objections to alleged doublets, parallels, and such in paranormal contexts. In the process of the discussion below, I'll be citing some of Maurice Grosse and Guy Playfair's tapes. Grosse's will be referenced with "MG", so MG94A is a reference to tape 94A in his collection. Playfair's tapes will be cited with "GP", so that GP3B is a reference to his tape 3B.
Here's a video of John Burcombe talking about a November 13, 1977 throwing of Janet Hodgson (allegedly by a poltergeist) that involved her landing on a radio in the corner of her bedroom. Here's a video of Graham Morris describing another throwing of Janet that took place 13 days later, on November 26. That's one for which we have a large amount of evidence, including some taped testimony from the doctor who examined Janet's medical condition just before the throwing incident and administered the Valium she was given shortly before the event occurred. I discuss the event and the doctor's testimony here. (Do a Ctrl F search for "One doctor's".) And 6 days later, on December 2, Janet was thrown again, first to one of the other beds, then to that same dresser where the radio was (MG31B, 3:07). That December 2 throwing was caught on tape, with corroboration from multiple witnesses who were present.
Notice the similarities among these throwings. Janet is the one thrown in each of the three incidents. She was thrown to the same highly unusual location each time. John Burcombe was the one who found her there on the first two occasions.
And even though he'd experienced such an event about two weeks earlier, he was disturbed by what he experienced the second time, as the photograph of his discovery of Janet on the radio illustrates:
That's relevant to the popular notion that Jesus' disciples and other individuals involved shouldn't have been surprised, disturbed, etc. when they experienced something Jesus or somebody else did for a second time or more. The photograph I've linked above shows Burcombe's reaction the second time he found Janet after she was thrown to the top of the radio.
There are other similarities among these events that could be cited: they occurred late in the fall (mid November to early December), at night, while Janet was in bed, etc. But these were three separate events, each of them fully historical and supernatural.
Similar points could be made about the famous photographs of throwing incidents in the Enfield case, which I've discussed elsewhere. In those photos, you often see Margaret Hodgson, Peggy Hodgson, or somebody else responding with surprise, screaming, or some such thing, even though they'd witnessed throwings and other paranormal events before.
Another example of highly similar events in the Enfield case involves Denise Burcombe's experience seeing a doppelganger of Maurice Grosse on November 7, 1977. Go here and do a Ctrl F search for "November 7" to read about what happened. Grosse and John Burcombe reported that Denise saw a doppelganger of Grosse again, apparently at the same location (through the bay window in the front of the house), in the first half of December of that year (MG44B, 15:39; GP24B, 4:03). So, the two events involved the same witness seeing the same kind of doppelganger in the same location.
I've done a lot of research on the Enfield case and have read and listened to many sources discussing it. It's common for people to only refer to one of the incidents when Janet was thrown on top of the radio in the corner of her bedroom or one of the occasions when Denise saw a doppelganger of Grosse through the bay window. Even people who are highly knowledgeable of the case and do know about or should know about the parallel events involved, such as Grosse and Playfair, have mentioned only one of the events at times. That illustrates the danger of assuming that people will mention every incident they know of every time they discuss a relevant topic. People are often highly selective in what they say, for a variety of reasons. Something like a temple cleansing or healing of a blind man could easily have occurred more than once in Jesus' life without each instance being mentioned every time the sources who knew of the parallel events wrote about a relevant issue.
Like God having patterns of behavior that can be traced in history, a poltergeist could have behavioral tendencies. In the Enfield case, for reasons I've explained elsewhere, I suspect the poltergeist had a malfunctioning mind, often repeated itself, and often gradually learned how to do things over time, which was a process that involved repetition. So, though a poltergeist would have different reasons for repeating himself than God has for repeating himself, both contexts involve a personal agent with reasons for repetition.
[sarcasm] Here's a modern historical case of a doublet that proves how inaccurate modern history is. Allegedly in World War 2 an American B-29 bomber dropped an atomic bomb on a Japanese city named Hiroshima. The explosion is said to have immediately killed an estimated 80,000 people; tens of thousands more would later die of radiation exposure. Then three days later another American B-29 dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki, killing an estimated 40,000 people. Why would the Japanese not have surrendered immediately after the first bomb? That's irrational. If the instantaneous killing of 80,000 people wasn't enough to cause the Japanese to surrender, why would the later instantaneous death of 40,000 suffice to do it? These alleged "facts" make the story/ies historical implausible. Because it's psychologically unlikely. Just like how God feeding the Israelites with quail twice makes no sense because they didn't expect or know God to have done it previously. In a similar way the alleged atomic bombings is an obvious fictional historical doublet.
ReplyDeleteThe first bomb is allegedly named "Little Boy" and the second bomb "Fat Man." How is this not an obvious case of legendary development, exaggeration and embellishment where the story grows as time passes and the story is passed on from generation to generation? It begins as "Little Boy" (smaller) and is embellished to "Fat Man" (larger). Another possibility is the later redactor(s) made up the two names so that the first name is anticipatory of the second name. That's just good story telling.
Yet, paradoxically fewer people are killed in the allegedly more powerful secondary bomb, hence proving a contradiction. How can more people be killed with a weaker bomb? That just doesn't make any rational sense. They didn't even get the names right. In one version of the story the city is supposed to be Hiroshima and in another version of the story it was Nagasaki. What obviously happened was that there were competing oral traditions with two different names for the cities and then when the time came to write down the stories for posterity both versions were written down as if the occurrence happened twice in two different cities. And ALL because they couldn't get their story straight.
Also, what are the chances that a B-29 bomber was used in both instances? That's another clue that the two stories stem from an original primitive story. Otherwise, two different types of planes would have been used. But according to the stories, two different planes of the same model with two different names were used [Enola Gay & Bockscar]. If the first plane survived the explosion, then they would have used it again in the second bombing. But if the first plane was destroyed, then they would have obviously used a different model for the second bombing because the first model was obviously not sufficient to survive another bombing. The fact that the same model of plane were used both times but with two different names used for the second bombing strongly suggests competing oral histories.
The two bombings allegedly happened 3 days apart. The number three of course is a highly symbolic number in many cultures, supporting the non-historical nature of the stories. If it really happened, it would be some other number of days like 2 or 6 or something. But exactly 3 days? Like three leaf clovers? Or the three main Hindu Gods? Or the three natural states of water? Three days is hardly enough time for the Japanese to become convinced through investigation that the Americans were responsible. Moreover, the Americans would have been hesitant to bomb a second time so soon afterwards if they were concerned about casualties. They might have waited a week for a second atomic bombing. If they weren't concerned about casualties, then bombing a second time and a third time the same day, or the very next day, or every day afterwards till the Japanese surrendered would have happened. But exactly three days afterward is HIGHLY suspicious. Three days is perfectly symbolic. [/sarcasm]
typo correction://If the instantaneous killing of 80,000 people wasn't enough to cause the Japanese to surrender, why would the later instantaneous death of 40,000 suffice to do it?//
DeleteThat is, if they were able to immediately confirm it was the Americans who were responsible. But Like I said later, it would probably take some time to confirm the Americans were responsible using multiple avenues of inquiry. Scientific, diplomatic, political, via espionage, etc.
Further elaboration: //If the first plane survived the explosion, then they would have used it again in the second bombing. But if the first plane was destroyed, then they would have obviously used a different model for the second bombing because the first model was obviously not sufficient to survive another bombing.//
DeleteThat is, in terms of speed, altitude, hull integrity etc.
typo correction://The fact that the same model of plane were used both times but with two different names used for the second bombing strongly suggests competing oral histories. //
DeleteShould read:
//The ostensible "fact" that the same model of plane was used both times but with a different name used for the second bombing strongly suggests competing oral histories. //
I could say more, but I'll end with this. Isn't it way too coincidental that the U.S. President who allegedly authorized the atomic bombing was named "Harry S. Truman"? "Truman" as in "a true man" and "a man [of] truth." A man who is truly manly. With the secondary connotation of a truth telling man. A True-man who is honest and just/righteous. The first connotation also comports with his being given the first name, "Harry." Harry men universally connote greater masculinity. These details are obvious cases of Americans passing on their folklore orally in a way that paints their leader at the time in a positive light. A great warrior with a righteous cause.
Delete@annoyed Surely you're familiar with New Directions in Pooh Studies!
Deleteuniontheology.org/resources/bible/biblical-theology/new-directions-in-pooh-studies
@Trent That's clever! Ha HA!
DeleteBut just for the record, even though Licona rejects the idea that Christianity was copied from paganism, he *does* seem to accept the idea of doublets, at least some of them, as understood by liberal New Testament scholars. Since they o.p. here covers both, I think that's worth saying. In particular, he suggests that Matthew 9:27-31 is a doublet of Matthew 20:29-34. Both involve the healing of two blind men, though under quite different circumstances and at different points in Jesus' ministry. Of course I'm not saying that he's originating that idea; it's pretty common in biblical studies. But he's treating it as a very live possibility even though it involves invention by Matthew. (He has a smorgasbord of possible explanations for the difference between one blind man and two in Jericho in Matthew and Mark. One of them even involves Matthew's inventing a second blind man to "compensate" for not telling Mark's healing of a blind man outside of Bethsaida! He doesn't decide among these, just lists them. And even seems to think that somehow if Matthew 9 is a doublet then that means the second blind man in Matthew 20 is not a compensation, by some obscure mathematical calculation according to which Matthew then already has "enough" healed blind men. Craig Keener appears to endorse the idea that Matthew has invented the second blind man and second demoniac.) Perhaps he *should* use the same reasoning by which he rejects pagan parallels to Christianity, but he doesn't, probably because "doublets" are considered so plausible within NT scholarship more broadly.
ReplyDelete