Approaching the ontological argument

Anselm proposed a famous, fascinating, controversial theistic proof. Some scholars contend that he presented two different versions of the ontological argument or two different ontological arguments. Other thinkers like Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, Gödel, and Plantinga proposed their own versions. 

I don't have an opinion about whether or not Anselm's argument, as it stands, is successful. That's because I don't know what he means, and interpretation is prior to evaluation. I can't assess it before I understand it. 

I doubt even he knows what it means. His argument is intuitive and compressed. He had a flash of insight which he labors to sharpen. He may be onto something, but he's fumbling to articulate his insight.

Here's one thing I will say about his argument. It raises the question: is our imagination greater or lesser than reality? Does reality exceed imagination or imagination exceed reality? 

For Anselm, God is the greatest conceivable being, and that's a good definition. For Anselm, the idea of a greatest conceivable being must have a counterpart in reality.

Human intelligence is quite limited. A paradox of human intelligence is that we're just smart enough to be aware of our intellectual limitations. Even the very smartest human beings hit a wall, and the distance between their understanding and wall of reality is very short. The distance between a human with Down Syndrome and the smartest man who ever lived is incomparably shorter than the distance between the smartest man who ever lived and reality. 

It's quite counterintuitive to suppose our imagination is greater than reality. To the contrary, not only is reality the equal of anything we can imagine, but infinitely beyond what we can imagine.

Therein lines the truth of the ontological argument. Is reality greater or lesser than what we can conceive? Surely reality is much bigger than the human mind. 

I'd add a caveat. Not everything conceivable is possible because an isolated idea needn't be consistent with every necessity and truth. We imagine little pieces of things that might not be possible or realistic if developed to their logical conclusion. 

But so long as the idea of God, as the greatest conceivable being, is coherent, then the basel insight of the ontological argument must be true, however successful or unsuccessful the precise formulations. 

It might be objected that we're talking about a human idea of God. Yes, Anselm has a limited grasp of what it means to be the greatest conceivable being. But in that respect, the reality is inconceivably greater than our idea of a greatest conceivable being. 

So it comes down to the question of whether human imagination surpasses reality or reality surpasses human imagination. I think the only reasonable position to take is that human imagination is just a sample of an illimitable, superhuman reality that exceeds the reach of the human mind in all directions. 

A modal ontological argument

1. If something is actual, then it must be possible. But can we reason in reverse? Can the possibility of something ever entail its existence? 

According to modal logic, for something to be possible means it exists in at least one possible world. Likewise, to exist necessarily is to exist in every possible world.

If God is possible, then God exists in one possible world. If, however, God exists in at least one possible world, then he must exist in more than one possible world. Indeed, if God exists in any possible world, then he must exist in every possible world. He must exist necessarily, in which case he actually exists. To disprove this, an atheist must show that God's existence is impossible. 

i) But why, if God exists in at least one possible world, must he exist in more than one possible world? One potential reason might appeal to the modal principle that possibility is invariant across possible worlds.

ii) Here's another reason. Take aseity. Aseity entails actual existence. Indeed, aseity is stronger than actual existence. Aseity entails necessary existence. But if aseity includes the greater claim (necessary existence), then it must include the lesser claim (actual existence). So an a se being cannot fail to exist. 

This shifts the burden of proof onto the atheist. The onus lies on the atheist to demonstrate that an a se being is impossible.

A possible limitation of this argument is that aseity is just one attribute, so that even if successful, the argument doesn't directly prove Christian theism. It is, however, a useful first step. 

There's also the interesting issue, which I won't pursue here, of what other attributes aseity entails. It's not as if an a se being only has the attribute of aseity. 

2. Sometimes parodies of the ontological argument are offered to deflect the ontological argument. You replace "God" with something else, like the greatest conceivab le unicorn or a perfect square circle. 

i) To begin with, even if there's a greatest conceivable unicorn, the greatest conceivable unicorn is not the greatest conceivable being. It's not the greatest kind of thing imaginable, but only the best example of something (that's not the greatest conceivable being). 

ii) There's the additional question of whether there can even be a greatest conceivable unicorn. Do unicorns range along a continuum with an upper limit of excellence? For instance, is there a greatest color for a unicorn to be? Seems arbitrary.  

iii) Moreover, the best unicorn, even if there were such a thing, or such a thing were possible, is still a contingent being by nature. 

iv) My argument isn't based on the greatest conceivable being, but aseity in particular.

v) A square circle isn't parallel to aseity unless both are impossible.