Despicable Calvinists

Arminianism is becoming more polarized and radicalized in relation to Calvinism. Calvinism itself hasn't changed that much. It's undergone some refinements. But because Arminianism was always a reactionary movement, it's not surprising that it's become more self-aware of its core values and consistent with those values. Hence, developments like Purgatory, postmortem salvation, and open theism, as well as the amissibility of salvation. 

Proponents like Jerry Walls and Roger Olson have become so antagonistic towards Calvinism that they are often incapable of representing the most sophisticated version of Calvinism or considering counterexamples to their own position. 

Roger Olson
I wouldn't go quite that far. But I think some Calvinists' views of God are similar to some Muslims' views of God. The common element is nominalism/voluntarism--the belief that God has no eternal, unchanging moral character that governs his actions but that God is absolutely free to do whatever he decides to do unfettered by any moral character. The result of that, of course, is the possibility (!) that God could change his mind and decide NOT to keep his promises. Such a God is, IMHO, cannot be trusted but only feared. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-2-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1476302276

i) One of Olson's tactics is his frequent allusion to nameless Calvinists who supposedly espouse what he alleges. No names or quotes. 

ii) Olson leaves it unclear whether he's evaluating Calvinism on external or internal grounds. When he says "God has no eternal, unchanging moral character that governs his actions but that God is absolutely free to do whatever he decides to do unfettered by any moral character," is that based on Arminian standards or Reformed standards?

iii) He doesn't quote any Reformed creeds or major Reformed theologians who say that "God has no eternal, unchanging moral character that governs his actions but that God is absolutely free to do whatever he decides to do unfettered by any moral character." And he doesn't attempt to demonstrate how that's an implication of Calvinism. So this is just a tendentious, defamatory accusation with nothing to back it up. 

iv) The claim that Reformed theism is voluntaristic is part of his routine. 

Roger Olson
Yes, most Calvinists deny, when pushed, that their view of God is voluntarist (i.e., that God has no eternal, unchanging moral character that governs his will). However, whenever I ask how God is loving and just in foreordaining some portion of human beings created in his own image and likeness and allegedly loved (in some sense) by him to eternal hell and consigns them there when he could save them (because salvation is unconditional except for the conditions God himself provides) they always fall back on "God is God and can do with creatures whatever pleases him." That removes God's character from anything knowable as moral and implies nominalism/voluntarism. I don't think most Calvinists understand this, but they have to do it when pressed to explain God's character. They won't say "He doesn't have one," but what they do say amounts to that. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-2-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1478690246

i) Once again, his conveniently anonymous reference to Calvinists who supposedly say this. HIs self-serving summary of what they allegedly say. What Calvinists is he asking? Is he asking Greg Welty? James Anderson? Jeremy Pierce? Paul Helm? Bill Davis? John Frame? Or is it like those "man-on-the-street" interviews?

ii) Notice the question-begging way he frames the issue. It's a loaded question: "how God is loving and just in foreordaining some portion of human beings created in his own image and likeness and allegedly loved (in some sense) by him to eternal hell and consigns them there when he could save them?"

Notice how his question implicitly takes for granted the very issue in dispute: that it's unjust. The question places the onus on the Calvinist to explain how that's just and loving, as if it's obviously unjust or unloving, and it's up to the Calvinist to overcome that crushing presumption. 

Olson is shirking his own intellectual duties. He shoulders the burden of proof in showing why he thinks that is unloving or unjust. He's not entitled to posit the prima facie injustice of Calvinism, then demand that a Calvinist disprove his stipulation. 

iii) Notice how he bundles two questions in one: Is it loving? Is it unjust? These are distinct questions. How is it indicative of the fact that "God has no eternal, unchanging moral character that governs his actions but that God is absolutely free to do whatever he decides to do unfettered by any moral character" if God redeems some evildoers but punishes others? How is that unjust? And even if it's unloving, so what? 

iv) Notice how he conflates unconditional salvation with damnation. Yet damnation is not unconditional. Only the wicked are damned. 

Roger Olson
That God does this for some and not for others when he could do it for all (because it is not based on anything he sees in anyone) is a mystery with which I cannot live. It makes God monstrous. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-1-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1480376975

What Olson presumes to call "monstrous" is precisely how the NT describes the saving grace of God. According to the NT, God doesn't save individuals based on anything he sees in them. 

Roger Olson
Of course they wouldn't say that, but what's the alternative to it? Election is unconditional. How can God or anyone select individuals out of a group "unconditionally" but not arbitrarily? No Calvinist has ever explained that to me. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-1-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1484199693

i) So for Olson, "arbitrary" is a synonym for "unconditional." Election is "arbitrary" unless it's based on something he sees in the elect. 

Yet humans are wicked. What God sees in us is evil. 

ii) And, once again, we're treated to his stock allusion to unnamed Calvinists. 

Roger Olson
Ah, but for Calvinists to become like the God their theory projects, they would be despicable people, moral monsters--going around rescuing some people and leaving others whom they could rescue in their horrible situations--arbitrarily. Thank God few Calvinists are like the God they claim to believe in.  

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-1-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1469354817

Notice how Olson acts as though it's self-evidently true that Calvinists would be "despicable people, moral monsters--going around rescuing some people and leaving others whom they could rescue in their horrible situations--arbitrarily."

But doesn't that depend on the kind of people in need of rescuing? Is there a standing obligation to rescue someone no matter how evil he is? There's a fundamental difference between rescuing someone in spite of his evil and acting as if there's a moral obligation to rescue him if you can. 

Olson bandies the phrase "moral monsters." Does he think we are duty-bound to rescue moral monsters? What's wrong with letting a moral monster die? If a moral monster finds himself in a "horrible situation," isn't that poetic justice? How does Olson become so morally twisted that he lacks that elementary moral discrimination? 

Roger Olson
No, it is not an explanation. It is simply an appeal to "God's will." It doesn't say anything about HOW God selects individuals for election to salvation. Strangely, Calvinists think this answer answers the question; it doesn't even begin to. As for God being just in condemning some to hell while arbitrarily selecting others for salvation--that's a very strange kind of justice that makes God monstrous. In fact, it isn't justice at all. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-1-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1486069637

Once more, Olson contents himself with these dictatorial assertions, as if that's indisputable. How is it "unjust" or "monstrous" to condemn some evildoers to hell? How is it unjust to redeem other evildoers through the atonement of Christ? Where is his argument? 

i) Let's consider the charge of "arbitrariness" from another angle. Unconditional election isn't "arbitrary" in the sense of God flipping a coin. Olson seems to operate with a mental picture of election and reprobation where you have a line of captives in single file. There's a guard who directs some people to the right and others to the left. Some people go free while others go to the firing squad. The choice is random. 

But in Calvinism, both elect and reprobate are sinners. If election were conditional (based on what God sees in us), no one would be saved, for we are evil absent God's justification and sanctification.

ii) To say election is unconditional doesn't mean God has no reason for whom he elects or reprobates. If God reprobated Abraham, that would change world history. If God elected Pilate, that would change world history. If God reprobated Paul, that would change world history.

One reason God elects some people and reprobates others is because God has a particular plan for the world. It's like a novel with a plot and characters. The characters drive the plot. If you had different characters, that would change the plot. If the novelist wants the story to go one way, he creates characters who move events in that direction.

Abraham has a role to play in God's story: a role that requires Abraham to be saved. Paul has a role to play: a role that requires Paul to be saved. 

Pilate has a role to play: a role that requires Pilate to be unsaved. If Pilate had been a God-fearer, he would have acquitted Jesus. But then, the plan of salvation would come to a screeching halt. The crucifixion had to be authorized by a Roman official. So Pilate's reprobation serves a purpose. 

God doesn't reprobate Pilate because of something he sees in Pilate. Rather, Pilate is a reprobate character. God created a villain to play the part of a villain. Reprobation is a character trait, just as saving Paul or saving Abraham is part of the package. They have a mission in God's plan which requires them to be saved. 

It's analogous to the organic theory of inspiration, where God providentially creates individuals with just the right personality, aptitude, education, and experience to become apostles, prophets, and/or Bible writers. God isn't picking some people for salvation and others for damnation at random. 

Moreover, it's not as if humans preexist in a neutral state (like Schrödinger's cat) before God either elects or reprobates them. Rather, God conceives of them with a particular destiny in mind. 

God is not a casting director, talent scout, or army recruiter who's on the lookout for what's needed. Rather, God creates the means as well as the ends. 

Roger Olson
This is a debate even among Calvinists--whether sanctification includes an element of synergism. Some Calvinists who are adamant about monergism in justification-regeneration allow an element of cooperation between the human will and God's grace in sanctification. Other Calvinists see that as a betrayal of the sovereignty of grace. As an Arminian I don't have that problem because, for me, it's synergism from beginning of salvation to its end. God provides all the ability (Philippians 2:13) but we decide to use it (2:12). 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-2-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1476297087

That's confused. "Cooperation" doesn't mean the same thing in Calvinism and freewill theism. In freewill theism, cooperation introduces an element of contingency or uncertainty into the outcome. It's a free variable that's not under God's control.

In Calvinism, by contrast, how much we cooperate with God is up to God. He controls the degree of cooperation. Sanctification can be deterministic without being monergistic. 

The Bible is the obstacle

What you win them with is what you win them to

Andy Stanley recently gave an interview that's getting some buzz:

http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/july-august/should-pastors-stop-saying-bible-says.html

In your book Deep & Wide, you suggest preachers should use more specific citations like "Jesus says" or "Paul says" rather than "The Bible says." What's at stake in using the phrase "the Bible says"?

In using phrases like "the Bible says," we assume a person is a Christian, because only a Christian takes the Old Testament and the New Testament as authoritative. So if I'm going to preach to people who aren't Christians, I have to leverage a different point of authority if I'm going to expect them to track along with me.

i) I'm unclear on the setting. Is he talking about a church setting or a gathering outside church? Normally, you're not going to find a group of unbelievers who are prepared to sit there and quietly listen to a Christian preacher. 

ii) Given the extent of biblical illiteracy in the general culture, many people don't know what the Bible says. It's useful to educate them on what the Bible says. For many of them, their knowledge of Scripture is based on hostile, thirdhand caricatures. Verses ripped out of context. Village atheist websites. So teaching them what "the Bible says" is a salutary corrective. 

iii) I agree with him that when dialoguing with an unbeliever, you can't simply quote Scripture, for the authority of Scripture is not a given (for the unbeliever). But that doesn't mean you can't quote Scripture. You can give him reasons for believing in Scripture. You can make a case for the authority of Scripture. 

iv) In addition, it's good for a pastor to include some apologetic content in his sermons. Or refer to apologetic resources on the church website. 

To get a person to the point where they believe the Bible is authoritative, they first have to believe that Jesus is the Son of God. The reason Christians take the Old Testament seriously is because Jesus did. We don't think of it that way, because [most of us] didn't become a Christian by becoming Jewish first and then a Christian. But any Gentile who takes the Old Testament seriously does so because Jesus did.

But that's absurdly shortsighted. Jesus didn't write anything. Quoting what "Jesus says" in contrast to what the "Bible says" is deceptive, for what "Jesus says" comes down to what Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John say Jesus said. So, if you're going to be logical, you can't avoid the appeal to Scripture. We don't have direct access to what Jesus said. That's mediated by the Gospels (as well as a few quotes from 1 Corinthians and Revelation).

In my book, I explain that I believe Adam and Eve are real people, not because the Bible says so, but because Jesus believed they were. 

They don't have to believe Noah built an ark and put animals on it to get there. In fact, the reason I believe the Noah story is historical is because Jesus did. 

I've already pointed out one fundamental problems with that shortcut (see above). In addition, that's a very defective religious epistemology. Andy acts as if the OT has no intrinsic credibility. But although the NT lends credibility to the OT, the OT lends credibility to the NT. The NT needs OT backing. 

So my point is this: Why create an unnecessary obstacle—it's all or nothing; it's the Bible—when the real issue is Jesus.

Believing the Bible is an unnecessary obstacle? Andy's approach is completely at odds with the evangelistic and apologetic methodology of the apostles, NT missionaries, and NT writers. 

I get pushback on this approach. But the truth is no one had copies of the New Testament until the printing press. If you did, you were wealthy. We forget that for 1,500 years, people had only bits and pieces. They saw only a copy or heard portions of Scripture read. Nobody in A.D. 150 got up in church and said, "The Bible says." They leveraged the Old Testament and then talked about Jesus or read a copy of something Paul said. Using phrases like "The Bible says" is a modern phenomenon.

"Scripture says" is a stock NT quotation formula. 

A lady I know wrote an article about how she lost her faith because she found contradictions in Scripture. She somehow believed that the foundation of her Christian faith was a contradictory-less Scripture. So when she found contradictions in Scripture, her faith crumbled. That's so unfortunate because the foundation of the Christian faith is not a Scripture without contradictions. I think my approach actually runs around all of that.

Biblical revelation is a foundational element of the Christian faith. That's not something we can or should run around. We shouldn't pander to people's unbelief. The Christian faith isn't a stack of bargaining chips. An evangelist doesn't negotiate terms with the unbeliever. The unbeliever isn't doing God a favor. 

Andy means well, but I think he's in over his head. Being the scion of a famous SBC pastor gave him a launchpad. I doubt he would have risen that far on the merits, with an entry-level position. 

The bitter fruits of feminism

A few weeks ago I was strolling through the parking lot to check on something at the drugstore. I saw an older woman in the parking lot, holding her keys, just standing there, at a loss. It seems obvious that she had forgotten where she parked her car.

Of course, that can happen to the best of us. However, this isn't some huge, sprawling parking lot at a shopping mall, or multistory parking tower at the airport. It's a fairly compact parking lot. Not that many places to look. 

It's possible that her eyesight is bad. Maybe she has macular degeneration. But I'm guessing she was having a senior moment.

Anyway, I was going to be in and out of the drugstore in a jiffy, so I figured that would give her an extra couple of minutes to find her car on her own, if she could. If she was still there when I emerged, I'd offer assistance.

Nowadays people are so suspicious that you're sometimes hesitant to volunteer help. 

Anyway, she was gone when I came back about 2 minutes later, so I assume she found her car. 

I say all that to say this: we have a generation of younger women who don't believe in motherhood. Dogs have taken the place of kids. Likewise, live-in boyfriends have taken the place of husbands.

A lot of these independent women are going to find themselves in the situation of this woman. They will become increasingly forgetful. Lose control. And they won't have any grown children to take up the slack. Cute pet dogs won't help them in that situation. Moreover, by that time, society will be increasingly intolerant of the elderly. 

It will be too late for them to make up for lost time. They imbibed feminism. Their biological clock struck midnight. That's a lost opportunity.   

I sometimes see the elderly in motorized wheelchairs go shopping on their own. Crossing busy intersections. They are so vulnerable. Easy pickings for a mugger. They are old enough to have grown children. Where are their kids? Are they childless? Are their kids estranged? The product of broken homes?

Monstrous grace

Roger Olson
That God does this for some and not for others when he could do it for all (because it is not based on anything he sees in anyone) is a mystery with which I cannot live. It makes God monstrous. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-1-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1480376975

Olson has gotten to the point where he calls good evil. He looks grace square in the face and calls it morally monstrous. Frankly, Olson's theology is diabolical. 

Then what becomes of our boasting? It is excluded (Rom 3:37)

For if Abraham was justified by works, he has something to boast about, but not before God (Rom 4:2)

28 God chose what is low and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to nothing things that are, 29 so that no human being[a] might boast in the presence of God. 30 And because of him[b] you are in Christ Jesus (1 Cor 1:28-30).

7 For who sees anything different in you? What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if you did not receive it? (1 Cor 4:7).

If I must boast, I will boast of the things that show my weakness (2 Cor 11:30).

8 For by grace you have been saved through faith. And this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God, 9 not a result of works, so that no one may boast (Eph 2:8-9).

11 though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad—in order that God's purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of him who calls— 12 she was told, “The older will serve the younger.” 13 As it is written, “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.”

14 What shall we say then? Is there injustice on God's part? By no means! 15 For he says to Moses, “I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.” 16 So then it depends not on human will or exertion,[b] but on God, who has mercy. 17 For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, “For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power in you, and that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth.” 18 So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills.

19 You will say to me then, “Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?” 20 But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, “Why have you made me like this?” 21 Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use? 22 What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction (Rom 9:11-22).

God “in” time? A Historical Note

https://philosophyandtheism.wordpress.com/2014/07/12/god-in-time-a-historical-note/

Who dwells in inapproachable light

I'm going to make some addition comments on this post:

https://philosophyandtheism.wordpress.com/2014/07/08/god-in-time-yes-temporal-god-no/

I'll be quoting Nate Shannon, then responding:

I think you’re leaning toward something Helm seems to say, which is that history is merely this: pulling back the curtain to reveal the decree. That’s hyper-Calvinism. I fear you’ll lose the free offer, and history itself (if consistency is the order of the day). 

From a predestinarian standpoint, what's wrong with understanding history as pulling back the curtain to reveal the decree? History is the eventuation of the decree. A spatiotemporal transcription (as it were) of the timeless decree. The decree is in advance of the fact, but we discover the contents of the decree after the fact by observing what actually happens.  

Shannon falls into the familiar trap of acting as if predestination is synonymous with fatalism. But predestination doesn't make us passive spectators. The decree includes our actions and reactions. Our predestined participation contributes to the appointed outcome. 

If we say God is God (a se), and we can agree on that I’m sure, then what does Ex 19 say? Nothing of significance? Epistemological apparitions only? Phenomena ‘improperly’ called ‘God’ (I won’t give this ground to Kant)?

Who is claiming that a symbolic presence is "improperly" called "God"?

The distinction between appearance and reality hardly began with Kant. That's not a uniquely Kantian distinction. When I see a mountain at a distance, I perceive the mountain at eye-level. I seem to be as tall as the mountain. Does that commit me to Kantian epistemology? Does Shannon believe I really am as tall as the mountain?

Or perhaps that God condescended by way of covenant? The question is, at the end of the day: does God do what Ex 19:20 says he does? My concern is that some philosophico-theological commitments impose upon such passages a hermeneutic such that Ex 19:20 cannot say what it in fact says.

i) Shannon acts as if his interpretation is metaphysically neutral. As if he brings no presuppositions to the text. He just takes it as is. But that just means he's oblivious to his own unexamined filter. 

ii) There's a rudimentary distinction between what a text says and what it means. Take sarcasm, where what the speaker means is the opposite of what he says.  

I don’t disagree with this excerpt from Turretin, except for this description: “. . . a symbolical presence, when under some visible symbol he manifests himself to believers . . .” I don’t think Scripture will allow us to say that the pillar or the fire or the burning bush were symbols but NOT the presence of the Lord. Put it this way: I disagree that we must, a priori, disallow the ‘spatio-temporal’ presence of God such as that described in Ex 19:20. I am not saying that God cannot be present only symbolically or metaphorically or anthropomorphically (though I do think this language is often just window dressing for ‘not actually there’ – denial of what Scripture plainly teaches); but the hermeneutic I’m uncomfortable with does indeed proscribe a priori the sort of divine presence described in Ex 19:20. It won’t allow God to be present non-symbolically. So if anyone is in the position to launch a Job 38:2 response, it’s me, on behalf of Scripture.

The incursion of natural theology into our theology proper precludes, that is, a priori disallows, a faithful reading of Scripture where it clearly teaches that the LORD was present on the top of Mt. Sinai. 

i) Shannon operates with a face-value hermeneutic. One problem with his approach is that we've been down this road before, with Clark Pinnock, Gregory Boyd, et al. How would he ever win an argument with an open theist, or even a Mormon? They make the same hermeneutical claims. 

ii) His hermeneutic is jejune by the standards of narrative theology ("the poetics of narrativity"). For instance, our first impression in reading Genesis might be that God is a bungler. Yet the reader is expected to interpret the historical action with the benefit of hindsight. There's a distinction between the hidden plot and the apparent plot. As we look back on the sequence of events, God's providential guidance emerges from a retrospective reading. 

iii) It doesn't occur to Shannon that he himself is making a priori demands on the text. He has a preconception of what God's "presence" must entail. Take a comparison: Suppose a wife tells her husband, "I spoke to Ken [their son] this morning."

That could mean she spoke to Ken face-to-face. Or it could mean they spoke over the phone. Did she really not speak to Ken if she only heard his voice in the receiver? If you wish to be pedantic, you could insist that that wasn't really his voice, but an electronic simulation of his voice. Does that mean it's false to say she spoke to her son? 

When Ken speaks to his mother by phone, is he "present"? Well, he's not present in person. He's not in the same room with her. Yet he has a projected presence. He's present to her in a way he wouldn't be if he didn't speak to her at all, whether in person or over the phone. Because they stay in contact, they aren't cut off from each other. It's a matter of degree. 

Now perhaps Shannon considers that an inadequate model of presence. If so, that's a reflection of his preconceived notion. 

iv) Ezekiel's prophecy opens with a classic, extended theophany. But consider how Ezekiel's qualifies the event:

"Such was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord" (Ezk 1:28). 

Does Shannon think the Lord was present with Ezekiel at that particular time and place? "Present" in what sense?  Notice the buffers. There's the "Lord," then there's the "glory of the Lord," then there's the "likeness of the glory of the Lord," then there's the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord. 

In Ezekiel's interpretation, the Lord is several steps removed from Ezekiel's experience. Ezekiel didn't experience the Lord directly. He didn't observe the Lord in himself. Rather, what he saw was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord. 

Ezekiel goes out of his way to introduce these distancing formulas to distinguish the theophany from the Lord. Yet Shannon's hermeneutic collapses that transcendent inaccessibility. 

Or take Paul's classic doxology:

"who alone has immortality, who dwells in unapproachable light, whom no one has ever seen or can see. To him be honor and eternal dominion. Amen" (1 Tim 6:16).

In Scripture, there is no unmediated divine presence. Rather, when God makes himself "present" to his creatures, that's refracted through natural media. 

But the point is that a priori, a Chalcedonian proper says that the LORD can be present ‘in the flesh’, or spatio-temporally; and a posteriori, if you like, we may find in Scripture that in fact he is (on the top of Mt. Sinai, for example).

That's confused on several grounds:

i) It confuses the order of being with the order of knowing. Even if in light of the subsequent revelation of the Incarnation, we identify the Sinai theophany as a Christophany, God wasn't present "in the flesh" at Sinai.  

ii) If, moreover, Shannon thinks God can be present in that anachronistic sense, then the Incarnation is superfluous. 

iii) Furthermore, the Incarnation doesn't mean God qua God "enters" space and time. Ironically, it's not classical theists who resort to metaphors at this point. Rather, it's folks like Shannon whose conceptual scheme is unconsciously metaphorical, but they lack the critical detachment to appreciate the picturesque metaphor they are using to conceptualize the event. 

Everything you always wanted to know about Arminianism

FAQ: Doesn’t classical Arminianism really say the same thing as Calvinism when it comes to the sovereignty of God?After all, if God foreknew everything that would happen and created this world anyway, wasn’t he foreordaining everything simply by virtue of creating? A: This is a very good question but one based on a misunderstanding of divine foreknowledge. Classical Arminianism does not imagine that God “previewed” all possible worlds and then chose to create this one. God chose to create a world and include in it creatures created in his own image and likeness with free will to either love and obey him or not. God’s knowledge of what happens in this world “corresponds” (is the best word) to what happens; it does not cause it or even render it certain. Admittedly we cannot fully explain God’s foreknowledge without slipping into determinism. But the mysteries of free will (power of contrary choice) and divine non-determining foreknowledge are mysteries much more easily accepted than any form of divine determinism which, given the shape of this world, would inevitably cast shadows on God’s character. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-5-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/

i) Olson fails to distinguish between foreknowledge and counterfactual knowledge. Is he denying that God has counterfactual knowledge?

Perhaps he associates "God previewing all possible worlds and choosing to create this one" with Molinism, and since he rejects Molinism, he rejects that picture. However, the picture of "God previewing all possible worlds and choosing to create this one" doesn't seem to be unique to Molinism. Rather, possible worlds are the standard way of cashing out the freedom to do otherwise, viz. accessing alternate possibilities. In that respect, Molinism would be a special case of freewill theism in general, and not a Molinist distinctive. 

(I'd add that Calvinism doesn't deny alternate possibilities. Rather, the question at issue is which agent–God or man–has that freedom.)

On the face of it, there's no reason why classical Arminianism would be at odds with "God previewing all possible worlds and choosing to create this one."

ii) By creating the world, doesn't God cause the world? Doesn't God thereby cause, albeit indirectly, the foreseen consequences? Doesn't God effectively foreordain that chain reaction by his initial creative fiat? 

iii) How does God's foreknowledge not render the outcome certain? Unless God's belief in the future can be falsified (in which case it wouldn't be knowledge of the future), foreknowledge ensures the outcome.

In fact, Olson goes on to concede this when he says "Admittedly we cannot fully explain God’s foreknowledge without slipping into determinism."

iv) It's fine to appeal to mystery if, in fact, freewill (power of contrary choice) and divine non-determining foreknowledge are a given. But whether those claims are warranted is the very point in dispute. If, "Admittedly we cannot fully explain God’s foreknowledge without slipping into determinism," then that counts against the claim. That's evidence to the contrary. 

Roger OlsonI did address that question. Did you read the whole series? The "determinitive factor" is not in human beings. Faith is the instrumental cause of salvation while grace is its efficient cause. Receiving a gift is not in any way "determinitive" of the gift. It's still as much a gift when freely received as when not. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-1-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1486090790

Seems to me that's a deeply confused explanation, even on Arminian grounds. 

i) How can saving grace be resistible if it's the "efficient cause" of salvation?

ii) The question at issue is not whether faith is the decisive factor in determining whether grace is a gift, but whether faith (in the sense of a libertarian exercise of the will) is the decisive factor in accepting or rejecting the gift (i.e. saving grace). 

Escape route

13 No temptation has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it (1 Cor 10:13).

Some freewill theists cite this as a prooftext for libertarian freedom. On their inference, Paul is saying God has given humans in general (not just Christians) the freedom to either resist temptation (to sin) or succumb to temptation (to sin). But there are some problems with that inference:

i) Paul doesn't say they have the freedom to either resist or succumb to temptation. Even if his wording allowed for that (either/or) inference, it doesn't entail that inference.

ii) It would be odd to say they have the freedom to succumb to temptation. That's not a beneficial freedom. That's puts them in jeopardy. Leaves them in jeopardy. That's not very encouraging. Yet Paul's statement is meant to be encouraging. 

iii) That cuts agains the grain of the text. Isn't Paul's point that God has given them an out, so that they don't find themselves without a sinful option? But that hardly requires them to have both a sinful option and a sinless option. 

iv) On the libertarian interpretation, God has handed them a double-edged sword. It can help them or harm them. 

Although having the freedom not to sin is preferable to not having the freedom not to sin, not having the freedom to sin is preferable to having the freedom to sin. 

Paul Himes claims that:

Therefore, “in situation (x), when confronted with temptation (y), it is possible that believer (w) will endure, but it is also possible that believer (w) will not endure (since Christians do, in fact, sin).”

Ironically, that's not a given in Arminian theology. In Wesleyan Arminianism, you have the Holiness tradition, with its doctrine of entire sanctification. 

Let's examine this Arminian prooftext from another angle:

During the Vietnam war, some G.I.'s fathered kids by Vietnamese prostitutes or girlfriends. By fathering a child, they acquired certain paternal duties to their Amerasian child. Indeed, two nested duties are in play:

i) They had a duty not to father a child out of wedlock when they were stationed overseas. And, according to freewill theism, they enjoyed the freedom to comply with that duty. For freedom and duty are correlative. 

ii) Having, however, exercised their libertarian freedom wrongly, they've acquired a second-order duty to the child they sired. After completing their tour of duty, they returned to the States, leaving their kid (or the pregnant mother) behind. 

On libertarian assumptions, they have the duty, and corresponding freedom, to discharge their paternal duties to their child. Yet in many cases, that's no longer feasible. At this juncture the father can't track the child down. He doesn't even have contact info for the mother. She was just some anonymous prostitute at a fly-by-night brothel. And even if he could find the child, lack of diplomatic relations with Vietnam precludes him from claiming their child and taking him back to the States to raise. His initial abuse of libertarian freedom creates an obligation which he cannot presently discharge.

Offhand, an Arminian (or freewill theist) might try to weasel out of this conundrum in one of the following ways:

i) He might bite the bullet and outright deny that the father still has any responsibility for the child he sired. In that case, we're not responsible for the consequences of our sinful actions if the consequences are out of our control. That, however, would be a morally breathtaking claim.

To take a comparison, if a scientist is unjustly fired, and seeks revenge by creating a doomsday machine, is he not responsible (or blameworthy) for the death toll because, by definition, the doomsday machine is unstoppable once the machine is activated? Likewise, if a business cuts corners by dumping toxic waste into the river, thereby contaminating the water supply downstream, is the business guiltless now that it's too late to undo the damage?

ii)  He might say the father is still responsible, even though he now lacks the ability to otherwise, because his current predicament is the result of a sinful choice he made in the past, at a time when he did have the ability to do otherwise. However, that move sacrifices the prooftext, for on that explanation the text is no longer a standing promise that we will always have an innocent option." That surrenders the original claim: 

Thus, if this paper’s interpretation of 1 Cor 10:13 is correct, one must assert that a believer, no matter what the situation, has the ability to choose not to sin…Since Christians sin, if they have the power/ ability not to sin at any given situation (regardless of their current value scale), then they must possess the power of contrary choice." (Himes). 

iii) He might go the Ockhamist route: if the truth of libertarian freewill requires the vet to be able to discharge his second-order duty, yet in point of fact he cannot now do so, then he must have the counterfactual freedom to alter the past action (i.e. what might have been) that generated this freedom-robbing consequence. 

However, even freewill theists admit that the Ockhamist solution is metaphysically dubious. And, of course, one can't exegete the Ockhamist solution from the prooftext. At best, that's extraneous to the prooftext. 

The Councils that Roman Catholics Prefer to Forget

More about the councils of Pisa, Constance, Basel, as ignored by Vatican 1, From Paul Bassett: “The Crisis of Authority in Catholic Modernity”

The post-Vatican II era has created a serious problem for Roman Catholics. And that problem is precisely how to reconcile the claims of the church with the facts of history – and sometimes with the facts of its own history! It is not that this is a new problem but rather that the world and how the church relates to the world has so changed as to now lay bear the glaring contradictions that previously had been covered over by structures of authority which Vatican II has made more transparent. Perhaps the most obvious examples are the claims made by Vatican I regarding the papacy and its foundation, continuity and extent. As it turns out none of those claims is supportable in history and modern Roman Catholic scholars are now free to plumb the depths of these errors however much they are enshrined as “de fide” pronouncements.

But what is new in all this is not the errors but the fact that they can be discussed openly. We know from history that John Calvin himself cajoled the Roman Church for its false claims and showed in his famous letter to King Francis I that all ordinations after the Council of Basel were fraudulent. Calvin showed how political machinations and not “apostolic succession” had made necessary the removal of some popes and the appointment of others with little regard for ecclesiastical involvement. And that those depositions and appointments had broken whatever alleged continuity Rome claimed theretofore from the Apostles.

Read more…

How Roman Catholicism Lacks Public Verifiability

From Stephen Wolfe: “Roman Catholicism on Trial: Evidence and Assumptions”

Protestants who engage Roman Catholics often end the discussion in frustration. It seems that Roman Catholic apologists have an answer for everything: nothing penetrates their system revealing inconsistency with the evidence. They are good at accounting for facts, even the facts that seem to contradict other claims. Though denied, Roman Catholicism at times appears to lack falsifiability. The idea of falsifiability will be in the background of this article, but my primary purpose will be to show that, given its theological system, Roman Catholicism lacks public verifiability. What I mean is that a Roman Catholic apologist, due to the parameters of his own theological system, cannot present sufficient reasons for a potential convert to believe the Roman Catholic Church’s claims for itself, namely that it is the one true visible church of Christ, such that one must, by good reason, assent to its authority. So, in other words, Roman Catholic apologists cannot publicly verify the authority-claims of the Roman Catholic Church.

Read more…

The sting of death

39 And he came out and went, as was his custom, to the Mount of Olives, and the disciples followed him. 40 And when he came to the place, he said to them, “Pray that you may not enter into temptation.” 41 And he withdrew from them about a stone's throw, and knelt down and prayed, 42 saying, “Father, if you are willing, remove this cup from me. Nevertheless, not my will, but yours, be done.” 43 And there appeared to him an angel from heaven, strengthening him. 44 And being in an agony he prayed more earnestly; and his sweat became like great drops of blood falling down to the ground. 45 And when he rose from prayer, he came to the disciples and found them sleeping for sorrow, 46 and he said to them, “Why are you sleeping? Rise and pray that you may not enter into temptation” (Lk 22:39-46).

This is a sequel to my earlier post:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2014/07/countdown-to-cross.html

 Theologians are often taken aback by the fact that in this passage, Christ balks at going through with his mission. As Robert Stein bluntly puts it, "If Jesus is quailing at the thought of physical death, he is a poor example for his followers of how they should face death." Stein and other like-minded commentators then appeal, not to the mere prospect of physical suffering and death, but to the prospect of Christ enduring the wrath of God. That, so goes the argument, is what he really dreads.

No doubt that points to an important theological truth. However, commentators are too quick to rush past the apprehension of death. They minimize the apprehension of death as if that's unworthy. But is it biblical to trivialize the fear of death?

i) In Scripture, human mortality is punitive. And it's not improper to dread divine punishment. 

ii) Christian martyrs aren't necessarily fearless. Courage is not the same as fearlessness. Indeed, someone who's fearless isn't really courageous. Courage is doing your duty in spite of the fearful risk or fearful consequences.

Moreover, Christian martyrdom doesn't necessarily require courage. What it does require is fidelity. To be faithful even–or especially–in the face of death.

iii) Furthermore, Stein has it backwards. Christians can face the prospect of death or martyrdom with greater equanimity precisely because, to a great extent, Jesus took the sting out of death through his own redemptive death in their stead. By absorbing the judgment of God, he makes death more bearable for his followers. 

iv) Some unbelievers draw invidious comparisons between the way in which Christ faced death and Hume or Socrates. They also draw attention to soldiers who steel themselves in the face of death. But what about that comparison?

a) Hume was simply a fool. He had every reason to fear death. He didn't believe in hell, but if, in fact hell exists, then he ought to fear death. 

b) Some people die peacefully simply because they are so worn out by the end that they lack the vital energy to resist it. That says less about their attitude towards death than the process of dying, which–itself–can be enervating. They don't put up a fight because they are too weak. In the words of Pete Seeger, "My get up and go got up and went." 

c)We don't really know how Socrates felt about his impending demise. All we have is Plato's eulogistic, hagiographic account. In addition, Socrates might have been terrified, but put on his best game face. In an honor/shame culture, you care about your reputation. How people remember you. How you go out. 

That dynamic is also a factor in battlefield valor. Likewise, in the heat of battle, soldiers may act instinctively. In addition, it's psychologically easier to die with your comrades than die alone. 

v) For most-all of us, death is inevitable. We can't avoid it even if we try. It's just a matter of when. We can sometimes postpone it, but in the long run, stalling tactics are futile.

But Jesus was in the unique position that no one could force him to die. He chose death in a way that no one else can. For he had the power to make himself immortal. Indestructible.

If we had that choice, then that would put death in a very different perspective. 

vi) Death exposes our impotence and creatureliness like nothing else. Dying in Christ is the ultimate act of faith, as we plunge into the darkness, hoping and praying that God will be there to catch us. That it's not a free fall. That he's waiting for us. But that's something we can only experience after we let go. After we put the securities of this life behind us. 

Countdown to the Cross

39 And he came out and went, as was his custom, to the Mount of Olives, and the disciples followed him. 40 And when he came to the place, he said to them, “Pray that you may not enter into temptation.” 41 And he withdrew from them about a stone's throw, and knelt down and prayed, 42 saying, “Father, if you are willing, remove this cup from me. Nevertheless, not my will, but yours, be done.” 43 And there appeared to him an angel from heaven, strengthening him. 44 And being in an agony he prayed more earnestly; and his sweat became like great drops of blood falling down to the ground. 45 And when he rose from prayer, he came to the disciples and found them sleeping for sorrow, 46 and he said to them, “Why are you sleeping? Rise and pray that you may not enter into temptation” (Lk 22:39-46).

i) Theologians find this disturbing. Jesus blinks. He hesitates in the face of his impending ordeal. Is seeking an out.  

The plan of salvation, devised in eternity, centuries in preparation, with every preceding event in the life of Christ bearing down on this outcome, yet at the last minute, a moment of weakness. 

Mind you, even in his extremity, he is explicitly and ultimately submitted to the Father's will. There's no possibility of his going rogue. 

Perhaps there are depths to this which we cannot probe, but it may be worth trying to understand as best we can. 

ii) At this juncture, Jesus is vulnerable. There's an obvious sense in which a vulnerability is a weakness, yet a vulnerability can be both a strength and a weakness. A vulnerability can be a virtue. A person might be a worse person without it.

Smiley's People is a Cold War thriller by John le Carré. The quarry is Karla. Karla is a shadowily figure high up in Soviet intelligence. He knows everything. He's dangerous to the free world, but he's dangerous to the Soviet Union. If he could be flipped, if he could be coaxed or forced to defect, the damage to the Soviet Union would be irreparable. He's the prize. 

So the challenge is to find a chink in his armor. Some point of leverage. That's quite a challenge, because Karla is a fanatic. Utterly devoted to the Revolution. At one point in his career he faced execution by his own side. But even though his side was disloyal to him, he remained steadfastly loyal. 

He's not the kind of man who will break under torture. He doesn't care about himself. He can only be reached, if at all, through another. 

Turns out, Karla had a daughter by a mistress. A daughter who's mentally unstable. Karla is prepared to sacrifice almost everything for the cause, but his daughter is the one thing, the only thing, who means more to him than the cause. He takes risks to protect her.

That's his fatal vulnerability, which Smiley exploits. Although it's his only weakness, it's his only strength. The Revolution is not quite enough to live for. And even though he's utterly ruthless, this is one remaining vestige of his humanity. A residual common grace virtue. He's better for it. If he was completely unreachable, he'd be completely evil. 

iii) To take another example, in "Who monitors the birds," an episode from Space: Above and Beyond, Hawkes volunteers for a very dangerous mission. If successful, he will receive an early honorable discharge. 

Hawkes is an In Vetro. Genetically engineered humans, specifically bred to be soldiers. They don't have parents or siblings. They don't grow up in families. They mature in artificial gestation chambers. They receive a subliminal education through a neural interface. They are awaked, full grown, at 18. 

Not surprisingly, they lack typical social skills when interacting with normal humans. For they are outsiders. Far more isolated than orphans.

Hawkes's comrade is killed during the mission. It's up to him to complete the mission.

He's all alone on a strange, hostile planet, risking his life for humans for whom he has no natural empathy or rapport. The closest thing he has to a family is his unit.  

It's situations like these that can drive home the realization of how alone we really are. Situations like these that prompt some soldiers to question there mission. "What the hell am I doing out here? Why am I risking my life for strangers who don't even care whether I live or die? If I die in the line of duty, I will be quickly forgotten. My life means nothing to my superiors."

iv) When you think about it, Jesus is uniquely socially isolated, because he's so unique. One of a kind. The Incarnation was an unprecedented and unrepeatable event. There was never anyone like him, before or since. Only one God-man in the history of the world.

As the Son of God Incarnate, we might think he's invulnerable. But perhaps that creates a different sort of vulnerability. 

He was always an outsider. Human, but more than human. He never quite fit in. Sinless. Impeccable. Divine. Both like us and unlike us. So there's a sense in which he's dying for strangers. They will never understand him. Related to him on his own level. 

v) Not only was he isolated, but he must have been alienated. A holy being immersed in the moral ugliness of human depravity. Frankly, we're not worth it. 

vi) Unlike you and me, Jesus always knew when he was going to die. We know that sooner or later, we will die. But that's an abstraction. It lies in the indefinite future. 

With Jesus, it's different. He knew the precise date. Divinely speaking, there was never a time when he didn't know the date. Humanly speaking, he became aware of the date in his precocious childhood, when he become mature enough to be cognizant of such things.

So he lived with that foreboding all his life. His life was a countdown. He knew exactly how and when it would end years in advance. That day was always in mind. Living forward, but counting backwards from that ominous end. 

Not knowing our future is often a mercy. A shield. 

But Jesus could see it coming from afar. Mentally marking days off the calendar.

When we are born, if we have a normal lifespan, we start out with decades, then years, then months, then weeks, then days, then hours, then minutes, then moments. Like watching a hourglass. The pace quickens towards the end. 

Like caring for a dying relative. You can see that you are losing them. You can see them slipping away. The remaining time is compressed. The less time remains, the more precious the remaining time. Each remaining day or hour is concentrated. 

Jesus could foresee the gains of sand lower and empty. Foresee the steadily accelerating rate of decline. The fated moment drawing near–like clockwork. The inexorable climax. 

His strength is his weakness. His weakness his strength. 

Would it be more meaningful had he found it easier to confront the Cross? To the contrary, would that not make it less meaningful? The fact that it's a struggle makes the sacrifice more meaningful. 

The Man upstairs

Brian Abasciano Roger Olson • a day ago
Well if a timeless God can reach into time to act, then he can reach into time to interact, and he can be affected by time bound creatures. On that view, God can be influenced and affected by prayer. I don't see it as making God any less personal at all. That seems like saying that because he can create out of nothing he is less personal or because he is invisible he is less personal.

• Roger Olson
Mod Brian Abasciano • 5 hours ago

• Not at all. But a "person" who cannot be acted upon by others does not seem personal to me.

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-3-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/

This exchange, between two prominent Arminians, compactly and nicely illustrates one of the core confusions of Arminian theology (and so much freewill theism generally). It fails to appreciate the fundamental asymmetry between the creature and the Creator. The notion that to have a "personal" relationship with God, we must be in a position to influence God, just as we influence our friends and family members. The influence must go both ways.

But the assumption that we can and should be able to influence God tacitly assumes that God doesn't know what is best unless and until we inform him and educate him. They seem to view God as  basically a human with superhero powers. 

Superintelligence

In The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins said the cosmological and/or teleological arguments for God's existence generate an infinite regress: a divine designer must be more complex than whatever he designs. Therefore, appealing to God to explain the world only pushes the demand for an ultimate explanation back a step; indeed, it compounds the perceived problem.

There are two different ways of responding to Dawkins:

i) We can respond to him on Christian grounds. We can point out that he hasn't mastered the position he presumes to refute. God isn't complex in the same sense that physical, composite objects or organisms are complex. God is not an organization. God is not a big thing made of smaller things, like disassembling an engine. To the extent that God is complex, he's complex in a way analogous to complex abstract objects like the Mandelbrot set. That's infinitely complex. But it's not the kind of thing you can take apart. It's not composed of smaller parts, which are, in turn, composed of even smaller parts, viz., a carburetor is part of a car engine while a gasket is part of a carburetor. But in classical theism, God has no spatiotemporal parts.

ii) But we can also respond to Dawkins on his own terms. His infinite regress argument reminds me of von Neumann's seminal lectures on self-reproducting automata. To begin with, it's very shortsighted of Dawkins to deploy an argument which, on the face of it, disproves macroevolution. As von Neumann notes:

Anybody who looks at living organisms knows perfectly well that they can produce other organisms like themselves. This is their normal function, they wouldn't exist if they didn't do this…Living organisms are very complicated aggregations of elementary parts…that they should occur in the world at all is a miracle of the first magnitude.
Furthermore, it's equally evident that what goes on is actually one degree better than self-reproduction, for organisms appear to have gotten more elaborate in the course of time. Today's organisms are phylogenetically descended from others which are vastly simpler than they are, so much simpler, in fact, that it's inconceivable how any kind of description of the later, complex organism could have existed in the earlier one…Evidently, these organisms have the ability to produce something more complicated than themselves. 

So an ironic consequence of Dawkins' argument is that, if sound, the infinite regress would disprove macroevolution. And that poses quite a dilemma for Dawkins inasmuch as macroevolution is his alternate to divine creation! 

Perhaps Dawkins would say the infinite regress argument only applies to designed products rather than undesigned products. If so, it's hard to see the logic of that restriction. If the designer must be more complex than what he designs, then mustn't the producer (e.g. evolutionary process) be more complex than the product? 

iii) There is, however, another problem with Dawkins' argument, from a secular scientific perspective. For his argument, if sound, would render AI research futile. As von Neumann goes on to say:

The other line of argument, which leads to the opposite conclusion, arises from looking at artificial automata. Everyone knows that a machine tool is more complicated than the elements which can be made with it…So, one gets a very strong impression that complication, or productive potentiality in an organization, is degenerative, that an organization which synthesizes something is necessarily more complicated, of a higher order, than the organization it synthesizes. This conclusion, arrived at by considering living organisms, is clearly opposite to our early conclusion, arrived at by considering living organisms. 

Von Neumann is discussing the prima facie dilemma of producing self-reproducing machines. Must a machine be more complex than what it produces? If so, then you can't make a self-replicating machine.

Yet AI is even more ambitious. According to AI, not only can computer designers construct self-replicating computers, but they can even construct computers which become more complex than the computer designer himself! Indeed, von Neumann, in the same lecture, gestures at this program: 

…the production of a more complicated object from a less complicated object is possible…There is a minimum number of parts below which complication is degenerative, in the sense that if one automaton makes another the second is less complex than the first, but above which it is possible for an automaton to construct other automata of equal or higher complexity…There is thus this completely decisive property of complexity, that there exists a critical size below which the process of synthesis is degenerative, but above which the phenomenon of synthesis, if properly arranged, can become explosive, where synthesizes of automata can proceed in such a manner that each automaton will produce other automata which are more complex and of higher potentialities than itself. 

Indeed, the AI community is concerned with the prospect that, if successful, AI machines will turn on their inventors and destroy the human race: 

So, while the idea of the generally intelligent agent continues to play an important unifying role for the discipline(s) of artificial intelligence, it also leads fairly naturally to the possibility of a super-intelligence. The usual concept is that if we humans could create artificial general intelligent ability at a roughly human level, then this creation could, in turn, create yet higher intelligence, which could, in turn, create yet higher intelligence, and so on ... “We can tentatively define a superintelligence as any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest.” (Bostrom, 2014 ch. 2). So we might generate a growth well beyond human ability and perhaps even an accelerating rate of growth, leading to an ‘intelligence explosion’. Two main questions about this development are when to expect it, if at all (see Bostrom, 2006; Hubert L. Dreyfus, 2012; Kurzweil, 2005) and what the impact of it would likely be, in particular which risks it might entail up to a level of existential risk for humanity (see Bostrom, 2013; Müller, 2014a). As Hawking et al. say “Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history. Unfortunately, it might also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid the risks.” (Hawking, Russell, Tegmark, & Wilczek, 2014; cf. Price, 2013). 

These results should be taken with some grains of salt, but we think it is fair to say that the results show an agreement among experts that AI systems will probably reach overall human ability around 2040-50, certainly (with 90% probability) by 2075. From reaching human ability, it will move on to superintelligence in 2 years (10%) to 30 years (75%) thereaf- ter. The experts say the probability is 31% that this development turns out to be ‘bad’ or ‘extremely bad’ for humanity. 

So, the experts think that superintelligence is likely to come in a few decades and quite possibly bad for humanity – this should be reason enough to do research into the possible impact of superintelligence before it is too late. We could also put this more modestly and still come to an alarming conclusion: We know of no compelling reason to say that progress in AI will grind to a halt (though deep new insights might be needed) and we know of no compelling reason that superintelligent systems will be good for humanity. So, we should better investigate the future of superintelligence and the risk it poses for humanity. 

http://www.sophia.de/pdf/2014_PT-AI_polls.pdf

So AI turns Dawkins' regress argument on its head. A designer needn't be more complex than what is designed. To the contrary, what is designed may be (or become) more complex than the designer! 

My point is not to endorse AI. And, of course, I don't think creatures are equally complex, much less more complex, than their Creator. I'm just analyzing Dawkins' argument on its own terms. Even secularists don't share his intuition. 

Brainless animal rights activists

http://www.ijreview.com/2014/07/156316-anti-hunting-activists-livid-photo-steven-spielberg-extinct-dinosaur/

The tail wagging the God

Roger Olson Mod Brian Abasciano • 5 hours ago
Sure, a God "outside of time" might be able to reach into time to act, but such a God couldn't INTERACT--that is, be acted upon by creatures in time. And the biblical narrative clearly (IMHO) indicates that we do affect God with our prayers.

stefanstackhouse Roger Olson • 2 days ago
Well, I would say that the purpose of prayer is not to conform God's will to ours (which can't be done), but rather to conform our will to God's. God delights in our coming to Him in prayer,
even though He already knows what we going to talk about Him about, and even though He already knows what He is going to do.

Roger Olson Mod stefanstackhouse • a day ago
That is certainly not the understanding of prayer I find in the Bible. With that interpretation we might as well give up on petitionary prayer altogether.

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-3-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/

To judge by his response to Stackhouse and Abasciano, Olson believes one or more of the following:

i) Successful prayer conforms God's will to our will.
ii) God doesn't know ahead of time what we will pray about.
iii) God doesn't know ahead of time what he will do in response to prayer.

Some Arminians might disagree with Olson. They might say he doesn't speak for all Arminians. 

However, the reason Olson takes fairly radical positions is because he labors to be a consistent freewill theist. That's his overriding priority. In freewill theism, God interacts and reacts to humans. In freewill theism, petitionary prayer is predicated on the presupposition that prayer must be able to affect God. Given that dynamic cause-effect relationship, it makes sense for Olson to deny that God has decided in advance, prior to prayer, how or whether he will grant our request. 

Idols of the mind

Some preachers have popularized the notion that you can make an idol of anything. You can idolize sex, money, prestige, or your career, and so on and so forth. You can make anything your "God." 

This loose definition of idolatry is not without insight. However, that expansive definition (or redefinition) runs the risk of deflecting attention way from the essence of idolatry. An idolater is someone who entertains a false or fictional idea of God, an idea that corresponds, not with what God is really like, but with what the idolater wants God to be like. Taking their opinions, desires, and prejudices as the starting-point. Basing their concept of God, not on God's self-revelation, but on make-believe and wishful thinking. Their "God" is a figment of the their own imagination. A self-projection. "God" is the apotheosis of their opinions, desires, and prejudices. 

It's important to keep that definition in sharp focus, because that's a perennial temptation both inside and outside the church. Take "progressive Christians," who remake God in the image of leftwing fads. Take freewill theists, who refuse to countenance certain Biblical representations of God. Or pluralists. Or annihilationists. Or universalists. 

Christians who affirm the inerrancy of Scripture are sometimes branded as "bibliolaters," but ironically, it is God's self-revelation in Scripture that's the antidote to idolatry. That's the touchstone.