From a Facebook debate I had regarding James Dolezal's defense of Thomism:
Hays
Let's begin with some comments by Dolezal on his own position:
As a Christian who confesses God’s incomprehensibility based upon his pure actuality, I cannot see how I can avoid appealing to mystery in the sense of (1). Yet there seem to be good reasons for this appeal. Most notably, as pure act God is beyond all categorical being and thus beyond definition in any scientific sense. (Hence, my commitment to analogical predication about God) It is God as ipsum esse subsistens (or, in biblical terms, as “I AM”) that chiefly accounts for his incomprehensibility and the mystery that permeates any discussion of his existence, essence, or triunity. This is rather unlike that more popular form of mysterianism that locates the ground of mystery in the human mind’s evolutionary situation (as urged, for instance, by Colin McGinn).I confess divine mystery at the outset, at the moment I conceive of God as pure act (as “I AM”). Admittedly, I did not make this as clear as I should have in chapter 7 of my book. The mystery of the conjunction follows from the mystery of God’s purely actual existence. Indeed, the mystery of divine freedom itself follows from the same. It is for this reason that I don’t expect (or even desire) “resolution” to the difficulty; such resolution could only be achieved by eradicating the ontological distinction between God and his creatures (which I would regard as impossible since God cannot produce a purely actual being distinct from himself).Still, you are right to raise the question of God’s power for counterfactuals. How shall I explain the modality of such freedom? I confess that I cannot. I have no idea how to adequately express the modality of a free choice made by an agent who is pure act. And yet his pure actuality requires that his will for the world’s existence be free. I would not hesitate to affirm that human libertarian freedom is an analogue of this divine liberty; but it fails to convey the precise modality of that freedom as it is in God. Human acts of knowledge are also analogues of the divine act of knowledge and they too do not disclose an adequate (or univocal) notion of the modality of God’s knowledge. As I cannot form a univocal notion of God’s pure actuality, neither can I form a univocal notion of all he does in that actuality (knowing, willing, relating among the divine persons, creating, etc.).
Several problems:
i) Dolezal admits that Thomisic simplicity generates intractable conundra regarding divine freedom (not to mention the Trinity). He defends it by retreating into mystery.
That would be a legitimate move if we were dealing with a revealed truth. However, Thomistic simplicity is an elaborate philosophical construct. As such, it is properly liable to rational scrutiny. It doesn't enjoy the presumption or immunity to rational disproof that a revealed truth or necessary implication of a revealed truth enjoys.
ii) In addition, Dolezal's appeal is viciously circular. He cites the fact of divine simplicity (or God's pure actuality) to justify his theory of divine incomprehensibility. Yet Thomistic simplicity is not a given. To the contrary, the factual status of Thomistic simplicity is the very issue in dispute.
Therefore, he's hardly entitled to cite Thomistic simplicity as an unquestionable starting-point, which we must adhere to despite the intractable consequences. He's elevated a philosophical construct to the status of unimpeachable dogma, which we must accept in the face of irrefutable objections. But his confidence is wholly unwarranted, because it begs the question.
Josh
I think Dolezal's appeal to Job 22 and Eliphaz's rhetoric is quite convincing in favor of the thesis, classical divine simplicity. If we agree that God neither receives, or is affected by creaturely acts, then we basically agree with Dolezal's contention.
Hays
We need to distinguish between the inspiration of Scripture and what speakers say in Biblical narratives. Not every speaker recorded in Scripture is, himself, inspired. The Bible often quotes uninspired speakers. Is Eliphaz a prophet?
Josh
This would be true if God did not confirm Eliphaz's words in Job 41:11, or if Elihu didn't say the same thing (Job 35:6, 7).
Hays
Job 41:11 is not confirming a statement about absolute metaphysical simplicity.
Josh
We cannot know like God knows, in a univocal fashion. We would have to be God to do this. This is why God's incomprehensibility must be our presupposition in this discussion.
Hays
That's ambiguous. We can't reproduce God's mode of knowledge. That's incommunicable.
But are you saying we can't know some of the same truths God knows? If God knows a truth, but we can't know the same truth, then what we believe isn't a truth but a falsehood. After all, isn't the ultimate standard of truth a belief that corresponds to what God knows?
Josh
God without parts or passions.
Hays
There are different ways to unpack that. For instance, you can deny that God has temporal "parts". You can deny that God's existed is subdivided into temporal moments. In that sense, God is simple.
That, however, is very different from the more radical claim that there's no real distinction between the divine attributes, so that justice and mercy are equivalent (to take one example).
Hays
To say God neither receives nor is affected by creaturely acts is a statement of divine impassibility, not simplicity.
Josh
This is true, but those doctrines are cognate doctrines, not mutually exclusive ones. In other words, what is said about the one informs the other. If God received, He would not be simple (divinely perfect).
Hays
Even if they're mutually consistent, that doesn't make them mutually implicative. So, for instance, even if simplicity entailed impassibility, it doesn't follow that impassibility entails simplicity. You either need a direct proof for simplicity or else something demonstrably true that entails simplicity.
Josh
Not really. A part is anything that accrues in order to make something what it is. Another way of defining 'part' is that a part is something more basic than the unified whole. An engine is part of a car, a wall part of a house, and so on.
Hays
The argument for Thomistic simplicity is an overextension of examples about physical objects comprised of smaller parts.
Josh
This is true for abstractions as well. Equations are made of numerical truth values, etc. If God is 'made up' of anything (attributes, qualities, properties, etc) then he is composed of that which is more basic than God Himself. It would then follow that, logically, there is something ontologically before God. But this can't be true if God is Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end.
Hays
i) To begin with, there can be a dependence-relation in God. The Father couldn't exist apart from the Son and vice versa. God couldn't exist apart from his omniscience or omnipotence, &c. The Father makes God what he is, the Son makes God what he is, the Spirit makes God what he is.
ii) Regarding abstract objects, take the Mandelbrot set. That's infinitely complex. An actual abstract infinite. Infinite self-similarity.
However, the internal iterations aren't more basic than the whole, but necessary reflections of the whole. The whole contains each iteration while each iteration contains the whole. Like mirror symmetries.
It would be nonsensical to claim the varied iterations of the Mandelbrot set are ontologically prior to the Mandelbrot set. They're not like abstract universals of which the Mandelbrot set is a concrete exemplification. For the entire set is a timeless abstract object or necessary truth, and not a property-instance of an abstract object.
iii) What makes you suppose the statement that God is the Alpha and Omega is a claim about divine simplicity?
Josh
Real distinctions between attributes would mean that God is made of of attributes more basic than Himself. There would then be something preceding God ontologically, and this absolutely destroys Christian theism as a whole.
Hays
You seem to be operating with a quasi-Platonic interpretation where distinct attributes would be akin to abstract universals, of which the whole is a concrete particular.
But if God is a timeless, spaceless, necessary being, then the attributes aren't more ultimate than the being they constitute. Constitution and composition aren't equivalent notions. The number Pi is constituted by the sequence, but it's not a composite object in the sense that these are separable elements. Rather, it's a complex necessary truth in which the entire series is a timeless entailment.
Josh
I would urge you not to see a problem with justice and mercy being equivalent. You ought to see it as God being the absolute perfection of both, not a God who partakes in them, but a God who simply is them. The distinctions, therefore, disappear into one God. God simply is His justice, mercy, etc. and if He is those things, wholly, then they cannot be truly distinct"
Hays
i) If these distinctions "disappear" in an undifferentiated reality, then God is equally merciful to everyone, which makes nonsense of God's discriminating grace.
In Scripture, divine mercy and justice, grace and judgment, often stand in contrast to each other: where some sinners are objects of justice (i.e. reprobation, damnation) while other sinners are objects of mercy (i.e. election, eternal salvation). You can't collapse the two attributes without collapsing the eschatological destinies represented by the temporal expression of two distinct attributes.
ii) When you say the divine attributes "disappear" into an undifferentiated unity, then "God" becomes indistinguishable from Brahma, the ineffable, undifferentiated blank of Hinduism
Josh
Uh no... because of Trinitarian theology.
Hays
Radical simplicity annihilates Trinitarian theology.
Josh
No, it doesn't. You're making an assumption without warrant. Read ch. 6 of Dolezal's book, and Aquinas on the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. You could also read Augustine and Calvin as well.
Hays
Actually, I'm bouncing off your own statements, as you attempt to explicate and defend Thomistic simplicity.
Josh
No, you're drawing conclusions from my statements, but you lack categories, so you draw the wrong conclusions. You should just familiarize yourself with the sources I just mentioned. I can't reason with someone who refuses to represent a position correctly.
Hays
You're not entitled to dictate the terms of the debate. I'm not required to operate with your categories. I reserve the right to use my own categories.
And now you're getting testy, which is characteristic of someone who's losing the argument.
Josh
Lest we wrongly divide the one true essence of God and compromise the Shema in Deut 6:4.
Hays
i) The Shema stands in contrast to pagan polytheism. It's not a statement about God's internal simplicity.
ii) Moreover, the Shema becomes a unitarian prooftext when you treat it as a claim about God's internal nature rather than a point of contrast between the one true God and the false gods of heathenism.
Josh
Is God made up of parts?
Hays
I didn't say God was made up of parts. You're the one who's translating attributes into parts, not me.
Josh
So, you do not believe God is made up of parts. Is he made up of attributes?
Hays
"Made up" has physical connotations, like bigger things composed of smaller things. That's inapplicable to a necessary, timeless, spaceless being.
Josh
So God cannot be made up of attributes?
Hays
I've given you different explanatory categories to explicate my position. What you are doing is to substitute your terms for my terms. That's retrograde.
Josh
Ok, let me ask a different question. Is God love?
Hays
God has the property of love. Love is a constitutive property of God. God is the exemplar of love.
Josh
Does God have love and justice as properties?
Hays
God is a property-bearer of love and justice, to use one philosophical formulation. But divine love and justice aren't property-instances of something over and above God himself.
Josh
Wait, you said earlier that God "has" the property of love. Does God also "have" the property of justice?
Hays
i) To begin with, there are conventional ways we express relations in idiomatic English. Don't press that into fine-grained ontological claims.
ii) To say God has the property of x is comparable to saying the decimal expansion of Pi has a particular sequence for the first million digits. But "has" a property is not equivalent to "exemplifies" a property. That's one of your hangups.
Josh
This is exactly Dolezal's point with reference to the divine attributes. Thank you for admitting language has limits.
Hays
Actually, my point had reference to English syntax, not divine attributes.
Josh
Is property A really distinct from property B?
Hays
Two properties can be distinct in one respect but not in another or others.
Take possible worlds. Assume that possible worlds are divine ideas. Mental representations of different world plots.
One plot is distinct from an alternate plot. Not one plot, but two or more plots. One plot is not identical with an alternate plot. These reflect different ideas. Different hypothetical scenarios.
But all of them inhere in God's timeless imagination. God's mind constitutes possible worlds.
Possible worlds are conceptually complex. Distinct plot elements. Distinct characters, settings, and outcomes.
But if possible worlds are constituted by God's concept of alternate timeline or world plots, then they share in God's timeless, necessary essence.
Josh
And I would also say that your side has the burden, not Dolezal's...
Hays
To stipulate that the opposing side has the burden of proof begs the question. If that's the best you can do, it's revealing.
Josh
The new kids have the burden of proof. If you introduce novelty over against 2,000 years of orthodoxy, you have a burden...
Hays
i) You have persistent difficulty framing issues in ways that don't beg the question. If you stipulate at the outset that you have 2000 years of orthodoxy on your side, then of course the onus is on the opposing side. But what's orthodox, and whether your position represents continuous orthodoxy, is the very issue in dispute.
ii) As I pointed out once before, Catholic apologists and theologians raised the same objection to the Protestant Reformation, while Orthodox Jews raise the same objection to Christianity. Your criterion is a double-bladed sword.
iii) There is, moreover, your persistent equivocation. Are you claiming that the details of Thomistic simplicity are documentable from the get-go?
iv) In addition, you commit the same fallacy as Catholic apologists. Antiquity is no guarantee of orthodoxy. There were already heresies in the 1C.
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