Doubting Thomist

I'm going to discuss growing pains in Reformed philosophy, using Ed Feser to segue into that larger issue. I'll admit at the outset that commenting on Feser poses something of a dilemma for me. As a rule, I read enough of a writer to make a preliminary judgment on whether or not I think it's worth my time to read more by him. For that reason, I'm not a regular reader of Feser's blog. He's a doctrinaire Thomist who seems to recast every issue in terms of Thomism. I quickly lose interest. I don't share his enthusiasm for Thomist epistemology or metaphysics. I guess that makes me a Doubting Thomist. 

But I admit this may mean I'm not qualified to offer an informed opinion of Feser. With that disclaimer in mind:

i) Feser seems to have a following among some young, philosophically-minded Calvinists. I think one reason is that Feser goes after "New Atheists" and philosophically-clueless secular scientists whom highbrow Christian philosophers don't generally deign to comment on. He's more of a cage-fighter than, say, Alexander Pruss or Peter van Inwagen. And that's useful. 

That said, from what I can tell (based on my admittedly cursory sampling), I have considerable reservations about Feser overall. For instance:

ii) He's a vociferous critic of intelligent-design theory. Now, ID-theory is fair game. However, it's philosophically unenlightening when philosophers like Feser (and Francis Beckwith) criticize ID-theory because it isn't Thomism. Unless you grant that Thomist epistemology and metaphysics should be the standard of comparison, that objection is uninteresting. 

There are intelligent criticisms of ID-theory. Del Ratzsch is a sympathetic critic. Darwinian Elliott Sober is a thoughtful critic. Bayesians like the McGrews are critical of ID-theory because they disagree with Dembski's filter for detecting design, which is a negative criterion (ruling out chance) rather than positive evidence for design. 

One may or may not agree with this criticisms. But at least they are interesting criticisms. 

iii) Apropos (ii), the problem is compounded by the fact that Feser's understanding of Paley and ID-theory have both been challenged. Consider the running debates between his blog and Uncommon Descent. 

iv) To be fair, one of the main attractions of Thomism is that it's a pretty complete philosophical system. Thomistic ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. It's almost unrivaled among theological traditions for its philosophical breadth and depth. 

Let's take some statements by Feser:

The modern approach is represented by Leibniz-Clarke style cosmological arguments, Paley-style design arguments and “Intelligent Design” theory, Plantinga-style ontological arguments, “Reformed epistemology,” Swinburne-style inductive arguments, etc.  Contemporary philosophy of religion is dominated by these modern sorts of arguments, though there are some thinkers (John Haldane, Brian Davies, Eleonore Stump, et al.) whose sympathies are classical.  These modern arguments typically operate with very different conceptions of causation, modality, substance, essence, and other key metaphysical notions than the ones classical thinkers would accept. 

Now, my approach, being Aristotelian-Thomistic, is decidedly classical.  Like many other Thomists, I not only do not defend the sorts of arguments most other contemporary philosophers of religion do, but I am critical both of the metaphysical/epistemological assumptions underlying the arguments and of the conception of God the arguments arrive at.  For instance, I reject the possible worlds theories in terms of which modality is typically understood in the contemporary arguments; I think the “argument to the best explanation” approach gets reasoning from the world to God just fundamentally wrong 

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/02/an-exchange-with-prof-keith-parsons.html

Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001) and her husband Peter Geach are sometimes considered the first “analytical Thomists,” though (like most writers to whom this label has been applied) they did not describe themselves in these terms, and as Haldane’s somewhat vague expression “mutual relationship” indicates, there does not seem to be any set of doctrines held in common by all so-called analytical Thomists. What they do have in common seems to be that they are philosophers trained in the analytic tradition who happen to be interested in Aquinas in some way; and the character of their “analytical Thomism” is determined by whether it tends to stress the “analytical” side of analytical Thomism, or the “Thomism” side, or, alternatively, attempts to emphasize both sides equally. 

We might tentatively distinguish, then, between three subcategories within the group of contemporary analytic philosophers who have been described as “analytical Thomists.” The first category comprises analytic philosophers who are interested in Aquinas and would defend some of his ideas, but who would also reject certain other key Thomistic claims (perhaps precisely because of their perceived conflict with assumptions prevalent among analytic philosophers) and thus fail to count (or even to count themselves) as “Thomists” in any strict sense. This sort of “analytical Thomism” might be said to emphasize the “analytical” element at the expense of the “Thomism.” Anthony Kenny (who rejects Aquinas’s doctrine of being) and Robert Pasnau (who rejects certain aspects of his account of human nature) would seem to exemplify this first tendency. A second category within analytical Thomism would comprise thinkers who do see themselves as Thomists in some sense, and who would argue that those aspects of Aquinas’s thought which seem to conflict with assumptions common among analytical philosophers can be interpreted or reinterpreted so that there is no conflict. This approach might be said to give both the “analytical” and the “Thomistic” elements of analytical Thomism equal emphasis, and is represented by thinkers like Geach, Brian Davies, and C. F. J. Martin (all of whom would attempt to harmonize Aquinas’s doctrine of being with Frege’s understanding of existence) and Germain Grisez and John Finnis (who would reinterpret Aquinas’s ethics so as to avoid what Moore called the “naturalistic fallacy”). The work of Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump also possibly falls into this second category, though since it is often interpretative and scholarly rather than programmatic, it is harder to say. 

Thomists of other schools have been very critical of both of these strains within analytical Thomism, sometimes to the extent of dismissing the very idea of analytical Thomism as being no more coherent than (in their view) “transcendental Thomism” is. But there is a third possible category of “analytical Thomists,” namely those whose training was in the analytic tradition and whose modes of argument and choice of topics reflects this background, but whose philosophical views are in substance basically just traditional Thomistic ones, without qualification or reinterpretation. Here the “Thomism” would be in the driver’s seat and the “analytical” modifier would reflect not so much the content of the views defended but rather the style in which they are defended. 

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/10/thomistic-tradition-part-ii.html

Several issues:

i) Feser seems to be a purist about Thomism, unlike modern revisionists. I find that ironic considering the fact that Aquinas was far from being a philosophical purist. He's quite eclectic. 

ii) Apropos (i), Feser seems to be very concerned with recovering the authentic interpretation of Aquinas. Who's the true Thomist?

Over the centuries, Thomism has acquired many interpretive layers. Is Cajetan's theory of analogy a legitimate or illegitimate development of Thomism? 

I think this whole approach is misguided. Ultimately, philosophy is about ideas. It doesn't matter where you get your ideas. The important distinction is between true and false ideas. Thin ideas and powerful ideas. 

From an intellectual standpoint, a misinterpretation can be more useful than a correct interpretation. Suppose you improve on Aquinas by unintentionally imputing to him a better theory than he held. That's bad exegesis, but good philosophy. 

iii) It isn't clear to me if Feser is saying philosophers like Anscombe, Geach, and Kenny misunderstand Thomism, or if they adulterate it with foreign influences. If the former, then I'd simply point out that, in my estimation, they are Feser's superiors when it comes to original research. Isn't Feser basically a popularizer? By contrast, Geach, for one, did groundbreaking work on Frege. 

If the latter, then I'd say that misses the point. The reason Geach or Anscombe feel free to modify Thomism is because they are real thinkers. They combine complementary ideas from different sources to improve on the status quo ante. They aren't concerned with simply expounding or repristinating Aquinas, but in advancing the argument. There is progress in the history of ideas.  

By the same token, both Feser and Pruss are Catholic philosophers, but Pruss doesn't hesitate to synthesize Aristotelian and Leibnizian insights. He helps himself to whatever he finds useful. And he's clearly Feser's intellectual superior.

Feser is someone who's mastered a system, then applies it to contemporary issues. Paint-by-numbers. Their Catholicism notwithstanding, Anscombe and Geach are fairly independent thinkers who–unlike Feser–both made significant, original contributions to philosophy. 

Kenny is somewhat anomalous. A priest who lost his faith. Very erudite and intellectually gifted, but agnostic. 

I don't see that Feser is a very promising role model for aspiring Reformed philosophers. Let's turn to Scripturalism. 

Gordon Clark was a bright guy, and a well-trained philosopher by the standards of the time. However, even if you're sympathetic to his approach, he can only take you so far. He's mainly a popularizer. He has a conversational style, like some other philosophers of his generation, viz. Brand Blanshard. That makes him readable. He's a way some Christians get hooked on philosophy. That's their introduction. 

But because he usually writes at a popular level, there's not a lot of depth or detail. And it lacks technical rigor. Plantinga raised the bar for how to do Christian philosopher. The same holds true, in a different way, for Swinburne. 

I expect many young Calvinists of a philosophical bent may still get their theology from Warfield and Turretin, or Schreiner and Beale, or Frame, but their philosophical role models are more in the vein of Pruss, Plantinga, the McGrews, van Inwagen, &c. 

Paul Helm has been a mediating figure. A Calvinist who defends classical Christian theism.

You also have bloggers and other Internet resources like William Vallicella, the Prosblogian crew, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which supply both substance and inspiration. The list goes on and on. 

Compared with that, the "intellectual ammunition" supplied by The Trinity Foundation or Vincent Cheung is pretty low caliber. 

Scripturalism suffers from brain drain. In the past, Michael Sudduth was the most intellectually promising Scripturalist of his generation, but he not only turned his back on Scripturalism, he turned his back on Christianity.

Among the up and coming generation, it's my impression that Ryan Hedrich and Bnonn Dominic Tennant were the most intellectually promising Christians who've been mentored by Scripturalism. However, Bnonn seems to have outgrown Cheung while Ryan appears to be means-testing Scripturalism. That doesn't mean they will make a complete break with Scripturalism. To some extent this can be a case of going behind Clark to the realist/rationalist tradition which inspired him. Going straight to the source. 

Both Ryan and Bnonn read a fair amount of contemporary philosophy and philosophical theology. As a result, their own positions become increasingly refined, with the corresponding result that the stock formulations and supporting arguments of Sean Gerety, Gary Crampton, and John Robbins look increasingly simplistic and amateurish. 

Vincent Cheung is another popularizer. Like a bartender who serves bum wine to the regulars while assuring us that he keeps the good stuff in the back room, Cheung reputedly has superior arguments at the ready. I keep waiting. 

I don't say that to wax triumphalistic about the fortunes of Van Tilian apologetics. Our own talent pool is pretty shallow at the moment. At least at the academic level. Frame is semi-retired. There's Poythress. There's James Anderson, who sometimes teams up with Greg Welty. Among academics, that's the cream of the crop. Now, there may be a lot of younger talent in the pipeline.

At one time, David Byron seemed to be the natural successor to Bahnsen, but it looks like that stalled. 

Likewise, if Gerety and Crampton are drag factors on Scripturalism, Nate Shannon is a drag on Van Tilianism. Both ships have barnacles on the hull.   

Van Tilian apologetics benefits from institutional patronage. Scripturalism has to live off the land. I think the main thing that keeps Scripturalism going is freebie material from Cheung and the Trinity Foundation. Anyone with Internet access can download lots of the material.

Mind you, institutional patronage is a mixed blessing. Seminaries, Christian colleges, and denominations keep some traditions on life support which couldn't survive on the merits. Likewise, some professors coast on ascribed status rather than achieved status.  

One issue is whether Van Tilian apologetics is an apologetic method or a Christian philosophy. Take Bahnsen's debate with Gordon Stein, where he stumped Stein's physicalism by invoking the laws of logic, as a paradigm case of abstract objects.  

That counterexample worked for a live debate with an unprepared opponent. However, the theistic foundations of logic go well beyond apologetic method. Rather, that requires a detailed metaphysical model. 

I actually think the future is promising for Reformed philosophy. As long as it remains rooted in Reformed theology, and uses Reformed theology as the benchmark, it can afford to be pretty eclectic about its philosophical influences.