Monday, May 10, 2010

God's VCR

STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

"In Molinism, we can choose otherwise."

i) Of course, that's equivocal. We can choose otherwise in what setting? In possible worlds? Or the actual world?

ii) And it's not as if the Molinist agent chooses which possible world will become the actual world. God makes that final decision in that regard.

BTW, I once ran that question by Alfred Freddoso, and he agreed with me.

iii) It's not as if, in Molinism, God shows possible Judas two different scenarios, then lets Judas choose one or the other. He doesn't say to possible Judas, Look, Judas, if I instantiate this possible world, you will betray Christ and go to hell, but if I instantiate that possible world, you will stay faithful to Christ (or repent) and go to heaven. So, Judas, which scenario would you like me to realize?

There is no possible Judas who stands over and above his counterparts in different possible worlds, and gets to choose which scenario actually plays out. Rather, each possible Judas is a worldbound individual. He only knows one possible world at a time (so to speak).

4/23/2010 3:10 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"Using the author analogy, you said...Seem like you are trying to have your cake and eat it too."

Are you really that confused? There's an obvious equivocation.

When the phrase "author of sin" is used in historical theology, is that being used as a literary metaphor? Or is that being used in the literal Latin (or Middle French) sense of "authorship"?

You're confusing the lexical meaning of a word with the metaphorical meaning of a word. They are hardly synonymous.

Try to think clearly.

4/23/2010 3:16 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"In Molinism, God is not ultimately responsible for evil, since He does not start a causal chain that predetermines evil will occur. Sure, God is a necessary cause of all things, including evil, but not a sufficient cause of all things."

How is that a morally salient distinction? How is that exculpatory?

Suppose I see a toddler wander into a busy intersection. I didn't cause the intersection. I'm not even a necessary cause of the intersection, much less a sufficient cause.

Does this let me off the hook if I allow the toddler to be run over? After all, I didn't start the causal chain leading to his death. I merely stood by as I saw a speeding car approach and mow him down–even though it lay within my power to rescue the child.

Drawing metaphysical distinctions is not the same as drawing moral distinctions. Why don't you try to offer a serious response?

Why is it that Arminians are so morally complacent? Why are they satisfied with such shallow, inadequate responses?


STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

"Of course, I agree with that too. But you fail to either understand or take into account the difference between this and what I said."

To say I fail to understand doesn't begin to demonstrate that I fail to understand.

"Again, I agree. But this does not mean Judas' damnation is inevitable or Judas is unable to choose otherwise (in the sense I describe above)."

But if you agree, as you just admitted, that possible Judas doesn't get to decide which one of the possible worlds containing him will become the actual world, then he is unable to choose which outcome becomes the real outcome.

His freedom to do otherwise is a freedom between one possible world and another possible world, not a freedom within the actual world, or a freedom to choose which possible world, with its attendant outcomes, is actualized.

And, yes, if God instantiates the possible world in which Judas goes to hell, then his damnation is inevitable in the real world.

4/23/2010 4:39 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"You said 'authorship of sin' is equivocal and asked for a definition. I provided one."

It would help if you could follow your own usage. Try to pay attention to you just said. It saves time. You gave to different definitions back-to-back:

i) "Using the author analogy, the author of evil, would be the author that writes evil into the storyline."

That's a figurative definition.

ii) "The author of something is the person The author of something is the person ultimately responsible for it or in other words the agent that initiates the causal sequence that predetermines and necessitates evil’s occurrence.

That's a literal definition.

Why can't you tell the difference between a figurative definition and a literal definition?

"Now you seem to think it's not equivocal and you have the one true historic sense of the phrase."

Did I say if I had the historic sense? No. I didn't say what I think it means, although I have discussed that in the past.

When Arminians like you use a phrase from historical theology, you need to define the term in historical terms. Do you have any documentary evidence that when "authorship" is used in historical theology, it denotes "the person ultimately responsible for it or in other words the agent that initiates the causal sequence that predetermines and necessitates evil’s occurrence."?

Or is this just your made-up definition?

When Reformed confessions and theologians deny that God is the "author of sin," what definition do you think they are using? Or do you even care?

If you're going to allege that, contrary to the denial of Reformed confessions and theologians, Calvinism makes God is the "author of sin," you first need to define the term the same way they did, then show that God is the author of sin on their own terms.

"By all means, provide the one and only understanding; noting that Edwards said God is the author of sin."

Gee, that's cute. If you're going to cite Edwards as an example of what you mean, then need to explain what you think he meant by that term.

Keep in mind that Edwards' metaphysical outlook was pretty idiosyncratic. He was either an idealist or occasionalist. So that's hardly representative of mainstream Reformed metaphysics.

4/23/2010 4:55 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"A greater good would get you off the hook for not helping."

And Calvinism helps itself to the same consideration.

"But of course, not helping is an omission, not a comission and a greater good doesn't get you off the hook for comissions (we are not to do evil that good may come)."

Was the Molinist God doing evil by instantiating a world with evil agents?

"Further, how did you wind up in that situtiation? IOW, how is sin even possible, if man isn't ultimately responsible?"

Since when does someone have to be ultimately responsible to be sinful? In the film Double Indemnity, which character is ultimately responsible for murdering the husband: the adulterous boyfriend or the adulterous wife?

If a Mafia Don orders a hit, who is ultimately responsible: the trigger man or the Don?

And if only one is ultimately responsible, then is the other one innocent?

4/23/2010 5:03 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"You said 'authorship of sin' is equivocal and asked for a definition. I provided one."

What you did was to take my *figurative* use of divine authorship, come up with your own *literal* definition, then impute *your* definition to my literary metaphor.

Do you lack the critical detachment to see how fallacious that is?

"The author of something is the person The author of something is the person ultimately responsible for it or in other words the agent that initiates the causal sequence that predetermines and necessitates evil’s occurrence."

i) I don't treat responsibility and culpability as synonyms. One party to a transaction can be *ultimately* responsible without being either *solely* responsible or *blameworthy*.

ii) You Arminians are the ones who keep recasting *predestination* or *foreordination* or the *decree* in *causal* and/or *determinist* categories.

I'm not the only who constantly frames my theology in those terms, although I sometimes use that terminology in response to somebody else who frames the issue in those terms.

iii) Apropos (ii), it is sufficient for my Calvinism to say that:

a) God has a complete plan for the world.

b) God's plan for the world doesn't derive from the world.

c) God creates the world according to his plan.

c) God's plan for the world doesn't derive from the world.

d) Everything happens according to plan.

e) Everything happens in the way it does on account of God's plan.

f) There are no unplanned events.

g) Nothing can happen contrary to God's plan.

iv) If you're going to use "causal" categories, then you need to define your terms. For instance, on a counterfactual theory of causation, both God and Judas were causal factors in the Crucifixion. And that's true whether you're Calvinist, Molinist, or non-Molinist Arminian.

If you think a different theory of causation is preferable, make your case.

v) If you're using "predetermine" and "necessitate" as synonyms for the absence of libertarian freedom, and you deem that to make God culpable, then your definition is a tendentious definition which takes Arminian action theory for granted.


STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

"That does not follow."

Since you don't even attempt to say anything responsive to what I wrote, there's nothing I need to reply to.

You also seem to suffer from an inability to distinguish between what this or that Molinist may claim, and whether his claims are internally consistent.

I'm not merely dealing with the claims of Molinism, but the implications of Molinism, which may not be consistent with everything a Molinist would like to claim for his position–in the event that Molinism is incoherent in some respects.

Unless and until you're prepared to deal with my arguments, instead of posing as some expert on Molinism, whose bare ipse dixit settles all disputes, there's nothing further to discuss.


STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

"Right. In an Arminian schema of responsibility, if God were to predetermine sin, He would be culpable. In a Calvinists schema, he would not. But then the question is God’s character. Does He really hate sin?"

Does the Arminian/Molinist God really hate sin? Sin was avoidable? Was he forced to make a world in which sin occurs? Do you think a fallen world is necessitated?

If no, then it what sense does God hate sin if he makes a fallen world, even though that sinful consequence was divinely foreseeable and avoidable?

5/04/2010 7:56 PM
STEVE SAID:
Godismyjudge said...

"Fair enough, but if you want to argue against the internal consistency of Molinism, you should at least present Molinism in a way recognizable and acceptable to Molinists."

You keep falling back on that intellectual shortcut. Why is that? Surely you don't think that's convincing, do you?

Since you're evidently impervious to the obvious, I guess I will have to spell it out to you: people who are deeply invested in a given position have a disincentive to "recognize" a critical statement of their position.

The mere fact that they claim that a critical statement of their position is "unrecognizable" is not a serious response. Indeed, it's frequently an evasive maneuver. They don't ever have to deal with a challenge to their position because they can always claim that so-and-so's statement of their position is "unrecognizable."

Are you capable of having a serious debate? Or will you continue to fall back on these "you-just-don't-understand" cop-outs?

You're not the world authority on Molinism, Dan. I've corresponded with Alfred Freddoso and Thomas Flint. Learn a little humility.

"The object of Judas’s choice is to betray Christ or not, and his choice actualizes that specific aspect of history."

Really? How does that work, exactly? After all, his choice is intertwined with other parties as well, such as members of the Sanhedrin. Does his choice actualize the Sanhedrin? Is the existence of the complicit members of the Sanhedrin contingent on his choice?

You keep asserting that Judas had the freedom to do otherwise. In what sense did possible Judas have the freedom to do otherwise? Is possible Judas a conscious agent? Did God present possible Judas with a range of possible timelines, then ask him which one he'd like to see realized?

Is possible Judas privy to all the possible worlds in which possible Judas exists? Did Judas give informed consent?

"But this does not mean Judas' damnation is inevitable or Judas is unable to choose otherwise (in the sense I describe above)."

Sure about that? As a friend of my recently said,

"It's hard for Molinism to avoid making God the author of evil. But the reason, I think, is that 'God's decree to actualize a world plus his knowledge of what would ensue if he were to do so' is both necessary and sufficient for evil to come to pass. It's necessary, because the evil can't come to pass unless God decrees to actualize the feasible world in which it would come to pass. It's sufficient, because the decree embraces all the means to the chosen end. (In addition, deciding to actualize a feasible world, while knowing infallibly what would happen if that world gets actualized, *is* sufficient for the evil to come to pass. After all, it's sufficient for the free choice to be actually made, and that's sufficient for the evil itself.)"


STEVE SAID:
GODISMYJUDGE SAID:

“Yes, God hates sin. I doubt that evil was necessary; that seems to imply God had to create.”

So the Molinist God instantiates a sinful world even though he hates sin, and sin is unnecessary.

Doesn’t sound very coherent to me. Much less a promising theodicy.

“Certainly in the sense that He is not ultimately responsible for sin.”

What’s the theodicean value of the adjective (“ultimately”) in relation to the noun (“sin”)? How does the adjective magically exculpate God on Molinist grounds?

You don’t have to be “ultimately” responsible to be partially responsible. You don’t have to be “ultimately” responsible to be culpable. So how does your distinction automatically exonerate the Molinist God?

“It seems that the greater good God is able to bring out of sin in this world, makes the world we live in at least as desirable to God as not creating, dispite His hatred of sin.”

If that’s your argument, then sin is a necessary means to a second-order good. Felix culpa. Very supralapsarian of you.

“In reducto ad absurdum argument, both the minor and major premise must be acceptable your opponent.”

Really? Says who? You’re confusing the soundness of an argument with person-variable persuasion.

“I consider choices as mental resolutions, to they can’t physically bump into each other.”

i) Well, when I defined choice as a mental resolution (quoting Kane), you took exception.

ii) How is “physically bumping into each other” the least bit responsive to what I said? This is what I said: “After all, his choice is intertwined with other parties as well, such as members of the Sanhedrin. Does his choice actualize the Sanhedrin? Is the existence of the complicit members of the Sanhedrin contingent on his choice?”

How did you manage to miss the point? The libertarian choices of Judas have real world consequences for the existence and choices of other libertarian agents. So do his libertarian choices actualize other agents in the transaction? Do his choices instantiate the network of consequences, including all of the other parties to the same transaction?

Try again.

5/10/2010 8:29 AM
STEVE SAID:
Cont.

“Causally possible and logically, in a divided sense.”

What is “causally” possible for merely possible Judas? Does Judas cause things to happen in a possible world? In what sense? Aren’t possible worlds timeless objects? So there is no actual cause/effect sequence in play. Do you simply mean “cause” in the sense that one fictional character causes something to happen in the narrative?

“Possible Judas is possible conscious agent; of course, he is not an actual conscious agent.”

So possible Judas didn’t consciously choose to be instantiated in a world where he betrays Christ. If so, then in what sense is his choice a “real” choice? Do merely possible, unconscious agents make “real” choices?

“Not timelines or whole worlds, but in some sense God ran hypothetical Judas (not to be confused with his ugly stepfather possible Judas) through a hypothetical senario.”

That’s not responsive to my question. The question is not whether the Molinist God ran hypothetical Judas through a battery of hypothetical scenarios.

The question, rather, is whether the Molinist God ran a battery of hypothetical scenarios past hypothetical Judas so that Judas had a say as to which possible world God would instantiate. Unless hypothetical Judas was shown the options, how was he in any position to give informed consent?

But, of course, you’re forced to admit that this isn’t tenable, for a merely possible agent is not a conscious agent. Therefore, Judas didn’t get to vote on which real world he’d find himself in. It was the luck of the draw (as Arminian critics of Calvinism are wont to say), and he had the ill-fortune to wind up on a world where he betrays Christ and presumably goes to hell. Not his lucky day.

Explain how that’s an improvement over what Arminians and Molinists find so odious in Calvinism.

“It’s as if God created multiple actual worlds in multiple dimensions and sees how things turn out, except, God doesn’t actually have create those worlds and yet His knowledge corresponds to what they would have been if He had.”

i) And how is the Molinist God in a position to see how things turn out? Is he just a spectator who watches what nonexistent agents would do in any given situation? Why is there anything at all, much less anything in particular, that a nonexistent agent would do? Where do you think possible agents come from in Molinism? You act as if they preexist in some static modality, like a DVD, with all of their choices in place. And God simply decides which DVD to put into the player.

ii) Even if Molinism were coherent, why should we believe it? Molinism is not a revealed truth. At most, the Bible reveals that God has counterfactual knowledge, not middle knowledge.

So what evidence do you have that Molinism is true? It’s not a truth of reason. It’s not entailed by a truth of reason. It’s not an empirical fact.

“While the decree embraces all the means it does so in nuanced ways; some things directly, other indirectly via permission.”

Traditionally, Calvinism also “nuances” the decree the same way.

“In Molinism, the decree (in conditions with MK and FK) are sufficient conditions for our choices but not sufficient causes for our choices.”

i) How do you define a “cause”? What’s your theory of causation?

ii) Even if your metaphysical distinction were tenable, how is that morally germane? How does your metaphysical distinction between sufficient conditionality and sufficient causality ipso facto exonerate the Molinist God?

iii) How does that stand in contrast to Calvinism? What theory of causation do you attribute to Calvinism?

iv) Apropos (iii), why is Molinism able to distinguish between sufficient conditionality and sufficient causality, but Calvinism is not?

19 comments:

  1. Steve, I wonder if you could clarify what you've meant when you've (in several posts) said something along the following lines:

    "the freedom to do otherwise is a freedom between one possible world and another possible world, not a freedom within the actual world..."

    What would "freedom within the actual world" amount to? As I understand it, when libertarians affirm that some agent S freely decides at t to do A, it (typically) means that, while S decides to do A in the actual world, there is a possible world W which is such that: W and the actual world have the same history, the same laws, and in W, S decides at t to refrain from doing A (or perhaps: decides to do some distinct act B).

    Would that count, on your view of things, as a case in which S had "freedom within the actual world"?

    If so, then how do you see Molinism being committed to something that is incompatible with that kind of freedom?

    And if not, then do you disagree with the gloss of libertarian freedom I've given?

    Thanks in advance...

    ReplyDelete
  2. What would "freedom within the actual world" amount to? As I understand it, when libertarians affirm that some agent S freely decides at t to do A, it (typically) means that, while S decides to do A in the actual world, there is a possible world W which is such that: W and the actual world have the same history, the same laws, and in W, S decides at t to refrain from doing A (or perhaps: decides to do some distinct act B).

    The agent must have been able to actualize W at t. If he was, then he had freedom in the actual world.

    ReplyDelete
  3. "The agent must have been able to actualize W at t. If he was, then he had freedom in the actual world."

    I'm not a Molinist but I'm not sure I understand your meaning. In what sense must he "be able" to actualize W at t? Couldn't the Molinist say that he "could" but he will "freely" decide not to?

    ReplyDelete
  4. In my mind of possible worlds, I have a lot of freedoms.

    In the actual world, God has all the freedoms and I am one of His creatures.

    I am subject to His prophesies in the actual world whether or not in my mind of possible worlds I am subject to them.

    I am glad for this:

    2Ti 1:6 For this reason I remind you to fan into flame the gift of God, which is in you through the laying on of my hands,
    2Ti 1:7 for God gave us a spirit not of fear but of power and love and self-control.

    Without that gift of God giving me a spirit of power and love and self-control, I am left with only possible worlds. Possible worlds never have and never will change this actual world.

    We are still subject to God's prophesies:

    Heb 2:1 Therefore we must pay much closer attention to what we have heard, lest we drift away from it.
    Heb 2:2 For since the message declared by angels proved to be reliable, and every transgression or disobedience received a just retribution,
    Heb 2:3 how shall we escape if we neglect such a great salvation? It was declared at first by the Lord, and it was attested to us by those who heard,
    Heb 2:4 while God also bore witness by signs and wonders and various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit distributed according to his will.
    Heb 2:5 Now it was not to angels that God subjected the world to come, of which we are speaking.
    Heb 2:6 It has been testified somewhere, "What is man, that you are mindful of him, or the son of man, that you care for him?
    Heb 2:7 You made him for a little while lower than the angels; you have crowned him with glory and honor,
    Heb 2:8 putting everything in subjection under his feet." Now in putting everything in subjection to him, he left nothing outside his control. At present, we do not yet see everything in subjection to him.

    ReplyDelete
  5. I'm not a Molinist but I'm not sure I understand your meaning. In what sense must he "be able" to actualize W at t? Couldn't the Molinist say that he "could" but he will "freely" decide not to?

    S can do A at t iff "S does A at t" is consistent with P·Q, where P = the history of the world up to t, and Q = the actual laws of nature


    The Molinist cannot say that he "could" actualize W because part of P would be "God believed at t-500 that S would A at t", where A is some action that S does not perform at t in W.

    If they don't like that definition of "can", then they have to offer a different one that is still distinctly libertarian and not compatibilist, yet allows them to say the agent "could" have done otherwise.

    ReplyDelete
  6. Steve said:
    But if you agree, as you just admitted, that possible Judas doesn't get to decide which one of the possible worlds containing him will become the actual world, then he is unable to choose which outcome becomes the real outcome.

    His freedom to do otherwise is a freedom between one possible world and another possible world, not a freedom within the actual world, or a freedom to choose which possible world, with its attendant outcomes, is actualized.


    This is still quite puzzling. I thought that, according to Molinism, there were counterfactuals of the form:

    CCF: C --> Judas freely does A

    where 'C' names a (completely specified) set of circumstances, and where the arrow in CCF is one of counterfactual implication, and the modal status of CCF is contingent. CCF amounts to the claim that if C were actual (i.e. if God were to actualize the state of affairs C), then Judas would freely choose to do A. But that's consistent with (indeed, on the Molinist view it entails) it's also being true that there is a possible world, W, which is such that C obtains in W, and Judas freely decides in W to refrain from doing A.

    So far, the state of affairs I've been calling C is not a possible world. It's at most a "world-segment," one whose obtaining is logically compatible both with Judas doing A and with Judas not doing A. Suppose God actualizes C. Then we know that Judas does A. But this does not mean that "Judas does A" is inevitable. After all, Judas - even in circumstances C - could have refrained from doing A. So I don't see any dialectically relevant sense of "inevitable" in which his doing A is inevitable. For instance, it's clearly false that "Judas does A" is inevitable, if "it is inevitable that S does X" means "S is not free to refrain from X." Of course, it's true that:

    It is inevitable that ((if God actualizes C and C counterfactually implies that Judas does A) then Judas does A)

    but it does not follow from this that "Judas does A" is inevitable, nor does it follow from this that it is inevitable that "If God actualizes C, then Judas does A." I thought a central commitment of the Molinist was the claim that truths like CCF were "up to" Judas (and, importantly, not "up to" God). But if they're up to Judas, then they aren't inevitable in any freedom-undermining sense of that term. Or?

    So it seems that the Molinist will explicitly affirm that "which possible world, with its attendant outcomes, is actualized" does depend in part on the free choices of (free agents like) Judas. After all, Judas was free to make it the case that if C obtains, then Judas refrains from A.

    Now, suppose that the following were true:

    CCF2: C* --> Judas freely does D

    It's true that Judas has no freedom (we can assume) to choose whether God actualizes C versus C*, and so Judas can't choose in some unrestricted sense "which possible world...is actualized." But surely he can choose which possible world becomes actual given an initial world segment (of either C or C*). That is, he can choose whether C is followed by A or by ~A (though he might not be free to make it a D-world). Likewise, if God actualizes C*, then "which possible world, with its attendant outcomes, is actualized" is up to Judas - he can make it a D-world or a ~D-world - even though, of course, Judas was not free to make it a C*-world in the first place.

    So again, I'm confused by this language of "actual world freedom" vs. "merely possible world freedom." I don't see how to map it onto the typical Molinist picture, at least as far as I understand it. Have I misunderstood what you meant, Steve? If so, could you clarify a bit?

    ReplyDelete
  7. BRIAN SAID:

    "What would 'freedom within the actual world' amount to?"

    A partially actual world, in which the past and present are actual, but not the future.

    And a world in which human agents actualize the future.

    "As I understand it, when libertarians affirm that some agent S freely decides at t to do A, it (typically) means that, while S decides to do A in the actual world, there is a possible world W which is such that: W and the actual world have the same history, the same laws, and in W, S decides at t to refrain from doing A (or perhaps: decides to do some distinct act B)."

    I don't think we can generalize about libertarianism, because different versions of libertarianism have different implications.

    In principle, you could have a secular version of libertarianism in which human agents are the only agents who actualize the future.

    However, when you bring theism into the mix, then that complicates matter. In that case, it is God who actualizes the future, even if he does so with a view to human choices (a la Molinism, Arminianism).

    But in that event, the human agent cannot do otherwise than what God has actualized. And that is so even if God merely ratifies a human choice. For having done so, the human agent isn't at liberty to undo God's action.

    "If so, then how do you see Molinism being committed to something that is incompatible with that kind of freedom?"

    In the event that Judas would do X if God put him in such-and-such circumstances, and God instantiates that scenario, then Judas cannot do otherwise in the actual world, for the actual world is the world in which Judas does X rather than Y.

    That's the scenario that God instantiated, and not some alternate scenario.

    Now, a Molinist may say that God simply actualizes the choice that Judas would have made (in a possible world). But having actualized that choice, then alternate choices cease to be live options.

    Likewise, In the event that Judas would do Y if God put him in such-and-such circumstances, and God instantiates that scenario, then Judas cannot do otherwise in the actual world, for the actual world is the world in which Judas does Y rather than X.

    Whichever scenario God picks, the contrary scenario is taken out of play.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Brian said...

    “CCF amounts to the claim that if C were actual (i.e. if God were to actualize the state of affairs C), then Judas would freely choose to do A. But that's consistent with (indeed, on the Molinist view it entails) it's also being true that there is a possible world, W, which is such that C obtains in W, and Judas freely decides in W to refrain from doing A.”

    I don’t deny that that’s the case when comparing one possible world with another. But an actual world realizes one possibility to the exclusion of an alternate possibility. What is possible for unexemplified possibilities isn’t a live possibility once one possibility is exemplified over against the remaining unexemplified possibilities.

    “So far, the state of affairs I've been calling C is not a possible world. It's at most a ‘world-segment,’ one whose obtaining is logically compatible both with Judas doing A and with Judas not doing A.”

    I sometimes use “world-segment” lingo as well. But if there are two abstract world-segments, in one of which Judas does A, and another in which Judas refrains from doing A, and God instantiates one of these, then whichever world-segment he instantiates, its contrary cannot still be viable.

    That would only work if there is more than one actual world (e.g. parallels worlds).

    “Suppose God actualizes C. Then we know that Judas does A. But this does not mean that ‘Judas does A’ is inevitable.”

    If God actualizes the world where Judas does A, then, by definition, it’s inevitable that Judas will do A in the actual world. It may not be inevitable at the level of abstract possibilities, but it is inevitable if one particular possibility is instantiated.

    “After all, Judas - even in circumstances C - could have refrained from doing A.”

    i) Are you talking about the actual world, or possible worlds?

    ii) If Judas, under identical circumstances, could either do A or not do A, then how can the Molinist God know in any given circumstances what Judas would do?

    “I thought a central commitment of the Molinist was the claim that truths like CCF were ‘up to’ Judas (and, importantly, not ‘up to’ God).”

    Truths in reference to what–possible worlds or the actual world? Even if the truth that Judas would betray Jesus in a given situation is up to Judas, this doesn’t mean the concrete exemplification of that truth is up to Judas. And if that truth is realized (or reified) by God, then that is how it must play out.

    “So it seems that the Molinist will explicitly affirm that ‘which possible world, with its attendant outcomes, is actualized’ does depend in part on the free choices of (free agents like) Judas.”

    Even if the outcome depends on the free choices of human agents, in the sense that God takes their choices into account, and never contravenes their choices, it remains God, and not the possible agent, who instantiates that world or world-segment. Merely possible agents aren’t real agents. They have no real power to make things happen–even at the level of second causes.

    “But surely he can choose which possible world becomes actual given an initial world segment (of either C or C*).”

    How can he choose that?

    i) To begin with, a merely possible agent is not a conscious agent. Consciousness is a result of his being actualized. So a merely possible agent can’t even make intentional choices.

    ii) Moreover, if he would do either C or C*, then he isn’t choosing one over the other. He’s doing both–in different possible worlds. As such, his choice fails to select for which possibility will be actualized. In lacks directionality, for it goes either way (in different possible worlds).

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  9. Hello Steve - thanks for your reply. I think I'm getting closer to understanding your position. A few more questions.

    You say:
    However, when you bring theism into the mix, then that complicates matter. In that case, it is God who actualizes the future, even if he does so with a view to human choices (a la Molinism, Arminianism).

    The Molinist typically affirms that, when it comes to the free actions of human beings, God weakly actualizes them, but does not strongly actualize them. Roughly, S strongly actualizes some state of affairs A iff S causes A; and S weakly actualizes A iff S causes X, and X counterfactually implies (but is not a sufficient cause of) A. So, the Molinist will want to say that God strongly actualizes circumstances C, and given that C counterfactually implies "S freely does A," then God thereby weakly actualizes A (and S's freely doing A). With that in mind, I have a question about what you say next, which is this:

    But in that event [God actualizes the future], the human agent cannot do otherwise than what God has actualized. And that is so even if God merely ratifies a human choice. For having done so, the human agent isn't at liberty to undo God's action.

    Why do you say that the human "cannot do otherwise than what God has actualized?" As the Molinist sees it, God has actualized two things:

    (1) God strongly actualized circumstances C
    (2) God weakly actualized A (S's free action, which is counterfactually implied by C)

    You're surely right that S cannot "undo" (1) - that is, S can't make it the case that C does not or did not obtain. And, obviously, once S has actually freely done A in C, then S cannot "undo" that (past) fact. But why think that, when (1) obtains, at that very moment S cannot do otherwise than A? I think you mean to answer that question when you say:

    In the event that Judas would do X if God put him in such-and-such circumstances, and God instantiates that scenario, then Judas cannot do otherwise in the actual world, for the actual world is the world in which Judas does X rather than Y.

    Given the standard Molinist understanding that the truth of "In C, Judas freely does X" is something over which Judas has control (that is, he has it in his power to do ~X in C, though he in fact will do X in C), I just don't see why you think that Judas cannot do otherwise. Sure, Judas cannot make it false that "If God actualizes C, and C counterfactually implies A, then A occurs." It does not follow from this that Judas cannot make it false that "A occurs," nor does it follow that Judas cannot make it false that "If God actualizes C, then A occurs." Only the latter two would make it the case that Judas cannot do other than A in the actual world; the first does not.

    (cont'd...)

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  10. Later, Steve wrote:
    But if there are two abstract world-segments, in one of which Judas does A, and another in which Judas refrains from doing A, and God instantiates one of these, then whichever world-segment he instantiates, its contrary cannot still be viable.

    This strikes me as a bit confused. God doesn't strongly actualize (or instantiate) A or ~A - Judas does that (otherwise we're not talking about Molinism anymore: Molinists, I thought, reject the claim that God strongly actualizes human free actions). All God can strongly actualize is the world-segment up to but not including the free decision of Judas. At that point, it is up to Judas whether the world-segment is extended in an A way, or in a ~A way. Of course, God knows which way he will go, and that's precisely why the Molinist says that God can have meticulous providential control (He needn't "wait and see," like the God of open theism, what Judas ends up doing). So given that God only weakly actualizes (say) A, its contrary (~A) is certainly still viable in the only way that matters for freedom: holding fixed everything about the circumstances that God strongly actualizes, Judas could have done ~A.

    One caveat: if we hold fixed both the circumstances C that God strongly actualizes and the counterfactual If God were to actualize C, then Judas would do A, then of course it is "inevitable" that A occur. But this is a "conditional inevitability," as it were - it is inevitable given the truth of a counterfactual over which Judas has control. That doesn't threaten freedom. Otherwise, isn't there a simple argument for logical fatalism to be had in this vicinity?

    Steve wrote:
    Even if the truth that Judas would betray Jesus in a given situation is up to Judas, this doesn’t mean the concrete exemplification of that truth is up to Judas. And if that truth is realized (or reified) by God, then that is how it must play out.

    When you speak of the "concrete exemplification of that truth," what is that? The "truth" in question, I thought, was the counterfactual:

    CCF: If C were to obtain, then Judas would freely betray Jesus.

    what is the "concrete exemplification" of CCF? The only thing that is concretely exemplified by God, as far as I can see, is C. But how the actual world turns out, once God has strongly actualized C, is up to Judas (though, again, God has always known how it will turn out). It seems you disagree, though, and my final clue about why you disagree is this comment of yours:

    Even if the outcome depends on the free choices of human agents, in the sense that God takes their choices into account, and never contravenes their choices, it remains God, and not the possible agent, who instantiates that world or world-segment. Merely possible agents aren’t real agents. They have no real power to make things happen–even at the level of second causes.Merely possible agents aren’t real agents. They have no real power to make things happen–even at the level of second causes.

    I don't quite understand what you mean by "merely possible agents" here. I thought we were talking about the actual (concrete, instantiated, exemplified) Judas. If so, then the Molinist would say that while God (strongly) instantiates the circumstances, Judas strongly actualizes his action A. Are you instead saying that human agents can't strongly actualize anything? Is that your understanding of what the Molinist accepts? Or are you offering this as a challenge to Molinism? Is it your view that an Edwards-like occasionalism is a theoretical commitment of the Molinist? Or rather that, since such an occasionalism is true, the Molinist is (therefore) mistaken? Or are you saying it is a "merely possible" Judas that would have done ~A?

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  11. Steve you said:

    At most, the Bible reveals that God has counterfactual knowledge, not middle knowledge.

    What is the difference between the two? I thought they were the same thing in Molinism?

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  12. Counterfactual knowledge is knowledge of counterfactual statements. Middle knowledge is knowledge of counterfactual statements that he doesn't make true.

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  13. Brian, it’s hard to break into your comment at any point to respond because you’re comment is one long question with many twists and turns along the way. I don’t say that as a criticism. But it’s like trying to board a fast-moving train.

    A short, partial answer is that, according to Plantinga, a possible world is a maximal state of affairs. Hence, what is instantiated is the whole package, not isolated contents.

    On a related note: “I don't quite understand what you mean by ‘merely possible agents’ here. I thought we were talking about the actual (concrete, instantiated, exemplified) Judas.”

    No, we’re talking about both. Take Craig’s position that there is at least one possible world in which all of the human agents freely go to heaven, but God chooses a different world in which some human agents freely go to hell–because the total number of heavenbound agents is greater in this world than in the world where everyone goes to heaven.

    So, on this scenario, God “begins” (as it were) with possible worlds. He knows what merely possible agents would do in every conceivable situation. He chooses which of those possible worlds to instantiate consistent with their free choices (in one or another possible worlds), but also consistent with his own aims.

    As a result of creating them, they become real agents. But in contemplating which world to actualize, the agents in view are merely possible agents. In that event, they don’t really deliberate or decide what to do.

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  14. Also, your objections center on the distinction between strong/weak actualization, but the correct interpretation (much less cogency) of that distinction is vexed:

    http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2010/01/weak-actualizat.html

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  15. Brian,

    Why does Craig seem to suggest that if God strongly actualizes C and weakly actualizes S, S can't do otherwise? Says Craig:

    "Suppose that God has decided to create you in a set of circumstances because He knew that in those circumstances you would make an undetermined choice to do A. Suppose further that had God instead known that if you were in those circumstances you would have made an undetermined choice to do not-A, then God would not have created you in those circumstances (maybe it would have loused up His providential plan!). In that case you do not have the ability in those circumstances to make the choice of not-A, but nevertheless your choice of A is, I think, clearly free, for it is causally unconstrained—it you who determines that A will be done. So the ability to do otherwise is not a necessary condition of free choice."

    Are you suggesting Craig is unfamiliar with the conceptual distinction between strong and weak actualization that you think rebuts Steve's position? Or, does Craig just not see that that distinction does the work you think it does?

    I am also unclear on what you mean by saying these ostensible free actions are "up to us." Aren't there eternal truths about these actions? So that Judas would do X in circumstance C, Y in C*, Z in C**, etc., are eternal truths. What does it mean to say these are "up to Judas?"

    Lastly, doesn't to say that Judas can do A or ~A in circumstance C "up to the minute" he chooses A commit you to might rather than would counterfactuals, an implication which rather undercuts the motivation for Molinism.
    Furthermore, how can this "up to the minute" talk lead us to the providential assurances Molinism promises us?

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  16. Yes, my last two posts were indeed a bit rambly and convoluted. My apologies.

    I'll try again. Several of your comments suggest that you take Molinism to be committed to the view (or, perhaps, that you take it to be the case, pace Molinism) that in a world in which God instantiates circumstance C, and in which C counterfactually implies (that S freely does) A (call that CCF), it follows that S cannot do otherwise than (freely doing) A. You say that while S, given CCF and C, could do ~A "in some other possible world," S cannot do otherwise than A "in the actual world."

    I don't yet see how this follows. It's true that if God instantiates an A-world, then S will do A. It's also true that:

    Necessarily, if God actualizes an A-world, then S does A

    And it's true that:

    It is impossible that (S does ~A in the actual world and God has actualized an A-world)

    But none of these entails "S cannot do ~A in the actual world." And none of these entails "Necessarily, If CCF and C, then S cannot do ~A in the actual world."

    Now consider a typical way you've put your point:

    In the event that Judas would do X if God put him in such-and-such circumstances, and God instantiates that scenario, then Judas cannot do otherwise in the actual world, for the actual world is the world in which Judas does X rather than Y.

    Notice that here your conclusion is that "Judas cannot do otherwise in the actual world" - a modal claim - and your premise is that "C counterfactually implies X, and God actualizes C." From this it follows, as you correctly state, that "Judas does X in the actual world" - a non-modal claim. But from the fact that Judas does X, it obviously doesn't follow that "It is inevitable that Judas does X." Any inevitability (for all that you've shown) attaches only to the consequence but not to the consequent. That Judas does X necessarily follows from "CCF and C obtain" (or from "God instantiates an X-world"); but that doesn't make "Judas does X" itself necessary (or in any freedom-undermining sense unavoidable, inevitable, power-necessary, etc.). Again, the fact that

    Judas cannot bring it about that it is false that (If God instantiates an X-world then Judas does X in the actual world)

    does not entail that

    If God instantiates an X-world, then Judas cannot bring it about that it is false that (Judas does X in the actual world)

    though it's still true that

    If God instantiates an X-world, then Judas will not bring it about that it is false that (Judas does X in the actual world)

    So is there some other reason for thinking that e.g. "Judas does X" is/was inevitable, rather than for thinking only that "Judas does X" inevitably follows from facts over which Judas (in the actual world) had counterfactual power? Or am I still missing your point about "freedom in the actual world" vs. "freedom in some possible world" (I ask that genuinely rather than rhetorically)?

    One final point: I would have thought that the standard way to give truth conditions for modal claims like "S is able to do A in the actual world" or "It is inevitable that S does A in the actual world" is by referring to certain kinds of possible worlds. But in making reference to non-actual possible worlds, one is still explaining what it means for S to possess the relevant property in the actual world. To be able to do ~A in the actual world is just for there to be a possible world with features X, Y, and Z. That's one reason why I was puzzled about your "freedom in actual vs. possible worlds" distinction.

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  17. Brian,

    "So is there some other reason for thinking that e.g. "Judas does X" is/was inevitable, rather than for thinking only that "Judas does X" inevitably follows from facts over which Judas (in the actual world) had counterfactual power?"

    If the putative individuals do not have the power to bring about the truth or falsity of some of the counterfactuals about them, it's hard to see how they can have the freedom Molinists want them to have. Consider:

    [1] If the crowd asks Peter if he follows the Lord Jesus, Peter will publicly deny Jesus to the crowd.

    [2] If the crowd asks Peter if he follows the Lord Jesus, Peter will not publicly deny Jesus to the crowd.

    Now, [1] is true, but Peter did not make it true since its truth doesn't seem to depend on Peter. If the crowd asks Peter, then he denies Jesus, and so the counterfactual has a truth value of T. But if the crowd does not ask Peter, Peter does not deny Jesus to the crowd. So we have another truth value, which is T. Since the truth value is T, how does Peter have the power to refrain from denying Jesus to the crowd once the crowd asks Peter if he follows Jesus?

    Another problem seems to lie in your claim that once God actualizes the world with [1], then [1] becomes a fact about the past. You appear to admit the accidental necessity of the past, and this may be a better way to read Steve than that of committing the modal fallacy.

    So, perhaps this is the type necessity Steve is referring to (and he can certainly correct me for my presumptiveness!), and so the modal fallacy you tried to apply to his claim would not stick. It seems that Steve's position is that once God actualizes the world in which [1] is true, then Peter cannot prevent it's occurence. So, the modal claim would look more like this: Now-unpreventably(P), Nec(If P then Q), therefore, Now-unpreventably(Q)). There's no modal fallacy here.

    At this point it appears that you just don't like this talk of unprevetability because, from what I can surmise, you take Occhamism to be just obvious. At least, you don't argue for it, you just seem to assume that counterfactual power over the past works here and that the fact of God's actualizing [1] is a soft fact about the past. Needless to say, these are hotly contested points, and so it shouldn't be that confusing to see why those, like Steve (and myself), don't find that Molinism affords a libertarian freedom worth wanting, one that comes with the desiderate of 'ability to do otherwise.'

    Would you say that's a fair assessment?

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  18. Hi Brian,

    I have so many irrational critics that it’s refreshing to interact with a reasonable critic for a change. And I think we may finally be making some progress inasmuch as you have clarified your objection.

    i) I think the basic problem is the modern tendency to subsume possible worlds under modal logic. But let’s keep in mind that Molinism antedates the rise of modal logic. Likewise, speculation about possible worlds also antedates modal logic. Consider the Scholastic question of whether the Incarnation would have occurred apart from the fall. That’s a debate over possible worlds. The supra/infra debate is another implicit debate over possible worlds (e.g. lesser or better possible worlds). You also have speculation about the best possible world in Aquinas. And, indeed, this ultimately goes back to Aristotle’s famous discussion of the Sea Battle.

    So we need to be careful not to reduce possible worlds to an extension of modal logic, even if modal logic is a useful way to express ourselves.

    ii) I also think this is apt to get things backwards. For, to my knowledge, reference to possible worlds is a way to explicate and ground logical relations, not vice versa. In that respect, the ontology of possible worlds is prior to modal logic.

    iii) On a related note, subsuming possible worlds under modal logic tends to reduce reality to a formal system of internal relations, where every truth of fact is equivalent to a truth of reason. This was a difficulty for Leibniz.

    And that, in turn, conduces to absolute idealism (e.g. McTaggart), and the denial of time (e.g. Gödel, McTaggart).

    iv) When we talk about the freedom to do otherwise, that normally has reference to the future. At present, the future is a garden of forking paths.

    Compare this with the accidental necessity of the past. What makes the past unchangeable? Is accidental “necessity” the same thing as logical necessity? Is this a modal claim? I don’t think so.

    Rather, it involves a claim about the concrete structure of time and causality. The linearity of time, cause and effect.

    Likewise, as you know, retrocausation is generally regarded as impossible because it is subtly or ultimately incoherent (e.g. the grandfather paradox). Those are “non-modal” limiting-conditions. Physical constraints. But if I say that it’s impossible to change the past, would you deny my claim because that “attaches only to the consequence but not to the consequent”?

    Surely that objection confuses different types of impossibility.

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  19. I see that Paul has presciently anticipated some elements of my response (e.g. accidental necessity).

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