Basinger on miracles

Recently I was reading David Basinger's new monograph on Miracles (Cambridge 2018). He draws a number of useful distinctions in the course of the book. That said:

However, since I am in that camp of philosophers who maintain that God’s existence cannot be conclusively disproved... (45).

Wow, what a ringing endorsement. If only traditional Christian creeds used that formulation!

Finally, it is important to remember that the burden of proof clearly lies with those who believe Jesus to have risen from the dead. Our human experience continues to confirm daily the undesirable but obvious fact: dead people stay dead. The historical evidence for any claim to the contrary must, therefore, be exceedingly strong (49).

That's awfully naive. Sure, when nature takes its course, then dead people stay dead. Yet the Resurrection isn't treated as a natural but anomalous event. The fact that all things being equal, dead people stay dead creates no presumption that Jesus didn't rise from the dead, since the Resurrection was never predicated on a random exception to natural processes. If it happened, it wasn't a fluke. So there's no presumption to overcome on those grounds. Hence, the onus isn't one-sidedly on the Christian. 

Here's a good analysis of coincidence miracles:

In the Holland story, as noted, a fully natural explanation is clearly present. However, another explanatory option is available in this situation: that the driver fainted at the precise moment because God directly intervened in some manner to make it so. And there are theists who would claim that if there was, in fact, direct divine intervention of this sort in this case then this event could justifiably be considered a miracle, even granting that a totally natural explanation would also be at hand. Other possible coincidence miracles of this sort might include a situation in which it is assumed that God brings to someone’s mind an elderly relative and for that reason this person stops by the relative’s home just in time to save her life by calling for emergency help, or a situation in which God brings it about that a person has a flat tire on the way to the airport and for this reason doesn’t make it in time to board a plane that crashes. (p10).

Luck acknowledges that some want to go even further, claiming that a natural effect that God brought about by initiating and ensuring a causal chain that included natural events can also be considered a miracle.1 Luck refers to divine activity of this sort as an indirect act of God. Consider again, for instance, Holland’s story of the boy saved from death because of a series of very fortuitous natural events: the engineer of a train faints, causing his hand to release the throttle which, in turn, automatically engages the brake, which causes the train to stop just before hitting a small boy playing on the tracks. Even assuming God caused the sequence of events to occur when and how they did for the purpose of saving the boy, given Luck’s terminology, this would be a miracle caused by an indirect act of God.

When it is believed that God has intentionally manipulated the natural order to ensure that an event happens exactly when and how it does, it then becomes a direct act of God, regardless of whether a fully natural explanation is available. Even here a finer distinction is sometimes made with respect to the relationship between coincidence miracles and direct acts of God. When we think of God directly bringing about an event, it is quite reasonable to conceive of God’s manipulation of the natural order occurring at the time that the event takes place. In our train scenario, it is quite natural to conceive of God acting in some way just before the train rounds the bend. Or when we think of God healing someone with cancer, it is quite natural to conceive of God intervening at the moment the healing is observable. And most who believe God brought it about that someone misses a fatal flight would be assuming that God did so at the time the person was attempting to reach the airport. There are philosophers such as Robert Adams, however, who have suggested another way of thinking about God’s activity in this context. We can, Adams (1992: 209) tells us, conceive of God creating “the world in such a way that it was physically predetermined from the beginning” that nature would act in the appropriate way “at precisely the time at which God foresaw” it would be needed. We can, for instance, think of God creating the world in such a way that the driver of a specific train on a specific track at a specific time would faint in order to save the life of a young child. Or we can conceive of God creating the world in such a way that the tire on a specific car would be flat at a specific time to ensure that the person driving the car would not arrive at the airport in time to board a fatal flight. This line of thought can also be found in those rabbis mentioned in the Talmud, who argued that to hold that the walls of Jericho came down at the exact time needed to ensure an Israelite victory was the result of divine intervention does not require believing that God intervened in the natural order at the exact time this event occurred. It can be assumed, rather, that God determined when setting up the natural order that an earthquake would bring down the walls “naturally” at the exact time this event occurred (Midrash Genesis, Midrash Exodus, & Pirkei Avot). [pp 14-16].

Finally:

Are there conditions, for example, under which a person could justifiably maintain that water had turned into wine or someone’s leg has been lengthened instantly?...As was noted in Section 2, most philosophers currently grant that reports of repeatable counterinstances to current natural laws cannot justifiably be dismissed – that is, they grant that if counterinstances to our current laws recur, given equivalent natural conditions, revision of the relevant laws must be considered. However, the types of counterinstances often considered to be miraculous by theists – for example, resurrections and healings – are at present not repeatable under specifiable natural conditions. There are a number of philosophers who maintain that when assessing the accuracy of reports of events of this type, much greater skepticism is required... There are highly confirmed natural laws on the basis of which we justifiably believe, for example, that water does not turn into wine, withered legs do not return to normal instantaneously, and the dead remain dead. These laws are not based on inaccessible scientific studies or outmoded historical hearsay. Rather, these laws can be tested by anyone at any time, with the result always the same: untreated water persists as water; withered legs remain malformed; and the dead stay dead. Such is not the case with reports of alleged miraculous events. Reported counterinstances to natural laws are supported only by personal testimony from the past, with evidence of this sort by its very nature always weaker than the evidence for the laws it allegedly contradicts. One reason the evidence is always weaker is that while large numbers of people testing independently continue to find the laws in question to hold, only a small number of possibly biased individuals maintain that the counterinstance occurred. Moreover, the evidence supporting the laws in question is objective, while the testimonial reports of those who claim to have witnessed the event are always quite subjective. Accordingly, Flew continues, there can never be stronger reasons for accepting the report of a nonrepeatable counterinstance to our current laws – for example, the claim that water turned into wine – than for rejecting the report as inaccurate. Again, if an occurrence of the unusual event were repeatable in the sense that it could be reproduced by anyone under specifiable natural conditions, we would then need to take it seriously. However, with respect to reports of nonrepeatable counterinstances, Flew (1976:28–30) concludes, “no matter how impressive the testimony might appear, the most favorable verdict history could ever return must be the agnostic and appropriately Scottish ‘not proven’.” 7 Or as Alan Hájek (2008: 88) has more recently stated this Humean conclusion, the “proof” supporting testimonial reports of nonrepeatable counterinstances can never be more compelling than the “proof” from experience against the actual occurrence of the event in question, so “testimony to a miraculous event should never be believed – belief in a miracle report could never be justified,” 32-34.

Let's comb through these claims:

Are there conditions, for example, under which a person could justifiably maintain that water had turned into wine or someone’s leg has been lengthened instantly?...As was noted in Section 2, most philosophers currently grant that reports of repeatable counterinstances to current natural laws cannot justifiably be dismissed – that is, they grant that if counterinstances to our current laws recur, given equivalent natural conditions, revision of the relevant laws must be considered.

The possibility or credibility of miracles isn't based on revising natural laws. 

However, the types of counterinstances often considered to be miraculous by theists – for example, resurrections and healings – are at present not repeatable under specifiable natural conditions. 

Why would they have to be repeatable under "natural conditions"–or "specifiable" natural conditions? What does that even mean?

...when assessing the accuracy of reports of events of this type, much greater skepticism is required... There are highly confirmed natural laws on the basis of which we justifiably believe, for example, that water does not turn into wine, withered legs do not return to normal instantaneously, and the dead remain dead. These laws are not based on inaccessible scientific studies or outmoded historical hearsay. Rather, these laws can be tested by anyone at any time, with the result always the same: untreated water persists as water; withered legs remain malformed; and the dead stay dead. 

But that misses the point. The claim is not that miracles happen under the same conditions, but that miracles happen due to an additional factor that circumvents or redirects the ordinary course of nature.

Of course we justifiably believe that the same antecedent conditions will yield the same results. A miracle presumes that a key variable was changed. The introduction of a new cause.

Reported counterinstances to natural laws are supported only by personal testimony from the past, with evidence of this sort by its very nature always weaker than the evidence for the laws it allegedly contradicts. One reason the evidence is always weaker is that while large numbers of people testing independently continue to find the laws in question to hold, only a small number of possibly biased individuals maintain that the counterinstance occurred.

That repeats the same confusion:

i) Miracles don't "contradict" natural laws. The claim is not that the same natural causes sometimes have different effects but that something changed to change the outcome. That's entirely consistent with the uniformity of natural processes. 

ii) The allegedly majority of witnesses to natural laws in contrast to the alleged minority witnesses to miracles is a red herring inasmuch as miracles operate on a different principle. They aren't exceptions to natural laws in the sense of natural anomalies. 

iii) The evidence is not confined to historical testimony. There are many reported miracles in modern times. 

Moreover, the evidence supporting the laws in question is objective, while the testimonial reports of those who claim to have witnessed the event are always quite subjective.

Why think that's true? Some kinds of miracles are directly observable. Others are inferential, but inference is a necessary part of science as well.

Again, if an occurrence of the unusual event were repeatable in the sense that it could be reproduced by anyone under specifiable natural conditions, we would then need to take it seriously. 

i) The power to perform a miracle is not a natural ability. 

ii) Why does it have to be repeatable? If there's evidence that naturally impossible events happen, then that's sufficient. 

No matter how impressive the testimony might appear, the most favorable verdict history could ever return must be the agnostic and appropriately Scottish ‘not proven’.

But that's fanatical. To discount all testimony to the occurrence of miracles is only justifiable if we already know from experience that we lived in a universe where that can't happen. Yet our experience includes extensive prima facie evidence for miracles. To preemptively dismiss all reported miracles is prejudicial, and arbitrarily privileges part of the evidence.

The “proof” supporting testimonial reports of nonrepeatable counterinstances can never be more compelling than the “proof” from experience against the actual occurrence of the event in question.

There is no proof that something can't happen. At best, there's no evidence that something happens. And that can be easily overcome by a little evidence to the contrary.