Since Clark gets his definiton from or rather believes he has support for his definiton from scripture, which he quotes, Anderson’s objection would have been weightier if he had simply provided exegesis of that verse and shown that it does not have the meaning that Clark attaches to it. (Source)
I don't recall Clark offering an exegesis of Proverbs 23:7. But we can start with the authorial intent. Is the intent of this passage to expound on philosophical anthropology? Second, isn't the passage actually referring to the begrudging host, in particular? Even if we could give Clark's reading serious attention for this one man, by what Clarkian right do we have to reason inductively to all men? Third, doesn't this passage really refer to character, i.e., the begrudging host reveals his true character., his stingy heart? There's a contrast between being generous (eat and drink) and being stingy (not wanting to give). So this passage simply refers to a hypocritical person, a contrast between what he outwardly says and what he inwardly feels (Waltke 242-43). Waltke says, "Outwardly the host conforms to his social obligations according to oriental rules of hospitality, but inwardly he is revolted by his guest." In fact, is there ANY exegete who exegetes this verse along Clarkian lines? This doesn't beg the question against Clark because (a) it would be gratuitous to call him an "exegete" and (b) he doesn't offer any. So I guess this leaves us waiting for the I.O.U. on the exegesis, until then Clark's position lacks the support of his "strongest" verse.
Since Anderson believes that there is apparent incoherence in scripture, which he calls paradox, one must ask what are the grounds upon which Anderson bases his seeming demands for coherence from this particular one?
The grounds he lays out in his book.
Further, Anderson’s objection would imply that self knowledge is incoherent.
Besides the fact that it doesn't, Scripturalism implies that claims to self-knowledge are false since such knowledge is non-existent! (Since it can't be so deduced and is not deducible from Bible verses.) As John Robbins once said in an email exchnage:
Please do not water down,
dilute, or make ambiguous the definition of the word “knowledge.”
Don’t blur it with opinion. Don’t bother citing immediate
“self-knowledge” or some such notion, for the Scriptures explicitly
say: “The heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked.
Who can know it?”
Further, Anderson’s objection would imply that self knowledge is incoherent. For, self knowledge must “presuppose(s) a distinction between the thinker (“he”) and his thoughts (“the propositions”).”
But Clark can't make that distinction, that's the point. Anderson isn't claiming that such a distinction can't be made, he's claiming that Clark's definition presupposes a distinction where there should be none if Clark were correct! So the charge of incoherence has not been met.
Either Anderson simply does not read his bible at all or in his pursuit of an anti-Clark agenda he must ignore passages in scripture from which Clark believes he had support for his ideas. Why Anderson objects to a congeries of propositions but has no objections to the passages in scripture where Christ says He is the truth and the Bible refers to Him as the Word is hard to explain.
Would Clark approve of false dilemmas? Besides that, how does any of this answer Anderson? It seems our author has now "proved" that "light" and "bread" and "paths" can "think" since Jesus calls himself all of those! Also, truth is a property or a value of a proposition, not a proposition itself. So our author has went beyond Clark. Maybe our author can deduce the conclusion: propositions can think from the premise: Jesus is the way, the truth, and the light. Needless to say, the deduction isn't obvious.
Huh? The ability to think [some of] the same thoughts is what provides a basis for a common definition of man, otherwise, we can only have individual men, but no man.
Really? But we can think some of "the same thoughts" as God too!
On the other hand indviduation is provided by the fact that no two minds (congeries of propositions) can be completely identical.
Really? That's not obvious to me. I agree no two minds can be "identical", but I deny that it is impossible for no two minds to think exactly the same propositions, and if we are numerically identical to the propositions we think, then if two people thing the same propositions they are, according to the transitivity of identity, identical. So, what would an argument for this impossibility look like?
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