One of the insidious villains over at Debunking Christianity has posted a piece on evidential apologetics:
“I consider evidentialist apologetics flawed.”
I agree, but not for any of the reasons given by Matthew.
“Metaphysical necessity, therefore, is an attribute of God's existence. Another attribute, closely related to metaphysical necessity, is moral necessity. God is believed to be a morally necessary being.”
Agreed.
“This poses tremendous problems for evidentialist apologetics. Why? Consider the following: If it's impossible for God to lie, then whatever God says is true by definition. If God says something, then what God says cannot be false and must be necessarily true.”
Agreed.
“The problem this creates for evidentialism is twofold. First of all, it shows that the resurrection cannot qualify as an historical explanation proper because the defining hallmark of any historical theory is falsification and testability.”
This confuses historical knowledge with a historical reconstruction of the past. We can know certain things about the past without offering a falsifiable theory.
For example, I know many things about my own past because I was there. It happened to me.
“An historical hypothesis is an explanation that is formulated to explain a given set of facts. Often with a given set of facts there is bound to be more than one possible explanation. The task of the historian is to use the Historical Method to test the explanations and see which one best fits the facts. Thus, in order to be an historical explanation proper, an historical hypothesis must be testable and, hence, vulnerable to falsification. The resurrection doesn't qualify as such because the resurrection is a necessary historical explanation. There is no possible way for it to be false or else God cannot be a morally necessary being.”
Although Matthew is ostensively taking aim at a particular school of apologetics, he’s really gunning for the Resurrection itself.
The NT doesn’t present the Resurrection as a possible explanation for a set of facts. This is not an inference from the empty tomb or Easter sightings.
Rather, the NT says that this is what happened, and says so on the basis of eyewitness testimony and prophetic fulfillment.
We resort to a historical reconstruction of events when we don’t know for a fact what happened, or we do not know, as a matter of direct evidence, what happened.
But falsification is not a necessary condition of historical knowledge. You have to judge that on a case-by-case basis.
To say we can’t know something happened unless we can falsify the historical claim is rather absurd. For if a historical claim is true, then it cannot be falsified since it isn’t even false.
Matthew is confounding verification with falsification.
In addition, there’s nothing self-contradictory, as a matter of apologetic method, in mounting a probabilistic argument for a necessary (=inevitable) event.
The nature of the event and the nature of the evidence are two different things. The former is a metaphysical question, the latter an epistemic question. Matthew is jumping categories.
“The second reason the resurrection cannot be an historical explanation is because there cannot be, in principle, evidence for the resurrection, or any facts for the resurrection, as an hypothesis or theory, to explain. The reason for this is that "facts" and "evidence" presuppose historical contigency [sic.]. Historical contigency [sic.] means that the course of history could've turned out a different way.”
Matthew is conflating different types of necessity. For example, there’s such a thing as accidental necessity. The necessity of the past is a textbook example.
This is also the sense in which some existential propositions can be necessary.
It’s unnecessary for a man to father a son, but if he does, indeed, father a son, then there’s an internal relation between paternity and sonship.
Easter Sunday could have been otherwise had God willed Easter Sunday to be otherwise.
God is free to will more than one outcome. But having willed one outcome, he cannot will otherwise.
So there is an element of contingency, not in the outcome itself, but in the choice of which possible outcome to eventuate.
Steve writes: "This confuses historical knowledge with a historical reconstruction of the past. We can know certain things about the past without offering a falsifiable theory."
ReplyDeleteSteve, just curiously- how does my argument confuse historical knowledge with a historical reconstruction of the past? I accept that we can know certain things about the past without offering a falsifiable theory. My argument was notthat we cannot know whether the resurrection happened or not or whether the resurrection can be an item of historical knowledge but whether the resurrection historically qualifies as an historical hypothesis.
Steve writes: "Although Matthew is ostensively taking aim at a particular school of apologetics, he’s really gunning for the Resurrection itself."
How so Steve? In my post I expressed my belief that it was presuppositional apologetics which had the upper hand in the argument. I made no argument that the resurrection itself was false. If I wanted to do that, I would have written a critique of the resurrection itself, not how to regard the epistemic status of the resurrection.
"The NT doesn’t present the Resurrection as a possible explanation for a set of facts. This is not an inference from the empty tomb or Easter sightings."
Where did I say that the NT presents the resurrection as a possible explanation for a set of facts. What I argued was that the resurrection would have to be a historically necessary explanation because God, a morally necessary being, said so, and being that he cannot lie, then what he says is necessarily true. God is believed to be speaking by the Holy Spirit in Peter's Pentecostal sermon- ergo, the resurrection is a necessary truth in Christian theology.
Seve continues: "Rather, the NT says that this is what happened, and says so on the basis of eyewitness testimony and prophetic fulfillment."
I was making an argument that the resurrection must be a necessary truth. If Christians believe that the resurrection explains the empty tomb, postmortem 'sightings' of Jesus, and the origins of the Christian faith in the resurrection, then, is it not logically so that the resurrection thus becomes a historically necessary explanation?
Seve continues: "We resort to a historical reconstruction of events when we don’t know for a fact what happened, or we do not know, as a matter of direct evidence, what happened."
Steve, did I say "historical reconstruction" or did I say "explanation". I believe it's the latter. I don't recall mentioning the word "reconstruction" and I do not intend for it to be part of my argument. If I am not mistaken, "reconstruction", Steve, is your word.
Steve: "But falsification is not a necessary condition of historical knowledge. You have to judge that on a case-by-case basis."
Uh Steve, did I say historical "knowledge"? Did I? Can I trouble you to quote me? I don't recall saying that falsification is a necessary condition of historical knowledge. I believe I did say that the criterion of falsification is necessary for an explanation to qualify as an historical hypothesis. Doesn't that sound a lot more like what I said Steve?
Steve says "To say we can’t know something happened unless we can falsify the historical claim is rather absurd. For if a historical claim is true, then it cannot be falsified since it isn’t even false."
Where did I say that we can't know something happened unless we can falsify the historical claim? What I said was that I feel that Christians are not qualified in asserting that the resurrection qualifies as an historical hypothesis or theory because any hypothesis or theory has to have potential for falsification. This says nothing about whether we can know something happened in history or not. I am talking about whether the resurrection qualifies as an historical hypothesis or theory. Get it now?
Steve: "Matthew is confounding verification with falsification."
How so? I'm not sure you have really understood my argument. If it's flawed, so be it. But, what I have read so far indicates to me that you might not have understood what I was arguing for.
Steve continues: "In addition, there’s nothing self-contradictory, as a matter of apologetic method, in mounting a probabilistic argument for a necessary (=inevitable) event."
Steve, I'm afraid you still might have misunderstood my argument here. I'm arguing that because the resurrection is believed, by Christians, to be have spoken of, having occured, by none other than God himself, it's a necessary historical explanation. How does one mount an apologetic using probability arguments to establish a necessary truth in history (it's historical necessity established by a morally necessary Being)? I'm not sure I understand how to do this!
Seve continues: "The nature of the event and the nature of the evidence are two different things. The former is a metaphysical question, the latter an epistemic question. Matthew is jumping categories."
Steve, how am I doing this? How am I "jumping categories" as you put it?
Steve continues: "Matthew is conflating different types of necessity. For example, there’s such a thing as accidental necessity. The necessity of the past is a textbook example."
How am I conflating different types of necessity? I recognize that there is such thing as accidental necessity. How am I confusing diferent types of necessity? Past sarcasm aside, (I'm being serious here)how have I conflated the two?
Steve continues: "This is also the sense in which some existential propositions can be necessary.
It’s unnecessary for a man to father a son, but if he does, indeed, father a son, then there’s an internal relation between paternity and sonship."
I don't doubt that some existential propositions can be necessary and your example illustrates the point nicely.
Steve continues: "Easter Sunday could have been otherwise had God willed Easter Sunday to be otherwise."
Steve, how can Easter Sunday have been willed by a morally necessary Being, though? I am persuaded that morally necessity and volition are contradictory. How can a Being be both morally necessary and volitional?
Steve continues: "God is free to will more than one outcome. But having willed one outcome, he cannot will otherwise.
So there is an element of contingency, not in the outcome itself, but in the choice of which possible outcome to eventuate."
I am not sure how it's possible that a morally necessary being can have free will? As for the choice of which possible outcome to eventuate, is this the case with a morally necessary Being though?
Concluding- Steve, I thank you for your critique despite my sarcasms. I'd be interested in anything you or your colleagues have to say in response. Seriously.
Kind regards,
Matthew