Tuesday, July 22, 2014
Monday, July 21, 2014
Prophetic gaps
In Jewish and Christian tradition, Gabriel's promise has been applied rather to later events: the birth of the Messiah, Jesus' death and resurrection, the fall of Jerusalem, various subsequent historical events, and the still-future manifesting of the messiah. Exegetically such views are mistaken. The detail of vv24-27 fits the second-century BC crisis and agrees with allusions to this crisis elsewhere in Daniel. The verses do not indicate that they are looking centuries or millennia beyond the period to which chaps. 8 and 10–12 refer…The passage refers to the Antiochene crisis. J. Goldingay, Daniel (Word 1989), 267.
i) I've discussed this before, but now I'd like to approach it from a general angle. Goldingay is making a specific claim about Daniel, but the same issue crops up regarding various OT and NT prophecies. Are conservatives inserting ad hoc gaps or intervals in prophecy as a face-saving device?
ii) Liberals like Goldingay take this position because they don't believe in predictive prophecy. They think these are failed prophecies or prophecies ex eventu.
However, even if one takes that secular position, a scholar ought to ask himself how, for the sake of argument, the prophecy would be expressed any differently, if at all, if it were, in fact, a long-range prophecy. Notice Goldingay assumes that if the verses were looking far ahead, there'd be some indication to that effect. But is that the case?
iii) Let's assume God knows the future. Let's assume he sometimes reveals the future to a prophet. These sometimes refer to the near future, sometimes to the distant future. Or there might be a series of oracles that span a long stretch of time.
As a rule, would the prophet know how soon these will be fulfilled? Unless the prophecy is worded in terms that clearly refer to events within the lifetime of the prophet or his immediate audience, I don't see why. Moreover, even long-range prophecy might be worded in contemporary terms for the sake of intelligibility.
iv) To approach this from the opposite direction–as indeed we must–knowing the interval between prediction and fulfillment is usually a retrospective rather than prospective assessment. After it happens, or after a significant time has elapsed since the oracle was issued, we can say how long it took or how long it is taking.
But that's not something a prophet can generally surmise looking forward. Rather, that's something we discern looking back. Since a prophet rarely knows in advance how long it will take, we wouldn't expect him to posit a gap or lengthy interval, even if, as it turns out, this is a long-range prophecy. From his standpoint, he can't tell if this is a short-term or long-term prophecy. He may state one thing after another, not because one thing happens right after another, but simply to indicate the relative sequence. One thing happens before or after another, without implying how much earlier or later.
Conservative Christians aren't inserting gaps or intervals. Rather, with the passage of time, the duration becomes clearer. We know something the prophet didn't, because God didn't reveal the timing to the prophet. Our hindsight complements his foresight. And that's in the nature of long-range prophecy. Often the prophetic referent, whether short-term or long-term, only emerges with the passage of time. Only time will tell.
Deceiving the nations
The "binding" of Satan in a way that keeps him from "deceiving the nations" (Rev 20:2-3) serves well as a description of the present age, in which the gospel is being spread to all the peoples of the world. In previous ages, the message of redemption was essentially confined to the borders of a single nation of the world. But now all nations are the privileged possessors of God's saving grace…Jesus himself referred to the binding of Satan in connection with the overthrow of his evil kingdom during his own earthly ministry (Mt 12:28-29). His disciples rejoiced in the fact that even the demons were subject to them (Lk 10:17-18). When Greeks came to him, Jesus declared that "now" the prince of this world would be cast out, and that when he was lifted up, he would draw all men to himself (Jn 12:31-32). Clearly the power to deceive the nations has been broken. O. P. Robertson, The Israel of God, 161-62.
Satan is bound, meaning that his power to influence the nations is suppressed. Premillennialists and some postmillennialists associate this event with the advent of an extraordinary future era of peace and prosperity, contrasting with the present (1 Thess. 2:18; 1 Pet. 5:8). But amillennial interpretation, the binding of Satan has already taken place through Christ’s death and resurrection (John 12:31; cf. Col. 2:15; Rev. 12:9; Matt. 12:29). The present spread of the gospel to the nations, as initiated in Acts, is the result of a restriction on Satan’s power to deceive. Possibly this restriction on Satan’s power is closely associated with the present temporary demise of the Beast (17:8). The deceiving of the nations takes place largely through the activity of the Beast (13:14; 16:14; 19:20). As the Beast can suffer repeated defeats (17:8, 10), so Satan can suffer repeated defeats in his power over the nations. The loosing of Satan in 20:7-10 represents his final attempt, leading to his final defeat.
http://www.frame-poythress.org/ebooks/the-returning-king/
i) Premills remain unconvinced. For one thing, they point out that the binding and loosing of Satan involves a three-stage sequence:
Satan unbound>Satan bound>Satan unbound
In other words, the binding of Satan presumes that he was unbound prior to his binding. And that, in turn, is followed by his release.
By contrast, the amil interpretation is gradualistic, with the progressive spread of the Gospel. That fails to do justice to the alternating pattern.
We could raise some additional objections:
ii) Rather than interpreting this passage of Revelation in relation to Revelation itself, the amil interpretation relies on passages outside of Revelation.
iii) Moreover, Robertson's projection is too schematic and idealistic. The history of Christian mission doesn't reflect the stately progress of the Gospel, where Satan's dominions fall one after another like dominos to the inexorable advance of the Gospel. What we actually witness is ground won and ground lost. Reversals. Countries or people-groups which had been pagan are evangelized. Yet after a few centuries, they may revert. It's not as if we win a nation or ethnic group to the Gospel, lock in our gains, then proceed to the next frontier. Formerly Christian countries or ethnicities may commit national apostasy or be conquered by militant followers of a new false prophet.
iv) In fairness to the amil interpretation, it's not as if the premil interpretation is without internal difficulties. After the enemies are decimated in Rev 19, followed by a spiritual renaissance in 20:4-6, the enemies in vv7-10 seem to spring up out of nowhere.
I still think an amil interpretation is defensible, but it needs to be retooled.
i) It's precarious to press the sequence in Revelation. For one thing, this book is an anthology of visions. John saw one thing, then another, then another. His visions are collected in the book. But what this or that discrete vision refers to may be independent of the sequence in which the visions are collected and ordered. Think of other prophetic anthologies in Scripture. Eventually, a prophet's disparate oracles are combined in one book. But the editorial arrangement isn't the same thing as the historical sequence in which they were received, delivered, or denote.
ii) In addition, John incorporates material from several sources. The reason scenes are arranged in a particular order in Rev 19-22 is because, to some degree, he is imitating Ezk 37-48. Moreover, he intercalates material from Isaiah, Zechariah, &c. So the sequence is arguably a bit arbitrary, inasmuch as he must find some place or another to wedge this material.
iii) I think it's better to understand the binding and loosing of Satan as a discrete vision (among others), "interrupted" by vv4-6, which presents a repeatable principle in church history. In this struggle, both sides score temporary victories and setbacks. The boundaries of Satan's kingdom expand and contract throughout the course of church history. He is pushed back for a time. In retreat. Then he rallies and rebounds. There's no consistent pattern. No permanent borders.
Thankfully, this won't go on indefinitely.
Daniel and Jerusalem
The climax to which chap. 8 looks lies in the crisis in the second century BC…The Antiochene crisis is heralded by the death of one high priest and the wickedness of another (26)…its real focus lies on the events of the 160s.
In Jewish and Christian tradition, Gabriel's promise has been applied rather to later events: the birth of the Messiah, Jesus' death and resurrection, the fall of Jerusalem, various subsequent historical events, and the still-future manifesting of the messiah. Exegetically such views are mistaken. The detail of vv24-27 fits the second-century BC crisis and agrees with allusions to this crisis elsewhere in Daniel. The verses do not indicate that they are looking centuries or millennia beyond the period to which chaps. 8 and 10–12 refer…The passage refers to the Antiochene crisis. J. Goldingay, Daniel (Word 1989), 266-67.
That's the standard liberal interpretation. Ironically, it backfires even on its own terms, posing a dilemma for the liberal interpretation. In particular:
And the people of the prince who is to come shall destroy the city and the sanctuary. Its end shall come with a flood, and to the end there shall be war. (Dan 9:26).
This predicts the destruction of the Second Temple as well as the destruction of Jerusalem. Problem is, neither event took place during the Antiochean crisis. And this isn't some incidental detail, given the central importance of both in Judaism.
If, according to the liberal reconstruction, the anonymous author of Daniel was writing "prophecy" after the fact, if he was writing history in the guise of prophecy, how could he be so inaccurate about something so important and so well-known–both to himself and his immediate audience?
Since, moreover, as Goldingay rightly points out, we need to interpret these verses as a literary unit, if 9:26 doesn't fit the 2C BC situation, then that reorients the other passages. In retrospect, Dan 9:26 is a prediction which was actually fulfilled in the Fall of Jerusalem (70 AD) and Bar Kokhba revolt (132-36 AD).
Sunday, July 20, 2014
The Garner Files
A few observations about the late James Garner.
He's a throwback to the kind of male actor you rarely see anymore. As I've often remarked, for some time now Hollywood has been picking actors and actresses who look like perpetual high school students. By contrast, Gardner was unmistakably a grown man.
A 6' 3" former high school football player, his hardscrabble childhood, working-class Southern background, experience as a manual laborer, and decorated Korean war vet, gave him a natural down-to-earth charm and manliness that's almost extinct in today's TV dramas and Hollywood movies.
And that, in turn, accounts for his longevity. Nowadays, most male movie stars lack staying power. They are very successful in their 20s and 30s, but their career bottoms out after they hit 40 (give or take). They cast about for some new vehicle to recharge their stalled career. But, of course, you can only retain the boyish looks for so long. If that's what you made your career on, you will wash out half way through the lifecycle. They grow old without growing up. They just look like over-the-hill teenagers.
He's also a man who remained married to his first wife for over 50 years. No small achievement in Tinseltown.
There's a somewhat random quality to his career. He's not the kind of guy who planned his life out. To a great extent he just let life happen to him. To be sure, he had a wily eye for opportunities. He made the most of lucky breaks. But had the timing been a bit different here and there, he would have ended the way he began: a drifter, never amounting to anything.
He was enormously successful in TV and film, and perennially popular, yet there's something sad about his life and death, because it's ultimately so aimless and ephemeral. The lack of Christian purpose. Christian vision.
From what I've read, he was a nominal Methodist. Unbelievers treat life like a lump sum payment. You only get so much. It's up to you how you spend it. Up to you how fast you spend it. Once it's gone it's gone. Don't look ahead. Live for the moment. He led a life that's simultaneously full and empty.
Random mercy
Findo It seems an odd sort of justice which makes it monstrous to give what is deserved.
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-1-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1486096392
Roger Olson So what you would think of a judge who, faced with a group of men deserving condemnation and liable to execution, randomly chose some to pardon, leaving the others to their deserved fate? Not monstrous?
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-1-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1489701273
Olson is posing a rhetorical question. Obviously, he thinks it would be "monstrous" to randomly pardon some while leaving the others to their deserved fate.
i) Since he considers that scenario to be "monstrous," what's his non-monstrous alternative? The way he frames the issue stands in implicit contrast to whatever he deems to be the acceptable alternative.
ii) On the face of it, the key consideration seems to be the randomness" of the selection process. Presumably, he doesn't think it's inherently monstrous to pardon some people but punish others. Rather, that's only monstrous in cases where you do so at random.
"Random" stands in contrast to what? Well, his hypothetical is an allegory for unconditional election, which he considers "arbitrary." The alternative is conditional election, where God chooses whom to save or damn based on what he sees (or foresees) in them.
So, by parity of argument, the non-monstrous alternative to randomly pardoning some but punishing others is to pardon or punish based on what the judge sees in them. So how does that apply to his hypothetical? Since his hypothetical stipulates that the men in question "deserve condemnation," are "liable to execution," which is their "deserved fate," then, presumably, it would be "monstrous" to pardon any of them.
iii) That raises an interesting question. Since his hypothetical is an allegory for unconditional election, doesn't his position commit him to the belief that conditional election is just as monstrous as unconditional election? After all, if everyone is a sinner who deserves condemnation, yet God pardons some while leaving others to their equally deserved fate, isn't that "monstrous" on Olson's own grounds? If God sees (or foresees) the same thing in everyone, because everyone deserves condemnation, then by Olson's logic, God is monstrous unless he damns everyone.
iv) Perhaps Olson will say God foresaw that some would accept the Gospel while others reject the Gospel. So that's the difference.
But that's not a difference in terms of who is deserving of condemnation. Acceptance doesn't make them innocent. So how does that difference salvage Olson's argument (assuming that's his argument)?
v) Keep in mind, too, that Arminianism is not committed to penal substitution. Penal substitution is not an Arminian essential. So Olson can't say conditional election is not monstrous because Christ paid the penalty for the sins of future believers. For that would make the moral licitness of Arminian election contingent on a theory of the atonement which many Arminians past and present (e.g. Grotius, Miley, Grider, Green, Rauser) reject.
vi) Olson evidently takes the position that it would be better to punish ten guilty men than show mercy to nine out of ten, or show mercy to one out of ten.
But in that event, isn't the very concept of mercy "monstrous"? If mercy pardons someone in spite of their guilt, how is that different from an unconditional pardon?
If pardon and punishment ought to be conditioned on what the judge sees in the accused, and if the defendant is worthy of condemnation, then by Olson's logic, isn't mercy intrinsically monstrous? By definition, mercy treats people better than they deserve. Does Olson think the Biblical concept of mercy is "monstrous"?
vii) Why does Olson think that if a judge, faced with a group of men deserving condemnation and liable to execution, randomly chose some to pardon, leaving the others to their deserved fate, that would be monstrous?
Does he think randomness per se is unjust or unfair because it treats people unequally? Inequitable treatment is unjust or unfair if the parties in question are alike (i.e. worthy of condemnation)?
If that's his intuition, I'd simply note that randomness often has the polar opposite function. In human affairs, we use randomizing devices, not because randomness is unfair, but because randomizing the outcome makes the situation fairer.
There are situations where the order in which something happens will confer a competitive advantage on one side or the other. Who goes first, who goes second, who goes last, can be advantageous or disadvantageous. Who gets the first pick. Who gets the last pick. Which debater makes the final closing statement. Who plays defense, who plays offense.
Neither side as a right to go first, second, or last. One team isn't more deserving than another. Yet someone has to go first, second, or last, and order in which that happens will confer an unfair advantage or disadvantage on the respective teams.
One traditional way of resolving the unfairness is a coin toss. Flipping a coin is a randomizing device which equalizes the chance of going first, second, or last. That's a way of making an unfair situation more fair. A blind, unbiased procedure. Although the outcome will confer a subsequent advantage on one side, neither side has an antecedent advantage on how the coin will land (heads or tails).
Likewise, a stacked deck is unfair precisely because it isn't random. That's why the deck should be shuffled and reshuffled. The sequence of the cards is supposed to be "arbitrary." That's why you should replace an old deck with a new deck (since old, creased, or dog-eared cards are equivalent to marked cards). Same thing with loaded dice.
It's the randomness in games of chance that makes them fair. Everyone has the same odds of winning or losing.
Another example is the waiting list for organs. There are not enough donated organs to go around. So it has to be rationed. There are, of course, criteria. Some candidates are more suitable than others. Some candidates are more urgent than others. That can bumped you up the list.
But you're bound have situations with equally qualified patients. Yet one gets lucky, and the other gets unlucky. Even in life and death situations, an element of randomness is sometimes the fairest solution.
Olson acts as if randomness is the antithesis of fairness, yet in many situations, we use randomizing devices to make it fair.
I'm not saying unconditional election is random. But even if (ex hypothesi) it were random, that, of itself, isn't "monstrous" or unfair. For randomness, of itself, isn't "monstrous" or unfair. At best, Olson would need to explain how randomness is "monstrous" under those particular circumstances.
viii) Apropos (vii), "random" is often treated as synonym for "aimless," "purposeless," "fortuitous," "unplanned," "undirected," "unpremeditated," "indiscriminate," "hit-and-miss,"&c.
Clearly, though, unconditional election isn't indiscriminate or hit-and-miss. To the contrary, Arminians complain that unconditional election is too discriminatory!
Likewise, unconditional election isn't unplanned, undirected, &c. To the contrary, this is God's antemundane plan for the some humans–in contrast to his equally premeditated design for the reprobate.
ix) In addition, the popular connotations of randomness fail to distinguish between a process and the function of a process. Let's go back to randomizing devices like flipping a coin or shuffling a deck. That's both a purposeful process and a random process. And that's not a contradiction in terms. Although the process itself is random, the process serves a purpose. There's a purpose behind the process. A coin toss is random, but it's not pointless. It's a means to an end. A method of conflict resolution.
Because the method is random, that makes it unbiased. Fair.
x) In principle, one could show mercy "at random" to underscore the fact that no one deserves it. If nobody has a claim on your mercy, then picking recipients at random makes that very point. It could just as well have been someone else. Grace is truly gratuitous.
I'm not saying unconditional election is random. Rather, I'm saying that even if (ex hypothesi) unconditional election were random, that wouldn't be pointless or unjust.
Saturday, July 19, 2014
From wrath to grace
There's been a public dustup between Scott Oliphint and Paul Helm on classical theism. As a rule, I prefer Helm's understanding of God's relation to time and space. But I think both men are making some mistakes in this particular dispute:
So the truth about atonement, about reconciliation to God, has to be represented to us as if it implied a change in God, and so an inconsistency, an apparent contradiction, in his actions towards us. But in fact there is no change in God; he loves us from eternity. There is however, a change in us, a change that occurs as by faith Christ's work is appropriated. The change is not from wrath to grace, but from our belief that we are under wrath to our belief that we are under grace (Paul Helm, John Calvin's Ideas, 395).Does Helm mean to say (or does he argue that Calvin says) that when Scripture says that God's people were under wrath prior to their conversion (e.g., Eph. 2:3), that what we're meant to think is only that we believed we were under wrath? And are we then meant to read Scripture so that, at conversion, our belief changed to thinking we are under grace? We are surely not to think, says Helm, that God's disposition toward us has changed from wrath to grace.
http://www.reformation21.org/articles/tolle-lege-a-brief-response-to-paul-helm.php
i) One source of confusion is equivocation over the nature of God's "wrath." Do we understand God's "wrath" as a particular kind of divine emotion (or attitude)? If so, does God become angry, then cease to be angry?
Speaking for myself, I think Scripture uses divine wrath as a colorful synonym for divine judgment. Take this example:
Behold, the name of the Lord comes from afar, burning with his anger, and in thick rising smoke; his lips are full of fury, and his tongue is like a devouring fire (Isa 30:27).
Here the "wrath" of God represents God visiting judgment on sinners. Divine "wrath" is manifestation of divine judgment. God's impending wrath is equivalent to his impending judgment. It's not that he has an emotional state which comes and goes, within himself; rather, judgment comes and goes, outside himself. Judgment coming or falling upon sinners.
ii) This brings us to the next point. We need to distinguish between "God's disposition toward us" and the objective expression of his disposition. The expression of his disposition can change without a corresponding change in God himself. Judgment takes place in time, in history.
What does it mean to be "under God's wrath"? What does it mean to be "under God's grace"?
The "transition from wrath to grace" paraphrases a passage from Ephesians. Paul is writing to converts from raw paganism. And in chaps. 2 & 4, he vividly describes the before and after. Their mindset and lifestyle before God saved them. In that sense, they were living under God's wrath before he saved them. That was an objective experience. And that stands in contrast to their experience of spiritual renewal. Living under God's grace. For instance:
And you were dead in the trespasses and sins 2 in which you once walked, following the course of this world, following the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that is now at work in the sons of disobedience— 3 among whom we all once lived in the passions of our flesh, carrying out the desires of the body and the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind. 4 But God, being rich in mercy, because of the great love with which he loved us, 5 even when we were dead in our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ—by grace you have been saved— 6 and raised us up with him and seated us with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus (Eph 2:1-6).
17 Now this I say and testify in the Lord, that you must no longer walk as the Gentiles do, in the futility of their minds. 18 They are darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them, due to their hardness of heart. 19 They have become callous and have given themselves up to sensuality, greedy to practice every kind of impurity (Eph 4:17-19).
3 For we ourselves were once foolish, disobedient, led astray, slaves to various passions and pleasures, passing our days in malice and envy, hated by others and hating one another. 4 But when the goodness and loving kindness of God our Savior appeared, 5 he saved us, not because of works done by us in righteousness, but according to his own mercy, by the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit (Tit 3:3-5).
This is perfectly consistent with predestination. A predestined change from unregenerate and vile to regenerate and sanctified. It's not a change to the decree, but a change within the decree. God intended all along to save these heathen Gentiles. But he didn't regenerate or sanctify them from the moment of conception. He didn't raise them in the church. Until adulthood, he left them in a state of internal and external depravity.
God didn't change his mind or disposition. He had this in mind from all eternity. Rather, God willed a change in their condition.
Reformed statecraft
In assessing the influence of Calvinism in the development of modern democracy, we must give our attention, first of all, to the twin pillars upon which democracy rests: (1) the idea of limited sovereignty, of a government under law, of limits beyond which government cannot go and to which it must conform; (2) the right of resistance when these limits are exceeded. These two concepts do not constitute the length and breadth of democracy, but they are the foundation stones upon which democracy rests. Winthrop S. Hudson, "Democratic Freedom and Religious Faith in the Reformed Tradition," Church History 15, no. 3 (1946): 181-2.
HT: Andrew Fulford
Guiding light
Some of the depositions spoke of miraculous sightings, of lights appearing in the sky to guide the Camisards through the dark of night past Catholic troops, and other supernatural phenomena. Claude Arnassan from Montel recounted that he had spent three years in Marseille as a galley slave, the penalty for having fought in Rolland Cavalier's troop. While soldiering, he had witnessed lights like torches in the sky, which appeared fortuitously on occasion: "He was no sooner on his knees, than there appeared in the air a light, like a large star, which advanced, pointing to the place where the assembly was met." As he was leaving, a young inspiré told Arnassan of a vision he had experienced, in which he saw that Arnassan would be imprisoned unless he immediately put himself back under Cavalier's leadership. Shortly after, he was jailed in Nîmes until 1704, Jacques Du Bois, who made his way from Montpellier to Geneva and then to London, witnessed "balls of fire fall from heaven to dazzle the eyes of their enemies" on several occasions. Similarly, Guillaume Bruguier, who had been captured at Usez, incarcerated for three months, then impressed into the king's service in Spain before deserting near Portugal, was guided in his flight by "Le Ciel": "I saw, as it were, stars directing toward the place, where it was, which I always looked upon as a guide, and never failed to find it true."C. Randall, From a Far Country: Camisards and Huguenots in the Atlantic World (University of Georgia Press 2011), 53.
French Protestants suffering intense persecution and martyrdom for their faith from the Catholic authorities. Although I certainly allow for the possibility that some of these accounts are fanciful or legendary, I think they're plausible. I find it believable that God would perform miracles like this to encourage Christians suffering severe persecution for the faith.
These reported miracles are interesting in part because they evoke Biblical parallels. For instance, God using astronomical portents and prodigies to confound enemy troops. Likewise, functional similarities with the Star of Bethlehem.
Liberal Bible scholars dismiss astronomical miracles as mythical or rhetorical, so it's striking to read about prima facie corroborative evidence in the annals of church history.
What would happen if we could arrange the atoms one by one the way we want them?
Some may already be familiar with Richard Feynman's classic lecture on nanotechnology (1959), which, by the way, contains assumptions as well as ideas overlapping with ID:
Modern-day Huguenot
Friday, July 18, 2014
Let God Arise
Claude Arnassan recalled accompanying some men from Cavalier's troop to a place where they expected to find an assembly, but getting lost along the way. One of their number urged them: "My bothers, pray God and he will guide us." No sooner had they fallen to their knees "when there appeared a light in the air, like a large star, which moved toward the place where the Assembly was, a half league from there. As soon as this celestial flame disappeared, we heard the signing of psalms and joined our brothers."
This was nowhere more clearly demonstrated than by the most famous miracle of the entire period, in August 1703, when Pierre Claris repeated the miracle described in the OT book of Daniel (3:23-8) by placing himself in a fire and emerging unscathed. Several historians have discussed this particular event… [e.g. Georgia Cosmos, "Trial by fire at Sérignan: an apocalyptic event in the Cévennes war and its echoes abroad," Proceedings of the Huguenot Society, 27/5 (2002), 642-58].
Pine cones and other combustibles were gathered and lit, and Claris stepped into the fire, continuing to prophesy until the fire had burned itself out…All of the prophets who were present and who later testified for Misson's Théâtre sacre left behind vivid accounts of his miracle, and Antoine Court remarked that "this event had a large impact in the providence and was attested by a large number of witnesses."
Court, the Protestant historian whom Joutard credited with writing the first "modern" history of the conflict, had considerable doubts. "But," he wrote, "by the information I have gathered, the truth is here altered: first, Claris did not stay in the fire; second, he entered it twice; third, he burned his arm and was obliged to stop in Pierredon and put on a dressing." Court, the rationalist pastor who fought much of his life against the prophetism that had fired the rebellion, was a concerned to show its fallacies as the witnesses in the Théâtre sacre were to show its accuracy. W. Gregory Monahan. Let God Arise: The War and Rebellion of the Camisards (Oxford 2014), 98-99.
The English translation of Le Théâtre sacré des Cévennes, accomplished by John Lacy, was entitled A Cry from the Desart. The most serious omission of the work, in terms of its English readership, is the collector of testimony’s preface, “Au Lecteur.” This piece is an integral part of the original which describes the aims of the work, its historical significance and the immediate context in which the depositions were collected in London. Contemporary reactions to désert prophecy (traced in chapter seven),[1] are central for an understanding of the circumstances which compelled Misson to undertake the collection of sworn evidence from former inhabitants from the region who claimed to have witnessed miraculous phenomena in the Cévennes. Witnesses who came forward between November 1706 and March 1707 to give testimony were cautioned against making false or inaccurate statements; they were to report “la vérité pure et simple” speaking only of events they could distinctly remember (pp. 24-7).
The texts of the Théâtre sacré confirm earlier contemporary reports documenting the occurrence of prophesying in adjacent provinces: the phenomenon had first appeared after the Revocation in 1688 in the Dauphiné, after which it spread to the Vivarais and Velay. The outbreak of prophesying in the Cévennes after 1700 was perceived by believers to be of a similar nature to the “miracles” which had occurred earlier in these provinces. Witnesses’ accounts of these events in their depositions reflect understandings of unified dimensions of time (pp. 34-6).
The depositions of the Théâtre sacré are distinct from records of interrogation held in archival repositories in France (p. 2). They are voluntary testimonies given by French exiles in London. It should be emphasized that most were collected after the act proclaimed against the Camisard inspirés in the Savoy church in January 1707. In all probability, witnesses were not unaware of the action taken against the three men by the ministry of this church. At the time of the collection of the depositions, it is unlikely that any of the witnesses could have imagined that they would later be summoned to verify their statements many of which were given under oath before Masters in Chancery (p. 166).
Only five out of the total number of witnesses who gave depositions for the Théâtre sacré gave declarations in support of assertions in the Examen du Théâtre sacre, a pamphlet published anonymously in London in 1708 (p. 170). Denial of former testimony was prompted by the very real fear of reprisal by the consistory. Evidence in consistorial records, for example, reveals that action was taken against persons who continued to attend the inspirés’ meetings after their denunciation by the ministry of the refugee churches (p. 168). It is also not inconceivable that witnesses could have denied their former statements so as to avoid further involvement in this controversial affair.
In my account of this event in Huguenot Prophecy, I locate this story within the context of the apocalyptic piety of the désert and also show how its reception in London provoked requests for verification of the miracle.
http://www.h-france.net/vol6reviews/Vol6no52cosmos.pdf
This is a good example of how to sift testimonial evidence for modern miracles:
i) Both Gregory Monahan and Georgia Cosmos are historians who specialize in this period. Their monographs have been published by prestigious academic publishing houses, which certainly have no bias in favor of miracles. Their studies are based on primary source material and eyewitness accounts.
ii) I don't think it's coincidental that we have reported miracles among the Huguenots and the Covenanters. I think it's antecedently more likely that God will perform encouraging miracles for Christians facing dire persecution.
iii) Cosmos discusses both the disincentive to lie under oath as well as the incentive to recant former testimony if the witness feels threatened by the escalating controversy.
iv) Monahan records the reservations of a skeptic. But he doesn't state Antoine Court's source of information. We should take those objections into account in assessing the credibility of the reported miracle. By the same token, we should take his hostile agenda into account.
Correcting Fred's falsehoods
I'm going to briefly comment on some accusations Fred Butler made on Facebook:
ii) I'm not getting my info "filtered through the ramblings of a notorious JMac critic/troll." My primary source of info. is Phil Johnson. Phil contacted me, and I asked him some questions. I then posted my correspondence.
- Fred Butler I know Phil has interacted with Steve via personal email on this. Steve is getting his info filtered through the ramblings of a notorious JMac critic/troll.
- But let's say JMac does make 2 million a year. Ummm. So what, exactly? How is his salary have any bearing on the reputation of his ministry? How exactly would his salary of such an amount keep him from honestly criticizing the emperor decadence of the charismatic tv preachers? I happen to know someone who is extremely close to Benny Hinn, and he doesn't live modestly at all and the criticism about the money he fleeces from his followers is spot on.
- BTW, do all of us who actually work for the guy, who have been watching him pastor for now 20 years (as for me) Phil who has been working for the guy 30 plus year have any credibility when we say the nonsense that Steve raises is grossly exaggerated? Or are we part of the money machine covering our treasure box? That of course would then cast dispersion on our own Christian reputation,
- Fred Butler You're not reading the documents accurately. Phil explained this all to Steve when they corresponded.
- Fred Butler He doesn't make 2 million a year. Stop embarrassing yourself. Steve has been told this stop parroting his nonsense. I thought you all didn't believe in vows of poverty.
- Fred Butler John doesn't make 2 million a year.
- Brian Wagnon Ok. What does he make? If there is nothing wrong with it then it shouldn't be a problem disclosing it, right?
- Fred Butler I have no idea. His salary is set by the board of directors of the various ministries in which he serves. I just know the man gives away a lot of it. My family has been blessed by his generosity.
ii) I'm not getting my info "filtered through the ramblings of a notorious JMac critic/troll." My primary source of info. is Phil Johnson. Phil contacted me, and I asked him some questions. I then posted my correspondence.
iii) One of the basic problems is that Phil doesn't know how much JMac makes from the combined ministries (or book royalties). And Phil doesn't want to know. He doesn't think that's anybody's business. And Fred admits that he doesn't know how much JMac makes.
Needless to say, they're in no position to say how much he doesn't make if they don't even know how much he does make.
iv) I realize Fred is playing the role of the loyal employee who sticks up for the boss. Like the White House press secretary who defends whatever the boss says or does. A company man. A classic apparatchik. But that's no excuse for Fred to level demonstrably false allegations and misattributions.
Thursday, July 17, 2014
Huguenot miracles
Following Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, French protestants faced the stark choice of abandoning their religion, or defying the law. Many fled abroad, whilst others continued to meet clandestinely for worship and to organise resistance to government policy, culminating in the bloody Camisard rebellion of 1702-10. During this period of conflict and repression, a distinct culture of prophecy and divine inspiration grew up, which was to become a defining characteristic of the dispersed protestant communities in southern France.
Drawing on a wide range of printed and manuscript material, this study, examines the nature of Huguenot prophesying in the Cévennes during the early years of the eighteenth century. As well as looking at events in France, the book also explores the reactions of the Huguenot community of London, which became caught up in the prophesying controversy with the publication in 1707 of Le Théatre sacré des Cévennes. This book, which recounted the stories of exiles who had witnessed prophesying and miraculous events in the Cévennes, not only provided a first hand account of an outlawed religion, but became the centre of a heated debate in London concerning 'false-prophets'.
http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9780754651826
Georgia Cosmos, Huguenot Prophecy and Clandestine Worship in the Eighteenth Century.
Chapter six is drawn almost entirely from the author’s article on a particular miracle near the village of Sérignan in August 1703, when the prophet Pierre Claris appeared to be consumed by fire, then walked miraculously out of it without any effect at all.[8] There were, in fact, a number of apparent miracles performed by prophets before and during the Camisard war, though this one was certainly among the more dramatic.
http://www.h-france.net/vol6reviews/Vol6no51monahan.pdf
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