Yahweh's double

1. Most of the agents in OT history are creatures. Men and angels. There are, however, three notable exceptions: Yahweh, the Spirit of Yahweh, and the Angel of Yahweh. 

Now that in itself may not get us all the way to the Trinity, but it sticks out in contrast to the rest. These three agents are categorically different from creatures. 

Not one, or two, or four, but three. So these are the exceptions. In a class apart from human or angelic creatures. 

2. A critic might say the Spirit of Yahweh (in the OT) isn't clearly a distinct person of the Godhead, but an extension of God. God's active presence in the world, or something like that. That's consistent with unitarianism.

However, even if, for argument's sake, we grant that the Spirit of Yahweh isn't clearly a distinct person of the Godhead, the representation of the Spirit is open to a Trinitarian interpretation. 

3. Moreover, it's not as if the Spirit of Yahweh is simply depicted as a power. Among other things, verbal inspiration and propositional revelation have their origin in the Spirit of Yahweh. But communicating words and concepts requires personal agency–from one mind to another. 

4. Then there's the Angel of Yahweh. In Gen 18, there are three "angels" ("messenger", malak), two of whom are creatures, but the third is represented as Yahweh himself. If the third is just another creaturely agent of Yahweh, the differential treatment makes no sense. 

Rather, it's more like a king with his retinue. Compare it to the theophany in Ezk 1. That's not just a theophany, but an angelophany. Not only does God appear to the prophet, but he brings an angelic entourage with him. 

5. There are also debates about whether the Angel of Yahweh is a theophany or Christophany. But for immediate  purposes we don't have to pin that down. The OT needn't present a Trinitarian deity to be incompatible with a unitarian deity. Evidence for binitarian theism would suffice to disprove unitarian theism. Conversely, while evidence for binitarian theism would rule out unitarian theism, it wouldn't rule out Trinitarian theism. Rather, it would mean OT theism is at least binitarian. 

6. If the OT depicted Yahweh as leaving heaven to visit earth (by assuming angelic form), that would be consistent with unitarianism. It would clearly be the same individual. When he's on earth there's no double in heaven. If, on the other hand, Yahweh is shown having a double, then that suggests two distinct individuals: the sender and the sent. And if that's not the case, it's quite confusing (e.g. Gen 24:7,40; Exod 23:20-21; 33:2). 

The point is not whether God has the ability to appear to be in two places at once, but whether that's counterproductive to monotheism if unitarianism is true. Is in the same individual appearing to be in two difference places at once, or two distinct individuals? If Yahweh seems to have a double, how could a reader tell the difference between a unitarian Yahweh and a binitarian Yahweh? 

7. But suppose for argument's sake we say the Angel's identity is ambiguous. The OT is ferociously hostile to idolatry. If unitarianism is true, it's unimaginable that there could be any confusion between Yahweh and the Angel of Yahweh. The very fact that the Angel of Yahweh is sometimes interchangeable with Yahweh (e.g. Gen 48:14-16; Exod 3:1-6) is baffling if unitarianism is true, given the dire OT warnings against idolatry. How could the OT afford to leave that in doubt? If unitarianism is true, then OT representations of Yahweh ought to be consistently and unmistakably monadic, to forestall idolatry. 

People of the lie

What does Rev 21:8 mean? It can't mean anyone who ever lied is doomed to hell. That would mean there's no point in unbelievers converting to Christianity. Most pagan gentiles lied on a regular basis. It can't mean it's too late for them to become Christian because their behavior as liars damns them in advance. 

In the larger context of Revelation, it has reference, not to tactful lies or altruistic lies (e.g. lying to protect the innocent). Rather, the "lie" in Revelation is false worship. Counterfeit religion. Diabolical heathenism, in defiance of the true faith. In Revelation, the "lie" is paganism. Idolatry. To be a devil-worshiper, under the guise of polytheism. You live in service of that lie. You live in service to a systematic lie about God. 

Not coincidentally, that's how the word is used in 1 Jn 2:22 & 5:10. A religious lie. Likewise, Jn 8:44. If's not as if Satan tells altruistic lies. That's not the kind of lie in view. Rather, he lies about God. He deceives people about God. He leads them astray from the one true God. 

The Deity of Christ and the First Table of the Law

https://www.proginosko.com/2019/02/the-deity-of-christ-and-the-first-table-of-the-law/

The Mormon multiverse

This is related to a recent post I did, but I'd like to narrow the focus. It's my impression that some Mormon apologists invoke the multiverse to sidestep monotheistic passages in the Bible. The argument is that passages about idolatry pertain to the god of our universe. Yahweh is the god in charge of our universe. As members of this universe, we must confine our worship to Yahweh. But other gods have jurisdiction over other worlds in the multiverse. The monotheistic passages don't apply outside our universe. 

i) To my knowledge, the scientific evidence for a multiverse relies on one particular interpretation of quantum mechanics. Because quantum mechanics conflicts with the theory of relativity, there's the question of whether quantum mechanics is a final theory. And even if quantum mechanics is a final theory, there are competing interpretations. 

The multiverse might be true or it might be false. So it's a precarious foundation on which to build theology.

ii) I'm sympathetic to a version of the multiverse, but the same God who made the multiverse. One Creator of the multiverse. 

iii) In classical theism, God preexists the world he made. In Mormon theism, the world preexists the gods. The gods are contingent rather than necessary beings. The gods are products of a preexistent reality. A Mormon multiverse fails to explain the origins of the multiverse. It simply pushes the cosmological argument back a step.

iv) Is the idea that each god only exists in one universe? No god exists in more than one universe?

But according to the logic of the multiverse scenario, each parallel universe corresponds to changing one variable, with whatever adjustments that requires, while leaving other things intact. In one timeline I'm raised by my parents. In an alternate timeline I'm an orphan. In another timeline I'm raised by my dad. In another timeline I'm raised by my mom. In one universe I have a brother, in another universe I'm an only-child. In one universe my hometown is New Orleans, in another universe my hometown is Albuquerque. 

However, it wouldn't be a different god for each parallel universe. Changing the god is one variable, with a parallel universe (or more) corresponding to that altered variable. But many altered variables don't entail changing the god in charge. So the same god would exist in more than one universe. Even if we play along with the thought-experiment, Yahweh will have jurisdiction over a vast number of parallel worlds. 

Just run through OT history and mentally change a variable. Suppose Yahweh calls Abraham's brother out of Ur rather than Abraham. Suppose Isaac runs away rather than submitting to sacrifice? That creates alternate timelines, but Yahweh is the same deity in those alternate world histories. 

Omnipotent Mary, spouse of the Holy Spirit

Catholics are wont to accuse you of "Nestorianism" if you deny the divine motherhood of Mary. Catholics make "Mother of God" sound innocuous to get a foot in the door, but look at where their "logic" leads to:

http://taylormarshall.com/2010/12/is-mary-spouse-of-holy-spirit-st.html

https://www.ewtn.com/faith/teachings/marya6.htm

http://www.catholictradition.org/Mary/glories6.htm

Weeping Madonnas

And it was allowed to give breath to the image of the beast, so that the image of the beast might even speak and might cause those who would not worship the image of the beast to be slain (Rev 13:15).

I'm going to comment on this article:

http://www.tyndalehouse.com/Bulletin/60=2009/5%20O'Connell.pdf

O'Connell raises some good objections to the mass hallucinatory interpretation of the Resurrection accounts:

i) Even assuming that his examples are best construed as mass hallucinations, these usually involve a religious expectation. So that introduces an autosuggestive dynamic. But the resurrection of Jesus was contrary to the expectation of the disciples. 

ii) He also makes the point that in the cited cases, the vision never carries on a conversation with the recipient. 

However, his case against the hallucinatory interpretation of the Resurrection accounts is far weaker than it could be, due to many dubious assumptions in his analysis.

i) As he himself admits, some reported Marian sightings could be optical illusions. That's different from a hallucination.

ii) There's no a priori reason to treat visions of Jesus (or Mary) as hallucinations. That's a prejudicial classification. There's no reason to assume that Jesus would never appear to someone in a vision. At least, I don't think there is, and O'Connell never offers a supporting argument for his assumption. He just takes it for granted. 

iii) A possible objection is that no one knows what Jesus looks like. So modern-day visions of Jesus (or medieval visions) necessarily mimic customary iconography. However, I don't think that, of itself, is a strong objection. Precisely because no one knows what Jesus looks like, if Jesus did appear to someone, he'd have to assume a recognizable appearance based on cultural expectations.

iii) The very fact that ancient Jews (and Gentile) believed in ghosts and visions means they'd distinguish ghosts and visions from a resurrection. When the Gospels record Jesus predicting his resurrection from the dead, it must mean something other than returning from the grave as a ghost or vision, since there'd be nothing special about a postmortem appearance in that respect. Rather, it has to stand in contrast to ghosts and visions. And that's already the case in Matthew and Mark, even before we get to the accounts in Luke, John, and 1 Corinthians which explicitly stress the physicality of his resurrection.

iv) I'd add that this undercuts O'Connell's angelic interpretation of some Resurrection appearances. Moreover, his angelic interpretation suffers from parallelomania. In addition, the luminosity of Christ in Acts 9 is no more angelic than his luminosity at the Transfiguration. 

v) It's a mistake to assume that sightings of Jesus and sightings of Mary must have the same explanation. To begin with, I'm automatically dubious about weeping or bleeding madonnas where the statue or icon is in the custody of a church or monastery. That's not subject to round the clock public surveillance. Rather, that provides after hours opportunities for monks and priests to touch up the statue or icon. In other words, it's easy to stage. 

vi) However, I don't necessarily assume that all Marian sightings must either be hoaxes or hallucinations. Before getting to my own explanation, let's consider another alternative. Is is possible that Mary sometimes does appear to people? It might be argued that this would be an encouragement to faith. It might also be argued that this would be a divine accommodation to culture. If that's the only religious culture which some people are in a position to know, and if God wishes to contact them, then it will be through their cultural categories. Or so goes the argument. 

vii) Having said that, I don't think it's theologically tenable in the case of Marian sightings. If some reportedly weeping or bleeding or animated madonnas are genuine, that would inevitably foster the kind of superstitious idolatry and totemism which the Bible constantly condemns. So we'd have conflicting revelations. Biblical revelations which condemn the veneration of images, and revelatory images of Mary. These don't mesh. 

viii) In addition, this fosters a Mary-centered piety that makes her a rival to Jesus in pious devotion. Indeed, the theological interpretation of weeping or bleeding madonnas is that Mary shares in the Passion of Christ. But that's wholly unacceptable from a Biblical standpoint. 

I realize that Catholic apologists rationalize Marian devotion on the grounds that this supposedly redounds to devotion to Jesus. But other issues aside, if Jesus is the ultimate object of devotion, why not more reports of weeping, bleeding, or animated icons and statues of Jesus rather than Mary? Why not cut to the chase? 

ix) Furthermore, you have reports of weeping or bleeding madonnas in both Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox settings. Yet these can't very well attest both theological traditions, inasmuch as these represent competing theological traditions.

x) In principle, there's a difference between a miracle that happens to Catholics, and a miracle that's inseparable from a Catholic theological paradigm. A reported miracle that, if authentic, inevitably lends credence to the theological tradition which sponsors it. 

A Catholic or Orthodox apologist might object that my interpretation of Scripture begs the question. They might accuse me of special pleading. But that won't work.

For one thing, we have to compare some religious claims to Biblical criteria. That's what the Biblical criteria is for. Take the classic criteria for a false prophet (Deut 13). And notice that this makes allowance for a bona fide miracle. 

Moreover, Catholics (and Orthodox) don't have a monopoly on reported miracles. You have Protestant parallels. So these can't be cited to uniquely evidence the claims of Rome. 

xi) In addition, we have an example of an animated statue in Rev 13:15. A statue that promotes veneration. Yet that's occultic. So there's biblical precedent for the possibility of phenomena analogous to weeping and bleeding madonnas, yet this doesn't imply that God caused the miracle. 

xii) It might be objected that attributing such phenomena to the dark side, if mistaken, borders on the unpardonable sin. However, we're not talking about Jesus, but Mary. Moreover, passages like Deut 13 and Gal 1:8 require us to make allowance for that explanation. And given conflicting evidence, we have no choice but to take sides. 

The cult of Trump

The Book of Revelation is often understood, in large part, in terms of Christian resistance to the Roman imperial cult. It's striking to see parallels between that and the Trump phenomenon:

http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-idolatry-of-the-donald/

In fairness, we could draw some of the same parallels with respect to Obama, although his star has faded.

Muhammad and Mars Hill

In the debate over whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God, some people who defend that proposition have cited Acts 17. This is, of course, a locus classicus for natural theology. But the appeal to Acts 17 to prooftext their position raises several issues:

i) I have no objection to natural theology, in the sense of a priori and a posteriori arguments for God's existence. Theistic proofs from reason or empirical evidence. 

Sometimes, however, the appeal is circular. There are traditional schools of natural theology, like Thomism and perfect being theology (Anselm). Some people come to Acts 17 with that package in mind, and interpret Acts 17 in light of that package. In their case, they aren't deriving their concept of natural theology from Acts 17; rather, they filter Acts 17 through their preconception of natural theology.

They act as though Paul is a Thomist. They assume Paul is very straight-laced in his dialogue with the Athenians. That he has a positive view of their piety. Although their piety is deficient, it is true so far as it goes. They begin with the God of natural revelation. It simply needs to be supplemented. 

ii) That, however, is a very anachronistic and naive reading of the text. To begin with, there's more than one audience for this address. There is Paul's audience, and then there's Luke's audience. Paul's audience are pagan philosophers or dilettantes, whereas Luke's audience are Christians. Moreover, Luke expects his readers to understand OT theism. That's the standard of comparison.

In addition, this pericope opens with the programmatic statement about Paul's stern disapproval of Athenian idolatry. That sets the tone for the rest of the presentation. That's something the reader is privy to, but not the Athenians. 

So the discourse reads at two different levels. For Luke's audience, there's a running irony in Paul's statements that would be lost on his pagan listeners. 

iii) This is reflected in Paul's backhanded compliment to their religiosity. Paul uses an ambiguous word (deisidaimon/deisidaimonia) that has both positive ("pious") and negative ("superstitious") connotations. A double entendre that would mean one thing to Paul, but something else to his audience. 

Some commentators reject the negative connotation because they think that would be off-putting to Paul's audience, but that misses the point. English has no word with the same ambiguity, but Paul didn't have to choose between a flattering word or a pejorative word. His audience wouldn't catch on. 

This allows him to preserve a certain distance. Common ground without complicity. 

iv) Along with his appeal to an altar to the "unknown god," this is part of Paul's captatio benevolentiae, in which a speaker curries favor with the audience to gain a hearing. 

In context, the "unknown god" is not the monotheistic Creator. Rather, erecting an altar to an unknown god is a way for fearful pagans to cover their bets. There are many gods they never heard of. Nameless gods who might be offended if there was no altar in their honor. You didn't want to get on the wrong side of a god or godless, so this is placeholder for all the other heathen deities the Athenians haven't heard of. 

Paul cleverly exploits this as a bridge. A tongue-in-cheek way of making a serious point. 

v) V28 contains one or possibly two quotes from pagan authors. Some commentators think the line about how we "live and move and have our being" in God is an allusion to Epimenides, but that's disputed. If it's from Epimedides, the god to whom that's originally addressed is Zeus. In any event, that's certainly the case in reference to the quote from Aratus. 

That, however, poses a dilemma for people like Francis Beckwith who say Muslims and Christians worship the same God. For they restrict that to the "Abrahamic religions" (Islam, Judaism, Christianity) in contrast to polytheism. Yet the context of Aratus is not to the monotheistic Creator, but to Zeus. So this either proves too much or too little for people like Beckwith. 

An exception would be Michael Rea, who goes so far as to say:

Christians and Muslims have very different beliefs about God; but they agree on this much: there is exactly one God. This common point of agreement is logically equivalent to thesis that all Gods are the same God. In other words, everyone who worships a God worships the same God, no matter how different their views about God might be. 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-rea/on-worshipping-the-same-g_b_8840936.html

That, however, cuts agains the grain of Acts 17, which, among other things, continues the OT polemic against pagan idolatry. 

Paul simply disregards the original setting because he's using this passage as a pretext to smuggle in a witness to the God of OT revelation, culminating in the revelation of Christ. 

Perhaps some people resist the ironic reading because they they imagine it would be unethical for Paul to resort to duplicate–as they view it. There is, however, nothing unethical about irony. Moreover, Paul believes what he says. But he's using certain tactics as a point of entree. That's not a foundation to build on, but a way of making people listen to something that will replace it. 

Sympathetic magic

Bnonn has an interesting interpretation of the 2nd commandment:

http://bnonn.com/are-pictures-of-jesus-idolatry-2/

The gist of his argument is that pagans used idols as a form of sympathetic magic. 

Aside from the merits of that interpretation in its own right, it's striking to compare that interpretation with a related interpretation of the 3rd commandment:

There is a third way someone in the ancient world might have taken God's name in vain: by using it as a magical term to make a spell or incantation more potent. The Egyptians thought that there was great power in knowing a god's secret name; the goddess Isis in on myth gains power over Re by learning his secret name. Something like this may be occurring in Acts 19:13-16, where Jewish exorcists use the name of Jesus to try to gain control over demons. D. Garrett, A Commentary on Exodus (Kregel 2014), 477. 

That would offer a unified interpretation of both commandments, based on a common principle: prohibiting various forms of witchcraft.  

In the same vein, notice the link between sorcerers and idolaters in Rev 21:8.

Marian devotion in theory and practice

There's two kinds of Marian piety. There's the official, theoretical version. That's bad enough. But then there's what is actually practiced. What the faithful live by, day-to-day. Something that Rome alternately fosters or winks at:

Consider the practices of some Catholic Latina women in the United States, who fend off the evil eye (especially of infants) with eggs, bury statues of saints like Mary and Joseph in their front yard when the saints refuse to grant requests, and dig them up again once the request is granted. As Michelle Gonzalez Maldonado details, this sounds rather irreverent, but the practice just illustrates how intimate the relationship is between the Latino community and the saints they revere. Home altars with pictures of Mary and the Saints are the territory of Latina Catholic women. Do these practices contribute to religious epistemology? If so, how?

The council of Trent wanted to eradicate these practices of saint reverence and fending off the evil eye, in which women prominently figured as practitioners and experts. However, it did not destroy these practices in Latina women. Neither did it destroy them entirely in European women, such as my grandmother. My grandmother was a devout Catholic woman who taught me the first things about religion such as the significance of the host, the meaning of infant baptism, how to pray. She had a wooden black statue of Mary (there is a tradition of revering Black Mary in Medieval Europe, and my grandmother's home town had a tradition that still kept this alive), to whom she talked and prayed. When Mary refused to grant her requests, she would be unceremoniously turned facing the wall until Mary changed her mind. 

http://philosopherscocoon.typepad.com/blog/2014/11/what-can-my-grandmother-know-about-mary.html

Are Catholics idolaters?

Catholics are often accused of idolatry. There are several grounds for this. One is veneration of the saints–especially Mary. Another one is Eucharistic Adoration. 

One way Catholics try to deflect the charge is to draw hairsplitting distinctions between dulia, hyperdulia, and latria. 

I'd just like to make a brief comparison. As I've often suggested, I think veneration of the saints is spray-painted syncretism: just replacing patron gods with patron saints. Different names, same function, same mentality. 

Now a pagan idolater can also distinguish between ascending or descending degrees of veneration. In polytheism, the pantheon has a pecking order. Not all gods or goddesses are created equal. There are high gods and low gods. 

If you're a sailer, you better pay your respects to Poseidon. If, however, you're a landlubber, you have little to fear from Poseidon. You're outside of his jurisdiction. 

You don't want to find yourself on the wrong side of powerful, vindictive gods or goddesses like Zeus, Juno, and Mars. However, Venus is not very intimidating. LIkewise, Vulcan isn't terribly threatening–unless you live in in the shadow of Mount Vesuvius.

In Hinduism, a pious Hindu typically becomes a devotee of a particular deity, like Vishnu, Shiva, Devi, Durga, Kali, Rama, or Krishna. 

My point is that it's easy to draw parallels between pagan devotion and Catholic devotion in that regard. Both Catholics and pagans have a gradation in the degree of veneration they accord to numina. Drawing finespun distinctions fails to shield Catholicism from the charge of idolatry, for the heathen can and do the same thing regarding the divine hierarchy. 

Cobelligerence

9 I wrote to you in my letter not to associate with sexually immoral people— 10 not at all meaning the sexually immoral of this world, or the greedy and swindlers, or idolaters, since then you would need to go out of the world. 11 But now I am writing to you not to associate with anyone who bears the name of brother if he is guilty of sexual immorality or greed, or is an idolater, reviler, drunkard, or swindler—not even to eat with such a one (1 Cor 5:9-11). 
14 Therefore, my beloved, flee from idolatry...21 You cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons. You cannot partake of the table of the Lord and the table of demons.
25 Eat whatever is sold in the meat market without raising any question on the ground of conscience. 26 For “the earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof.” 27 If one of the unbelievers invites you to dinner and you are disposed to go, eat whatever is set before you without raising any question on the ground of conscience. 28 But if someone says to you, “This has been offered in sacrifice,” then do not eat it, for the sake of the one who informed you, and for the sake of conscience (1 Cor 10:14,21, 25-28).
14 Do not be unequally yoked with unbelievers. For what partnership has righteousness with lawlessness? Or what fellowship has light with darkness? 15 What accord has Christ with Belial? Or what portion does a believer share with an unbeliever? 16 What agreement has the temple of God with idols? For we are the temple of the living God (2 Cor 6:14-16).

One of the issues in the prolife movement is cobelligerence. Should evangelical prolifers combine forces with Catholic prolifers?

Abolish Human Abortion takes the position that cobelligerence is wrong because Catholics are idolaters. What about that?

i) I agree with AHA that Catholics are idolaters. I won't bother to defend that claim in this post, since that's not the point of my post.

ii) In addition, two parties can be mutual allies in one respect,  but mutual critics in another respect. Cobelligerence on abortion does not and should not preclude evangelicals from critiquing Catholicism. And it's not as if Catholics refrain from critiquing evangelicalism. 

iii) Mind you, there are better and worse ways of doing that. It needs to be an intelligent critique that's able to field stock Catholic replies to the contrary. 

In addition, it shouldn't be motivated merely by a desire to distance abolitionism from the prolife movement. Scripture condemns displays of spiritual ostentation which are designed to impress other people. 

iv) Ironically, AHA has it backwards. Paul doesn't forbid Christian association with idolaters. Indeed, Paul considers that unavoidable (1 Cor 5:9-10). Christian association with idolaters is permitted rather than prohibited.

v) Paul discusses degrees of licit or illicit association. 

a) Paul permits private meals between pagans and Christians (1 Cor 10:25-27), with a caveat (v28). 

b) Paul forbids Christian participation in pagan cultic ceremonies (1 Cor 10:14-22; 2 Cor 6:14-16). 

c) Paul forbids Christian cultic meals (the eucharist, agape feast) between believers and impenitent professing Christians (1 Cor 5:11). That calls for excommunication. 

vi) 2 Cor refers back to this discussion. It's referring to fellowship in the technical sense of the congregational life of the church, in contrast to pagan ceremonies. 

If we map this onto cobelligerance, Pauline strictures permit evangelicals to work with Catholics in opposing abortion, but forbid evangelical participation in the Mass (to take one example).  

Idols of the mind

Some preachers have popularized the notion that you can make an idol of anything. You can idolize sex, money, prestige, or your career, and so on and so forth. You can make anything your "God." 

This loose definition of idolatry is not without insight. However, that expansive definition (or redefinition) runs the risk of deflecting attention way from the essence of idolatry. An idolater is someone who entertains a false or fictional idea of God, an idea that corresponds, not with what God is really like, but with what the idolater wants God to be like. Taking their opinions, desires, and prejudices as the starting-point. Basing their concept of God, not on God's self-revelation, but on make-believe and wishful thinking. Their "God" is a figment of the their own imagination. A self-projection. "God" is the apotheosis of their opinions, desires, and prejudices. 

It's important to keep that definition in sharp focus, because that's a perennial temptation both inside and outside the church. Take "progressive Christians," who remake God in the image of leftwing fads. Take freewill theists, who refuse to countenance certain Biblical representations of God. Or pluralists. Or annihilationists. Or universalists. 

Christians who affirm the inerrancy of Scripture are sometimes branded as "bibliolaters," but ironically, it is God's self-revelation in Scripture that's the antidote to idolatry. That's the touchstone. 

The Virgin of Guadalupe

I disagree with the viewpoint of this article, which is too concessive and sympathetic. It does, however, provide lots of useful background material to help explain the sociological appeal of Mariolatry in Latin America:

http://www.ijfm.org/PDFs_IJFM/28_4_PDFs/IJFM_28_4-Yeh&Olaguibel.pdf

Bergoglio’s Gig: Devoutly Venerate This Painting.

Protectress of the Roman People

If peace breaks out in Syria, some Roman Catholics will believe it was because Pope Francis invoked this icon: the “Salus Populi Romani”, or the “Protectress of the Roman People”.

ROME, September 12, 2013 – With the passing of the days the extraordinary nature of the vigil presided over by Pope Francis in St. Peter's Square on the evening of Saturday, September 7 is becoming ever more perceptible.

First of all, the reason: a day of fasting and prayer to call for peace in Syria, the Middle East, and wherever there is war. With the participation not only of Catholics but of men of every religion and simply “of good will.” Not only in Rome but in many cities of the world.

Then the duration. One cannot recall a public vigil of prayer of four consecutive hours, from sunset to late into the night, in the constant presence of the pope.

Then the silence. Over the entire span of the vigil the recollection of the hundred thousand persons crowding St. Peter's Square and the surrounding areas was intense and emotional. In harmony with the accentuated austerity of the very presence of the pope.

Then, above all, the form that the prayer took on. It began with the rosary, the most evangelical and universal of the “popular” prayers, and with a meditation by Pope Francis. It proceeded with the adoration of the sacrament of the Eucharist. It continued with the office of readings - the nocturnal psalmody of the monks - with the reading of passages from Jeremiah, St. Leo the Great, and the Gospel of John. It concluded with the singing of the “Te Deum” and with Eucharistic benediction imparted by the pope.