3 Mormons

I finally watched the whole debate between James White, Jeff Durbin, and Mormon Kwaku:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1XbJ3954HW8

I don't normally comment on Mormonism. I usually defer to Christian apologists who specialize in Mormonism and other cults (e.g. Islam). In that regard, here's a good general resource:

http://mit.irr.org/

http://mit.irr.org/category/joseph-smith

It takes considerable stamina to watch the whole thing, not just because it's 2 ½ hours of talking heads, but because it's such a train wreck. I'm sorry to report that in terms of overall performance, I think Kwaku won the debate. There were so many missed opportunities. 

One problem is that White and Durbin often spoke at cross-purposes. Durbin would challenge Kwaku to demonstrate his position from the Bible, then White would interrupt to change the subject. Nothing was ever nailed down.

Frequently, Kwaku wanted to talk about a passage from the Bible, but White and Durban wouldn't let him. The dialogue was utterly chaotic. Let's try to run back through the topics. I'll give my own answers to issues raised by Kwaku:

1. He cited Ps 82 as a prooftext for polytheism, but that was never discussed. He admitted that elohim can denote angels. One problem is that elohim has a wide semantic range. The meaning is context-dependent. It usually refers to Yahweh but in pagan settings it can denote something else (e.g. 1 Sam 28:13). Regarding Ps 82, one noted commentator takes the position that

The psalmist used the word "gods" to refer both to human judges and the supernatural powers behind them A. Ross, A Commentary on the Psalms (Kregel 2013), 2:725.  

On that interpretation (shared by Tate), this is not even a prima facie prooftext for a divine pantheon.

2. In response to classic monotheistic prooftexts, Kwaku countered that evangelicals are quoting those passages out of context. Viewed against the backdrop a general ancient Near Eastern setting, those concern henotheism rather than monotheism. Having a covenant with Yahweh alone. 

He said there's pagan ancient Near Eastern literature from the same period using the exact same words to describe their gods, yet these texts belong to polytheistic cultures, so the language isn't intentionally monotheistic. Kwaku quoted two examples:

The Tale of Sinuhe ... "He is a god without equal, with none in existence preceding him" and the great Cairo Hymn to Amun-Ra: "Unique one, like whom among the gods (literally like whom of the gods)? you are the sole one who made all that exists. One alone, who made that which is. Single, unique, without second."

I think both Durbin and White tended to miss the point. If the argument is successful, then appeal to monotheistic passages is viciously circular because Mormon apologists reinterpret them. So a Christian apologist needs an independent consideration, over and above rote prooftexting, to refute that argument. There are in fact some basic problems with Kwaku's argument:

i) It would make it impossible for Bible writers to affirm monotheism and disaffirm polytheism even if that's their intent and monotheism is true. How else would Bible writers express themselves?

ii) I'm no Egyptologist, but to my knowledge the comparison is equivocal. Aren't these Egyptian examples pictographic texts rather than a verbal texts? If so, it can't worded in the same way as biblical texts because it never used words at all. If it was originally written in hieroglyphs (or hieratic script), doesn't that mean there's a lot more play in how it can be translated? It isn't a case of finding English synonyms for Egyptian words. Rather, the pictographs must be turned into words in the first place. Aren't pictographs more open-textured than words? 

iii) In addition, Bible writers sometimes resort to polemical theology, where they lampoon heathenism by ironically or satirically purloining pagan categories and images to throw back in the face of paganism.  

iv) If Yahweh is just one of many gods, what warrants exclusive worship of Yahweh? Polytheism is pretty tolerant in that regard. Even if an idolater has a patron god who's the focus of worship, it's not disloyal to worship other gods. If they all exist, then no one god has an inherent claim on the fealty of individuals or people-groups. So henotheism fails to account for the intensity of OT polemics against idolatry and polytheism.

v) It's not just that Yahweh is described in preeminent terms. Rather, the unique existence of Yahweh is often set in explicit contrast to the heathen competition. That's the frame of reference. So that rules out the heathen alternatives.  

3. To show that God is a man, Kwaku cited God walking in the Garden of Eden, man made in God's image, and Jacob's encountering God face-to-face at Peniel. White responded by saying Scripture uses hyperbole and metaphor. That's true, but the wrong answer in this case.

i) The obvious explanation is Pentateuchal angelology. The audience for Gen 2-3 is expected to understand that description in light of the Pentateuch generally, which is full of theophanies, angelophanies, as well as theophanic angelophanies (i.e. the Angel of the Lord). God walking in the Garden movies in the same conceptual space as Gen 18, Exod 3, Exod 33, &c. The point is that God sometimes manifested himself angelomorphically. That's categorically different from a physical humanoid being. 

ii) Because Scripture doesn't explicitly define the image of God, scholars debate what it means. According to one standard interpretation, it has a representative significance. For instance, an idol stands for a god, a statue stands for a king. More abstractly, Adam and Eve are representatives of God on earth. Vice-gerents. Likewise, a son (Gen 5:1) can act on behalf of and in place of his father. So the principle is not about physical resemblance, 

4. Kwaku thinks Christians believe God is an "energy consciousness everywhere but not anywhere". An "intangible spirit essence everywhere". He asked Durbin to define "spirit". Durbin said "immaterial". Kwaku asked "immaterial what"? If not consciousness or person, then what? That's a good question. Durbin never gave a good answer. 

In response to Isa 6, he then asked how Yahweh was sitting down when you don't believe he has a body. How is he sitting down if he's everywhere? To which White responded, why would you have to have a physical body to sit down? But that's a bad answer. 

White said Isa 6 is a vision of "the one who'd become the Son in the Incarnation". Presumably, White misspoke. I assume he meant to say that's a vision of the one who'd become Jesus in the Incarnation. White believes in the eternal preexistence of the Son, right? 

i) In classical theism, God subsists outside of time and space. So God isn't literally anywhere. God is illocal. For that matter, human souls are essentially illocal. However, God can symbolize his presence through emblematic tactile or audiovisual manifestations (theophanies). 

In addition, God is "everywhere" in the indirect, but pervasive sense in which a novelist is present in his story or a painter is present in his painting. Everything in the story reflects the mind of the novelist. Everything in the painting reflects the hand and plan of the painter. 

ii) Isa 6 is a vision of God. Just like dream characters have simulated bodies. Yahweh isn't literally a humanoid king sitting on a literal throne. But God generates that imagery in the mind of Isaiah because it's analogically true: God is a ruler. 

iii) Energy is physical. God isn't physical.

iv) God is a discarnate mind. Consciousness is an acceptable category.

5. Kwaku used Jesus as an example of an exalted man. But that misconceives orthodox Christology. The Son was always divine. He assumes a human nature. The Incarnate Son is undergoes exaltation. As an embodied agent, he undergoes exaltation. That's new (in a sense). But that's additional to his preexistent status–which never changed. 

6. Kwaku said White's appeal to Phil 2 was inconsistent. How could the Son be coequal with the Father "from eternity to eternity" if the Son assumes a subordinate position? I think White missed the point. I take Kwaku to mean the Son can't be eternally coequal with the Father in the sense of continuously coequal with the Father if there's a period when he's subordinate. If that's interrupted by his ministry on earth. That represents a break in continuity.

For some reason, White and Durbin both failed to give the standard orthodox explanation, which appeals to the two natures of Christ. In his divine nature, the Son qua Son is continuously coequal with the Father. In his human nature, the Son qua Incarnate is subordinate to the Father. So equality and inequality refer to two different things. Hence, there's no inconsistency. 

7. Kwaku quoted Mk 13:34 to prove that Jesus can't be God. If the Father and the Son are both God, they must know the same things. Once again, White and Durbin both bungled the response by failing to unpack the hypostatic union:

i) On a two-minds Christology, the divine mind of Christ is omniscient while the human mind of Christ has finite knowledge. 

ii) Although each person of the Trinity generally knows everything the other two persons know, there's a technical sense in which they don't absolutely know all the same things. Some dimensions of self-knowledge are indexical. The Father knows that he's the Father. The Son can't share that viewpoint since he's not the Father. Likewise, the Son knows that he's Incarnate. The Father can't share that viewpoint. 

8. Kwaku said the Trinity is mathematically impossible. If God has no body or borders, where does one spirit end and the second spirit begin? If they're one, they can't be three. If they're three, then God can't be indivisible. If they're countable, that implies a part/whole relation. Conversely, if they're not separate, then they're not countable. [I'm paraphrasing his objection, using his own words or variations thereof.]

i) Distinct physical objects have surfaces and boundaries. If they're countable, then they're divisible. 

ii) But that's the wrong template. In classical theism, God isn't a physical object. Abstract objects supply more suitable analogies. 

Take the number Pi. According to mathematical realism, that's a timeless, spaceless object. It has an infinite decimal expansion. And it's countable in principle, although humans and computers can only count up to finite sequences.

There's internal differentiation in Pi. Within its infinite decimal expansion there are finite sequences. And these are different from each other. The first million numbers have a different sequence than the second million numbers, and so on. 

However, the infinite series has no internal boundaries. No parts. Pi is indivisible in the sense that the entire sequence is necessary. There can't be any variation overall. Can't have one number less. Pi can't be subdivided into smaller Pi's. There's just one Pi. 

Another example is the Mandelbrot set. That has internal differentiation. Infinitely many distinct, self-similar permutations. Is it one or many? Both. The Mandelbrot set can't be subdivided into smaller Mandelbrot sets. There's just one Mandelbrot set, even though we can distinguish infinitely many iterations. 

9. Kwaku said he read the Stanford article on the Trinity. He's probably unaware of the fact that it's written by a unitarian (Dale Tuggy). BTW, it would be something to watch a Mormon apologist debate a unitarian apologist. 

10. Kwaku said ancient Near Eastern literature doesn't define "eternity" the same way Christian theologians do. I'd like to see documentation for that claim. The basic contrast is between an eternal God, eternal world–or cosmic process. 

11. He said that if the Book of Mormon is true, then Mormonism is true. The embryonic argument seems to be that the Book of Mormon can't be true unless Joseph Smith had supernatural knowledge. If you can validate the Book of Mormon, that validates Joseph Smith, which, in turn, validates his other writings and teachings. And he cited alleged archeological confirmation for the Book of Mormon. 

i) That's disputed. For instance:

http://www.mormonapologies.com/book-of-mormon/4-ways-the-new-maya-discoveries-prove-the-book-of-mormon-false/

ii) It's not that simple. The argument cuts both ways. White brought up historical blunders in Joseph Smith's First Vision as well as the Book of Abraham debacle. 

We could also mention genetic evidence which undercuts the claim that American Indians descend from Sephardic Jews. In addition, there's a superabundance of evidence that Joseph Smith as a conman. Mormonism is a target-rich environment. 

12. Kwaku decided to attack Calvinism, knowing that Durbin and White are Calvinists. That's a diversionary tactic to run out the clock. Durbin retreated into mystery, which doesn't surprise me since he's a Sye-clone. I'll briefly make three observations:

i) I wonder if Kwaku is even aware of many familiar, tenacious objections to the freewill defense.

ii) Calvinism doesn't mean God only loves Calvinists. The elect aren't conterminous with Calvinists–not by a long shot. Conversely, some Calvinists are reprobates.

iii) Kwaku imagines that if God predestines bad things, then he wants bad things to happen. But that's simplistic. To take a comparison, suppose I have a son by a woman who subsequently abandons me and our child. Did I want my wife to have an affair? Did I want her to walk out on the marriage? The answer is no.

Does that mean I regret having married her? If I could step into the time machine, would I marry a different woman the first time around?

Ah, but our failed marriage gave me a son. I wouldn't trade my son for anything. I didn't want my marriage to turn out the way it did. But I treasure one of the results of our failed marriage. Yet that precious, irreplaceable result is unobtainable apart from the bad marriage. So there's a tradeoff. To say I want my son doesn't mean I want everything that happened in that marriage. I may want the goal even despite the means necessary to secure the goal.