Sunday, June 06, 2010

Gibson on Craig


Here is a slightly different angle on Craig's view (supposing everything you said about Craig's view is in fact his view).

Suppose Craig were convinced that M is false. So we have:
1. C v M v A
2. ~M
3. C v A

Now C and A are mutually exclusive since each entails the falsity of the other. How should one choose between C and A? Well, it seems to me that the right thing to do, epistemically, is to consider how strong the arguments are in favor of C, against C, in favor of A, and against A.

From what I know about Craig, I find his acceptance of A over C to be strange. I would have thought that he regarded his arguments for God's existence, which is entailed by C, and which entail ~A, to be stronger than his commitment to incompatibilism. But if he *really* would rather choose A over C, then it seems that my presumption is mistaken. Worse: he finds incompatibilism so much stronger than his arguments for God *and* against A (e.g., his claim that atheism implies all things are permissible). The implication, "all things are permissible," is more absurd than would be having to switch from incompatibilism to compatibilism (or semi-compatibilism). Having recognized the preference for A over C requires the commitment, would Craig now stop using the moral argument he typically runs? I don't know.

No comments:

Post a Comment