Monday, August 01, 2016
Catholic crisis management
But bit by bit, any idealism I had was just shredded. Some priests, at least by reputation, were not real vigorous in observing their vows of celibacy In some cases, we knew, or at least the report was, that they were caught doing something with altar boys. If it was two priests, they would be separated and reassigned. The attitude seemed to be, "Well, we'll just cover this up." But if you were having an affair with a woman, that could be dangerous. It might end up with a child-support suit and things like that, so that was not tolerated. They would be disciplined, very severely. D. Dennett & L. LaScola, Caught in the Pulpit (2013), 128.
Zombie caterpillars controlled by voodoo wasps
Recently I thumbed through two books. One was The Bible Tells Me So by Peter Enns. A few things struck me about his treatment:
i) There's the patronizing tone. He's constantly talking down to reader. Maybe he views himself as the wizened master in Kung Fu films who imparts mumbo jumbo to his young apprentice.
ii) But another reason it reads at such a childish level is because Enns has nothing insightful or original to say. He communicates at that level because he really is that trite and banal.
You wonder why he even bothers to churn out these potboilers. He doesn't say anything that hasn't been said before, by people more intelligent or eloquent than he.
iii) For all his intellectual condescension, what stands out is the flaccid quality of his reasoning. It's a completely one-sided presentation that labors to poison the well for conservative scholarship. He always takes the easy way out. Takes intellectual shortcuts. You only have to compare it to scholars like Kenneth Kitchen, Alan Millard, and Richard Bauckham (to name a few) who painstakingly sift evidence and question conventional wisdom.
Ironically, the book by Enns pans right into the other book I was thumbing through: Caught in the Pulpit: Leaving Belief Behind (2013), coauthored by Daniel Dennett and Linda LaScola. This is about theological liberals and "fundamentalists", pastors and seminary professors, who lost whatever faith they had. In the case of the liberals, they never had much to lose in the first place. Many statements skewer the fence-straddling position that people like Enns take. For instance:
Liberal Christians have no difficulty saying what they don't (any longer) believe, but they find it hard to express a positive version of their message...
My colleagues and clergy friends would ridicule fundamentalists, but at some point I came to realize they are preaching and teaching what they believe. If you read the Bible, they are actually being consistent in what they’re teaching or they’re believing. We’re the ones who are sugarcoating it and trying to contextualize it and put it in other language, and we don’t really mean what we say. And at some point, that just felt kind of mentally weak.
Many commentators have noted a telling symmetry. Fundamentalists and other defenders of the literal truth of the Bible agree with the New Atheists on one thing: Truth claims need to be taken seriously—which means they must be evaluated as true or false, not merely interpreted as metaphors and symbols. Liberal clergy, as noted, are squeezed between these two opposing adherents of the “put up or shut up” school of interpretation. The liberals think both extremes are simplistic; it’s complicated, they say. The New Atheists have shrugged off this charge, accusing the liberal apologists of creating a pseudointellectual smokescreen to cover their retreat, and here the symmetry is extended, since that is also the opinion of many fundamentalists and other conservatives.
I have a priest friend who says, "There's living in the myth, and there's living outside the myth". For me, when I'm in the myth, I totally believe the themes of the Resurrection and Ascension, and those mean a lot to me. And outside the myth, I don't think they're literally true. It's just not possible, based on what I know about science…And the point of this life–well, there is no point to this life, but you have to find some meaning, because we're meaning-making creatures. So we do a lot of things to make this a meaningful existence. Hopefully, that existence lasts beyond us to some degree, but probably not. That's what I really believe. And at the same time, the Christian mythology speaks to me at a cultural level–more [on that level] now than at a real belief kind of level.
That's an apt description of Enns. In addition, although Dennett notes a telling symmetry between atheists and fundamentalists, there's a telling symmetry between atheists and theological liberals. Like theological liberals, secular humanists live inside their own myth. Within the myth of secular humanism, people are important. My life is significant. What we do matters. How we treat others is important.
But outside the myth, we're just temporary collections of particles. Individuals are expendable and replaceable. Natural selection has brainwashed us into loving kith and kin, like "zombie caterpillars controlled by voodoo wasps". Secular humanism only works when you forget what the real work is like, according to secular humanism.
Avenging angels
Larry Hurtado summarizes a monograph on inscriptions in Roman Asia Minor that refer to "angels":
He says "A number of the inscriptions in question are in burial sites, and warn against disturbing the graves, effectively warning the ire of angels if anyone does so. They also come from a particular geographical area in present-day Turkey, and a few islands off/near the Turkish coast."
This, of course, intersects with the time and place of the apostle John's ministry. I wonder if that's applicable to John's enigmatic reference to "angels" in Rev 2-3. What does John mean by that appellation? Does he mean "angels" in the technical sense of the word? If so, in what respect do the churches have angels?
Keep in mind that the inscriptions are just a surviving sample. Presumably, there were more inscriptions of the same kind.
As I've noted before, I think the identity of the "angels" depends in part on whether we view Rev 2-3 as an interlude in the narrative, or part of the narrative. John's vision begins in 1:9. If Rev 2-3 are a continuation of his visionary experience, then it could well denote angels. To say the churches have angels within the visionary narrative doesn't imply that the historical churches of Asia Minor had angels. We need to distinguish what happens inside the visionary narrative from reality outside the visionary narrative. Things can happen in the vision that don't actually happen in real space and time. Rather, visionary events point to something analogous.
However, the inscriptions raise another issue. According to the epitaphs, the angels have a deterrent value, to ward off would-be grave-robbers. Avenging angels who will punish those who presume to desecrate the grave.
This raises the question of whether John (or God through John) is trading on the local connotations of angels. By analogy, the angels of the churches could be guardian angels. That doesn't necessarily mean the churches literally have guardian angels in the sense of cherubic warrior angels. Rather, that's a way to indicate divine protection of the churches.
Sunday, July 31, 2016
How supreme is the Supreme Court?
In his endorsement of Donald Trump, Wayne Grudem's argument centered on the fate of the Supreme Court. He did a good job of detailing judicial policy if Hillary is elected.
There is, though, a problem with that argument. What if Trump loses? Grudem doesn't offer any backup plan in that eventuality.
Conservatives need to remind Americans that the Supreme Court doesn't enjoy unconditional authority. The very notion that 300 million Americans should automatically genuflect to whatever 9 (or simply 5) unelected judges dictate is utterly servile. Why would 300 million Americans allow 5 unelected judges to tell them how to live their lives? It's childish. Why should we be so obedient?
I'm not suggesting that we should flout judicial rulings we dislike. My point, rather, is that when judges issue rulings that have no basis in the text, logic, or history of the Constitution, such rulings should be ignored.
The only legitimate authority the judiciary has is Constitutional authority. The judiciary can't invoke Constitutional authority for rulings that have no basis in the text, logic, or history of the Constitution. That's just make-believe. Everyone is supposed to pretend that's a Constitutional right even though everyone knows it's not. Why play that game? Why go along with that transparent charade?
I'm not suggesting that individual Americans should buck the judiciary. That's a losing proposition. Rather, there needs to be mobilized resistance, especially among civil magistrates.
A system of checks and balances is an honor system. It only works if the three branches play by the rules. If one branch refuses to abide by its Constitutional charter, that cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. In our form of gov't, we cede authority to the state on condition that the state respects the ultimate will of the public as expressed through its elected representatives or direct democracy (e.g. ballot initiatives and referenda).
Saturday, July 30, 2016
Patsies for Trump
I'm going to comment on an op-ed by Wayne Grudem:
I like Grudem. He's a good man who's done a lot of good.
There are roughly two different ways to defend voting for Trump in the general election. One is simply about the odds. Hillary is probably worse than Trump. As Dennis Prager put it, behind Door #1 is a man-eating lion. Behind Door 2 there might be a beautiful princess or a man-eating lion. Given those alternatives, it's rational to opt for Door #2.
Mind you, I think that's simplistic, but it's a reasonable position.
But then you have people who indulge in willful self-delusion to justify voting for Trump. I think Grudem's problem is that he's guileless, and so he projects his guilelessness onto Trump. Some people are too good to understand evil people. Their virtue blinds them to evil people. They can't relate to evil people. They can't see past the mask. They can't work themselves into that devious mindset. Ironically, Grudem is too ingenuous to recognize what a conman Trump is. That's too alien to Grudem's own character. Unfortunately, that makes him a easy mark for imposters like Trump.
I agree with most of Grudem's principles. Problem is, Trump is a mismatch for the principles.
Friday, July 29, 2016
Literary Greek
Bart Ehrman repeatedly says the traditional authorship of the canonical Gospels must be false because they are written in sophisticated literary Greek whereas the disciples of Jesus were Aramaic-speaking peasants. He also judges 1 Peter to be pseudonymous for the same reason.
The way Ehrman frames the argument is false on the face of it.
i) According to traditional authorship, only one of the four Evangelists would even be a candidate for "an Aramaic-speaking peasant": John. Certainly that description doesn't fit Matthew, Mark, or Luke.
ii) It's simplistic to say John was an Aramaic-speaking peasant. For one thing, he had entree with the high priest. That suggests he moved in higher social circles. He was well-connected.
The next question is whether the Gospels are even written in sophisticated literary Greek. Keep in mind that this is only germane to Jewish authors. Since Luke was gentile, there's be no incongruity in his writing in literary Greek.
I'm going to quote the analysis of Nigel Turner in A Grammar of the New Testament Greek; Volume IV: Style (T&T Clark, 1980). I'm just giving samples of his detailed analysis.
Unlike Ehrman, Turner is a Greek scholar by specialization. That's his area of expertise.
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Mark
Howard concurred with Lagrange that the Greek was translation Greek (11).
There is considerable evidence favoring influence of an exclusively Aramaic kind upon the style of Mark, but the case for the translation of documents is somewhat weakened by the fact that here in the same gospel are instances both of exclusive Aramaisms and exclusive Hebraisms side by side (15).
Mark's style is conspicuously different from the Ptolemaic Papyri and closer to the LXX, following the order: article>noun>article>genitive (54 times). He never has the position which is common in non-Biblical Greek: article>article>genitive>noun (17).
Some features of Markan style recall Latin constructions and vocabulary. That they are probably more frequent in Mark than in other NT texts, except the Pastoral epistles, may raise the question whether Mark was written in Italy in a kind of Greek that was influenced by Latin. However, supposing that his language is influenced in that way, we presume that it could have happened as well in the Roman provinces (29).
Matthew
On the whole, Matthew is not as Septuagintal in style as Luke (36).
It is sometimes assumed that Matthew writes Greek of a less Aramaic quality than Mark, and that he tends to soften the Semiticisms in general. That is not always true: we have found already many Semiticisms which may be attributed to Matthew independently of Mark.
If we examine the Markan sections of Matthew we shall find the contrary evidence, suggesting that Matthew has altered Mark to something more Semitic, conforming what we have already found…It would seem then that there is very little to choose between the relative Semitism of Mark's and Matthew's style (37).
Luke
Hebrew influence: This is far more extensive, and is not confined to the Infancy narrative (46).
The literal translation of Hebrew infinitive absolute comes into Biblical Greek from the LXX (47).
Physiognomical expressions: The large proportion of its occurrences are not in the Koine, but in Biblical literature, and the papyri instances are relatively slight when compared line by line with the LXX, Testament of Abraham, Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, Greek Enoch, Psalms of Solomon, and other works of this kind. There are 34 instances in Luke Acts, 31 in Revelation. In view of its place in Luke's own composition, it is not only a word of translation Greek but belongs to Jewish Greek (49).
Semitic influence: This is vast, enabling the respective advocates of Aramaic and Hebraic sources to claim the features as Aramaic or Hebrew to suit their purpose (50).
And (or for) behold! An exclusively Biblical Septuagintal phrase, perhaps also from Aramaic, it is frequent in the LXX, and Luke and Paul probably obtained the expression from here. As it occurs in the possibly "free" Greek of the Testament of Solomon (seven times) and Testament of Abraham (ten times) it may be a feature of free Jewish Greek, derived perhaps from the translated books. It is scattered throughout Luke-Acts… (53).
John
The Shepherd of Hermas [has] the same kind of Greek, influenced by Jewish idiom and marked by an over-use of asyndeton, though to a less extent than John (70).
The place of the verb is important: in Luke and John it is so often in the primary position that it is no longer secular Greek (72).
The Gospel vocabulary is limited to 1011 words, only 112 which are NT hapax. Many of these words are repeated, so that the vocabulary is only 6 1/2 percent of total word-use, almost the lowest in the NT (76).
We conclude that John's language throughout is characteristic of Jewish Greek, syntactically very simple, dignified but without the flexibility of the secular language, pointlessly varied in syntax and vocabulary… (78).
[Jewish Greek] appears in some free-Greek books of the LXX (e.g. Tobit), and some Jewish works as far away in time as the Testament of Abraham and the Testament of Solomon, which cannot be shown to be translations of Semitic originals. Ignorance of Greek as a cause of Jewish Greek, is altogether less probably than the influence of the Greek Bible through widely scattered synagogues, forming a new community language (78).
We must conclude that 1 Peter wears a veneer of good stylistic revision upon a basic draft of the same kind of Greek that is found elsewhere in the NT. It is tempting to ascribe the veneer to an amanuensis, not necessarily Silvanus (130).
The Superiority Of Jesus' Miracles
"No other man has ever remotely approximated the abundance of faith cures worked by Christ. No faith-healer, shrine, or medical experiment has ever even begun to cure many entire towns or many large groups of all kinds of disease….The lavishness of the cures of Christ points to the hand of God….Even two thousand years after the events, the signs of Christ retain to us living today indicative force approached by no other non-Christian prodigies. The words of Christ still apply: 'If you are not willing to believe me, believe the works' (Jn 10:38)….still, after nineteen centuries, the light from his works makes that of all others seem as darkness. His works shine as a beacon guiding all men to look again at his words, the first and last source of peace." (Robert Smith, Comparative Miracles [St. Louis, Missouri: B. Herder Book Co., 1965], 176-8)
Later miracle workers were inferior to Christ, but there were ongoing Christian miracles. In the patristic era, for example:
"Ramsey MacMullen reviews testimonies of people [in the earliest centuries of Christianity] believing because they had seen miraculous events…He gives many instances of Christian persuasion through exorcism, healing, and other strange deeds with reference to figures such as Gregory the Wonderworker…MacMullen also gives instances of conversion in paganism through wondrous deeds…MacMullen remarks that the church grew in historically significant numbers through demonstrations of miraculous power….He [Celsus] charges (1.6 [59,8-10 Koet.]) that 'Christians are powerful because of the names and invocations of certain demons.'" (John Cook, The Interpretation Of The New Testament In Greco-Roman Paganism [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], n. 78 on 34, 39)
For more about topics like the preeminence of Jesus' miracles, the evidence for the miracles of Christianity, and their superiority over non-Christian ones, see here and here. On prophecy fulfillment in particular, see here. And here on Jesus' resurrection.
Later miracle workers were inferior to Christ, but there were ongoing Christian miracles. In the patristic era, for example:
"Ramsey MacMullen reviews testimonies of people [in the earliest centuries of Christianity] believing because they had seen miraculous events…He gives many instances of Christian persuasion through exorcism, healing, and other strange deeds with reference to figures such as Gregory the Wonderworker…MacMullen also gives instances of conversion in paganism through wondrous deeds…MacMullen remarks that the church grew in historically significant numbers through demonstrations of miraculous power….He [Celsus] charges (1.6 [59,8-10 Koet.]) that 'Christians are powerful because of the names and invocations of certain demons.'" (John Cook, The Interpretation Of The New Testament In Greco-Roman Paganism [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], n. 78 on 34, 39)
For more about topics like the preeminence of Jesus' miracles, the evidence for the miracles of Christianity, and their superiority over non-Christian ones, see here and here. On prophecy fulfillment in particular, see here. And here on Jesus' resurrection.
Thursday, July 28, 2016
Beat the devil
William Holman Hunt (1827-1910) was a Victorian painter best-known for his famous Light of the World. To my knowledge, he was the most pious member of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. He made four trips to the Holy Land, which he used to lend verisimilitude to his paintings. For instance, his painting of The Scapegoat was set on the shores of the Dead Sea. The unforgiving landscape is authentic.
His Christian paintings harmonize realism with religious symbolism by evoking traditional typology. He encountered technical barriers in attempting to paint The Triumph of the Innocents. This painting blends elements of the Flight into Egypt with the Massacre of the Innocents. In this painting, the souls of the martyred children accompany the Holy Family into Egypt. There's an interplay between natural lighting (moonlight) with supernatural lightning (the nimbic aura of the sainted children).
In a letter, Hunt recounts an uncanny experience he had, when he felt he suddenly achieved a psychological and technical breakthrough. His experience reminds me of how Daniel's prayer was impeded by demonic opposition (Dan 10).
The story about the unaccountable noise, you will remember, I gave as an illustration of the degree to which the difficulty with my picture has distressed me. For four years this torment has been going on, wasting my life, and health, and powers, just when I believe they should be at the best, all through a stupid bit of temper on the part of a good friend. I don't like to hold him responsible, although his agency caused the beginning of my difficulties, but I have got into the way of thinking that it is one of many troubles during these seven years (balanced by much joy of my last four years) which the Father of Mischief himself only could contrive. What I told you is only a good story, as my impressions give the experience. It is not evidence, remember, one way or the other, although I give the exact truth. I was on Christmas Day induced to go and work at the studio because I had prepared a new plan of curing the twisted surface, and, till I could find it to be a practicable one, it was useless to turn to work which I had engagements to take up on the following days. When I arrived it was so dark that it was possible to do nothing, except with a candle held in my hand along with the palette. I laboured thus from about eleven. On getting to work I noticed the unusual quietness of the whole establishment, and I accounted for it by the fact that all other artists were with their families and friends. I alone was there at the group of studios because of this terrible and doubtful struggle with the devil, which, one year before, had brought me to the very portals of death ; indeed, almost, I may say, beyond these, during my delirium. Many days and nights too, till past midnight, at times in my large, dark studio in Jerusalem, had I stood with a candle, hoping to surmount the evil each hour, and the next day I had found all had fallen into disorder again, as though I had been vainly striving against destiny. The plan I was trying this Christmas morning I had never thought of before the current week, but it might be that even this also would fail. As I groaned over the thoughts of my pains, which were interwoven with my calculations of the result of the coming work over my fresh preparation of the ground, I gradually saw reason to think that it promised better, and I bent all my energies to advance my work to see what the later crucial touches would do. I hung back to look at my picture. I felt assured that I should succeed. I said to myself half aloud, "I think I have beaten the devil!" and stepped down, when the whole building shook with a convulsion, seemingly immediately behind my easel, as if a great creature were shaking itself and running between me and the door, I called out, "What is it?" but there was no answer, and the noise ceased. I then looked about ; it was between half-past one and two, and perfectly like night, only darker ; for ordinarily the lamps in the square show themselves after sunset, and on this occasion the fog hid everything. I went to the door, which was locked as I had left it, and I noticed that there was no sign of human or other creature being about. I went back to my work really rather cheered by the grotesque suggestion that came into my mind that the commotion was the evil one departing, and it was for this I told you the circumstance on the day of your visit. I do not pretend that this experience could be taken as evidence to support the doctrine of supernatural dealings with man. There might have been some disturbance of the building at that moment that caused the noise which I could not trace ; indeed, I did not take pains to do this. Half an hour afterwards I heard an artist, who works two studios past mine, come up the stair, and before he arrived by my door he said to some one with him, " It is no use going in, it is as dark as pitch," and they went down again. This was the only being that came to my floor during my whole stay, which was till 3.30. I perhaps should have taken more pains to explain the riddle, but while I quite accept the theory of gradual development in creation, I believe that there is a " divinity that shapes our ends " every day and every hour. So the question to me is not whether there was a devil or not, but whether that noise was opportune, for I still hope that the wicked one was defeated on Christmas morning about half-past one. Thus, you see what a child I am ! — Yours truly, W. Holman Hunt. William Minto, ed., Autobiographical notes of the life of William Bell Scott : and notices of his artistic and poetic circle of friends, 1830 to 1882 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1892), 2:229-31.
Wednesday, July 27, 2016
Tell me what's true
Some years ago a student came to me in anguish, confessing that he intended to convert from his Protestantism to Roman Catholicism. He was in anguish because, of course, this would cause some consternation, if not disruption, within his family and among his friends. I asked him why he planned to convert and he said “Because I need someone else to tell me what is true.” He clearly meant (and said) he wanted the pope to decide truth for him. First, with tongue in cheek, I offered to be his desired arbiter, decider, of truth. He declined my offer. Second, I pointed out to him that by deciding to convert he was deciding for himself what to believe about truth. He had not thought of that.
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2016/07/2-my-second-principle-only-i-can-decide-what-is-true-for-me/
Although this stands on its own two feet, it's worth making some additional points:
i) What's the goal? Is it to avoid believing falsehoods? But suppose the institution you choose to tell you what's true is unreliable? If the Roman Magisterium or Eastern Orthodox tradition is not a reliable arbiter of truth, then there's certainly no presumption that you will believe fewer falsehoods. If you rely on someone else to tell you what's true, and you pick the wrong horse, you can easily end up believing more falsehoods that if you use your own judgment.
ii) What makes some people think they have the right to contract out their beliefs to a second party? What if you are directly answerable to God for what you believe? What if God takes a dim view of people who give a religious institution a blank check? What if God didn't authorize you to delegate those decisions to someone else?
iii) Joining the church of Rome or the Orthodox church is not an alternative to denominationalism. Rather, you've decided to join the Roman Catholic denomination or the Eastern Orthodox denomination.
iv) Even if, hypothetically, the idea of a magisterium sounds preferable, if the actual candidate is demonstrably unreliable, then that's a nonstarter.
v) Does God hold you accountable for having false beliefs, or does God hold you accountable for why you believe it? Suppose you make a good faith effort to believe what's true. Will God condemn you if you made an innocent mistake? If you made the most of your limited opportunities, but failed to get it right, is that culpable? Is that what God cares about? Or was the fact that you were conscientious, that you did the best you could given your natural aptitude and the available evidence, praiseworthy even if you happen to be in error? How does Scripture prioritize our duties? For instance: Love God with all the heart and with all the understanding and with all the strength, and to love one’s neighbor as oneself, is much more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices (Mk 12:33). Here the key consideration is the motivation.
The end of freedom
I can't forecast the future with assurance, but here's a plausible trajectory, based on what we see happening in Europe and the UK. Muslim immigration will destroy a free and open society.
When Muslims immigrate to a Western country, they bring their social pathologies with them. Once the percentage of Muslims reaches a certain threshold, authorities confront a painful dilemma:
i) Take for granted that a certain incidence of Muslim-related rape, gang-rape, honor-killing, sex trafficking, and domestic jihadist attacks, &c., are now an ineradicable fixture of life in the host country. That's something the general public needs to get used to.
ii) Expel the Muslims.
The problem with (ii) is that if you wait until you have millions of Muslims in your country, expelling them will be very violent. Because (ii) is such a drastic options, authorities settle for (i).
Even if you restrict Muslim immigration, because they generally have higher birthrates than the locals, their percentage of the population will expand over time.
Having opted for (ii), this leads to certain policies:
1. At best, it becomes an exercise in keeping Muslim criminality at manageable levels. That includes no-go zones where police have simply written off certain areas.
2. Police will surveil Muslim communities. This, however, will give police a pretext to engage in dragnet surveillance of the general public. Everyone's communications and activities will be monitored.
3. Police won't protect you or your dependents from Muslim crime. Police won't allow you to protect yourself or your dependents from Muslim crime. Rather, the policy will be to appease Muslims to stave off rioting.
4. Speech and actions which Muslims deem to be provocative will be illegal. Muslims won't be punished for responding to (alleged) provocative speech and actions. Rather, the (alleged) provocateur will be punished.
5. The ruling class will find this arrangement preferable. A surveillance state and security state empowers the ruling class. In gives the ruling class the pretext and apparatus (e.g. security forces) to engage in social engineering to promote its utopian agenda. Members of the ruling class live in posh gated communities where they don't suffer the consequences of social policies they inflict on the general public. The ruling class will rarely encounter Muslims.
Tuesday, July 26, 2016
Choosing between Trump and Hillary
It's often said that choosing between Hillary and Trump is a choice between the lesser of two evils. But in actuality, we could argue that choosing between Hillary and Trump is a choice between two greater evils.
Treating people as means
I'll respond to a statement by a commenter on my blog:
A related objection that you (and others) might want to respond to is the claim that Christianity (and especially Calvinism) is evil because its God accepts the principle that "the ends justify the means" and that therefore the Christian God apparently practices a consequentialist morality. Finally, it seems to me that as Calvinists we can't evade the conclusion that God purposes to ultimately bless the elect at the expense of the non-elect/reprobate…How can we Calvinists respond to the charge made by atheists and Arminians (et al.) that that's immoral for God to do that?
i) Since many atheists subscribe to consequentialism, it's hard to see how an atheist is in any position to say Calvinism is evil because it (allegedly) operates with a consequentialist ethic. Consequentialism is compatible with atheism. Those are not opposing positions. Peter Singer is a secular consequentialist. Indeed, the most influential secular bioethicist of his generation. Even if an atheist rejects consequentialism, that's independent of atheism. So that goes to an intramural debate within atheism.
ii) Consider some standard definitions of consequentialism:
Consequentialism is the view that morality is all about producing the right kinds of overall consequences [IEP].
Whether an act is morally right depends only on consequences (as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act or anything that happens before the act) [SEP].
A critic has to show that according to Calvinism, God's actions are solely justified by the consequences. The fact that Calvinism has a teleological component doesn't make that the only consideration in Reformed theodicy.
iii) The onus is on the critic to defend Kantian deontologism. We can reject the proposition that the end always justifies the means without taking the polar opposite position that the end never justifies the means. That's a false dichotomy. Surely we can stake out a mediating position between those two extremes, viz. some ends justify some means.
For instance, suppose I'm morbidly obese. That's detrimental to my health, so I go on a diet. Doesn't the goal of lowering the risk to my health justify dieting as a means to that end?
iv) Perhaps, though, a critic will say he's not objecting to the principle in general, but to the specific case of using people as means rather than ends. But even on that restriction, is there something inherently wrong with using people as means? If I break my ankle skateboarding and go to the doctor for medical treatment, my aim is to repair the damage and receive painkillers, and I'm using the physician as a means to that end. But surely that's not immoral. So the critic will have to present a much narrower objection.
v) Perhaps his objection is that we should refrain from using people merely as means. Or we shouldn't use people without their consent.
If so, why should I accept that claim? For instance, even if (ex hypothesi) it's wrong to use innocent people as a means to an end, what about evil people? What if, by their evil, they have forfeited their prima facie immunity from harm? For instance, suppose a terror master uses couriers to send and receive messages. Suppose, unbeknownst to the courier, a counterterrorist organization plants a remote-control bomb on the courier so that when he visits the terror master, the bomb is detonated, killing the terrorist and thereby saving hundreds or thousands of innocent lives. That's using the courier as a means to an end, but so what? The courier is culpable for working with the notorious terrorist.
Likewise, what if a country is dominated by two drug cartels. The authorities lack the wherewithal to defeat the cartels directly. Instead, they stage a hit on one cartel to make it look like it was attacked by the other cartel. That foments a war between the two cartels. They destroy each other. Although that's a ruthless tactic, since both cartels are evil, what's wrong with using them against each other to destroy each other?
vi) Finally, freewill theists like Jerry Walls and William Lane Craig resort to an end-justifies-the-means theodicy, in which God creates a minority of hellbound humans as a means of producing a majority of heavenbound humans. The salvation of the many comes on the backs of the damned. So they're in no position to attack Calvinism for utilizing a principle which they themselves utilize:
Indeed, God did not have to create and in doing so he clearly thought it was “worth it.” So if my view entails that God did not do all he could have done to prevent the damnation of the lost simply because he did not refrain from creating at all, I plead guilty…Given that God does not control the counterfactuals of freedom, perhaps there are no actualizable worlds in which he can save all free persons. Indeed, if part of our freedom includes the freedom to choose whom to marry, and with whom to procreate, perhaps we play a significant role in determining which persons will be born, and thus which persons God can actualize. In that case, God actualizes the world in which he can save many people while minimizing the number of the damned. Perhaps God was faced with the choice between this sort of world and none at all, and he judged it “worth it” to create. I think this is not merely possible, but plausible.
http://evangelicalarminians.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Walls.-Pharoaohs-Magicians.-Response-to-Cowan-and-Welty.pdf
Moreover, it is far from obvious that God's being all-loving compels Him to prefer a world in which no one goes to hell over a world in which some people do. Suppose that God could create a world in which everyone is freely saved, but there is only one problem: all such worlds have only one person in them! Does God's being all-loving compel Him to prefer one of these underpopulated worlds over a world in which multitudes are saved, even though some people freely go to hell? I don't think so. God's being all-loving implies that in any world He creates He desires and strives for the salvation of every person in that world. But people who would freely reject God's every effort to save them shouldn't be allowed to have some sort of veto power over what worlds God is free to create. Why should the joy and the blessedness of those who would freely accept God's salvation be precluded because of those who would stubbornly and freely reject it? It seems to me that God's being all-loving would at the very most require Him to create a world having an optimal balance between saved and lost, a world where as many as possible freely accept salvation and as few as possible freely reject it.
Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/can-a-loving-god-send-people-to-hell-the-craig-bradley-debate#ixzz4FXAqTPTD
Monday, July 25, 2016
Is God exempt?
I'll respond to a statement that a commenter left on my blog:
I'm not sure how to answer the atheist objection that it's special pleading and ad hoc to appeal to God's special prerogatives (as God) to get out of the dilemma that the types of evils God allows/permits (and ordains in the case of Calvinism) would be evil on our part if we allowed or planned them but somehow not evil for God if He allows or plans/ordains them.
I believe that by faith, but I'm not sure how to rationally defend that to an atheist (though, it's much easier against an Arminian who accepts Biblical authority). Especially if I include in the problem of evil the uniquely Calvinistic view of reprobation (and pre-damnation as some Calvinists make a distinction).
The atheist question is "How does appealing to God's superior ontology and status as Creator, the most perfect and supreme being and who is allegedly the standard of goodness exempt Him from being guilty of evil for allowing and ordaining such things when of all beings in existence He's the most capable of preventing them?" It's not merely that God is supposed to be guilty, but especially guilty because God, in His omnipotence, can prevent them from occurring.
And in the case of Calvinism, God doesn't passively permit, but actively ordains evils and reprobation. As I've been asked, "How can Calvinists claim God is good with a straight face?" Allegedly, there's cognitive dissonance involved.
Ryan Hedrich already gave a good response. Now for me:
i) It's true that some Calvinists are too quick to invoke divine authority as a solution. Although that response is true at a certain level, it's not an explanation, and it's only persuasive for someone who already agrees with the theological framework–yet that's the very issue in dispute.
In fairness, I've seen Arminians stipulate that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting inscrutable evils. But, of course, that appeal has no explanatory value, and begs the question. Likewise, Marilyn McCord Adams contends that divine and human goods are ontologically incommensurate. So these maneuvers are hardly confined to Calvinists.
ii) Suppose you have a fictional character in a story who enjoys foresight regarding the future. To be precise, he foresees two possible futures: what will transpire if he intervenes and what will transpire if he doesn't intervene. He often finds himself in situations where he could prevent some tragedy, yet he refrains from doing so. For instance, he sees a house fire. He's in a position to rescue one of the children who's trapped inside. Yet he does nothing. To outside observers, his inaction appears to be reprehensible.
But here's the dilemma: what if by preventing a short-term evil he causes a long-term evil or preempts a second-order good? Whenever he intervenes, there are tradeoffs. By preventing harm to some people, his action has the side-effect of harming others, or eliminating some resultant good.
What if he knows that the child, had he survived, would have a tenth-generation descendent who's a serial killer? Or what if he knows that if the child dies, the parents will procreate another child to take the place of the child they lost in the house fire. If he intervenes, he deprives the replacement child of existence. So which life takes precedence? On either scenario, someone loses out. Someone will benefit from his action or be harmed by his action. There's no timeline that secures all the same goods while eliminating every evil. In each alternate timeline, some evils are offset by some goods while some goods come at the cost of some evils.
A fallen world is a network of good and evil. Some evils cause some goods. Some goods cause some evils. Some goods preempt other goods.
iii) Or suppose you had a video game with artificially intelligent characters. Should the gamer forestall harm to his characters? Well, that depends. The game has a plot. One thing leads to another. Some characters come into existence as a result of what other characters do, including the actions of villainous characters. You might even have the heroic son of a villainous father. By preventing certain harms to certain characters, the gamer is robbing some potential characters of existence. Likewise, by eliminating all the villains, he eliminates some of the heroes, whose existence is contingent on the prior actions of the bad guys. Some good guys wouldn't exist if some bad guys didn't exist. Suppose a bad guy kills the boyfriend of a female character. As a result, she marries someone else, and has a son by him, who turns out to be a hero. (Or has a daughter who turns out to be a heroine.) In this case, preventing one murder takes another life. So eliminating some evils must be balanced off the resultant goods that you thereby eliminate, or alternative evils that take their place.
iv) The fact that humans are related to other humans, whereas God is inhuman, can in some measure justify differential treatment. To take a few examples, suppose a grown son commits a heinous murder. He is sentenced to death. It would be cruel to require his family to carry out the sentence. It's better to delegate execution to a disinterested third-party.
Likewise, suppose you're given a choice between saving your mother's life and saving the lives of fifty innocent people. Objectively speaking, it could be argued that saving fifty innocent lives is better, or more obligatory, than saving one life. But it would be unbearable for a son to sacrifice his own mother to save fifty strangers. Moreover, it's not even clear that his duty to the common good overrides his filial duty.
There are situations in which in would be right for an angel or an alien from Alpha Centuri to do something which would be wrong for a human to do, precisely because the alien or angel isn't human. He doesn't have the same social obligations or emotional investments where humans are concerned. He can act with greater moral detachment.
v) Finally, everyone who suffers evil is evil in some degree. Take a mob family. Mothers, fathers, aunts, uncles, husbands, wives, siblings, cousins. Some members of the mob family may be much more evil than others. Still, there's a sense in which none of them deserves to be immune from harm. And some of them richly deserved to be harmed.
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