Signs and seasons

I will comment on this post:

http://scripturalism.com/sensation-and-knowledge/

Today, I came across this article on Triablogue.com:  Is Scripturalism Unscriptural?  This is a good example of a typical first reaction to scripturalism and to the study of philosophy in general. 

Ah, yes, a "first reaction." Couldn't be that I've been studying scripturalism and philosophy in general for probably longer than Luke Miner has been alive.

One line of argument says that knowledge consists in sensation or perceiving the facts.  One of the challenges that this faces is in extracting propositions from sensation.  How can a mass of sensations:  reds, greens, softs, hards, sweets, sours, highs, and lows, be turned into propositions? 

Let's take some examples:

i) I see what appears to be a red rose. I conclude that it's a colored object. After all, every red object is a colored object. 

Incidentally, this inference would be valid even if I misperceived the true color of the rose–assuming it has a true color.

ii) On my daily walk I stroll past an ER. Sometimes when I'm walking I hear a siren approaching. I conclude that it might well be an ambulance taking a patient to the ER.

iii) On my daily walk, for 400 days straight, I see flocks of crows. All of them are black. On day 401, I see an albino crow. I conclude that not all crows are black. It only takes one counterexample to disprove a universal negative.

If this task can be so performed, how can one verify the reliability of these propositions?  The empiricists usually admit that hallucinations and dreams are unreliable. 

When Scripturalists appeal to the Bible, how can they verify that they are reading the Bible rather than hallucinating or dreaming about a "Bible" that's not the real Bible?

BTW, Miner's appeal to dreams and hallucinations is an appeal to inductive experience. How can a Scripturalist get away with that?

Of course, this assumes the point at issue.  It does nothing to explain how disjointed sensations can act as signs for seasons.  It just assumes they do.

Notice that Miner point-blank refuses to believe what Gen 1:14 says about the function God assigned to the sun, moon, and stars–because it conflicts with his armchair epistemology. How is his attitude any different than an infidel who rejects what Scripture says about homosexuality? 

No, I didn't just "assume" it does. I got that from the testimony of Scripture. Scripturalists like Minor pay lip-service to Scripture, but they don't really take Scripture as their epistemological starting-point. 

Secondly, it is hard to see why God making the stars for signs implies that man’s senses are reliable.  Could not God have made signs and also cursed man at some point so that he sometimes misinterprets them?  Indeed this is closer to the biblical teaching.  Maybe this is why the weasel word “general” is used in the quotation above.

i) How is that hard to see? For instance, the Mosaic law mandates a number of festivals (e.g. Sabbath, Passover, Pentecost, Yom Kippur, Feast of Tabernacles) that must be observed on a particular date, for a particular duration. And the celestial luminaries were given in Gen 1 in part to enable man to tell the time. How does Miner think you can be a Sabbath-keeper if you can't tell when a day begins or ends–based on sunrise and sunset? How does Miner think ancient Jews were supposed to obey these injunctions without using the sun, moon, or stars to keep track of time? 

ii) Or take the distinction between clean and unclean animals. The Mosaic law not only distinguishes them, but contains empirical descriptions which enable the observer to identify them and differentiate them. But if, according to Miner, eyesight can't be trusted, how were ancient Jews supposed to obey those injunctions? 

iii) While we're on the subject, there's an interplay between general and special revelation in Gen 1. Gen 1 contains a taxonomy. However, it doesn't contain definitions of the animals. Or illustrations. It therefore relies on extrabiblical information to connect the textual designators with corresponding categories. It doesn't define the word "bird" or "flying" or "sky." It doesn't show a picture of birds. So that needs to be supplemented by extrabiblical information. Acquaintance with what names were used to designate what animals. And that's inductive.   

iv) Although Scripturalists claim to be Calvinists, they don't operate with a Reformed doctrine of creation and providence. The reason induction can be a source of knowledge is that God created natural kinds. So a sample can be representative. 

Moreover, don’t the Scriptures provide many examples where people were deceived by their perceptions?

But when the disciples saw him walking on the sea, they were terrified, and said, “It is a ghost!” and they cried out in fear. (Matt 14:26)

Jesus said to her, “Woman, why are you weeping? Whom are you seeking?” Supposing him to be the gardener, she said to him, “Sir, if you have carried him away, tell me where you have laid him, and I will take him away.” (John 20:15)

i) That's confused. The observers weren't deceived by their senses. Their senses didn't malfunction. The disciples didn't hallucinate Jesus walking on water. Mary Magdalen didn't mistake a fig tree for a man.

Rather, reason deceived them. They misinterpreted what they saw. An intellectual error, not a sensory error.

But where does that leave Miner's position? It is his position that something is an unreliable source of knowledge if it ever deceives you? But by that yardstick, he can't trust his own mind or memory. Consider how much of his post depends on his ability to recall what he's read. 

Does he think something is an unreliable source of information unless it's infallible? Unless it is uniformly reliable? Unless it can never be mistaken? But his mind and memory are no less fallible than his senses. So how can he know anything at all?

ii) In addition, Miner's appeal to Jn 20 is deceptive. He only cites the first part. Although it begins with Mary disorientation, it ends with a recognition scene. When she hears him speak, she realizes who it is. But hearing is just as empirical as seeing. 

To my knowledge, the Bible nowhere affirms that things are always as we perceive them and we need not affirm such a counterintuitive conclusion. 

i) What makes him think my argument was based on that? In fact, let's take a personal example: in my mid-30s I was diagnosed with partial color-blindness. But I never suspected that because, despite my visual defect or abnormality, I function just fine in my visual environment. I recognize traffic lights. Even if I don't perceive what normal people perceive, I've make a subconscious adjustment or substitution that's functionally equivalent. 

ii) Suppose Miner lived in an area frequented by the eastern coral snake. Would he teach his sons how to distinguish between the markings of the coral snake and the scarlet king snake? Or would he throw his hands up in the air and exclaim, "the senses deceive, so don't even try to tell the difference!"