Circumcision and the state

Some Christian anticircumcisionists use the following argument to justify banning male neonatal circumcision: according to the NT (e.g. Acts 15, Galatians), circumcision was a rite of the passé old covenant. Christians aren’t obligated to practice circumcision. That’s defunct. Hence, the state has the authority to ban circumcision.

The underlying principle of this argument is that gov’t has the authority to proscribe whatever the Bible does not (currently) prescribe. But there are several problems with that argument:

i) It’s a recipe for totalitarian gov’t. Whenever you empower the state, you disempower the public. You are transferring power from the public to the state–power which the state will frequently use against the public. So that's not something to be done lightly.

Do we really wish to cede to gov’t the authority to forbid whatever the Bible doesn’t command?

For instance, although the Bible encourages Christians to have children, the Bible doesn’t specify how many children a Christian couple ought to have. Does this mean the state has the right to dictate the number of children Christians are allowed to have?

The Bible doesn’t say Christians should have four children. Does this mean the state can regulate the number of children Christian couples can have? Does the state have the authority to forbid a Christian couple from having four kids?

ii) The argument is also fallacious.

a) As a rule, if something is obligatory, then it’s permissible–at least in principle. That’s an a fortiori argument from the greater to the lesser (a maiore ad minus).

God would not command something that’s intrinsically evil. But before something can be morally obligatory, it must be morally permissible.

b) If God used to command something, then even if that’s no longer an obligation, the fact that it ceases to be obligatory doesn’t make it prohibitory. So even if circumcision is no longer a religious duty, it doesn’t follow that circumcision is now forbidden. Rather, it would be adiaphoral.

c) Of course, it’s possible for some things to be permissible under special circumstances, but impermissible under general circumstances. Yet that requires a separate argument. That’s not a given. 

iii) In addition, it is sometimes better for the state to allow evil than suppress evil if the effort to suppress evil would cause greater evil.

For instance, it’s evil for a man to gamble away his paycheck, so that he can’t provide for his dependants. Should the state therefore suppress that evil by outlawing casinos and online gambling? But there are two problems with that solution:

a) It drives gambling underground. Creates an unregulated, black market. And that can be worse than legalized gambling.

b) It would take a police state apparatus to enforce a blanket ban on commercial gambling. And that would create its own evils. Expansive, intrusive gov’t. Abuse of power. 

In theory a police state might seem to be more virtuous because it cracks down on all manner of vice. In practice, a police state is more corrupt because those in power use their unchecked power for personal aggrandizement. The state because a massive, official shakedown operation.

iv) Apropos (iii), let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that Jewish circumcision is morally wrong. That, of itself, is not sufficient reason to outlaw the practice–for we need to weigh the (alleged) evil of the practice over against the attended evils of enforcing a law against it.

That’s an a fortiori argument from the lesser to the greater (a minore ad maius). Does suppressing a lesser evil have the side effect of generating an even greater evil?

To take a concrete example, the Mosaic law had a complex position on prostitution. Cultic prostitution was forbidden. Likewise, male and female Israelites were forbidden to be prostitutes (on pain of death!).

However, foreign nationals were allowed to practice prostitution (except cultic prostitution). The Mosaic law did not condone the practice. But the Mosaic law distinguished between sins and crimes. Not every sin was a crime. Not every sin fell within the jurisdiction of the state.

That’s why Proverbs uses prudential arguments rather than judicial arguments against prostitution.

v) This, in turn, goes to the question of religious tolerance. How permissive should the state be in reference to false religion?

Take folk Buddhism. That’s a false religion.  Should a Christian state outlaw the practice of folk Buddhism?

But even the Mosaic law made provision for resident foreign nationals. These were not Jewish believers. They were normally pagan. As long as they practiced their pagan faith in private, that was tolerated. What was not tolerated is if they attempted to subvert and supplant the true religion.

So let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that rabbinical Judaism is a false religion. That wouldn’t automatically mean it ought to be outlawed. 

And, of course, rabbinical Judaism isn’t false in the same degree as folk Buddhism.