Sunday, July 29, 2007

"On Becoming a Heretic"

Calvinism comes under fire all the time by professing Christians of a more liberal stripe. And there’s a sense in which they’re half-right—as long as you buy into their operating assumptions. But their conclusions fall short of their premises—for these doctrines hang together with great inner cohesion and Scriptural support.

Edwin Curley is a seasoned philosopher who specializes in the Enlightenment. In describing his youthful apostasy, he presents the logical alternatives with the frank clarity and refreshing candor of someone who has nothing to lose since he long since ceased to have a personal investment (from his perspective) in the correct answer.

“My mother—and maternal grandmother, who had lived with us from my infancy—were Episcopalians. They saw to it that I went to the Episcopal church and Sunday school, and rejoiced when I became an acolyte,” “On Becoming a Heretic,” L. Antony, ed. Philosophers Without Gods (Oxford 2007), 80.

“As I became an adult, I began to have doubts about the religion in which I had been raised…Probably the most crucial factor was the prayer book my mother gave me when I was sixteen…At sixteen I read those articles of religion, carefully and critically, for the first time,” ibid. 80.

“I was disturbed that my church accepted predestination. Before the foundations of the world were laid, the articles said, God had chosen some vessels for honor and others for dishonor, that is, some of his human creatures for salvation and others for damnation. This did not seem fair. But one of the first principles of my church was that no one should be required to believe, as necessary for salvation, any doctrine that could not be proved from scripture. So far as I could see, there was as good scriptural foundation for this teaching as there was for any doctrine my church taught. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans seemed pretty unequivocal on this score,” ibid. 80-81.

“There also seemed to be strong philosophical reasons for accepting predestination. If God is omniscient, if he knows everything, he must have foreknowledge of the future, including his creatures’ ultimate destiny. So before they are born there must be a fact of the matter about what their fate will be, a fact that would seem to be unalterable, unless we suppose that God can be mistaken in his beliefs. So our belief that we might determine our destiny by the choices we have yet to make, choices that might go either way, must be an illusion,” ibid. 81.

“Some Christian philosophers will say that God’s omniscience requires only that he know everything that is knowable, and that propositions about the future (or more modestly, propositions about future human free actions, and all others that depend on them) lack a truth value; not being knowable, they are not in fact known, even by an omniscient being. This may be a way of reconciling God’s omniscience with human freedom, but it does so only by creating problems for the doctrine of divine providence,” ibid. 289n3.

“Moreover, if God is omnipotent, if he can do anything he wants to do (or any logically possible thing he wants to do), then nothing can happen except by his will. If I wind up going to hell, God must have willed that I go to hell. This takes it out of my hands. How can I prevent what an omnipotent being wills?” ibid. 81.

“Theologians sometimes try to save God from responsibility for our sins by saying that he merely permits them. But to permit something to happen when you could have prevented it, and when you knew what would happen if you didn’t act, is not to escape responsibility for it. In Lillian Hellman’s Little Foxes, Regina is having a quarrel with her husband when he suffers a heart attack. He asks her to bring him his medicine, and she refuses to do so. She has it in her power to bring him the medicine, and she knows what will happen if she does not. Her decision not to bring him the medicine makes her as much responsible for his death as if she had shot him,” ibid. 81.

“Some Christian philosophers will no doubt object that, although God could prevent me from committing the sins that will justly cause my damnation, he cannot do so in a way that would entitle me to moral credit for refraining…Even if we accept the libertarian conception of freedom that this reply presupposes, it doesn’t seem to work. It doesn’t show that God can’t cause me not to perform the act that, if done freely, would be a sin. It just shows that he can’t do this without depriving me of the libertarian freedom necessary for my refraining to accrue moral credit. It’s the value he places on human freedom that prevents him from causing me not to sin, and that value may seem, on reflection, too high,” ibid. 81.

“If I am destined to go to Hell, God will not only have known that from eternity, he will also have willed it from eternity. The scriptural texts supporting predestination seem to do no more than endorse the implications of deeper theological commitments to God’s omnipotence and omniscience. Sometimes Christians claim that the acceptance of predestination—or as they may say, double predestination, the predestination not only of the elect, but also the damned—is an example of Calvinist excess. It’s well to remember that the chief theologian of the Roman Catholic Church also accepted double predestination [‘See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, xxiii’],” ibid. 82, 289n4.

“Another doctrine of my church that disturbed me as an adolescent was the doctrine that we are all sinner, who require God’s grace if we are to be saved…This is the doctrine of original sin. I cannot believe in original sin. Original sin is less widely accepted now than when my church was founded. I find many Christians who reject original sin. I sympathize with them. Their hearts are in the right place, certainly. But Christians can reject original sin only at the cost of a substantial reinterpretation of their scriptures and traditions,” ibid. 82.

“Consistently with the doctrine of original sin, it is common among Christians to believe that we cannot earn salvation by our works. If we are to be ‘justified,’ that is, to achieve salvation, it must be by our faith in Jesus. Not that this is an action that is in our power to perform or not, an alternative to obeying God’s commandments, which is beyond our power. Rather, God is merciful; he may forgive us and treat us as if we were righteous. The mark of our having been forgiven is that God, by an act of grace, gives us faith (Rom 3:21-26),” ibid. 82.

“It implies that those among us who lack faith in Jesus have not received grace, have not been forgiven, and will, if we continue in that state, go to Hell. So the doctrine of justification by faith, which has strong support in the Christian scriptures, leads to exclusivism, to the idea that all who reject Christian doctrine must be damned, no matter how good they may be by ordinary standards. If God chose the beneficiaries of his grace on the ground of some distinctive merit they possessed, this might not be unfair to those he didn’t choose, whom we would presume to lack that merit. But that would be contrary to the idea of grace, which implies a free gift, not something given to someone who deserves it on account of merit,” ibid. 82-83.

“It’s a hard and ugly business, this doctrine of grace…Yet my church taught that these people could not be saved, not matter how good they might otherwise be, if they did not believe in Jesus. While there might not be any philosophical reason to believe this, there certainly seemed to be ample scriptural support for it, as is illustrated most clearly by the Gospel of John, though also by other texts,” ibid. 83.

“The scriptures that my church pronounced sacred seemed to teach that most of us will go to hell: ‘The gate is wide and the road is easy that leads to destruction, and there are many who take it…the gate is narrow and the road is hard that leads to life, and there are few who find it’ (Mt 7:13-14). Another passages reads: ‘Many are called, but few are chosen’ (Mt 22:144),” ibid. 83.

“So far, my objections have been mainly theological; they are objections to teachings whose basis is primarily scriptural rather than philosophical. The main exception to that generalization is the doctrine of predestination, which has philosophical grounds as well as scriptural grounds. I know many Christians will not feel that their understanding of Christianity requires them to accept all these doctrines, either because they have a different interpretation of scripture or because they do not regard the Christian scriptures as absolutely authoritative in determining their beliefs and conduct. I think those Christians who adopt a freer attitude toward scripture—and do not feel that their acceptance of Christianity commits them to predestination, or hell, or original sin, or justification by faith, or exclusivism—those Christians have their hearts in the right place, I say. But I also think their feet many be planted on the slippery slope to heresy, and that more conservative Christians, who would accord greater authority to scripture, have a clearer right to call themselves Christians. How much of traditional Christianity can you reject and still be a Christian?” ibid. 85.

6 comments:

  1. I don't believe it is uncommon for a number people to develop conclusions like this. One atheist and former Christian I speak with regularly suggested to me that if he is to return to Christianity again, it will have to be with the package of Calvinism and the doctrine of hell, because he believes these are taught in the Scriptures. But he considers these to be repugnant doctrines... doctrines which he finds to be increasingly difficult to say what the objection to them is!

    One reason why I don't believe it is uncommon, aside from running into former Christians who held such views at one time or another, is that a number of Christians I meet say similar things like, "I could never believe in a god like that!" So, convince them of this and that and you get the deduction to unbelief fairly easily. Of course, the move to unbelief is not so simple. One may be confronted with an anomaly and attempt to remove the problem by further research over a number of years. Others may be more motivated to give up a view altogether - and there various psychological and sociological factors will play in. After all, if someone were hardbent on finding a way to continue an adulterous relationship, say, it might be in someone's "benefit" to debunk something like the Bible. And if someone can't withstand the tragedy of seeing a loved one in hell, one might look for reasons to support universalism or claim heaven and hell are superstitions. Anyway, Curley's conclusions are a likely one to expect. What possible philosophical defenses he considered during his time as a believer is the interesting thing; and if he offered very few, that would also be interesting!

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  2. Calvinism IS a nightmare, and I can't understand a mind that willingly embraces it. The idea that most humans are born incapable of doing anything about their condition because of the errors of a distant ancestor and held accountable for that condition by a God who refuses to do anything about that same state is repugnant on every level. It is quite frankly the vision of a universe ruled by a sadistic lunatic.

    What is so hard about finding an "objection", James? What creature desires to be harmed and to suffer even temporarily, let alone eternally? Spiritual and physical pain hurt, after all. Yet, Calvinism promises most of humankind the most awful torments imaginable, torments that the "elect" all too willingly accept because they "know" that they will be of the select group who will slide into Heaven.

    It reminds me of a great analogy: suppose someone was told that they were going to be invited by a wealthy king to live with him in his palace where they will be treated to the most ravishing delights, all on one condition: the rest of the city would be tortured and killed, from the young to the old. Suppose this same person were to say: "Sounds great! Bring it on!"

    Would this be a moral person, in your estimation? This is how the Calvinist sounds to those on the "outside".

    - Todd

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  3. Todd said:

    What is so hard about finding an "objection", James? What creature desires to be harmed and to suffer even temporarily, let alone eternally? Spiritual and physical pain hurt, after all.

    The main problem here is Todd presumes we are innocent and we don't deserve to be punished (or, perhaps, we don't deserve to be punished eternally, that somehow eternal punishment is incommensurate with our sins against God and others). However, the Bible teaches that we are sinners. We have sinned against God and against others. Not only does the Bible teach that we are sinners, but if we look at the world around us, it's evident we are sinners.

    It reminds me of a great analogy: suppose someone was told that they were going to be invited by a wealthy king to live with him in his palace where they will be treated to the most ravishing delights, all on one condition: the rest of the city would be tortured and killed, from the young to the old. Suppose this same person were to say: "Sounds great! Bring it on!"

    A better analogy would be if we supposed that a supremely kind and compassionate king forgave a few guilty and convicted prisoners on death row of their terrible crimes and sins -- sins which they themselves had originally and intentionally and maliciously sought to perpetrate against the king himself -- and graciously invited them to dine with him in his palace.

    Suppose that one of the prisoners, who was no less guilty than the others, but who was not forgiven by the king, was to say, "That's not fair!" Is the king somehow being unjust in not extending forgiveness to the prisoner for his plot to assassinate the king?

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  4. Hey Todd.

    It shouldn't be too difficult for you to understand how a person could embrace Calvinism. Consider a moral skeptic like Richard Double. To a moral realist like myself, it is just obvious that propositions like, "Unless there is an overriding reason, John should not steal Mary's car" is true. Double rejects the realism because he believes there are good arguments facing moral realism. I think Double's view is implausible, but it is not incomprehensible how someone could adopt his view. And neither should it be incomprehensible for any reasonable person to see how a person could become a Calvinist on rational grounds. They go something like this: suppose S believes all of the following: (1) knowledge ascriptions are defeasible; (2) the Bible is reliable; (3) the Bible teaches Calvinism; (4) it is difficult to understand how Calvinism or a whole host of other doctrines are true. Now, does (4) give a person a reason to reject (3)? Not that I can see. Not if one already is sure of (1) and (2) and thinks (3) is the most plausible exegesis of the text, as well as being philosophically defensible or supported. None of this should be incomprehensible to you, Todd.

    Perhaps the problem is that you've already couched the debate in language that inhibits you from asking the more important question: is Calvinism true (though you've laid out moral repugnance more about original sin, I think)? You only objections in your post are intuitions; and that's fine. But if your intuitions are not considered reliable on the topic or they are not shared by another party, they will hold no weight in an argument with someone like me. Some of your intuitions are shared by me, but I think the first option (unreliability) is a property of them.

    Finally, it is not clear to me what your objections amount to. For instance, you write, "What creature desires to be harmed and to suffer even temporarily, let alone eternally?" Well, only gluttons for pain. But most people do not fit into that category. And I cannot find anything in Calvinism or any other Christian doctrine for that matter that implies creatures desire to be harmed (or have the receiving of pain as their intentional goal). So what's the relevance of this?


    You continue: '...Calvinism promises most of humankind the most awful torments imaginable, torments that the "elect" all too willingly accept because they "know" that they will be of the select group who will slide into Heaven.'

    This is confusing to me. I thought it was the doctrine of Hell that promises mankind the most awful tornments imaginable? But now you are going to have to provide an *argument* that hell is unjust. And the debate should be there.

    JG

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  5. Patrick,
    your comments presuppose the ability of the "sinners" in question to be able to willingly choose to commit their offenses in the first place. Calvinism doesn't allow for that. It states not only that men are bad by nature and by birth, but that God has decreed from the beginning of eternity that they be as such because of the sin of an ancient ancestor. What would you think of a father who demanded his daughter clean her room and beat her mercilessly when she didn't (despite the fact that she could not see or hear him because she was blind and deaf)?
    Such a person would be considered an amoral monster. Such is the Calvinist God.

    Of course, the typical Calvinist response is "Who are you to answer God back?", but if you are honest, you will know that this is no answer at all.

    If men are sinners and cannot be other than what they are because of an all-powerful God's decree that they have no capacity to resist, then God bears some responsibility here. "Can" He do whatever He wants? Well, I guess. I'm not sure that defines Him as "all-good". He's only (maybe) "kind of" good ... once in a while.

    - Todd

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  6. Patrick,
    your comments presuppose the ability of the "sinners" in question to be able to willingly choose to commit their offenses in the first place. Calvinism doesn't allow for that. It states not only that men are bad by nature and by birth, but that God has decreed from the beginning of eternity that they be as such because of the sin of an ancient ancestor.


    This is hardly an objection to Calvinism. It's not as if Arminians, Roman Catholics, or even the Orthodox deny this. The dispute over this arises not over the doctrine of original sin, but the imputation of the sin of Adam to the whole race, eg. federalism.

    However, that argument is reversible, for the imputation of the sin of Adam in the covenant of works is reversed in the imputation of the righteousness of Christ in the covenant of redemption, and, since the identity of the elect are never disclosed and there is no different set of instructions for salvation for the elect and nonelect, it isn't as if God is not offering the gospel freely to them both on the same terms.

    And which of us disagrees with what Adam did? Nobody does, and according to Scripture that justifies us being held in our bondage to sin, since none of us would have done any better and all of us agree with Adam. In Scripture, a person is to be blamed for his own sins, but, in addition, if by his sins and his attitude toward his fathers' sins, he agrees, he is justly held responsible for them. If you, for example, brag about having built the tombs of the prophets that your ancestors murdered, you're giving approval to those murders. If in doing this you also murder the Son of God while denying that you approve of your ancestors murders of the prophets, you show your objection to be false. Such was the fate of the Pharisees and Sadducees.

    What would you think of a father who demanded his daughter clean her room and beat her mercilessly when she didn't (despite the fact that she could not see or hear him because she was blind and deaf)?

    This is a category error; it confuses physical inability and moral inability.

    Calvinism promises most of humankind the most awful torments imaginable, torments that the "elect" all too willingly accept because they "know" that they will be of the select group who will slide into Heaven.'

    Really, is this what Calvinism teaches? Couldn't this be applied to evangelical Christianity as a whole?

    Further somebody isn't up to par on his reading of Calvinism. Lorraine Boettner log ago pointed out that there is no reason to suppose that the number of the reprobate outnumbers the elect; in fact, Boettner believed the elect would outnumber the reprobate.

    hat would you think of a father who demanded his daughter clean her room and beat her mercilessly when she didn't (despite the fact that she could not see or hear him because she was blind and deaf)?
    Such a person would be considered an amoral monster


    If we're just a bunch of walking talking apes and a collection of cells that just happen to have minds, and morality is just based on consensus, then how do nullifidian ethics justify this moral objection and serve us any better?

    Of course, the typical Calvinist response is "Who are you to answer God back?", but if you are honest, you will know that this is no answer at all.

    If men are sinners and cannot be other than what they are because of an all-powerful God's decree that they have no capacity to resist, then God bears some responsibility here. "Can" He do whatever He wants? Well, I guess. I'm not sure that defines Him as "all-good". He's only (maybe) "kind of" good ... once in a while.


    No, the "typical Calvinist answer" is to point out, once again, that responsibility and blame are not the same principles. Somebody can't differentiate between a necessary and a sufficient condition. Responsibility is a necessary but insufficient condition of blame.

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