Jason Stellman’s Epistemological Crisis

I had mentioned that Jason Stellman’s resignation letter lifted a quote right from another Roman apologist, Michael Liccione. It is:

unless the church’s interpretation of Scripture is divinely protected from error at least under certain conditions, then what we call the “orthodox” understanding of doctrines like the Trinity or the hypostatic union is reduced to mere fallible human opinion.

http://www.creedcodecult.com/2012/06/heartfelt-farewell-to-pca.html

An anonymous student of the Scriptures has pointed out a particular epistemological crisis that is often faced with this type of statement:

http://ldrshlshllmd.wordpress.com/2012/06/05/jason-stellman-and-the-epistemological-crisis/

Reformed Protestant “de-conversions” and “conversions” to Rome (where it sounds like Stellman is heading) typically involve an epistemological shift and crisis (e.g. lack of certainty, the nagging reality of subjectivity vs. the “pure objectivity” that Rome purportedly offers, the “unanimous consent” of the Fathers, etc.). And this quote provided above, found in his resignation letter, is nothing but odd and naive for a number of reasons, which I will list.

1.       “…divinely protected from error…” Does Stellman believe that the dogma quoad se [doctrines in themselves] and dogma quoad nos [as they have to do with us] are identical with one another and perfectly correspond at every single point? Is content and expression, essence and form, God’s absolute truth and the Church’s assimilation into her consciousness, confession, cultural language and ideas, articulation, and proclamation identical at every point (cf. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:30-32)?

2.       “… at least under certain conditions…” We should ask, “What are these certain conditions that you speak of? Without resorting to question begging and vicious circularity, when do we know that we are and are not encountering one of these certain cases and conditions? Without begging the question, from where do we arrive certainty that these conditions (and no others) are instances when the church is divinely protected from error?” And then we can ask (ad infinitum), “And from what authority do you appeal to in order to have certainty about the certainty of these conditions and no others?”

3.       “…what we call the “orthodox” understanding of doctrines like the Trinity or the hypostatic union is reduced to mere fallible human opinion.” This goes back to my first question concerning whether the dogma quoad se and dogma quoad nos are identical at every point. Obviously, this cannot be without falling into epistemological naivety and arrogance, for God is the Creator and we are His creatures, and our knowledge of Him and His truths, are analogical, and never univocal. We can know God truly, but never exhaustively. And this is the same for the Church’s articulation of doctrines such as the Trinity or hypostatic union. The church’s articulation of the Trinity and hypostatic union cannot exhaust nor fully grasp these truths in its entirety (cf. James Anderson’s Paradox in Christian Theology).

But we can ask another question about the “orthodox” confession, for example, of the Trinity, and fallible human opinions. Let us consider the filioque clause in the Nicene Creed, which was added over two centuries later in the West (but still to this day rejected by the East). Which creed is fallible and which is infallible? Did the Church fall into error in the 4th century because it did not include the filioque clause or did the Church fall into error centuries later the West added it? It depends who you ask.

So Stellman attempts to seek epistemological refuge by wanting to fall back upon the Church (in his mind, the “Roman Catholic” church) and her being divinely protected from error, for example, in her articulation of the Trinity…but of which creedal statement? With or without the filioque clause? And how does Stellman know this?