Me, Myself, and I, part 4

{Part one here}

{Part two here}

{Part three here}

Ethical Egoism EE teaches that man has the moral duty to act in his sole self-interest. He must be the beneficiary of his actions. We might express EE's theory of what makes actions right or wrong thusly:

* An act A is right iff A was in my best (long term) interest.

** An act A is wrong iff A was not in my best (long term) interest.

*** An act A is morally permissible iff A is neither in my, or not in my, best (long term) interest.

What about conflicts of interest (ethical dilemmas?)? Baier (among others) brings this up in his book The Moral Point of View. A conflict of interest C might be something like this:

[C] Moral agent 007 needs a kidney. Moral agent 008 needs a kidney. There is one kidney that is a match for agent 007 and agent 008. Both 007 and 008 are ethical egoists. Who should get the kidney?

What is the morally right (or correct) action to take in C? (This isn't hard to see. We make ethical decisions like this all the time. We would all agree that the 18 yr. old kid who suffers from a rare kidney disease through not fault of his ownshould get a kidney over the 90 year old man who drank alcohol like a fish for 75 of his 90 years.)

Since moral principles are supposed to serve as action-guides for the right (or wrong) way to act in situations, what principle should the 00's espouse?

It would seem that 007 should say that the right thing to do in this situation is to secure the kidney for himself.

He should prescribe that 008 has a moral duty to act in 007's best interest.

(As an aside, this is a prime example of the critique that EE should not teach its ethical theory as the correct theory. If 007 was an egoist, it would have been best for him had 008 been an austere altruist. Moral principles serve as action guides that inform us how to act in situations. Moral precepts should be teachable. Teach others how to act (this would be a necessary but not sufficient feature, character/virtue ethics and teleological ethics would also need to be included). Publicized so that others are morally informed agents. But if Ethical Egoism were true, not only would it be unwise for me to teach it, it just might be immoral for me to teach it. Teaching others to be egoists could easily turn out to be not in our best interest.)

007 should prescribe that 008 has a duty to give 007 the kidney. But 008 is an egoist and thinks that he has a moral duty to secure the kidney for himself.

Thus 008 has the moral duty to give 007 the kidney and to not give 007 the kidney.

This seems like an inconsistency.

EE may say that 008 only has the duty to act in 008's best interest.

Thus 008 does not have the moral duty to give the kidney to 007.

But then why should an EE prescribe a principle that is not in 007's best interest.

It would seem that if 007 prescribed that 008 had a moral duty, and this was the correct moral duty, to secure the kidney for himself, then this would conflict with *. Why should 007 prescribe that 008 should act in 008's best interest and not 007's?

If 007 thinks that 008 has the moral duty to secure the kidney for himself (008) then this will harm 007's self-interest. Thus according to ** to prescribe this would be to prescribe something morally wrong.

Stopping 008 would be in 007's best interest, it would be the right thing to do.

But if 008 has an objectively right moral duty to secure the kidney, and if 007 has an objectively right moral duty to stop 008 from getting the kidney, then 007 has the objectively right moral duty to stop 008 from doing the objectively right moral duty. Something has gone wrong. Any ethical theory that prescribes actions whereby one agent has a moral duty to stop another agent from doing their moral duty seems implausible.

But the Egoist can say that it isn't problematic to stop someone from doing his/her duty. For example, soldiers have duties to stop other soldiers from doing their duty. We can separate beliefs from desires, it is claimed. So, a soldier A believes that another soldier B has a duty to his country to make it across enemy lines and plant a bomb at enemy headquarters (A's). But A can desire that B fail. We can just extrapolate to the "kidney war." In other words the belief that 008 ought to get the kidney does not imply that 007 wants 008 to get the kidney.

Two problems, right off the bat: [1] We are talking about objective right and wrong. Applying that to the war, if there is a just and an unjust side, then one is objectively right and the other is objectively wrong. Say soldier A is on the just side. A does not have to believe that B has a duty to get across enemy lines (A's lines) and plant the bomb. A doesn't because A doesn't believe people have duties to commit immoral acts. [2] piggy-backs off of [1]. Any moral theory that implies that you actually want people to commit an immoral act (or that you don't want them to do a morally right act) seems to suffer immediate intuitive problems. There are certainly times that we don't want the morally right side to win. To prevail. But surely we would call this a defect in our character, wouldn't we?

A virtuous person has their duties in line with their desires. I think most agree that there is a moral difference between these two cases: a person who did a right act (did her duty), and did it because she sincerely wanted to do the right thing (her desires); and a person who did a right act (his duty) but did so dragging his feel and moping about it (he didn't desire to do it). An improperly functioning moral agent would be an agent who believes one thing about moral duties, but desire an altogether contrary thing. People who believe that other people have the objective duty to do the immoral thing seem to be impotent in laying blame at the feet of others. If someone is subjectively rational in his moral ideas, then some culpability is avoided.

Another response is one that James Rachels gives in his book Elements of Moral Philosophy (p.83).

Rachels says that the above critique works if one assumes the moral principle it appeals to. Rachels says that the Moral Principle appealed to is this:

[MP] When a moral conflict arises people have the duty to find a solution such that everyone involved can live harmoniously.

Thus the above dilemmas will be resolved "not by application of an ethical principle but by one of them winning the struggle" (ibid).

This seems odd since ethical theories purport to tell us the right way to act in situations. They do this by offering principles which serve as action-guides. In this case, EE fails the determinacy test (see Timmons, Moral Theory, pp. 13-14). No action-guides are offered, rather, do what you have to do to win is the action-guide. This is vague, and so we don't know what to do. If asked "What is the correct answer to a moral dilemma?", the response would be, "Whoever wins the struggle." In this case, what makes an action right would vary from case to case. This fails the theoretical test (see Timmons, ibid, p. 13). Furthermore, the way the argument was set up above is not what is stated in [MP]. The solution is to find the right course of action to take. The duty is to do the right thing, for the right reasons, and out of the right character. This may be harmonious for all involved, but this is simply a by-product of doing the right action. If we are morally virtuous people, then we should all accept the right answer to the question, and thus live in harmony over the decision. But, this need not happen. From a Christian perspective it is right that all people serve and love God rather than, say, money. In this postlapsarian world, this may not get a harmonious response. The point is, the main goal isn't harmony, but harmony would be a by-product if the people were comprised of morally virtuous agents who desired and believed that the right principles should be offered for moral dilemmas.