Thursday, May 24, 2012

1956 Oscar Cullmann work available in reprint


I learned today that an Oscar Cullmann work I’ve been citing for some time now, Cullmann’s article on “The Tradition” has been reprinted now, (in “The Early Church,” London: SCM Press LTD © 1956, reprinted ©2011). I had been told by a Seminary Professor that this work of Cullmann’s is probably the best article discussing the relationship of Scripture and Tradition in the early church. I have the 1956 edition, which was difficult to get, but it’s good to see that this fine work is now available to anyone who wants to look into it.

Other essay titles include:

1. The Necessity and Function of higher Criticism
2. The Origin of Christmas
3. The Plurality of the Gospels as  Theological Problem in Antiquity
4. The Tradition
5. The Kingship of Christ and the Church in the New Testament
6. The Return of Christ
7. The Proleptic Deliverance of the Body According to the New Testament
8. ὁ ὀπίσω μου ἐρχόμενος (“he who comes after me”)
9. Samaria and the Origins of the Christian Mission
10. Early Christianity and Civilization

I’ve not read much at all of the other articles, but I offer this as a source for those exegetically-minded folks who might be interested.

Anarcho-Catholicism

On the one hand:

http://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=14369

On the other hand:

http://www.catholicculture.org/commentary/otc.cfm?id=967

The 1%

http://www.celebritynetworth.com/

http://www.therichest.org/celebnetworth/

Why I won't miss Missing

Missing has been canceled. I only caught a few minutes from scattered episodes as I was channel-surfing. Apparently the show was about a middle-aged mom trying to rescue her kidnapped son. Chuck Norris in a skirt.

Another example of just how far removed from terra firm Hollywood has become. To begin with, why is a middle-aged mom physically protecting her 18-year-old son? If push came to shove, shouldn’t that be the other way around? Isn’t a son in his youthful prime faster and stronger than a mother in her mid-40s? Not to mention that her son was played by a 26-year-old actor. Shouldn't he be her bodyguard, not vice versa?

Really, now–how stupid can you get?

To be sure, there are some women who could best some men in hand-to-hand combat. If they cast Ronda Rousey as the mother, it would be a bit more convincing (although she’s too young to have a son that age) But, of course, Ashley Judd isn’t Ronda Rousey. She's a has-been fashion model. It’s no wonder the show was canceled after a few episodes. 

Our Man in Havana


I’m going to comment on this post:


What really got me wondering about this was last Sunday’s (May 13) episode of “60 Minutes.” They interviewed a former top US spy who had a lot of interesting things to say about strategies for information gathering. One that caught my ear was providing pornography to foreign diplomats and agents. He said he never met a diplomat of a certain country that didn’t love pornography and that he and other US agents provided pornography to them in exchange for information.

I had never thought about that before. I knew that as a US secret agent you might have to kill people, but provide them with pornography? Now that’s another question. Can a Christian do that with a clear conscience—for whatever payoff? Does any end justify such an immoral means?

Needless to say, if Olsen, at the very outset, defines the means as “immoral,” then, by definition, no goal, however, worthy, can justify the use of immoral means.

But that simply illustrates Olson’s chronic inability to accurately represent a position he opposes. He’s interjecting his own value-judgment into the way he frames the opposing position.

Assuming (ex hypothesi) that we did think that pornography was a justifiable enticement in espionage, it wouldn’t be with the understanding that the means is immoral.

So why am I even posting about this? I wonder if, in our American evangelical Christian churches, we have given enough thought to what Christians should and should not do or participate in, in terms of sinful behavior, for the greater good of our country?

Once again, if you initially define the means as “sinful,” then the question answers itself. But that begs the question.

As I watched that I wondered how many Christians watching the show shuddered at that method of obtaining secret information about our enemy countries. I suspected that many who wouldn’t hesitate to defend torture or even assassination did shudder at that and wondered to themselves whether they could do that with a clear Christian conscience.
 
Again, I suspect many conservative evangelical (and other) Christians would balk at supplying graphic pornography to enemy agents but not balk at participating in torture or assassination or capital punishment (assuming they are constitutionally able to stomach such things).

i) This is unintentionally comical. Why would some Christians think torture or assassination is sometimes warranted, but using pornography is never warranted? Why is that where we’d draw the line? If anything, wouldn’t it be the other way around? Surely “torture” and assassination are more serious than pornography. (Keep in mind that we’re speaking of pornography in espionage.)

ii) In addition, Olson is such a babe in the woods. The guy’s 60 years old. He lived through much of the Cold War.

Not only does espionage sometimes employ pornography, but prostitution–as a form of blackmail. Has Olson never heard of “honeypots”? He acts like he just fell off the turnip truck.

Thus far I haven’t bothered to comment on the morality (or not) of using pornography in espionage. For now I’m just remarking on Olson’s naïveté, as well as his inverted priority system. I haven’t commented on pornography in espionage because I think that’s fairly trivial compared to some other issues in espionage and counterterrorism.

Olson has led such a cloistered existence. He spent his entire life in insular church circles. His lack of real-world experience no doubt accounts for some of his ethical positions.

Where exactly are the limits? I know that there are evangelical Christians working in intelligence gathering for the US government. What will they absolutely refuse to do—no matter what the pay off might be in terms of obtaining important information that might make us more secure as a nation?
Let’s consider torture. I have heard reasonable people defend torture as a last resort. (You can call waterboarding whatever you want to; to me it’s torture.) Okay, let’s agree to disagree about that. (I think torture is always wrong and should never be condoned by policy.) What about torturing a suspected terrorist’s wife and children—if torturing him doesn’t work?

Absurd, you say? Well, it has happened in history. I have read accounts of it being done by Nazis, so it isn’t literally absurd.

No, you say? Never? Why not? What justifies drawing an absolute line between torturing a suspected terrorist to extract information and torturing his wife and children if it is likely to work? (Remember, he’s only a suspected terrorist, so saying torturing him is justified whereas torturing his wife and children is not because he’s guilty and they’re innocent won’t work.)

i) When Olson classifies a terrorist as a merely “suspected” terrorist, what does that stand in contrast to? A convicted terrorist? Is this just a legal formality?

What about an admitted terrorist? And by that I mean a terrorist who was an admitted terrorist even before he was “tortured” or apprehended. Surely there are “suspected” terrorists whose involvement in terrorism isn’t in serious doubt. For instance, Bin Laden was never convicted of terrorism. Does that mean he’s merely a “suspected” terrorist?

ii) So, yes, there’s a fairly obvious distinction between a “suspected” terrorist and his kids. Of course, that also depends on what Olson means by “children.”

Is Olson using “child” in a chronological sense, for an underage minor? Keep in mind that grown children can follow the old man into the family business. A twenty-something or thirty-something child of a terrorist can be a terrorist in his own right. Let’s not get sentimental.

iii) There’s a fairly obvious moral difference between “torturing” a terrorist for information about terrorist plots, networks, &c., and “torturing” an innocent bystander.

iv) As to drawing an “absolute” line, ethics is chockfull of borderline cases. There are situations in life where we can’t draw an “absolute” line. Can Olson draw an absolute line between murder and self-defense? There are many situations in which that line can clearly be drawn, but there are other situations in which that’s ambiguous. 

In real life we’re going to be confronted by situations where there’s at least apparent moral ambiguity regardless of what we do or refrain from doing. Where we don’t have instant answers. Where we don’t have as much information as we need to be morally confident. It's unrealistic to demand the "exact limits" of what's permissible or impermissible. Olson himself has nothing to offer in that regard. 

Demanding an “absolute line” in every situation doesn’t keep you morally pristine. You’re going to find yourself in circumstances where making a tough decision one way or the other is unavoidable even if you can’t point to an “absolute line” distinguishing one course of action from another.

I think some Anabaptists (and perhaps others) prefer not to work for any government agency or branch because it is impossible to discern the line between what is participation in unchristian, immoral acts and what is not. And there is always the danger of being asked to participate, however indirectly, in violence or immorality such as providing pornography to someone.

But that’s just a cop-out. By delegating the task to someone else, then turning a blind eye to what the second-party does, you still share responsibility for the outcome.

Sequestering yourself in an Amish community simply relocates the issue. You’re still drawing lines. After all, there’s no “absolute” line between the morality of working in gov’t and working outside of gov’t.

I don’t agree with Hauerwas or Yoder about everything, but I think they do (did) the church a great service by at least raising questions about Christian virtues and government practices.

Is that a great service to the church? Unless they have a workable alternative, they bring Christian ethics into disrepute. They make Christian ethicists look like ninnies who fight terrorism with a plate of home-baked cookies.

In Hannah’s Child (his autobiography) Hauerwas writes about the backlash he felt from theological friends when he criticized America’s invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. One well known theologian with whom he was close walked out on a talk he was giving and later wrote to ask him if he felt no “natural loyalties”—meaning to country, I take it.

Well, that’s very vague. Was there a backlash merely because he opposed the wars, or was it specific to the reasons he gave?

Of course, if he’s a pacifist, then he’d criticize any military response regardless of the threat or provocation.

And so what if there was a “backlash” (whatever that means)? Criticism is a two-way street.

I guess I would ask that theologian if he would provide pornography to an enemy agent if it would result in the likelihood of obtaining information that would help make our country more secure. If his answer was “yes,” I would ask if he would provide LSD or other mind-altering drugs.

I don’t see how administering a hallucinogen is a reliable way of obtaining information. Perhaps Olson has truth serum in mind. That’s a convention of spy novels.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that truth serum was a reliable way of obtaining information from a terrorist, yes, I think that’s justifiable.

If the answer was “yes,” I would ask what he WOULDN’T do to obtain such information. If there was ANYTHING he wouldn’t do, I could ask him if he felt no natural loyalties.

Olson is trying to up the ante. He acts as if administering truth serum is already morally outrageous. Hence, if you’re prepared to do that, what are you not prepared to do?

But he hasn’t begun to explain why administering truth serum to a terrorist is the next fateful step in moral freefall. Why does he think that’s immoral? Where’s his argument? Otherwise, there is no downward spiral.

Certainly there are lines that Christians shouldn’t cross. The ends, however noble, can never justify immoral means. But that leaves open the question of what means are intrinsically immoral. Olson hasn’t provided a general formula or rule-of-thumb for distinguishing moral means from immoral means.

All he’s done is to give us some examples of what he deems to be immoral, without furnishing any supporting arguments. He can’t extrapolate from his examples before he defends his examples.

Hauerwas believes it is always wrong for Christians to kill fellow Christians. Whether he is a strict pacifist is somewhat difficult to discern. I thought so, but then I read an article by him that muddied the waters a bit. He seemed to back off absolute pacifism into a kind of “war is always evil even when it’s a necessary evil” position. But one thing is clear—he wants Christians to be in the forefront of abolishing war (and capital punishment, etc.).

Abolishing war? How does that work, exactly? Does Congress pass a law abolishing war? Does the UN pass a resolution abolishing war? Then what happens? Does everyone compliantly disarm? How do you enforce a resolution against war?

This is why pacifism is morally frivolous.

Should natural loyalties over ride Christian brotherhood? C. S. Lewis thought so. What did Christians of the first three centuries think? For the most part they did not participate in war or serve in the military.

That’s a false dichotomy. Christian brotherhood has national as well as international dimensions. What about protecting Christian brothers on the home front?

Can anyone imagine the Apostle Paul, just to choose one first century Christian, providing pornography to anyone for any reason?

Why is Olson so obsessed with the moral propriety of pornography in espionage? Surely that’s small potatoes compared to other issues in military ethics. Aren't there more important things to evaluate?

Can anyone imagine the Apostle Paul, just to choose one first century Christian, providing pornography to anyone for any reason? Participating in torturing someone for any reason? Taking up arms to kill someone for any reason? I can’t.

Rather than putting words in St. Paul’s mouth, I’d just point out that Paul was a firm believer in the divine inspiration of the OT. Let’s take some concrete examples of OT ethics in action:

17 But Sisera fled away on foot to the tent of Jael, the wife of Heber the Kenite, for there was peace between Jabin the king of Hazor and the house of Heber the Kenite. 18 And Jael came out to meet Sisera and said to him, “Turn aside, my lord; turn aside to me; do not be afraid.” So he turned aside to her into the tent, and she covered him with a rug. 19 And he said to her, “Please give me a little water to drink, for I am thirsty.” So she opened a skin of milk and gave him a drink and covered him. 20 And he said to her, “Stand at the opening of the tent, and if any man comes and asks you, ‘Is anyone here?’ say, ‘No.’” 21 But Jael the wife of Heber took a tent peg, and took a hammer in her hand. Then she went softly to him and drove the peg into his temple until it went down into the ground while he was lying fast asleep from weariness. So he died. 22 And behold, as Barak was pursuing Sisera, Jael went out to meet him and said to him, “Come, and I will show you the man whom you are seeking.” So he went in to her tent, and there lay Sisera dead, with the tent peg in his temple.
 
24 “Most blessed of women be Jael,
    the wife of Heber the Kenite,
    of tent-dwelling women most blessed.
25  He asked for water and she gave him milk;
    she brought him curds in a noble's bowl.
26  She sent her hand to the tent peg
    and her right hand to the workmen's mallet;
she struck Sisera;
    she crushed his head;
    she shattered and pierced his temple.
27 Between her feet
    he sank, he fell, he lay still;
between her feet
    he sank, he fell;
where he sank,
    there he fell—dead.
 
(Judges 4:17-22; 5:24-27
 
While Israel lived in Shittim, the people began to whore with the daughters of Moab. 2  These invited the people to the sacrifices of their gods, and the people ate and bowed down to their gods. 3 So Israel yoked himself to Baal of Peor. And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel. 4 And the Lord said to Moses, “Take all the chiefs of the people and hang them in the sun before the Lord, that the fierce anger of the Lord may turn away from Israel.” 5 And Moses said to the judges of Israel, “Each of you kill those of his men who have yoked themselves to Baal of Peor.”
6 And behold, one of the people of Israel came and brought a Midianite woman to his family, in the sight of Moses and in the sight of the whole congregation of the people of Israel, while they were weeping in the entrance of the tent of meeting. 7  When Phinehas the son of Eleazar, son of Aaron the priest, saw it, he rose and left the congregation and took a spear in his hand 8 and went after the man of Israel into the chamber and pierced both of them, the man of Israel and the woman through her belly. Thus the plague on the people of Israel was stopped (Num 25:1-8).

I imagine that St. Paul approved of these actions.

At times it seems to me that we simply assume that we should do whatever our country asks us to do—especially if we are in the government’s service—without question.

Who’s assuming that?

Olson isn’t a serious moralist. He’s just a showman.

The brain account of personal identity

From Jeremy Pierce.

Misplaced confidence

"Biologos, Theistic Evolution, and Misplaced Confidence" by Michael J. Kruger.

Which came first, the “apostolic succession” or the New Testament?


The second of Michael Kruger’s three “criteria for canonicity” is “Apostolic origins” of the New Testament canon. With his use of the term “Apostolic Origins” as a criterion for canon, Dr Kruger recognizes that the Apostles played a unique role not only in the development of the canon but in the foundation of the church.

The message of redemption in Jesus Christ was entrusted to the apostles of Christ, to whom he gave his full authority and power: “The one who hears you hears me, and the one who rejects you rejects me” (Luke 10:16, pg 109).
                                                                                            
Roman Catholics are accustomed to hearing this verse in conjunction with the notion of “apostolic succession”, the notion that the Apostles somehow passed on this authority to “the Church”, and that this “succession” of apostolic “authority” was “handed on” in full measure not only from Christ to the Apostles (which it was), but from the Apostles to the church that came after them.

And while the concept of “apostolic succession” really has nothing to do with the growth and acceptance of the New Testament canon, it’s important to place this into the context of the overall discussion about the New Testament canon.


The question often is asked, (as Trosclair places it in this comment):

the same men who saw the need to ‘fix’ the Biblical canon also saw the need to ‘fix’ the lists of those who were successors to the Apostles. As a matter of fact, the Apostolic sees were more important for Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian, etc. for the purpose of combating the Gnostic sects than was the Biblical canon. This contradicts Cullmann’s thesis. The Church fathers make it clear that the Scriptures could be twisted but the Apostolic sees had the sure ‘charism of truth’ which would preserve orthodoxy.

The short answer is that the “canonical core” of Apostolic writings was in place long before Irenaeus (c. 180), Tertullian (c. 200), and Cyprian (c. 250) ever commented about “lists”. Prior to the time these men wrote, both the Old Testament and the “canonical core” (of the collected works of Paul and the four gospels) of the New Testament were actually were the source of orthodoxy and the precursor of the “rule of faith” (see Canon Revisited, pgs 133-141). I’ll discuss the specifics of this as I move forward through the book.

Suffice it to say that Cullmann’s thesis (“Scripture and Tradition,” reprinted in “The Early Church,” London: SCM Press LTD © 1956, reprinted ©2011) does account for this fact, in a way that Trosclair may not have seen in the short selections I’ve posted from Cullmann’s writings. The writings of the New Testament came first, (in the form of the “canonical core”, to be sure), and the “Apostolic sees” came later. Someone may protest that “the canonical core” wasn’t quite complete, but it was authoritative nonetheless.

Here is how Cullmann described the apparent unreliability of “oral tradition” in maintaining “the apostolic witness”, which was regarded to be unique and unrepeatable, in comparison with later “ecclesiastical” traditions, which were certainly not binding on the universal church (especially not the church of the Reformation or the church in our time):

For a long time it has been noted that, apart from the letters of Ignatius, the writings of the so-called Apostolic Fathers, who do not really belong to the Apostolic age but to the beginning of the second century—[1 Clement, Barnabas, the Shepherd of Hermas]—despite their theological interest, are at  a considerable distance from New Testament thought, and to a considerable extent relapse into a moralism which ignores the notion of grace, and of the redemptive death of Christ, so central to apostolic theology. [See Torrance’s “The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers,” 1948].

It has also been noted that the Church Fathers who wrote after 150—Irenaeus and Tertullian—although chronologically more remote from the New Testament than the authors of the first half of the century, understood infinitely better the essence of the gospel. This seems paradoxical, but is explained perfectly by that most important act, the codification of the apostolic tradition in a canon [a “canonical core”], henceforward the superior norm of all tradition.

The Fathers of the first half of the century wrote at a period when the writings of the New Testament already existed, but without being vested with canonical authority, and so set apart. Therefore they did not have any norm at their disposal, and, on the other hand, and on the other hand, they were already too far distant from the apostolic age to be able to draw directly on the testimony of eye-witnesses. The encounters of Polycarp and Papias with apostolic persons could no longer guarantee a pure transmission of authentic traditions, as is proved by the extant fragments of their writings.

But after 150 contact with the apostolic age was re-established through the construction of the canon, which discarded all impure and deformed sources of information. Thus it is confirmed that, by subordinating all subsequent tradition to the canon, the Church once and for all saved its apostolic basis. It enabled its members to hear, thanks to this [“canonical core”], continually afresh and throughout all the centuries to come the authentic word of the apostles, a privilege which no oral tradition, passing through Polycarp or Papias, could have assured them (96).

The writings of Irenaeus (c. 180), Tertullian (c. 200), and Cyprian (c. 250), came much later than this “canonical core” of Paul’s writings and the Gospels. Cullmann goes on to note that, of course “scripture needs to be interpreted” and “the church ought to feel responsible for this interpretation” (97).

However, if the notion of “apostolic sees” was helpful in combating the Gnostic heresies of the day, it must be recognized that this was a still-later development (late second century), and the church at large ought in no way to be bound by what really was an “interpretive hermeneutic” of the second century.  It was by no means a “structural component” of “the Church that Christ founded”. An apologetic tactic that worked in the context of Gnostic heresies by no means subjects the later church to that hermeneutic and tactic.

And comments by late second and third-century writers ought by no means to provide the basis for a governmental structure that clearly became not merely open to abuse, but which itself became a form of abuse, and desperately needed to be changed.

This is precisely where the heart of the conflict between Rome and the Reformation lies. Once the notion of “apostolic succession” is put into perspective as a mechanism for addressing heresies (and not a mechanism by which the “authority” of the apostles was “handed down” to later popes and bishops), it clears the way for us to understand that the Reformers rightly cast off Roman authority when they did.


The Reformation holds that the role and “office” of Apostle was unique and unrepeatable. Rome holds, too, to some form of lip service that the “office” was unrepeatable, but somehow, the authority made its way to “bishops” (and from Peter to “the successor of Peter”), as somehow “structural” to the church – an “ontological reality” of the church. “Bishops must be in charge”, and not only are they “in charge”, but they somehow have interpretive mastery over the texts of Scripture.

Cullmann goes on to say that, in its acceptance of core canonical works of the New Testament as normative (based on the apostolic testimony therein), it is tacitly making the agreement that it “does not impose on future generations to take as a starting-point and as a norm of their interpretation of the same text the decision that it feels bound to take, but it remains conscious of the superiority of the scripture as the immediate testimony of the divine revelation to the interpretation which it feels compelled to give, and which can only be a derivative testimony…” (97).

So, the concept of “apostolic succession” within the “apostolic sees” did not, for the church of this period, constitute a “structural element” of the church, in the same way that the “apostolic testimony” (or “apostolic tradition”) was normative and foundational for the church. 

Wednesday, May 23, 2012

An open letter to "post-partisan" evangelicals

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/frenchrevolution/2012/05/23/an-open-letter-to-young-post-partisan-evangelicals/

The invisible gardner


The initial problem with the problem of evil is that God Himself is inscrutable.  Think for a minute about someone being absolutely independent. Is it any wonder then that there are things that this inscrutable God does that our minds are unable to contain?  Paul even tells us that God's ways and judgments are beyond our ability to scrutinize them (Rom. 11:33f.).
 
That, of course, was the lesson that Job had to learn.  We are privy to more of what is going on with Job than even Job was so it is sometimes too easy to be hard on him.  But remember Job wants an answer to his own personal problem of evil. And how does God answer Job?
Job 40:1-10:
The LORD said to Job: "Will the one who contends with the Almighty correct him? Let him who accuses God answer him!" Then Job answered the LORD: "I am unworthy-- how can I reply to you? I put my hand over my mouth. I spoke once, but I have no answer-- twice, but I will say no more." Then the LORD spoke to Job out of the storm: "Brace yourself like a man; I will question you, and you shall answer me. "Would you discredit my justice? Would you condemn me to justify yourself? Do you have an arm like God's, and can your voice thunder like his? Then adorn yourself with glory and splendor, and clothe yourself in honor and majesty.
In the midst of His suffering, Job decided it was time for inscrutability to stop.  And so he tells God that it's time to give answers.  There needs to be a God-justifying reason for what is happening to Job, and in the world generally.
 
And how does God respond to Job?  Job, you've forgotten one crucial thing - I am God, and besides Me, there is no other.  Inscrutability lies at the feet of Almighty God, and therefore there are things that we simply will not understand - things, as Job says, "too wonderful for me, which I did not know."


The problem with that example is that Job's situation is not inherently inscrutable. The Book of Job is a classic case of dramatic irony. Thanks to the prologue (Job 1-2), the audience knows something the characters (including Job) do not. And the dramatic irony is also the source of the dramatic tension. 

Kinda like those horror films where the audience knows the identity of the psychopathic killer while the unsuspecting characters only find out when it's too late.

The prologue doesn't give us a general explanation for evil, but it does explain Job's situation. And it furnishes a possible explanation for some analogous situations.

So our response to Flew's parable, and to others who demand that God bow to their inquisition, is simply this: Whatever God's ultimate reasons for evil in this world, far from being unconcerned, He came down, and, at the costliest expense imaginable, as the only innocent one who ever lived, was put to death on a cross. Therefore, those who put their trust in Him can say with the apostle Paul, that whatever God's reasons, in spite of the sheer inscrutability of His ways, "I consider that the suffering of this present age is not worthy to be compared to the glory that will be revealed in us." (Romans 8:18) Because He who knew no evil, came down, and became evil on our behalf. In that way, by way of Theophany, he, personally and painfully, resolved the problem of evil for eternity. Do we really need to know more than that?

That doesn't solve the problem of evil. Rather, it only takes the problem back a step. For it fails to explain why there's a fallen world in the first place. Given a fallen world, you can appeal to redemption. But why was the world in a condition needed to be redeemed?

After all, Oliphint thinks that God predestined the Fall. So the atheist will ask, why did God predestine the Fall?

Commenting on the same post, a friend of mine made some additional observations.

The second aspect to Flew's parable is more revealing. In writing of his rationale for the parable, Flew says:
 
Someone tells us that God loves us as a father loves his children.  We are reassured.  But then we see a child dying.  His Heavenly Father reveals no obvious sign of concern.  Some qualification is made.  Just what would have to happen to entitle us to say 'God does not love us' or even 'God does not exist'?  What would have to occur to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?(1)

Oliphint is simply mistaken here. The problem of evil is not Flew's "rationale for the parable". Rather, evil is one of many possible ways that God's existence should be seen to be falsifiable. But since the religious believer doesn't regard evil, even the worst evil, as falsifying God's existence, this is evidence that the claim 'God exists' or 'God loves me' is not falsifiable. Combined with the falsificationist criterion of meaning, the conclusion is that 'God exists' is meaningless. The parable is not about "the problem of evil" as this is traditionally discussed in philosophy of religion.

Flew's conclusion was that the God of Christianity is dead; He has died the death of a thousand qualifications. And it was the problem of suffering and evil that motivated this conclusion.
 
The motivation behind Flew's parable is "the problem of evil."

Again, this is mistaken. In the gardener parable, Flew is not offering an argument against God's existence from the existence of evil. The very idea is absurd.

Oliphint seems to think that Flew is offering a case for the nonexistence of God. He's not. He's offering a case for the notion that the claim 'God exists' is a meaningless claim. In Flew's view, 'God exists' doesn't even have the dignity of being the kind of thing that can be true or false.

The Department of Social Justice

http://dailycaller.com/2012/04/06/justice-served-to-obama/?print=1

Why won't God amputate heels?


My post on amputees provoked a number of predictably uncomprehending objections from village atheists:


Before commenting on the specifics, let’s back up a bit.

The presupposition of the amputee argument is that God doesn’t heal amputees because:

i) Unlike other reported miracles, you can’t fake limb regeneration

ii) Ergo, there is no miracle-working God

However, this intersects with the argument from evil. If God has a morally sufficient reason not to heal amputees, then you can’t validly infer God’s nonexistence from amputees whose prayers go unanswered.

And the assumption that typically underlies the argument from evil is that we can imagine better possible worlds than this world. God is culpable for failing to create a better world, since that option was available to him.

And this, in turn, is related to the notion of a best possible world. However, I think that’s simplistic.

Now there may be philosophical versions of the argument from evil that don’t require this assumption, but I’m discussing the popular argument from evil. In the popular version, an atheist studies the actual world and imagines all the improvements he could make if he were God. Surely an omniscient, omnipotent God could do a better job than this?

But is that really so obvious? Take those eugenic scenarios about a utopian future where everyone is handsome, healthy, wealthy, and young. Like teen dramas where everyone has perfect teeth. Every student drives a Porsche. Every girl is busty and every boy has six-pack abs. A world designed by a cosmetic surgeon.

In some respects that’s a better world than a world in which many people are homely, sickly, poor, and elderly. But is the utopian vision truly ideal?

A world in which everyone is handsome, healthy, wealthy, and young is a world deficient in character-building virtues. No one has to share. No one has to sacrifice. A Nietzschean world that’s intolerant of the weak. Disdainful of losers. A world of full of fair-weather friends.

If you fall behind, you will be left behind. No one will go back for you. Buff bodies and hollow souls.

I’m not presenting that as a stand-alone theodicy. I’m just questioning the glib assumption that underlies the popular argument from evil.

Tuesday, May 22, 2012

Who wrote the Fourth Gospel?

http://www.whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2012/05/on_the_authorship_of_the_fourt.html

The Left’s Misplaced Concern

http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/300669

AN EXHIBITION OF INCOMPETENCE: TRICKERY DICKERY BAYES

http://rjosephhoffmann.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/the-jesus-process-stephanie-louise-fisher/

Maurice Casey on mythism

http://rjosephhoffmann.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/the-jesus-process-maurice-casey/

Liberal ethnocentricity

BTW, one of the ironies of Rachel Evans' now infamous post is how provincial and blindly ethnocentric her vision of Christianity really is. Compare her parochial perspective with how it appears beyond the bubble of her chic coterie:

http://www.anglican-nig.org/Pri_obj_Homo.htm

Plain sense or just plain nonsense?


Without detracting one iota from DeYoung’s piece, I want to use it to drive home an important truth which we need to meditate on carefully.  The force of DeYoung’s scriptural argument depends on whether or not he can demonstrably prove that, contrary to the person he is responding to (someone called Daniel Heminiak), “the Bible really really calls homosexuality a sin.”   And he’s right, it does.
 
BUT – the Bible only “really really calls homosexuality a sin” if we believe what it says!  That is, if we employ the kind of hermeneutics which let’s the words say what they say without re-interpreting them by use of a non-literal hermeneutics.
 
Now some of you might recall that in my debate with Steve Hays I constantly referred him to “the plain-sense,” making repeated pleas for what the text says in its context, and providing many clear examples where later OT writers took earlier writers literally.  Hays’s persistently refused any interaction with these examples, or with my rebuttals of his interpretations of some passages in the Prophets, and ducked and weaved while questioning what “the plain-sense” and “face-value” mean.
 
This last example, part of which was used by Steve Hays to demonstrate a “New Exodus” motif which pointed to fulfillment beyond the “land,” is helpful because once we see how “land” is used in verse 13 (which Steve did not quote), we can understand what he means by “land” being returned to in verse 15.
 
Did Hays yield to what the Bible says here?  No.  Like most others today he continued either questioning it or else avoiding it!  This is standard operating procedure among many evangelicals.


Several issues:

i) Henebury contents himself with repeating his stale arguments while disregarding my extensive counterarguments. I might as well be conversing with a prerecorded message.

ii) I’ve also analyzed the arguments of dispensational scholars like Robert Thomas, Craig Blaising, and Harold Hoehner.

iii) Actually, you don’t win an argument with a homosexual apologist by simply appealing to the “plain sense” of Scripture. For instance, Robert Gagnon doesn’t merely invoke the “plain sense” or “face-value” meaning of Scripture. Rather, he conducts painstaking exegesis of his prooftexts, and carefully deconstructs interpretations to the contrary.

iv) Let’s take some examples of groups who appeal to the “plain sense” or “face-valuing” meaning of Scripture:

a) Open theists/Mormons

Open theists take at “face value” Biblical statements about God changing his mind, expressing surprise, regret or disappointment.

And Mormons are in a position to take literally various statements about God’s physical or humanoid features.

b) Annihilationists

They take “literally” statements about the eschatological “destruction” of the lost.

c) Sacramentalists

Lutherans, Catholics, Anglo-Catholics et al. appeal to the “plain sense” of Jn 3:5, Jn 6, Tit 3:5 &c. to prove the real presence and baptismal regeneration.

d) Geocentrists

They take at face-value Biblical statements about the immobility and centrality of the earth in relation to the sun, moon, and stars.

e) Arminians/universalists

They take "literally" statements about the atonement for "all" or the "world." 

f) Errantists

They appeal to flat-earth prooftexts, which they take literally. The solid dome, subterranean hell, &c.

They say the chronology of the fourth day plainly contradicts the chronology of the first day. They say the chronology of Gen 1 plainly contradicts the chronology of Gen 2. They say the flood account contradicts itself on the number of animals (one pair or seven?). They say the chronologies of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles are mutually contradictory. They say the genealogies of Christ (in Matthew and Luke) are mutually contradictory. They say the chronologies of John and the synoptic gospels are mutually contradictory. They say the resurrection accounts are mutually contradictory. They say the two accounts of Judas’s death are mutually contradictory. They say Daniel plainly mispredicted the demise of Antiochus. They say Jesus plainly mispredicted the Parousia. They say the Bible makes contradictory statements about the visibility of God, as well as contradictory statements about the mutability of God. 

Henebury is emulating the tactics of liberals and cultists who preemptively discredit orthodox, Bible-believing scholars who patiently correct their naïve interpretations and facile attacks on Scripture. 

v) According to the “literal/plain sense/face-value” meaning of Gen 17, the Abrahamic covenant is exclusive to circumcised male posterity of Abraham.

Does Henebury think that only ethnic Jews are party to the Abrahamic covenant? Does the Abrahamic covenant exclude Christian gentiles?

vi) Apropos (v), the terms of the Abrahamic covenant are hardly confined to land-promises. For inheritance is contingent on circumcision. The duration of the Abrahamic covenant is commensurate with the duration of circumcision, as the mandatory rite of initiation. The perpetuity of the land-promises is inseparable from the perpetuity of circumcision.

Is that Henebury’s position?