A Response To Annette Merz On The Infancy Narratives (Part 8)

(Previous parts in the series: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4, part 5, part 6, part 7.)

There's a section in Merz's chapter about the date of Jesus' birth. She suggests that an early tradition may have placed his birth under a Herod other than Herod the Great. And she argues against the historicity of Luke's census account. I'll begin with her claims about which Herod Jesus was born under.

After saying that there are "serious doubts" about placing Jesus' birth at the time of Herod the Great (478), Merz tells us that Matthew wanted to parallel Jesus to Moses by having a figure like the Pharaoh of Exodus 1-2 in Jesus' childhood. Therefore, Matthew may have had unhistorical, typological motives for placing Jesus' birth at the time of Herod the Great. I've addressed that argument in a previous response to Merz. See my quotation of Mark Smith and my response to that quotation about halfway through the post here.

Merz then writes:

From a historical point of view, the slaughter of the innocents most certainly must be regarded as a legend mirroring Pharaoh's order to kill the sons of Israel (Ex 1-2) and echoing Herod's infamous cruelty towards his own family and subjects. (479)

Penultimate thoughts on Trump

This may be my final post on Trump. 

1. There are conscientious conservatives like Dennis Prager, Robert George, Robert Gagnon, Bill Vallicalla, Victor Hanson, Thomas Sowell, Scott Klusendorf, Andrew McCarthy, Tony Perkins, and E. Calvin Beisner who've argued that it's reasonable to vote for Trump to block Hillary. We must choose from the available options. 

What I've seen in some quarters is an effort say it's out of bounds even to make a case for that. I disagree. Their arguments merit a respectful hearing. I won't vote for Trump, but we face a real dilemma. It's understandable that some people fall on the other side of the dilemma. You can disagree with them while granting that their position is ethical and rational.

I'm referring to the good guys. We need to separate the good guys from the bad guys. For instance, Ralph Reed is a snake. 

2. Another problem is that NeverTrumpers need to be more evenhanded. It was a mistake for NeverTrumpers to direct nearly all their fire at Trump, to the neglect of Hillary. It's not enough to document how bad Trump is. You need to document how bad Hillary is. 

From time to time I've thought about doing a post in which I make the case against Hillary. But for several reasons I never did. For one thing, I doubt most Tblog readers are inclined to vote for Hillary. And the few that are would not be swayed by what I say. 

In addition, I haven't attempted to keep track of all the wacky things Hillary has said in speeches, debates, and interviews since she threw her hat into the ring. Not to mention the revelations from Wikileaks. But the case against Hillary would be incomplete without that additional supporting material.

But that's really not my responsibility. Unlike National Review or The Weekly Standard, I'm not a paid political junkie. I write about many other things. And they have a different audience. 

3. Regarding Trump's "locker room banter," both liberals and conservatives have accused the other side of hypocrisy. Ironically, they sometimes use the very same example! Liberals exclaim: "You said 'character counts during the Lewinsky scandal. But once Trump becomes the nominee, you change your tune!"

Conservatives exclaim: "You feign outrage at Trump's sexual ethics, but you turned a blind eye to Bill Clinton, or even defended his shenanigans!" 

What are we to make of this?

4. Some Trump supporters are hypocrites. They are blind partisans whose principles change with the candidate. And the same holds true for Democrats. In my observation, that's more true for Democrats. 

This is the difference between an ideologue and a partisan. An ideologue is consistent (for better or worse). 

5. That said, remember that the Lewinsky scandal was almost 20 years ago. I don't mean by that that because it's an old story, it doesn't matter. What I mean, rather, is that there's been lots of turnover in the GOP and the religious right since that scandal broke. Therefore, it's inaccurate for liberal critics to simply scream "hypocrisy!" It would only be hypocritical if the same people who took one position on Bill Clinton have pivoted when it comes to Trump. But you can't just assume that people who take a position on Trump even had a position on Bill Clinton back then. 

6. Someone might object that if I'm going to make that allowance for conservatives, I should make the same allowance for liberals. And I agree. The reason I think it's legitimate to counter liberal fulminations about Trump's sexual ethics by reminding Democrats of JFK, Teddy Kennedy, Bill Clinton et al. is not necessarily to say they've changed their tune. Some have. But I'm using these as test cases. Even if you had no position on them at the time, do you, in retrospect, hold them to the same standard that you now hold Trump to? 

7. And, of course, this isn't just about the past. The pop culture routinely celebrates sexual debauchery. And the women are just as debauched as the men. For instance, Jersey Shore ran for six seasons. At its peak, it was the top-rated MTV show. And to some extent that was just a teaser for even more explicit DVDs. Beyoncé is another example:

http://www.city-journal.org/html/trumped-outrage-14777.html

So it's hard to take the outrage seriously.

8. Someone might object that I'm excusing Trump by saying "you're just as bad!" But that's not what I'm saying. Rather, I'm using a tu quoque argument. I'm responding to liberal critics on their own grounds. I'm challenging them to be morally and logically consistent. Liberals live in such an echo chamber that it doesn't even occur to them that they chronically contradict themselves.

When I parry their moralistic denunciations of Trump by drawing attention to moral degenerates that the pop culture and the liberal media (often indistinguishable) glorifies, that doesn't represent my own viewpoint. There's no point in having two political parties if the GOP is just as bad as the Democrat party. That's the problem with the Trump nomination. So I do think it's important for the GOP to be a better alternative. Otherwise, it has no raison d'être.

BTW, assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the tu quoque is a perfectly legitimate counterargument:

http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~hitchckd/adhominemissa.htm

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2016/02/are-tu-quoque-arguments-fallacious.html

P.S, I never thought the Lewinsky scandal was the worst thing you could say about Bill Clinton. As I've said, it was like getting Al Capone on tax evasion. 

9. Finally, there's nothing necessary hypocritical about changing your mind. We can't anticipate every eventuality. We sometimes take positions that make sense at the time. But when times change, that may force us to become cognizant of additional considerations that didn't occur to us before. As finite creatures, we make shortsighted statements. 

Bible background

1. I was asked to comment on the idea of knowing culture background to better understand the Bible. It's hard to give a general answer to that question. On the one hand, there are certainly many instances where background knowledge aids the reader in understanding the text. For instance, books like Isaiah, Ezekiel, and 1-2 Kings are full of references to the international politics of the day. Much of this is obscure or opaque to a modern reader. So it's useful to fill in the background.

Likewise, knowing about the nature of Egyptian religion can help the reader understand how the miracles in Exodus are sometimes an attack on the pretensions of Egyptian religion. The cult of Pharaoh. The sun god Ra. The role of the cobra. The "divine" Nile river, as a personification of the god Hapi. 

By the same token, knowing that ancient Israel had an agrarian economy, common property, tribal social structure, knowing about the climate and topography, can help explain the function of some of OT laws. 

In addition, this can sometimes be useful in terms of genre criticism and literary conventions. 

I'd add that the OT is often countercultural. It doesn't just mirror the ANE, but often provides a corrective. 

2. However, when scholars like John Walton, Peter Enns, Kenton Sparks, Kyle Greenwood, Bill Arnold, Charles Halton et al. talk about the need to read the OT in the original context, they have something additional in mind. They mean Bible writers rely on obsolete conceptual categories. Bible writers unwittingly posit as true what we now know to be false. Carried to a logical extreme, this leads to atheism. The view that the whole notion of external divine intervention from a God (or angels) who exists beyond the earth is part of this (allegedly) antiquated cosmography.

They think they are viewing the OT through ancient Near Eastern eyes. Up to a point, that's a good objective. We should attempt to read the OT as the original audience understood it. However, I don't think the scholars in question are actually viewing it through ANE eyes. Rather, they are viewing it through the eyes of Western high-tech urbanites who are out of touch with the experience of ancient Near Easterners.  

The exercise is potentially circular, for unless you know how ancient people viewed the world directly, you can't say how literary or pictorial depictions of the world were meant to reflect the world. Let's take a few comparisons, moving back in time. 

3. Suppose a scholar inferred from Holman Hunt's The Light of the World that Victorian Christians thought Jesus knocks on everybody's front door. Of course, that's a fallacious inference. 

4. Suppose a scholar wrote a monograph on Verne's cosmography. He cited Journey to the Center of the Earth to demonstrate what 19C Europeans thought about the earth's interior. But, of course, Verne's story is fictional. 

Perhaps someone would object that that's an equivocal comparison. We classify his work as fiction because a scientifically educated man of his era would know that's not what the earth's interior is like. By contrast, the same thing can't be said for ancient Near Easterners. 

However, I doubt that at the time of writing (1864), Europeans knew that much about the earth's interior. Not to mention that Verne wasn't even a geologist. Moreover, he's writing in a genre that had been around for a while. There were literary precedents. Consider earlier examples like Casanova's Icosaméron (1788) and Niels Klim's Underground Travels (1741). How much did 18C literati know about the earth's interior? 

5. Suppose scholars inferred from spirituals that black slaves thought that at the moment of death your soul was transported to Palestine, where you had to ford the river Jordan to enter Beulah land?  

6. Suppose a scholar wrote a monograph on Buyanesque cosmography. He cited The Pilgrim's Progress to demonstrate that 17C Englishmen thought heaven was a place on earth. Heaven lay just beyond the Delectable Mountains. You could walk to heaven on the King's Highway, although you had to ford the Thames to reach the Celestial City. The scholar produces a roadmap with landmarks and place names to document the state of 17C English cosmography. 

But, of course, that's a fallacious inference. Bunyan's work is fictional. 

7. Suppose a scholar wrote a monograph on Dantean cosmography. This seems like a more promising example. Dante's Comedy is cobbled together from Aristotelian physics, Ptolemaic astronomy, and Greco-Roman depictions of the Netherworld. Dante believed the underlying science was true. And you can certainly map out the world of the Comedy. 

That said, did Dante really think Purgatory a mountain? Moreover, even if he thought the scientific underpinnings of the story were true, he knew that he was inventing the details every step of the way. The landscape of hell, and the climate of hell, with boiling rivers of blood, sleet, brimstone, deserts of burning coals, bleeding trees, &c., is a figment of his imagination. 

Furthermore, there's a major plothole running through the entire story. The character of Dante is still alive. He has a physical body. But most of hell's denizens are discarnate spirits: ghosts and demons. If hell is physical, how can it contain and confine discarnate spirits? If hell is physical, how can the sleet, brimstone, boiling rivers, &c., have any affect on them? 

In theory, it could be like a psychological simulation. A stable, collective nightmare. But in that event, the character of Dante would be outside the dreamscape, not inside the dreamscape. 

So there's this constant paradox. If the character of Dante can interface with hell, then most of the inhabitants cannot. If most of the inhabitants can interface with hell, then his character cannot. It requires the willing suspension of disbelief. 

8. Suppose a scholar wrote a monograph on Homer's oceanography. He cited The Odyssey to demonstrate what ancient Greeks believed about the nature of their world. 

But there are problems with that inference. In The Odyssey, the action is set around the Mediterranean, Aegean sea, Ionian sea, Strait of Messina. Sicily, Ithaca, the Peloponnese, &c. The travelogue of Odysseus includes encounters with the Calypso, Circe, Sirens, Cyclops, Laestrygonians, &c.

Surely, though, ancient Greek mariners who were familiar with the harbors and islands along his route. Yet they never encountered anything like he relates. Wouldn't Greek sailors be skeptical about these tales?  

I can't give a firm answer. My point is that it doesn't even occur to scholars like John Walton, Peter Enns et al. to ask questions like that when they make assumptions about ancient Near Easterners. 

Gut reactions

I'm going take another swipe at Collin Hansen's recent article, but before I do so I'd like to put the issue in a larger context. Ethicists often use hypotheticals to illustrate or undercut certain moral intuitions. Since these thought-experiments are abstract and artificial, no one really gets hurt. By the same token, I see lots of Christians who have bad rules of thumb for making ethical evaluations. Now, in normal times, society has enough padding that you can get away with illogical reasoning. Society is so big and diffuse that it can absorb many mistakes. 

However, in more extreme times, due to the cumulative impact of codified falsehoods and detrimental social policies, we no longer have that buffer. At that juncture, additional illogical justifications become exponentially more costly. 

I'd add that even before we get to that point, having bad rules of thumb for making ethical evaluations can still be very harmful at an individual level. Take medical decisions involving an elderly relative–or a family member who was wheeled into the ER after a terrible traffic accident. 

Christians need to have the right tools in their ethical toolbox for personal ethics and social ethics. The cummulative consequences of poor reasoning can be calamitous. That's why I did a recent post on some popular terminological fallacies:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2016/10/glossary-of-terminological-fallacies.html

Keep in mind that voters using bad rules of thumb are what got Trump nominated in the first place. When enough people shirk reason and evidence, that's the dire result. 

Back to Hansen:

To the older evangelicals planning to vote for Trump: You can try to explain the difference in electing a president and hiring a 23-year-old college graduate to evangelize students. You can say we’re electing a commander in chief and not a Sunday school teacher. You can say that God often raises up pagan leaders to deliver his people from their enemies. But no one is fooled by your arguments. 

They can see you will apparently excuse anything in a Republican nominee so long as the alternative is a manifestly unqualified Clinton. And they will conclude that they don’t really need to listen to you when it comes to “traditional, biblical ethics.” 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/10/08/this-is-the-last-spastic-breath-from-the-religious-right-before-its-overdue-death/

i) Notice how Hansen frames the issue. What he's done, no doubt unintentionally, is insidiously evil. He's cast the issue in a way that subverts rational persuasion. He preemptively discredits any explanation or justification in this case as "hypocritical". You'd be a "fool" to accept those arguments. Stop listening. 

That's a very dangerous tactic, because the liberal establishment will be only too happy to apply that to any Christian argument for Christian ethics. No one is fooled by arguments against abortion. That's just a cover to control women's bodies. No one is fooled by arguments for religious liberty. That's just a cover for homophobia, transphobia, bigotry, and intolerance. And so on and so forth.

How we frame a moral issue can be just as important as the issue itself, for if we get into the habit of miscasting issues, that sets a bad precedent. People build on that false premise to derive harmful conclusions. Notice how liberals routinely turn outrageous assumptions into unquestionable assumptions, then build on that rotten foundation. 

ii) Another problem with Hansen's contention is that he simply posits an analogy between voting for president and hiring criteria at a Christian organization. Notice that he doesn't provide an actual supporting argument to show how those are, in fact, relevantly analogous. He acts as if he should have the benefit of that analogy without having to argue for the analogy. But that begs the question. He seems to be really ticked off by the "religious right," and he's getting something off his chest. He has an inarticulate feeling that there's something deeply wrong. A gut reaction. 

iii) There is, however, nothing disreputable about taking the position that if you're confronted with only two viable candidates, both of whom are equally decadent, but one of whom is likely to promote and impose far more harmful social policies than the other, to vote for the less damaging candidate. That's a morally and intellectually respectable principle in voting. The way to attack the argument is not to attack the principle, but to attack the comparison. And that's a different objection. For instance, one objection to Trump is that, if elected, he will co-opt the conservative movement. He will corrupt the conservative moment from within. That's a legitimate consideration. And that involves a comparison between the overall consequences of each candidate–long-term and well a short-term. But as a matter of principle, there's nothing dishonorable about making choices that mitigate evil, if that's the best you can do. Both candidates have said and done things that ought to disqualify them from holding public office. What if both candidates fail minimal standards? 

iv) Finally, if I were arguing for Trump, I wouldn't say things like "we're electing a commander-in-chief, not a pastor-in-chief". The problem with that comparison is that it acts as if there should be no standards for president. An amoral Realpolitik philosophy. 

However, even that comparison does have a grain of truth. Gen. Patton would make a poor pastor. John Piper would make a poor president. (For one thing, Piper's a pacifist.) There are things that disqualify someone for pastoral ministry that don't disqualify someone from military command. What we want in a general is a guy with a good head for strategy and tactics. Adaptable intelligence. Situational awareness. If you're in a war for national survival, and your best general is a personal creep, you use your best general. 

Now, someone might object that my own analogy begs the question. Is Trump comparable to Patton? I agree. My analogy was deliberately weak at that point. I think it's a valid analogy to illustrate a point of principle. But whether the principle applies to Trump is a different question. I'm not making a case for Trump. But I am making a case for certain principles in decision-making. 

These are principles we need to keep in mind moving forward. This is important over and above the current race for president. Irrespective of who wins, and the consequences of that election, we need to frame ethical issues properly for the battles ahead.

Why Walls is still wrong

This has become a stock objection to Calvinism:

God could give all persons “irresistable grace” and thereby determine all persons to freely accept a right relationship with himself and be saved. 

https://tyndalephilosophy.com/2016/10/11/whats-not-wrong-with-jerry-walls-argument-against-calvinism/

But that proves too much since even the freewill theist God could give everyone irresistible grace. 

Or the freewill theist God could redefine the terms of salvation. Broaden the terms of salvation sufficiently to save everyone. That wouldn't infringe on libertarian freedom. Even the psychopaths could be consigned to an eternal tropical paradise. Kinda like those Swedish "prisons" that resemble resort hotels. 

In addition, as James Anderson points out:

It appears to me that your symbolization of Jerry’s premise 5 is incorrect. As you have it, the mere fact that God can give irresistible grace to S entails that S will be saved. But that’s not what premise 5 states or implies, nor is it something that the Calvinist ought to grant.

Rich Davis concedes that objection, but adds: 

Here’s another possibility. My symbolization of (5) is what Jerry intends, but there is a supporting argument for (5)–running in the background, as it were–which employs certain bridging premises.

Problem is, Walls and Davis want the benefit of a bridging premise without having to supply a bridging premise. If they have a supporting argument, let's see it! Freewill theists keep giving us I.O.U.s. 

Why a Virgin Birth?

https://thearcmag.com/why-the-virgin-birth-7271d0d03627#.aj90dsx1i

Divine Sovereignty & Human Freedom

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmxyfcNgVbQ

Atheism, trust, and friendship

Atheists complain that they are distrusted. Being atheists, they think that's unfair. Sheer prejudice.

But here's the problem: it's not directly about morality. There are atheists who inconsistently believe in morality. So it's not that they can't be trusted because they are immoral or amoral–although some certainly are. And, indeed, atheists are far more likely to deny moral realism than Christians. So the odds are that they are less trustworthy in that respect.

But that's not the main thing. It's less about morality than mortality. If you think this life is all there is, then are you going to do the right thing even if that puts you at personal risk? I'm not saying you don't have brave atheists, but from the standpoint of mortality, isn't that foolhardy? 

To take a cliche example, suppose you're gentile and your best friend is Jewish. But then the Nazis come to power. You still want to be his friend. But there's now a conflict between self-interest and altruism. Are you prepared to risk your life or freedom to remain his friend?

From a secular standpoint, isn't that irrational? So that has an indirect effect on your commitment to morality. In a pinch, can your Jewish friend trust you to watch his back? Or is the price too high? In normal times, your friendship isn't costly. Indeed, your friendship is mutually agreeable. But now that friendship is politically dangerous. If this life is all there is, will you hazard your life or freedom to protect him? Or will you protect yourself? 

The acid test of friendship is taking a risk–even a grave risk–for your friends. That's a gamble. And if you can't afford to lose the bet, you can't be a real friend, you can't be a friend when it matters most. When the stakes are high, that's why he needs a friend–and that's when the stakes are too high for you to be his friend. It isn't safe to be around him. 

Objectifying women

One complaints about Donald Trump is that he "objectifies" women. Now, Trump is a certified creep, but that doesn't mean we should allow feminists to define morality. To my knowledge, the complaint about "objectifying" women originates with feminist sociologists. If fact, I've seen feminists complain that calling a woman "pretty" or "beautiful" is "sexist". 

Let's be honest for a moment. Human beings are sexual creatures. It's only natural and normal to view at least some members of the opposite sex from a sexual standpoint. If you wish, to view them as sexual "objects". 

In that regard, there are both similarities and differences between men and women. On the one hand, you will never hear a normal man complain that a woman "objectified" him or viewed him as a sex object. "You only love me for my body–not my mind!"

Likewise, if a pretty women were to slap a man on the butt–even a stranger–he wouldn't be offended. For the moment, I'm not discussing what's appropriate, but just making a descriptive observation. In that respect, I think there's some difference between men and women. Insofar as we admit men and women have different reactions, that undercuts feminism. 

Conversely, let's not pretend that women never "objectify" men. For decades, Hollywood has not only showcased actresses who are physically appealing to male viewers, but actors who are physically appealing to female. Women are quite capable of viewing men as sex objects. And some men would be disappointed if they didn't. 

Likewise, not a few women deliberately dress in ways that invite sexual objectification. They know exactly what they are up to. Again, I'm not discussing what's appropriate at the moment, but just making a descriptive observation. 

So I find the politically correct double standard rather tiresome. The only men who never "objectify" women are homosexual men. It's a two-way street.

From a Christian standpoint, it's wrong to prioritize appearances. And it's wrong to only judge a member of the opposite sex by their looks. 

Glossary of terminological fallacies

This is a glossary of terminological fallacies that Christian pundits frequently commit. I often see Christian pundits use terms and categories that they clearly don't understand. They just wing it when it comes to ethical analysis. They don't seem to have even a rudimentary grasp of ethical categories and distinctions. They think they can fly by the seat-of-their-pants. 

One problem is people using dictionary definitions for philosophical concepts. They fail to distinguish between the ordinary meaning of words and technical terms that designate philosophical positions or idiosyncratic positions. It's like the difference between "home," "run," and "home run," or "slam," "dunk," and "slam-dunk". What these words mean individually is different from what they mean as technical jargon. 

Ethics requires precision thought. I've discussed these terms and categories before, but I'd like to collate them in a single post for ready reference. 

1. Lesser-evil principle

Many people are confused about the word "evil" in "the lesser of two evils." But that doesn't mean choosing between a lesser wrong and a greater wrong. Rather, that's choosing between bad and worse.

If I can't saving everyone in a nursing home that's on fire, I have a choice between bad (letting some die) and worse (letting all die). It's not immoral for me to rescue those I can. It's not a lesser "evil" in that sense.

The "lesser evil" does mean a moral evil. It doesn't mean doing wrong. Rather, it's a contrast between a bad outcome and a worse outcome.

Take amputating a gangrenous limb to save a patient. Amputation is a bad solution. Letting the patient die is worse. 

Indeed, letting the patient die when you could save his life through radical surgery is morally evil. In a fallen world, we're often confronted with situations where we don't have ideal options. The best we can do is to limit evil. 

2. Consequentialism

It fails to distinguish between the ordinary sense of "consequences" and "consequentialism"–which is a technical designation for a philosophical position. Here are three academic definitions:

Consequentialism is the view that morality is all about producing the right kinds of overall consequences.   

http://www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/

Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. This general approach can be applied at different levels to different normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most prominent example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.  

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/

Consequentialism assesses the rightness or wrongness of actions in terms of the value of their consequences. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), 2:603. 

i) In the ordinary sense of the term, a "consequence" is synonymous with an outcome, effect, end-result, fallout, aftermath. Taking the predictable or foreseeable results of an action into account in decision-making is by no means equivalent to consequentialism, where the morality of an action is "all about" the consequences or "depends only on the consequences."

"Situation ethics" is a label popularized by the late Joseph Fletcher. The fact that he wrote a book by that title doesn't mean he owns situation ethics. Indeed, I daresay most people who use that phrase have never read his book. 

3. Pragmatism

i) It equivocates by failing to distinguish between pragmatic ethics and making pragmatic judgments. Pragmatism is actually difficult to define. It's not that unified. But there's a basic difference between "pragmatism" in the technical sense of a philosophical value system, and "pragmatism" in the informal sense of taking practical consequences into account when we make ethical decisions. It's trivially easy to illustrate the fact that there are many situations in which it would be immoral not to take practical consequences into consideration when making ethical decisions. The Biblical mandate to love our neighbor requires us to gauge the impact that our actions have on others. Are our actions likely to be beneficial or harmful to others? That's essential to social ethics. 

Put another way, in pragmatic ethics, the practical consequences are the sole factor that determines right and wrong. Practical consequences dictate the ends as well as the means. By contrast, we can distinguish between means and ends. What's the point of pursuing a goal through ineffective methods? Even if consequences don't select for the goal, it would be counterproductive to have means that work at cross-purposes with the ends. 

I can have objectives based on normative principles, but be "pragmatic" about how I achieve my objectives. 

ii) As a matter of fact, there is such a thing as "extenuating circumstances". To take a stock example, killing is prima facie wrong. There are, however, special circumstances under which killing is permissible or even obligatory. Although some actions are intrinsically right or wrong, obligatory or prohibitory, there's a class of actions where the licit or illicit character of the action is context-dependent. 

4. Situation ethics

"Situation ethics" was the title of a book by Joseph Fletcher. He used that phrase to designate his particular ethical system. It's a brand name.

That hardly implies that if you take the situation into account in decision-making, you are a situation ethicist in Fletcher's idiosyncratic sense. That confuses one man's position with a much broader concept. The fact that Fletcher used the word "situation" doesn't mean his usage defines the concept. The fact that words are used as brand names doesn't mean they only or primarily denote that specialized sense. 

This is just a guilt-by-association tactic. "Situation" in "situation ethics" is a technical term for a particular system of ethics. But taking circumstances into account in decision-making is by no means equivalent to "situation ethics" according to Fletcher's position. For a proper definition:

Proponents of situation ethics…reject [Augustine's] stipulation that there are certain things that are always wrong…Situation ethics is thus a movement that protests generally against the imposition of unchanging moral absolutes that prohibit everywhere certain classes of actions. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), 8:798. 

5. Moral relativism

Radical relativists hold that any morality is as true or justified as any other. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), 6:540. 

Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons. 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/
Moral relativism is the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to some particular standpoint (for instance, that of a culture or a historical period) and that no standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others.  

Ethical non-realism is the view that there is no objective moral order that makes our moral beliefs true or false and our actions right or wrong. 

Ethical non-realism is typically presupposed by moral relativists, but it is not the whole of moral relativism…merely denying that morality has an objective foundation of this sort does not make one a relativist; for moral relativism also asserts that moral claims may be true or false relative to some particular standpoint such as that of a specific culture or historical period. 

Saying that the truth of a moral claim is relative to some standpoint should not be confused with the idea that it is relative to the situation in which it is made.  Only the most extreme rigorists would deny that in assessing a moral judgment we should take the particular circumstances into account.  Most people would agree that lying in court to avoid a fine is wrong, while lying to a madman to protect his intended victim is justified. The particular circumstances surrounding the action alter its character and hence our appraisal of it. 

http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/

6. The end doesn't justify the means!

It's a false dichotomy to assert that either the end always justifies the means or else the end never justifies the means. That overlooks a third alternative: some ends justify some means.

Take "the end justifies the means". That's ambiguous. As a universal principle, the claim is false. In that respect, it's an unreliable moral yardstick. 

However, we all use ends-means justifications all the time. If I have a duty to support my dependents, then I have a duty to get a job. That end justifies that means.

Normally it's wrong to chop off someone's arm or leg. If, however, he has gangrene and that's the only way to save his life, then that end justifies that means.

Cancer is life-threatening and some cancer treatments are life-threatening. So it's a calculated risk. If the risk of death by cancer is greater than the risk of death by complications from cancer therapy, then that end justifies that means.

Making the best of a bad poker hand

These evangelical leaders have said that, for the sake of the “lesser of two evils,” one should stand with someone who not only characterizes sexual decadence and misogyny, brokers in cruelty and nativism, and displays a crazed public and private temperament — but who glories in these things. Some of the very people who warned us about moral relativism and situational ethics now ask us to become moral relativists for the sake of an election. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/10/09/if-donald-trump-has-done-anything-he-has-snuffed-out-the-religious-right/

I doubt Russell Moore has the slightest idea what "moral relativism" and "situational ethics" really mean. So often, those labels are bandied as terms of abuse, without any effort to properly define what they mean. 

The 2016 presidential election will be remembered as the last spasm of energy from the Religious Right before its overdue death. 

To the older evangelicals planning to vote for Trump: You can try to explain the difference in electing a president and hiring a 23-year-old college graduate to evangelize students. 

But woe to the hypocrites who hold the most powerful leader in the world to a lower standard than they do the searching young believer who desires to serve God and neighbor. 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/10/08/this-is-the-last-spastic-breath-from-the-religious-right-before-its-overdue-death/

Look, I'm a NeverTrumper. I've repeatedly explained why I won't vote for him. But there are good arguments and bad arguments. Russell Moore and Collin Hansen are using bad arguments that obscure moral discrimination, and reinforce simplistic approaches to ethical evaluations and moral comparisons:

i) Certainly the Trump candidacy brought some Evangelical leaders into disrepute. It is, however, invalid and unjust to extrapolate from their conspicuous failures to smear the entire religious right. The religious right isn't any one thing. It's a huge social movement with millions of players. Many of them have done wonderful work. 

ii) There's a distinction between the primaries and the general election. Does Hansen have any reliable polling data to show that most members of the religious right supported Trump during the primaries? 

iii) The general election is a different dynamic. Once you force voters into a binary choice between the only two variable candidates, then it's natural for them, however, grudgingly, to select the candidate whom they perceive to be the least worst option. We can question their evaluation, but the system itself has narrowed the options at that juncture, so that's what prospective voters are considering. We have conscientious conservatives who are struggling to make the best of a bad poker hand. They didn't ask for that. They resent that. 

iii) Hansen's comparison is muddleheaded. A Christian organization has many job applicants to choose from. And a Christian organization naturally has Christian standards for its employees. If it didn't, it wouldn't be a Christian organization.

That's hardly comparable to the general election in which we are struck with a binary choice between two viable candidates. And unlike a private Christian association, we don't have the same power in hiring and firing. 

iii) In a choice between two morally atrocious candidates, it's not "hypocritical" to vote for the candidate you guess will have less harmful policies. Now, that can be criticized on other grounds. We can debate whether one candidate really is a lesser evil. We can debate whether the lesser-evil principle has a threshold below which we shouldn't go. But that's not an issue of "hypocrisy". That's the wrong category. You can't be morally serious if you refuse to use intellectually serious arguments. 

iv) It's a problem when spokesmen like Hansen and Moore allow themselves to become tools of the liberal media. 

v) Notice that in their Washington Post op-eds, Hansen and Moore denounce Trump, but have nothing to say about Hillary. Why the selective, one-sided disapproval? 

Trump apologists

Secular Outpost@SecularOutpost I don't want to hear another word about "objective moral values" from any Christian apologist who still supports Trump. #apologetics8:42 PM - 8 Oct 2016

I assume this tweet is from apostate atheist Jeff Lowder. I'll use it as a springboard to make some general observations:

1. I'm unimpressed by the leftwing critics and "progressive Christians" who denounce an evil thug like Trump, but refuse to denounce an evil thug like Hillary. Indeed, leftwing critics and "progressive Christians" act as though denouncing Trump automatically makes them virtuous. As if merely opposing Trump is any kind of substitute for having a good alternative ideology. Opposing Trump while supporting Hillary doesn't make you virtuous. Rather, that masks your own evil preferences. Selective, one-sided indignation leaves me yawning. What about the locker room banter between Vernon Jordan and Bill Clinton? 

2. Jeff's statement is a non sequitur. Indeed, he has it backwards. The fact that some "Christian apologists" (whatever that means) still support Trump despite objective moral values, at best shows their inconsistency. But we can only evaluate their support thanks to objective moral values, which atheism cannot sustain. That illustrates the necessity of a Christian worldview.

3. NeverTrumpers have some reason to feel vindicated by currently developments. But while schadenfreuda is understandable, we need to guard against too much triumphalism. The prospect of Hillary winning is truly tragic. 

4. Since I've consistently opposed Trump, I don't fall under Jeff's censure, although I don't measure myself by his yardstick. 

5. But now is a good occasion to classify and assess Trump apologists. These are not all of a kind.

i) Some people openly disdain Trump, but support his bid because they think he's relatively benign compared to Hillary's malevolence. That position is consistent with objective moral values. It's not my own position. But it's not a position that discredits the person who takes it. 

I'd add that the current revelations about Trump don't change that position. To begin with, we didn't learn anything new about Trump that people who were paying attention all along didn't already know about Trump. And it's not directly germane to the (alleged) contrast between Trump and Hillary on policy. 

True, it's a thankless task to be a Trump apologist. He makes it very hard for his defenders to support him. However, the apologists I'm talking about would blame the situation. They didn't ask to be put in this situation. They resent this situation. It's the fault of primary voters. But now we have to play the hand we were dealt. 

That's not my own position, but it's a morally and intellectually defensible position. So that's the best of the Trump apologists. It goes downhill from there.

ii) There are Trump apologists who combine principle with credulity. Take Wayne Grudem. 

Although Grudem's endorsement was ill-conceived, he has many compensatory virtues. By contrast, many Trump apologists have no compensatory virtues. 

iii) You have Trump apologists who measure conservatism by Trump rather than measuring Trump by conservatism. Trump's barfly effusions become the new definition of conservatism. That's a marriage between a candidate with no core values and a subset of voters with no core values. 

iv) You have Trump apologists who act as character witnesses for the Donald. That includes some prominent evangelical "leaders". They assure us that he's a changed man. Critics have exaggerated how decadent he is. 

That's what happens when credulity meets wishful thinking. 

I wouldn't necessarily say evangelical "leaders" who endorse Trump discredit themselves. That's because some of them were flakes to begin with. They had no line of credit to lose. 

v) Even worse are Trump apologists who measure Christianity by Trump rather than measuring Trump by Christianity. We even have people comparing Trump to "flawed" Bible heroes like King David. Problem is, Trump was never a man of faith. And he's never been contrite. 

vi) There are Trump apologists who lie about his stated positions and his shifting positions. They pretend he takes positions he doesn't. They pretend that he's consistent. 

vii) There are empty-suited apparatchiks like Reince Priebus.

viii)  There are Trump apologists who want a piece of the action. 

ix) Conversely, the fact that someone like Russell Moore happens to be right about Trump is hardly a ratification of his judgment in general–which is highly erratic. 

6. Many public Trump apologists will be disgraced when the dust settles. Their reputations permanently tarnished. 

It's been striking to see the stampede for the exit by people who formerly endorsed Trump. He's exactly the same man he was a week ago. But now they're panicking. It feeds on itself, like a stock selloff. 

A Syntax Guide

http://exegeticaltools.com/2016/10/06/interview-charles-lee-irons-syntax-exegesis-forthcoming/

It's up to us!

It is up to us to decide how we wish to live our lives to make life worth living to us. It is this self-directedness that makes life meaningful. Russell Blackford and Udo Schüklenk, 50 Great Myths About Atheism (Wiley Blackwell, 2013), 34.

There are many things wrong with that claim. To begin with, it simply begs the question. Whether that's sufficient to make life meaningful is the very issue in dispute.

But here's another problem. The claim is so elitist. It presumes that people have freedom of opportunity. But what about a slave-state like North Korea? Apart from the ruling class, do individual North Koreans get to decide how they wish to live their lives to make life worth living to them? We could easily multiple analogous examples. 

And even apart from totalitarian regimes, many humans just don't have a great menu of options to choose from. Their circumstances force them to eke out a grinding subsistence existence. 

Yet atheists typically deny the afterlife. So this is your one and only shot at life. If we grant how the authors frame the necessary conditions of a meaningful life, hundreds of millions of humans, maybe billions, never get to enjoy a meaningful life. And there won't be any compensations for anyone in the world to come, since there is no world to come. Therefore, the "myth" that "Atheism Robs Life of Meaning and Purpose" is often true even by their own lights.  

50 "myths" about atheism

Recently I was thumbing through 50 Great Myths About Atheism (Wiley Blackwell, 2013), by Russell Blackford and Udo Schüklenk.

As you can tell from the title alone, it's a PR exercise designed to dispel allegedly harmful stereotypes and prejudices about atheists. However, the book suffers from a central dilemma. On the one hand, there's the vexed question of how to define atheism in the first place. On p3 they say:

George H. Smith adopted a very broad view of atheism as simply "the absence of religious belief." According to this approach, any person who does not believe in the existence of any god or gods is literally an atheist. For the purpose of this book we take a similar approach. 

Let's be clear on what this implies. According to their preferred definition, their operating definition, an atheist or atheism is consistent with any belief or practice apart from the singular exception of belief in the existence of a god or gods. Now, let's compare that to some of their "myths" about atheism:

Myth 7 Atheists See No Good in Religion 

Myth 11 Atheism Robs Life of Meaning and Purpose 

Myth 12 Atheism is Depressing 

Myth 20 Without God There is No Morality 

Myth 21 Atheists are Moral Relativists 

Myth 23 Atheists Deny the Sanctity of Human Life 

Myth 24 If There is No God We are Soulless Creatures 

Myth 26 Atheists Can’t be Trusted 

Myth 27 Many Atrocities Have Been Committed in the Name of Atheism 

Myth 31 Atheists are Intolerant 

Myth 32 Atheists Want to Ban Teaching Religion to Children 

Myth 33 Atheists Want to Strip People of their Beliefs

Myth 34 Atheists Want to Ban Religion from the Public Square 

Myth 43 Atheism Implies Scientism 

Notice that atheism is consistent with every one of these "myths" about atheism. Each one of these can be true of atheists. Indeed, an atheist could subscribe to every one of these "myths" about atheism. 

Since nothing in their definition of atheism rules them out, in what sense are these "myths" about atheists or atheism? 

Perhaps the authors would say atheism doesn't entail any of these beliefs or practices. But even if we grant that contention for the sake of argument, atheism does not entail the denial of any of these beliefs or practices. These are all compatible with atheism or atheists. 

Moreover, that's not just a logical possibility. There are actual atheists in each category. There are atheists for whom the "myth" is an accurate description. And not just riffraff, but important representatives.

So the "myth" boils down to the banal qualification that these descriptions aren't universally true for every self-identified atheist. At best, they think popular stereotypes overgeneralize about atheists. But that's not a very catchy title or selling point. 

In addition, a book like this is intended to promote a favorable image of atheism and atheists. To that end, it will lowball atheists who take their position in a more intolerant or nihilistic direction–whether moral nihilism, existential nihilism, or both. But what if that's just taking atheism to a logical conclusion? Even if many or most atheists did not espouse nihilism, atheism can still imply nihilism. They stop short of going all the way because the consequences are far too bleak. Likewise, intolerant atheists are bona fide atheists. 

Trump tar-baby

Before the first presidential debate, Trump was doing better than expected in the polls. But he was unprepared, and that hurt him. Now we have a new Trump scandal. Before I get to that I'd like to comment on the faux indignation from the Left. Just as Hillary's badness doesn't make Trump any better, Trump's badness doesn't make Hillary any better. 

1. There's the glowing double standard when it comes to Bill Clinton. He's an infamous skirt-chaser. This includes credible allegations of sexual assault, according to legal analyst Stuart Taylor. 

Hillary defended him because he's an escalator to advance her own insatiable political ambitions. 

2. In addition, Hillary impugned the credibility of a rape victim, even though she knew the allegations were true:

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/380880/hillarys-child-rapist-defense-matthew-continetti

3. Then there's the general tolerance for sexual misconduct in the Democrat establishment. We could give many examples. The womanizing of JFK and Teddy Kennedy. Barney Frank's then-boyfriend and callboy running a male brothel out of the Congressman's home. 

Nancy Pelosi initially defended Anthony Weiner's sexting scandal. Even after he resigned, he was leading in the NYC mayoral poll before another sexting scandal sunk his bid. 

3. Or take the college hookup culture. That isn't just spontaneous. Rather, college administrators instigate a hookup culture. Take the biennial Yale Sex Week. Or the Vagina Monologues. Or coed dorms and locker rooms. 

4. In addition, the sexual mores of women in the pop culture are frequently deranged. To take a few examples, consider all the buzz about 50 Shades of Grey a while back. Isn't that very popular with women? Yet it's said to glorify licentiousness. 

I've also read about women whose idea of women's night out is to visit a night club with male strippers. They go with other female friends. 

Or take the Facebook group called "Mommy wars". That comprises about 23,000 military wives. They were caught giving each other tips on how to commit adultery while their husbands stationed overseas.

Or consider this sample of pop cultural morality:

http://www.dailywire.com/news/9639/sluts-takeover-la-amanda-prestigiacomo

Point is: both sexes can be equally depraved. 

5. Then there's the Trump groupies. Men like Trump are magnets for a certain kind of woman. There are ambitious women who intentionally seek out men like Trump. They sleep their way to the top. 

In addition, some women who are genuinely attracted to men like Trump. They like the swagger. 

There are women who knowingly marry skirt-chasers. They are under no illusions. I read that about Sinatra's last wife. There are women who prefer a rich man or celebrity, even though he's faithless–to a faithful working class or middle class husband. 

Take his current wife. She's a classic trophy wife. She posed nude, in chains, on his private jet. 

Yes, his comments reveal his character, but his character reveals the character of women who hang out with him. Women who voluntarily enter his gravity well. Consider the female contestants on The Apprentice. 

His reputation precedes him. They know what they are getting into. They do it for what they can get out of it. Mutual exploitation. 

6. As for Trump's comments, the problem isn't confined to the obscene descriptions of women, but to what he said he did. Now, there's a degree of posturing. The sexual braggadocio. 

But it's very plausible that he did what he said he did. It's not uncommon for powerful men like him to take advantage of their position. Indeed, that's why they seek out certain positions, like presiding at beauty pageants. Surely he does that to hit on voluptuous, nubile young women. 

7. That's the problem with being a spokesman for Trump. It's morally compromising to keep defending and excusing his comments. You become a tar-baby for Trump. When you constantly excuse what he says and does, that rubs off on you. 

A Response To Annette Merz On The Infancy Narratives (Part 7)

(Previous parts in the series: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4, part 5, part 6.)

Though Merz doubts that Jesus was born in Bethlehem, she writes:

All of the canonical and extracanonical reports on Jesus' birth transmit Bethlehem as his place of nativity. (476)

She thinks some sources in the New Testament imply that Jesus was born somewhere other than Bethlehem. But she doesn't cite any extrabiblical sources in support of a non-Bethlehem birthplace. Eusebius, who had access to many sources no longer extant, wrote, "all agree that Jesus Christ was born in Bethlehem" (Demonstration Of The Gospel, 3:2). Jesus' birthplace isn't an issue of dispute in the earliest extrabiblical exchanges between Christians and their Jewish and pagan opponents, and the Bethlehem birthplace seems to have been widely accepted among the earliest opponents of Christianity. That support for a Bethlehem birthplace in the extrabiblical sources is highly significant.

Merz writes:

Celibacy and abortion

Here's an issue I've never seen discussed (which doesn't mean it hasn't been discussed). As is well-known, bishops have no compunction about engaging in elaborate schemes to conceal the sexual activity of priests. And the news coverage is focussed on homosexual priests.

However, you also have straight priests. I don't know if they're in the majority or minority. Of the total number of straight priests, a percentage have affairs with women. Or trysts with prostitutes. 

The question this raises is what bishops do when a priest impregnates a woman? A parallel question invokes a pregnant nun. How do you keep that a secret?

In the case of a nun, her superiors might instruct her to give the child up for adoption. 

In the case of a woman whom a priest impregnated, hush money is a possibility. Say a one-time lump sum payment to make her go away.

However, the safest and most cost-effective way to conceal an unwanted pregnancy would be an abortion referral. Does the policy of mandatory celibacy facilitate abortion? Do bishops avoid the scandal of pregnant nuns or women impregnated by priests by discreet abortion referrals?

I've never seen this discussed, but since there are undoubtedly children conceived in this situation, the question of what happens to them is inevitable. Clearly something happens to them. It's not that we don't hear about it because no such children are conceived. Rather, we don't hear about it because measures are taken to keep that under wraps. Do such measures include abortion?