Tuesday, June 05, 2007

Falsifying Touchstone

In the comments on this post, Touchstone (who has an insatiable need to mock T-Bloggers before the Debunking atheists can—you know, the typical Christian response to other Christians who challenge atheists….) mocked Steve Hays and myself before dancing around a direct challenge I issued him. I triple dog dared T-Stone to demonstrate evolution from the fossil record.

Naturally, he didn’t, as I pointed out before. But I wanted to take the opportunity of his comment to address one of the other things T-Stone said.

T-Stone, speaking of falsification, said:
Here's a blurb from a physics professor named James Schombert at the University of Oregon I've participated with on other forums in the past on this subject:

The scientific method has four steps:

* observation/experimentation
* deduction
* hypothesis
* falsification

Note that there is an emphasis on falsification, not verification. If a theory passes any test then our confidence in the theory is reinforced, but it is never proven correct in a mathematically sense. Thus, a powerful hypothesis is one that is highly vulnerable to falsification and that can be tested in many ways. Science can be separated from pseudo-science by the Principle of Falsification, the concept that ideas must be capable of being proven false in order to be scientifically valid.


There are several problems with this, however (especially the way T-Stone is taking it). For example, every single universal negative argument can be falsified. If I said, “There are no elves in Greenland” then all it would take is one elf to prove my statement wrong. This would ironically put universal negatives in the class of being impossible to prove logically, yet being (according to T-Stone), “a high quality scientific theory.”

But there are other arguments that fit this same category. If I said, “There is proof for the existence of aliens on the back of Alpha Centauri”, that statement would be possible to falsify. All you’d have to do is get to the back of Alpha Centauri. That one is not physically capable of doing so right now does not mean the theory is not falsifiable, for at some point in the future it could happen that someone could go to the back of Alpha Centauri.

Now my examples are obviously trivial examples designed to prove a point. Let’s use a more pertinent example.

T-Stone is in essence arguing:

A. Evolution is falsifiable.
B. Creationists have not falsified evolution.
C. Therefore, evolution is true.

But this logic is identical to the logic that I gave above regarding aliens on Alpha Centauri. See:

A. The theory that there is evidence of aliens on the back of Alpha Centauri is falsifiable.
B. T-Stone has not falsified it.
C. Therefore, the theory is true.

This is obviously bogus. For the same reason, T-Stone’s implicit argument that Evolution is true because Creationists haven’t falsified it is likewise bogus (and that ignores the fact that Creationists have falsified many points of Evolution already).

On a more scientifically-broad basis, however, falsification is not some “magic” thing that suddenly gives a theory credibility. Indeed, it is not the case that all theories must be falsifiable to be scientific. In fact, is it possible to falsify the falsifiability theory? If not, then would that not mean that a non-scientific theory is defining science?

Now one other thing to point out. T-Stone said: “Being falsifiable makes it [a theory] ‘real science’, even if it is eventually falsified.” By that standard, my argument for the existence of aliens on the back of Alpha Centauri is “real science” even though I just made it up for the purposes of refuting T-Stone.

T-Stone said:
Ask yourself how "common design", an idea Steve Hays likes to throw out, or your favorite creation theory would be falsified.
That’s easy. Demonstrate how an irreducibly complex chemical reaction in a cell occurs without anyone designing the mechanisms. Just show one of them spontaneously occurring without a designer. That would falsify the theory, wouldn’t it?

Hey, I guess ID is “real science” after all now that we’ve got T-Stone’s stamp of approval on it.

30 comments:

  1. I guess it is easier for T-Stone to interpet the Bible as allegory so that he can attempt to squeeze it into his scientific view, so as to be reconciled with the main stream scientific community. I'm sure by now, or at least he should know, that that view has more problems, and causes more problems, than the one he feels like he is attempting to fix. I pray that the HolySpirit will open his eyes to this error.

    I can sympathize with T-Stone. I had a brief struggle down this line for a while. I thank God for the forgiveness he gave me through His Son Jesus Christ, and the forgiveness He continues to give.

    Sorry guys, I know I'm not dealing with an emotional bunch here, and I'm usually not that type either, but there is some room for emotionalism in orthodox Christianity today.

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  2. Peter,

    You said:
    T-Stone is in essence arguing:

    A. Evolution is falsifiable.
    B. Creationists have not falsified evolution.
    C. Therefore, evolution is true.


    That's completely false. I've not contemplated sucha ridiculous argument let alone offered one. I'd like to see the quote from me that you are basing this on.

    If a theory is "not-falsified" it does NOT mean it's confirmed. A hypothesis being offered, before it's even been examined in light of the evidence, is in an indeterminate state, epistemologically; it's performance is initially unknown before we subject it to the evidence and tests. But it's also unfalsified. So a hypothesis in its initial state is un-falsified but uncomfirmed. It's not ben rejected or affirmed at that point.

    The opposite of "un-falsified" is NOT "true", Peter.

    Also, you suggest here:

    This would ironically put universal negatives in the class of being impossible to prove logically, yet being (according to T-Stone), “a high quality scientific theory.”

    That's not an accurate quote, Peter. Falsifiability is *a* mark of a high quality theory (and as I said previously with respect to Creationist theories which have failed miserably, the "high quality" reflects its epistemic liabilities, not it's confirmation or falsification). If you will read the quote you have from Dr. Schombert above, you will see that he too lists falsification as *a* part of the scientific method. Falsification is not the *only* criterion, but it is *a* criterion. That's an important qualification that you either missed or purposely left out. Here's the full sentence from my post at 6/04/2007 8:47 PM, for the record:

    It's just an obvious, simple way that evolution is liable to falsification -- a mark of a high quality scientific theory

    The other marks would be the things I mention repeatedly in my posts, explanatory power, conformance to observations and evidence, and meaningful predictions. Each of those is *a* mark, but none of them alone are sufficient. Clear?

    On a more scientifically-broad basis, however, falsification is not some “magic” thing that suddenly gives a theory credibility. Indeed, it is not the case that all theories must be falsifiable to be scientific. In fact, is it possible to falsify the falsifiability theory? If not, then would that not mean that a non-scientific theory is defining science?

    It's certainly not "magic", you're right about that, Peter. But after a good start there on that paragraph, you completely lose it. Falsifiability is *not* a scientific theory, Peter. Why you would suppose it is, I can't imagine.

    Science is not *defined* by scientific theories, Peter. I don't know where you are getting this crazy stuff, but it's got you quite confused.

    You said:
    Now one other thing to point out. T-Stone said: “Being falsifiable makes it [a theory] ‘real science’, even if it is eventually falsified.” By that standard, my argument for the existence of aliens on the back of Alpha Centauri is “real science” even though I just made it up for the purposes of refuting T-Stone.

    OK, now you're compounding your errors. 1) Falsification does *not* by itself make a theory scientific (see above, or anywhere else in the clued-in planet) and 2) It's false to state that I've offered an argument that evolution derives its truth from it's lack of falsification.

    You said:
    T-Stone said:
    Ask yourself how "common design", an idea Steve Hays likes to throw out, or your favorite creation theory would be falsified.That’s easy. Demonstrate how an irreducibly complex chemical reaction in a cell occurs without anyone designing the mechanisms.


    Bzzzt. Even if that were shown, in wouldn't falsify ID, or "common design". At worst, IDers would have to just admit that that process wasn't a good example of irreducible complexity after all. So what if the bacterial flagellum is shown to reducible? IDists can just point to something else for which we don't have all the details of the biological development available for audit. How about blod clotting? Oh, that's reducible? Never mind. How about, um, the brain! Yes, that's it (that oughtta keep those science guys busy for years...)!

    Your falsification test wouldn't falsify anything, as even the proponents of irreducible complexity admit that many things are *not* irreducibly complex, and absolute precision in determining what is IC or not is not available. So, suspected IC examples that are "falsified" are simply tossed out of the "IC list". The idea carries on, untouched by falsifiability so long as there other candidates (even in principle) available as examples of IC.

    In fact, this kind of "no designer" process has has been shown. See here .

    Behe identifies gated ion channels as IC in his book, and whaddya know, we find a case where gated ion channels are created de novo -- "from scratch". Whoops!

    That's not a great circumstance for Behe, but it's important to note that this does not falsify the idea that *some* systems are irreducibly complex. It only falsifies the idea that that *particular* gated ion channel is IC. No problem for Behe or ID, they simply point to other examples.

    That's not at all the case with a human skull fossil recovered from the Pre-Cambrian. In that case, there's no explanation like "that's just not IC". Evolution would be discredited by that one Pre-cambrian fossil.

    Just show one of them spontaneously occurring without a designer. That would falsify the theory, wouldn’t it?

    As above, no, it would not falsify it. All of this ignoring the fact that Irreducible Complexity is manifestly not a creation theory, or "common design" which was what I was asking about in terms of falsification.

    Hey, I guess ID is “real science” after all now that we’ve got T-Stone’s stamp of approval on it.

    Heh. You're a comedian, Peter.

    -Touchstone

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  3. First of all,

    Thank you, T-Stone, for demonstrating that for as much ado as you make out of falsification, it's really not that big of a deal after all. Now if only you could be consistent.

    By the way, you said:
    ---
    Even if that were shown, in wouldn't falsify ID, or "common design". At worst, IDers would have to just admit that that process wasn't a good example of irreducible complexity after all.
    ---

    You mean kinda like how if we show a fossil "reconstruction" to be bunk at "proving" evolution, the evolutionist can just say, "That wasn't a good example of linear descent after all" and make up something else?

    You said:
    ---
    So what if the bacterial flagellum is shown to reducible? IDists can just point to something else for which we don't have all the details of the biological development available for audit.
    ---

    Just like Darwinists have ALWAYS claimed "We'll find the 'missing links' eventually. Just give us time. We'll think of something else."

    Your double standards are pathetic, T-Stone.

    T-Stone said:
    ---
    That's not at all the case with a human skull fossil recovered from the Pre-Cambrian. In that case, there's no explanation like "that's just not IC". Evolution would be discredited by that one Pre-cambrian fossil.
    ---

    No it wouldn't. The find would first be called a fraud. If it could be proven that it wasn't a fraud, then next they would challenge the dating of the fossil. They would argue that experimental error caused the misidentification of the rock. After that was thoroughly refuted, they'd come up with other alternate explanations. Perhaps an early man was digging a tunnel or was burried there. Any number of things would suffice as an excuse, because your precious scientists aren't anywhere near as unbiased as you think, T-Stone. Haven't you read your Kuhn, T-Stone. Scientists don't change their minds on their theories. They die out and others who disagree take their place.

    T-Stone said:
    ---
    All of this ignoring the fact that Irreducible Complexity is manifestly not a creation theory, or "common design" which was what I was asking about in terms of falsification.
    ---

    By the way, this is precisely why it shouldn't be rejected as being religious in orientation and promoting YEC. You know, all the "legal" reasons ID denied access to classrooms. Thanks, yet again, for revealing more than you wished to.

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  4. By the way, one other thing I forgot to mention. T-Stone said:
    ---
    Falsifiability is *not* a scientific theory, Peter. Why you would suppose it is, I can't imagine.

    Science is not *defined* by scientific theories, Peter. I don't know where you are getting this crazy stuff, but it's got you quite confused.
    ---

    Here's another instance where T-Stone admits more than he realizes.

    Science has a controlling philosophy. Its philosophy is not based on the scientific method. The scientific method is, therefore, obviously NOT the most fundamental method of coming to knowledge. The scientific method must be guided by a controlling philosophy.

    After all, T-Stone argues that there is such a thing as "high quality" science, which puts it in distinction with "low quality" science. But how does T-Stone make this determination?

    He gives us a quote from some guy he's conversed with on an e-mail list. But who made James Schombert the arbitur and definer of good and bad science?

    The fact of the matter is that T-Stone is not pushing science here. He is pushing scientism. He's pushing an entire controlling philosophy that, by his own admission, is itself not scientific. He is appealing to the non-scientific, and then complaining that our theories are not scientific.

    Again, the double standard is astounding.

    But don't let a little thing like providing a defense for your controlling philosophy stand in T-Stone's way. No sir. Scientism just IS, and if you don't like it...well, you're not scientific!

    As if that means anything.

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  5. Peter,

    You said:
    No it wouldn't. The find would first be called a fraud. If it could be proven that it wasn't a fraud, then next they would challenge the dating of the fossil. They would argue that experimental error caused the misidentification of the rock. After that was thoroughly refuted, they'd come up with other alternate explanations. Perhaps an early man was digging a tunnel or was burried there. Any number of things would suffice as an excuse, because your precious scientists aren't anywhere near as unbiased as you think, T-Stone. Haven't you read your Kuhn, T-Stone. Scientists don't change their minds on their theories. They die out and others who disagree take their place.

    Your assumptions about scientists being dishonest doesn't change anything, Peter. Even if they *did* misrepesent the fossil, the fact remains that if a human fossil *is* found that really *was* placed in sediment during the Pre-Cambrian, evolution as conceived by Darwin would be falsified. Dishonest scientists don't change the actual status of the human fossil here, Peter. The actuality of a human skull from the Pre-Cambrian would falsify evolution.

    If there is a "silver bullet" scenario like this for falsifying ID, I don't know what it is, and I suspect you don't either. Which is one reason ID is not considered to be a scientific (but, as I apparently need to explicitly state for you, not the only reason).

    -Touchstone

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  6. Whatever we believe we should demand evidence for that belief, and historical evidence in the past simply isn't good enough. What we need is evidence.

    Without it we could believe there was a witch in our town simply because a baby died, as they did in early modern Europe.

    Valerie Tarico describes what can happen without it. Tarico claims “it doesn’t take very many false assumptions to send us on a long goose chase.” To illustrate this she tells us about the mental world of a paranoid schizophrenic. To such a person the perceived persecution by others sounds real. “You can sit, as a psychiatrist, with a diagnostic manual next to you, and think: as bizarre as it sounds, the CIA really is bugging this guy. The arguments are tight, the logic persuasive, the evidence organized into neat files. All that is needed to build such an impressive house of illusion is a clear, well-organized mind and a few false assumptions. Paranoid individuals can be very credible.” (p. 221-22). This is what Christians do, and this is why it’s hard to shake the Evangelical faith, in her informed opinion.

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  7. John said,

    "Whatever we believe we should demand evidence for that belief..."


    Paul: I demand evidence for that belief.

    best,

    ~PM

    P.S. Just so I don't have to post again, if you give me evidence for that belief then I assume you'll believe that evidence supports your original belief. So, while I'm here I'll demand the evidence for all your beliefs about the evidences you've provided. Ad infinitum. So get busy John, you don't have all day.

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  8. Falsifiability is a test of proper deductive logical construct of a hypothesis where empirical testing is inductive generation of data to demonstrate the mathematical likelihood of the deductive premise of the hypothesis. For example, we should be able to restate any hypothesis as "if A then B". We then use controls to demonstrate the sufficiency of A to B and falsifiability to demonstrate the necessity of B to A. The empirical testing is inductive in that it observes the likelihood of B where A occurs. In the deductive, this is a fallacy called "affirming the consequent." However, the scientist isn't make deductive conclusions. Because of this no scientific conclusion should never purport to claim absolute certainty. Therefore it can be said that science can never prove (in the common sense) anything to be absolutely true, but it can prove something to be false.

    ReplyDelete
  9. John, in my opinion you haven't grasped this at all and don't know what you're talking about. I personally have not read through what you wrote, but I have a strong hunch of this because you didn't provide the proper clues to understand what your intent was. I guess we all do that from time to time. But you share the blame.

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  10. Jim said:
    ---
    Therefore it can be said that science can never prove (in the common sense) anything to be absolutely true, but it can prove something to be false.
    ---

    The problem with this is that science cannot prove something to be false unless it can prove something to be true first. Look at this logically. Suppose we have a theory (T) and it's falsifier (F). Therefore we have:

    1. Theories cannot be proven true.
    2. T & F are theories.
    3. If F is true, T is false.
    4. In order to disprove T, we must prove F.
    5. But to prove F, we must prove a theory, contra 1).
    6. Therefore, T can be neither affirmed nor falsified.

    Thus, falsification is ultimately a shell game. It works on a "common sense" level to help weed out some junk science; but at the ultimate level it does not function at all. Therefore, you cannot use falsification further than its very narrow application (at a common sense level, rather than at a theoretical level).

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  11. Cute Peter. Point taken.

    Paul, how do we guarantee that our assumptions are not viciously circular? They must be grounded in some evidence, correct?

    Best to you too.

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  12. I'm glad that I'm blessed with an "effortless faith" so I don't have to get all worked up over all of this year 2080 sci-fi mumbo jumbo.

    I "KNOW" I'm saved!

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  13. Not to change the subject, but why should anyone believe Darwin's theory stands or falls purely on the basis of the fossil record?

    I can see doing that a century ago, but not since the advent of genetics and biochemistry.

    (I hope this doesn't post twice)

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  14. Peter,

    You are confused about the nature of scientific theories, Peter. A scientific theory has no 'falsifier' in the Boolean sense, as you have provisioned it. That is, for a given theory (T), it's falsifier (F) is not also a theory. Therein lies your misunderstanding.

    A scientific theory is a testable model or explanation for natural phenomena, testable through experimentation or predictions, and empirically falsifiable.

    If you understand that, then you won't be offering a "falsifier" for a given theory as a theory itself. For example:

    (A) Phlogiston is a fifth element in addition to fire, water, earth and air. Phlogiston is what is released when a flammable object is consumed by fire.

    Now, we can go into all manner of criticisms and jokes about the Phlogiston theory, knowing what we know now (or at least those of us who embrace the testimony of science), but the point here is to demonstrate the problem with construing its "falsifier" as a competing or separate theory. If we create a "falsifier" in a accordance with your comments above:

    (B) Phlogiston is NOT a fifth element in addition to fire, water, earth and air. Phlogiston is NOT what is released when a flammable object is consumed by fire.

    or, maybe you'd prefer a summary form of negation:

    (C) IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT (Phlogiston is a fifth element in addition to fire, water, earth and air. Phlogiston is what is released when a flammable object is consumed by fire.)

    Any way you want to negate (A), by virtue of the fact that you are negating, you are not producing a theory. To restate that, the negation of a theory is not also theory by virtue of its negation.

    Given that, your syllogism becomes nonsense. Neither (B) or (C) are theories; they do not provide testable, falsifiable explanations of physical phenomena. The are just negations, not theories in and of themselves.

    It is for this reason that we can say that theories can be falsified with certainty, but not confirmed with certainty. It's asymmetric epistemically due to the positive nature of scientific theories. They are by definition positive propositions.

    Reading your comments here in reply to Jim, the only way I can make sense of what you wrote is if you mistake scientific theories for "Boolean propositions". Scientific theories are not Boolean propositions, and therefore can't participate in deductive syllogisms in like the one you offered.

    -Touchstone

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  15. John Farrell,

    Fossils certainly aren't the *only* evidence to bring to bear in support of evolution, and probably not even the best evidence anymore. Nevertheless a human skull from the Pre-Cambrian would be devastating to the core of the theory.

    -Touchstone

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  16. P.S. Just so I don't have to post again, if you give me evidence for that belief then I assume you'll believe that evidence supports your original belief. So, while I'm here I'll demand the evidence for all your beliefs about the evidences you've provided. Ad infinitum. So get busy John, you don't have all day.

    I'll give you this, Paul. You have a knack for making Peter here look thoughtful by comparison.

    I don't know who got you into your van-Tillian-Humean Franksenstein Approach to thinking, but they were pulling your chain. At some point (an usually quite quickly) the regression bottoms out at raw percpetion and experience; peopl value evidence because their most basic experiences suggest through trial and error that having some evidence for what you believe aids in survival, and maintaining beliefs without empirical support is a good way to get killed quick (or starve to death slowly, or, insert your favorite method of demise here...).

    Right quickly your Hume fetish becomes self-evidently ridiculous. Man learns from experience that logic built from evidence and applied to evidence helps you survive. And flourish, even.

    But, you're committed to standing there as man processes his perceptions and forms concepts and build a logical frameworks (however crude) as a proven method of survival, and sneer that man can't "justify" his reliance on his most basic experiences. Man just looks at the sneering Manata, transfixed by the shininess of new and alien philosophical gimmicks he thinks have some sort of transcendent power, and moves on, shaking his head.

    Man can't justify why the sun should come up in the morning, according to Hume, and apparently, Manata. But man relies on it all the same, and just laughs at the one who thinks *him* a fool for doing so. And thus the regress comes to a screeching halt.

    -Touchstone

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  17. T-stone,

    "I'll give you this, Paul. You have a knack for making Peter here look thoughtful by comparison."

    Thanks! Though I don’t think Peter needs my help in looking thoughtful.

    You, however, have the knack for making an earthworm look thoughtful by comparison. I was going to mention rocks, but I didn't want to offend any.

    "I don't know who got you into your van-Tillian-Humean Frankenstein [sic] Approach to thinking, but they were pulling your chain."

    So they [Plantinga, Bergman, Sosa, Dennett, et al.] also make Peter look thoughtful by comparison?

    Unfortunately for your logic, I assume that Peter agrees with me on this. And so the deduction of T-stone's brilliant slam is that Peter makes Peter look thoughtful by comparison. That is, T-stone thinks my position makes me look relatively unthoughtful as compared to Peter, but since Peter agrees with me, then T-stone has said that Peter's unthoughtfulness makes him appear more thoughtful! Do try to think through all the inferences before you come and show us that you’ve been fossilized as “bone-head.”

    "At some point (an usually quite quickly) the regression bottoms out at raw percpetion [sic] and experience;"

    Awww, look, T-stone's shifting the goal posts for his buddy, John.

    Let's remind T-stone of the *context:*

    John Loftus said: "Whatever we believe we should demand evidence for that belief,"

    Let's translate that into traditional categorical form:

    1. All things we believe are things we should demand evidence for.

    And so John said that ALL our beliefs must have evidence for them.

    I simply asked for evidence for this belief. And, then, if he believes his evidence, I want evidence for that. This was John's claim, not mine.

    Now, I assume that T-stone here is defending John by saying that the regress argument would bottom out because John had a raw perception of experience of the belief that ALL things believed are things which we should demand evidence for. Hmmmm, I'd like to see that perception. Furthermore, how would an *experience* lead to a *normative* conclusion like saying that we *should* have evidence for our beliefs?

    But, let's let T-stone tell us all about the experience which grounds the universal claim that "*all* beliefs are things that *should* have evidence given for them."

    Furthermore, hasn't anyone notified T-stone that his reliance on classical foundationalism is a bit dated? Indeed, I ask him to show me the perception or experience which grounds the idea that "At some point (an usually quite quickly) the regression bottoms out at raw perception and experience."

    Boy T-stone, you sure know how to make a slug look thoughtful.

    "peopl [sic] value evidence because their most basic experiences suggest through trial and error that having some evidence for what you believe aids in survival"

    Nowhere in my post did I deny that people value evidence. So, feel free to cheer as you watch your scud missiles blow up the straw countries you're aiming at. But, from where I'm sitting, your celebration looks a bit ridiculous.

    And, beliefs aimed at survival don't = beliefs aimed at truth. You can survive with false beliefs and bad evidence, ya know.

    Lastly, where is your evidence for this belief? And, bottom it out in raw perception.

    "and maintaining beliefs without empirical support is a good way to get killed quick (or starve to death slowly, or, insert your favorite method of demise here...)."

    Tell that to the roach.

    Furthermore, your claim is, again, different than John's claim. How do I look unthoughtful for arguing against a claim you're not defending?

    And, what's the empirical support for this belief of yours?

    What's the "raw perception" for your belief in the laws of logic, etc. Are those grounded in "raw perception?" If so, show me the perception for both the above questions.

    Lastly, I've blogged on the problems with all this before:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/03/tremblay-vs-plantingas-eaan-and-winner_07.html

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/03/round-2-tremblay-vs-plantingas-reformed.html

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/03/round-3-come-back-kid-or-rope-dope.html

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/03/more-on-plantingas-eaan.html

    "Right quickly your Hume fetish becomes self-evidently ridiculous"

    I don't have a Hume fetish. But, the one who grounds all beliefs in "raw perception" and "experience" seems to fit the bill for a Humean fetish."

    " Man learns from experience that logic built from evidence and applied to evidence helps you survive. And flourish, even."

    Where did I deny this in my post?

    And, make sure to show me your experience for this claim.

    Further, how does this prove that ALL BELIEFS "should" have evidence demanded of them? It doesn't The simple fact is that we have beliefs that seem to have no survival value, such as detailed beliefs about modal logic and possible worlds, for example. Furthermore, not all beliefs that have evidence for them help you survive. Remember, T-stone, you're trying to defend (1) above. So far you've not come close.

    "But, you're committed to standing there as man processes his perceptions and forms concepts and build a logical frameworks (however crude) as a proven method of survival, and sneer that man can't "justify" his reliance on his most basic experiences."

    I never said that, at all. Let's re-cap:

    John said:

    "All things we believe are things we should demand evidence for."

    Paul said:

    "Where is the evidence for that belief?"

    Paul then said,

    "After you've given the evidence, if you believe it, then you must have evidence for those beliefs."

    This is all based on JOHN'S LOGIC, T-stone.

    Now, perhaps John and you could avoid my reductio by saying that you don't believe your evidentialist constraint. I'll accept that too.

    "Man just looks at the sneering Manata, transfixed by the shininess of new and alien philosophical gimmicks he thinks have some sort of transcendent power, and moves on, shaking his head."

    Right. I know all about the old trick that if you have no arguments reach for rhetoric and emotion-ridden verbiage.

    Furthermore, let's note that YOU didn't "move on, shaking [your] head." Therefore I must conclude that T-stone thinks he's not a "man." If he does, then it's false that "man ... moves on shaking his head." And since that's false you've shown us that you truly are giving nothing but rhetoric.

    "Man can't justify why the sun should come up in the morning, according to Hume, and apparently, Manata."

    Actually, I'm not an internalist nor a deontologist. And, I do believe that we have warrant for our inductive beliefs. So, keep arguing against that straw-man you've constructed. So much better than fighting the real man.

    "But man relies on it all the same, and just laughs at the one who thinks *him* a fool for doing so. And thus the regress comes to a screeching halt."

    Right, and as I've pointed out to your sophomoric mind before, there's a distinction between optimistic-over rider proper function rationality, and alethic rationality.

    Of course proper function would demand continued belief in the Inductive Principle IP, but this is not because this portion of your cognitive faculties are aimed at truth, but, rather, at the avoidance of cognitive disaster. A person S may be in a situation - say, lost in a snow storm on top of a mountain - and S may see a ridge that S thinks could be leaped to. Based on perception, this belief is basic to S. But, S would not have thought this if S were not in this survival situation. So S maintains this belief that the chasm is able to be jumped. Proper function requires this belief to be maintained. The optimistic over rider has kicked in. But the faculties governing this have some other virtue in mind - survival rather than true belief. In normal, reflective situations, S would not form said belief.


    Or, suppose S ingests agent XX, a hallucinogenic drug, producing hallucinations in 90% of those who take XX. Proper function would require assuming the IP so as to avoid cognitive disaster. So, S has powerful inclinations to continue on in belief in the IP, even though S has come to believe that the probability that her beliefs are true is low or inscrutable, and S may take it in a basic way, but of course these powerful inclinations don't count as evidence for the IP. S would have this inclination whether she was in or out of the lucky 10%.

    Have a nice night and glad I could help,

    All the best,

    ~PM

    ReplyDelete
  18. John,

    "Paul, how do we guarantee that our assumptions are not viciously circular? They must be grounded in some evidence, correct?"

    One way is if your assumptions are pre-conditions.

    Second, is your assumption here, so that it's not "viciously circular" an assumption that is "grounded in evidence?"

    If so, show me the evidence? Then, show me the evidence that backs up that evidence, ad infinitum.

    best,

    ~PM

    ReplyDelete
  19. Paul,


    "At some point (an usually quite quickly) the regression bottoms out at raw percpetion [sic] and experience;"

    Awww, look, T-stone's shifting the goal posts for his buddy, John.

    Let's remind T-stone of the *context:*

    John Loftus said: "Whatever we believe we should demand evidence for that belief,"

    Let's translate that into traditional categorical form:

    1. All things we believe are things we should demand evidence for.

    And so John said that ALL our beliefs must have evidence for them.

    I simply asked for evidence for this belief. And, then, if he believes his evidence, I want evidence for that. This was John's claim, not mine.

    Now, I assume that T-stone here is defending John by saying that the regress argument would bottom out because John had a raw perception of experience of the belief that ALL things believed are things which we should demand evidence for. Hmmmm, I'd like to see that perception.

    That's doesn't obtain from what John said, by my lights. Beliefs rest on concepts which rest on perceptions. That doesn't imply that *perceptions* are beliefs. They are predicates for concepts which are predicates for beliefs. So when John says "We should demand evidences for our beliefs", there's nothing more complicated to it than saying that predication should hold: perceptions -> concepts -> beliefs. When you demand evidence for the belief that beliefs should be supported by evidence, John simply points back at past experience -- experience which shows that concepts that are based on evidence (directly perceptual or logically derived) provide better approximations of the real world than concepts that do not have such support.

    If John wants to walk up a case of stairs, he can learn by experience (if he has not already -- heh!) that using the perceptions from his eyes as evidence of the location of the steps gives him a significantly better probability of navigating the staircase without difficulty versus trying to do the same without those perceptions/evidences. When he tries to walk up the stairs with his eyes closed, his much more likely to stumble and fall.

    If you agree with the value of vision as a means of collecting evidence of what's about in the real world -- for climbing the stairs, say -- then you should have no trouble understanding the chain of beliefs derived from concepts derived from experience. Beliefs are *not* raw perception, which is the point that's being offered to you here; that's what breaks the regress you suppose presents a problem here.

    Furthermore, how would an *experience* lead to a *normative* conclusion like saying that we *should* have evidence for our beliefs?


    It may *not* lead to a normative conclusion in an "authoritative" sense, and it doesn't need to. It can be simply empirical. I *should* base my beliefs on evidence (derived from experience) because this same experience shows that I can accomplish my goals much more surely and effectively by demanding evidence for my beliefs than divorcing my beliefs from any evidential basis.



    Or, like I said, John can walk up the stairs without difficulty when he has his eyes open, and can develop beliefs about the location and orientation of the stair steps based on the perceptions his eyes afford him. With his eyes closed, he has learned he is like to stumble and fall. So, empirically, he has good cause to include this experience as empirical evidence for *should* in his decisions about evidence.


    It's a mistake to suppose John needs to bother with your concept of a "normative conclusion" in reviewing the advantages of using his vision to aid in navigating a staircase. Experience shows that vision (evidence) aids in a map of the world that aids in accomplishing the goals John wants to accomplish.

    But, let's let T-stone tell us all about the experience which grounds the universal claim that "*all* beliefs are things that *should* have evidence given for them."

    John's experience demonstrates that visual perception (construed as evidence about the real world) is a valuable asset in the task of navigating the staircase.

    John's experience demonstrates that his visual perception (construed as evidence about the real world) is a valuable asset in the task of driving a car.

    John's experience demonstrates that his visual perception (construed as evidence about the real world) is a valuable asset understanding emotional cues in the facial expressions of his wife when she talks to him.

    On and on an on... over thousands of tasks and experiences (and I've just been using visual perceptions by way of example here, and haven't even touched on other forms of perception), John accumulates a large pile of experiences that, when reviewed, strongly suggest that evidence represents a means to improve or clarify his model of the real world, as demonstrated by his ability to accomplish his desired objectives.

    That's a solid, empirical basis for the belief that beliefs should have evididential bases underneath them.


    Furthermore, hasn't anyone notified T-stone that his reliance on classical foundationalism is a bit dated? Indeed, I ask him to show me the perception or experience which grounds the idea that "At some point (an usually quite quickly) the regression bottoms out at raw perception and experience."


    Paul you have that backwards. Classical foundationalism holds that the basis of knowledge -- the fundamental pillars of knowledge -- must be secure, infallible, skeptic-proof. That's quite opposite from what I'm suggesting, and in fact would say that demands for a "normative conclusion" are more indicative of such an orientation than anything I've said.

    I'm comfortable with a pragmatic bit of bootstrapping. We have experience, we form concepts, build beliefs on top of them, and subject them to the rigors of daily life. There's nothing indubitable about that at all.
    ook thoughtful.


    "peopl [sic] value evidence because their most basic experiences suggest through trial and error that having some evidence for what you believe aids in survival"

    Nowhere in my post did I deny that people value evidence. So, feel free to cheer as you watch your scud missiles blow up the straw countries you're aiming at. But, from where I'm sitting, your celebration looks a bit ridiculous.


    Paul, the reason people believe evidence is valuable is because they have evidence to support that notion -- their experience. So when you say you don't deny that people value it, you are affirming that they have a belief in the value of evidence -- a belief that people SHOULD have evidence in support of their beliefs.

    As it is, it looks like you are talking out of both sides of your mouth. One one hand you affirm (or at least don't deny) that people value evidence, then suggest that people (or maybe just John) do not/cannot have evidence for such belief. The *evidence* for the belief in the value (should) of evidence is our experience, which we've been accumulate since we were born.

    If you drive a car, and you do so with your eyes open, then you're endorsing this belief. If not, try driving to your local 7-11 for a pack of smokes with your eyes closed. You can report back what your experience suggests about the SHOULD of evidence (visual evidence as to the location and attributes of the objects you will be driving on/near/around).

    And, beliefs aimed at survival don't = beliefs aimed at truth. You can survive with false beliefs and bad evidence, ya know.

    That's just foolish, Paul. Truth -- an accurate a model of the real world as we can achieve -- is a huge asset in the quest for survival. If you deny this, well, try to drive to the local 7-11 for a pack of smokes with your eyes closed!

    We seek an accurate model of the real world because our experience shows that we are generally penalized in our efforts to accomplish our goals when our model is less accurate, and generally rewarded when our model is more accurate. If John uses his vision to aid in navigate the stairs, he will have a more accurate model of his surroundings than if he kept his eyes closed, and will generally fare better in his pursuing his goal of navigating the staircase.

    A more accurate model of the real world is definitely a survival advantage over a less accurate model of the real world. But it goes beyond just survival. More accurate models help us achieve all sorts of goals and objectives we have in life, from the mundane task of climbing the stairs to more complex task, say, of earning a living as an economic forecaster.

    Lastly, where is your evidence for this belief? And, bottom it out in raw perception.

    The evidence is my experience (perceptions) of what results when I base my beliefs of evidence and what happens when I don't. If I close my eyes and try to climb the stairs, my "bottomed out" evidence is pain from a bleeding shin, caused when I stumbled, thinking the stairs were somewhere else than where they actually were.

    Is *pain in the shin* a raw enough experience for you, Paul?

    "and maintaining beliefs without empirical support is a good way to get killed quick (or starve to death slowly, or, insert your favorite method of demise here...)."

    Tell that to the roach.


    I think I just did.

    Furthermore, your claim is, again, different than John's claim. How do I look unthoughtful for arguing against a claim you're not defending?

    Oh, I've read enough of your posts, including some of the links you have below to have a fuller sense of where you are coming from than what's obtained from your short, initial post here. That's just shorthand for a schtick I've come to know too well from you.

    If you want me to quote some of what I'm referring to for you, please advise.


    And, what's the empirical support for this belief of yours?

    What's the "raw perception" for your belief in the laws of logic, etc. Are those grounded in "raw perception?" If so, show me the perception for both the above questions.


    What are you talking about, Paul??? "Law of Perception"? Perception is self-evident; if you are conscious, you are perceiving something, by definition. I hope you deny this, and press on with your regress here, as it shows the ridiculous nature of the idea. I don't "justify" my perceptions. They are a brute fact. As "brute" as anything ever was.


    Lastly, I've blogged on the problems with all this before:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/03/tremblay-vs-plantingas-eaan-and-winner_07.html

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/03/round-2-tremblay-vs-plantingas-reformed.html

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/03/round-3-come-back-kid-or-rope-dope.html

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/03/more-on-plantingas-eaan.html


    Yeah, I know. It's a mess. I've read some, and I think more than I need to to understand. But you can correct me if I'm mistaken and you now have gotten to the point of accepting the terminus of your epistemological regress in the brute fact of consciousness and perception.

    "Right quickly your Hume fetish becomes self-evidently ridiculous"

    I don't have a Hume fetish. But, the one who grounds all beliefs in "raw perception" and "experience" seems to fit the bill for a Humean fetish."

    " Man learns from experience that logic built from evidence and applied to evidence helps you survive. And flourish, even."

    Where did I deny this in my post?


    Experience is the evidence for the belief that John was expressing. We belief we should demand evidence for our beliefs because our experience shows that such demands translate to improved abilities to pursue our goals, whether it's mere survival, or getting the Higgins account closed to make your numbers for the quarter.

    If you assert that you intend to question the basis for such a belief, ad infinitum, that's
    a clear indication that you do not recognize the groundedness of that belief in John's (or anyone else's) experience.

    Which is to say, your declared intent to pursue regress represents the denial of this claim.

    And, make sure to show me your experience for this claim.

    What claim are you asking about here, Paul?

    Further, how does this prove that ALL BELIEFS "should" have evidence demanded of them?

    It's a truism, Paul. Don't be pedantic. Our experience is evidence for the belief that evidence is a beneficial underwriter for our beliefs. We SHOULD demand evidence for beliefs, and this belief is based on our experience; we fare better with evidence-based models than models that are not evidence-based, according to our experience.

    It doesn't The simple fact is that we have beliefs that seem to have no survival value, such as detailed beliefs about modal logic and possible worlds, for example. Furthermore, not all beliefs that have evidence for them help you survive. Remember, T-stone, you're trying to defend (1) above. So far you've not come close.

    Sure, but I'm no sucker for your pedantry. We live in the real world, and of course, we don't have all the evidence available that we would prefer. Sometimes we have little to no evidence in view for decisions or beliefs that are required. That's life.

    But those pragmatic constraints don't diminish the truth of what John asserted, based on our experiece; we *should* have evidence for our beliefs. Obviously, if no evidence is available, then no evidence is available. We should question whether it's necessary or beneficial to have a belief at all on that matter at that point. If we must, well, it's the real world, Paul. We try to do our best with what resources we have available.


    "But, you're committed to standing there as man processes his perceptions and forms concepts and build a logical frameworks (however crude) as a proven method of survival, and sneer that man can't "justify" his reliance on his most basic experiences."

    I never said that, at all. Let's re-cap:

    John said:

    "All things we believe are things we should demand evidence for."

    Paul said:

    "Where is the evidence for that belief?"

    Paul then said,

    "After you've given the evidence, if you believe it, then you must have evidence for those beliefs."

    This is all based on JOHN'S LOGIC, T-stone.


    Sure. Got it. My understanding of what John wrote/is saying is that his experience -- which includes the view he has of others and their experiences on the same question -- is evidence in support of the value of evidence as a basis for belief.

    John, if you are reading this, maybe you can confirm if I've gotten this correct.

    Now, perhaps John and you could avoid my reductio by saying that you don't believe your evidentialist constraint. I'll accept that too.

    Paul, your reductio is worthless pedantics. It doesn't need to be avoided, as it's only got force in your head. Man doesn't need to "justify" his perceptions. And those perceptions are the raw materials that give rise to concept formation and beliefs.

    "Man just looks at the sneering Manata, transfixed by the shininess of new and alien philosophical gimmicks he thinks have some sort of transcendent power, and moves on, shaking his head."

    Right. I know all about the old trick that if you have no arguments reach for rhetoric and emotion-ridden verbiage.


    No, Paul, there's an important point there. Your regress doesn't regress past the point of human perception. It stops there, and demands that man justify or rationalize his raw perceptions are nothing more than non-sequiturs. It does not follow that when John points to his experience regarding the belief in the value of evidence that that evidence must be justified. You might as well ask a rock how it justifies being a rock.

    Furthermore, let's note that YOU didn't "move on, shaking [your] head." Therefore I must conclude that T-stone thinks he's not a "man." If he does, then it's false that "man ... moves on shaking his head." And since that's false you've shown us that you truly are giving nothing but rhetoric.

    I was using 'man' in the general sense, Paul. You're being pedantic here, too. I'll gladly take a moment to explain this to you, but don't think that your "regress" puts any practical constraints of epistemology of people building concepts out of their experience (perceptions), and beliefs out of those concepts.

    I get the sense that you think you are really on to something profound with your regress schtick. It's "not even wrong", Paul. It's an imaginary set of constraints that don't exist in the real world.

    "Man can't justify why the sun should come up in the morning, according to Hume, and apparently, Manata."

    Actually, I'm not an internalist nor a deontologist. And, I do believe that we have warrant for our inductive beliefs. So, keep arguing against that straw-man you've constructed. So much better than fighting the real man.


    If that's true, then you've got no basis for pressing such a regress as you declared with John. By means of induction, John, I and you develop beliefs about the value of evidence as basis for belief. You belief we *should* have evidence for our beliefs, too. If you deny this I have a set of questions for you, which I believe the answers you provide will demonstrate that you operate on this very principle yourself.


    "But man relies on it all the same, and just laughs at the one who thinks *him* a fool for doing so. And thus the regress comes to a screeching halt."

    Right, and as I've pointed out to your sophomoric mind before, there's a distinction between optimistic-over rider proper function rationality, and alethic rationality.

    Of course proper function would demand continued belief in the Inductive Principle IP, but this is not because this portion of your cognitive faculties are aimed at truth, but, rather, at the avoidance of cognitive disaster. A person S may be in a situation - say, lost in a snow storm on top of a mountain - and S may see a ridge that S thinks could be leaped to. Based on perception, this belief is basic to S. But, S would not have thought this if S were not in this survival situation. So S maintains this belief that the chasm is able to be jumped. Proper function requires this belief to be maintained. The optimistic over rider has kicked in. But the faculties governing this have some other virtue in mind - survival rather than true belief. In normal, reflective situations, S would not form said belief.


    Paul, that's a neat story. Now why do I care that S is thinking one thing in panic mode, when he might make another assessment if he weren't? This doesn't attach to what John was suggesting. John is (or at least I am) suggesting something quite different; an accurate belief as to the probability of making it across the chasm (assuming that jump somehow saves S) is an *advantage* to survival. Evidence here, say pine trees in the chasm that help you gauge the distance across, is an advantage to survival. If the evidence keeps you from jumping to your death, where you would not have made it across to the ridge on the other side, then this would be yet more experiential evidence for your belief that evidence matters. If that evidence encourages you to jump and you make it, again, more evidence in support of the idea that evidence matters.

    If I misjudge because I'm panicked, on the edge of collapse from hypothermia? Them's the breaks. We aren't guaranteed perfect perception. But that doesn't alter the fact that our experience provides a strong argument for the belief that we should have evidence to support our beliefs (saying this over and over... it's somewhat surreal to have to be arguing for the idea that we *should* have evidence for our beliefs).

    Or, suppose S ingests agent XX, a hallucinogenic drug, producing hallucinations in 90% of those who take XX. Proper function would require assuming the IP so as to avoid cognitive disaster. So, S has powerful inclinations to continue on in belief in the IP, even though S has come to believe that the probability that her beliefs are true is low or inscrutable, and S may take it in a basic way, but of course these powerful inclinations don't count as evidence for the IP. S would have this inclination whether she was in or out of the lucky 10%.

    Well, you might as well just go all the way, and take Peter Pike's line: what if we are in something like the movie The Matrix??? What if all of this is kind of Cartesian hallucination? Should I take the red pill, Paul?

    It's precisely because you think this is a meaningful concern that I think you may have ingested XX prior to typing up your post. What bearing does this have on the value of our experience as basis for the belief in the value of evidence for our beliefs??? If you are hallucinating, or stuck fighting with Mr. Anderson in The Matrix, all this becomes a moot point. Blank out.

    Have a nice night and glad I could help,

    All the best,

    ~PM


    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  20. Touchstone responded the way I figured he would respond. He said:
    ---
    You are confused about the nature of scientific theories, Peter. A scientific theory has no 'falsifier' in the Boolean sense, as you have provisioned it. That is, for a given theory (T), it's falsifier (F) is not also a theory. Therein lies your misunderstanding.
    ---

    No, this shows you to be the one who is confused. The falsifier of a theory must be expressed as a theory of some kind, in the same way that the original theory was expressed as a theory.

    However, you seem to think that the falsifier would be a theory in the form of ~T (as in your Phlogiston example). F could be anything that results in T being false; but F is most definitely NOT simply saying ~T.

    Let's use a better example: gravity. For the sake of arguing, let's simplify it to say:

    1. Assume there are no hindering forces, such as a gust of wind or whatever. This assumption applies throughout the entire argument.

    2. T = "Any object that is above ground will, when dropped, fall to the ground."

    Now, the falsifier of T does not have to be "It is not the case that any object that is above ground will, when dropped, fall to the ground." That is the contradiction of T, but it is not the falsifier. Instead, we have:

    3. Object X, when dropped, does not fall to the ground.

    Remember, per 1, we are not assuming other forces such as gusts of wind are involved. We are assuming it has actually been observed that Object X, when dropped, does not fall to the ground in violation of the theory of gravity.

    4. F = "'Object X, when dropped, does not fall to the ground' falsifies T."

    5. The statement "Object X, when dropped, does not fall to the ground" is itself a theory.

    In fact, it is identical in structure to the theory of gravity. The theory of gravity is that all objects will fall, but this is not an absolute statement because we cannot test all objects; in the same way, the theory of Object X is that Object X will never fall, but this is not an absolute statement because we cannot test Object X forever.

    In other words, if you say that observations are falsifiers, the observations themselves must be expressed in the form of a theory. If you say, "I have observed X to be the case" that is the same thing as saying, "I theorize that X is the case."

    Now that you see I'm not talking about Boolean operators here, perhaps you can swallow the rest of your foot and try to speak intelligently in a response. But somehow I doubt it.

    ReplyDelete
  21. Peter,

    You're still missing the distinctions that identify a scientific theory. I chose Phlogiston as a (now funny and falsified) example of a real scientific theory -- it provides an explanation for combustion and oxidation. Just from the suggestion that phlogiston is the subtance consumed when we burn a flammable object, we can produce predictions, tests and falsification criteria.

    But, here, you offer T:

    "Any object that is above ground will, when dropped, fall to the ground."

    Tell me, Peter: what phenomena does T explain?

    It doesn't explain anything. At best it might qualify as observational evidence that is processed in evaluating a real scientific theory.

    Next, you move on to propose you propose F:

    "'Object X, when dropped, does not fall to the ground' falsifies T."

    Tell me, Peter: what phenomena does F explain? What is the mechanism it is proposing to be tested and evaluated against the evidence (and possibly falsified)?

    This doesn't explain anything, either. If you offered either T or F as you have them here as an example of a scientific theory in your freshman biology quiz, you'd get a big red "X" through both of these.

    You continue:
    The statement "Object X, when dropped, does not fall to the ground" is itself a theory.

    Not according to science, it's not. It doesn't provide an explanation of a model for anything. It doesn't offer any predictions, it doesn't provide a rationale for matching to existing evidence. It does not provide a means for falsification -- there's nothing to falsify, as all you are doing is reporting an observation.

    Moving on...
    In fact, it is identical in structure to the theory of gravity.

    You have *got* to kidding me, Peter. Do you really believe this???

    The theory of gravity is that all objects will fall, but this is not an absolute statement because we cannot test all objects;

    First off, there is no *one* theory of gravity. General Relativity has pretty much retired Newton's theory of gravity now, but various species of quantum gravity (e.g. Loop Quantum Gravity and String Theory) are now being advanced because gravity in the GR model can't be reconciled with quantum mechanics.

    Here's a quote from Newton about his theory of gravity (from Philosophae Naturalis Principia Mathematica):

    I deduced that the forces which keep the planets in their orbs must be reciprocally as the squares of their distances from the centers about which they revolve; and thereby compared the force requisite to keep the Moon in her orb with the force of gravity at the surface of the Earth; and found them answer pretty nearly.

    The explanation is that mass attracts mass according to the inverse-square law.

    That idea is chock full of explanatory power. Even though it has been superceded by GR, it was accurate enough to conclude that a another planet (Neptune) must exist based on the movements and behavior of another planet (Uranus). A multitude of tests proceed from it, and it provides a general explanation for not only the rock falling from your hand to the ground, and raindrops splashing on the sidewalk from the clouds above, but the motion of the planets.

    in the same way, the theory of Object X is that Object X will never fall, but this is not an absolute statement because we cannot test Object X forever.

    Allright, this bit you have there is just pure nonsense. Do you suppose your science professor would accept this kind of stuff as anything but nonsense, Peter?

    In other words, if you say that observations are falsifiers, the observations themselves must be expressed in the form of a theory. If you say, "I have observed X to be the case" that is the same thing as saying, "I theorize that X is the case."

    You are not talking science here at all, Peter. Apparently you are thinking that the popular, informal meaning of "theory/theorize" is the one science operates from. It's not. If you offer this as your scientific theory:

    "I theorize that this rock in my hand will drop to the ground when I release it."

    They are gonna roll their eyes at you Peter, and tell you stop wasting their time. A theory must offer a model or explanation of natural phenomena, and in such a way as to account for available evidence, make predictions that can be tested and be liable to falsification. I keep saying these things over and over, but you keep posting like your unable to understand the distinction between that and having a hunch about some random consequence, or the noting of some observation.


    Now that you see I'm not talking about Boolean operators here, perhaps you can swallow the rest of your foot and try to speak intelligently in a response. But somehow I doubt it.


    Ahh, the irony...

    I think until you come to grips with what constitutes a scientific theory, there's little chance that you will be able to make headway here.

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  22. My understanding of what John wrote/is saying is that his experience -- which includes the view he has of others and their experiences on the same question -- is evidence in support of the value of evidence as a basis for belief.

    John, if you are reading this, maybe you can confirm if I've gotten this correct.


    Yes, indeed.

    ReplyDelete
  23. So I didn't take over this combox, I posted a response to T-stone here:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/06/josh-mctouchstones-evidence-ad.html

    ReplyDelete
  24. Hi John,

    T-stone said: My understanding of what John wrote/is saying is that his experience -- which includes the view he has of others and their experiences on the same question -- is evidence in support of the value of evidence as a basis for belief.

    John, if you are reading this, maybe you can confirm if I've gotten this correct.

    John replied: Yes, indeed.

    Me now: So John, you've had an experience of the belief that ALL beliefs should have evidence demanded of it?

    Do you believe that you've had this experience?

    If so, what is the evidence for this *new* belief?

    Thanks.

    ~PM

    P.S. Don't listen to T-stone. You obviously didn't know what you were getting into when you made your outlandish claim, but T-stone's only making it worse on you. I'd cut him loose right now if I were you. Save face, ya know?

    ReplyDelete
  25. P.P.S. John forgot to squeeze this one in also:

    If you agree with T-stone, then why do you say that "evidence from history is not good evidence" but yet you can use evidence from "past" experiences?

    I don't get it? Why do you get to use "evidence from history?"

    Do you think you're better than us or something?

    So, if you could please explain. Thanks.

    ReplyDelete
  26. T-Stone has a problem with my proposed scientific theory, claiming it is not scientific because:
    ---
    It doesn't explain anything. At best it might qualify as observational evidence that is processed in evaluating a real scientific theory.
    ---

    Under such criteria, I have to point out that the following is NOT scientific:

    ---
    1. A particle not subjected to external forces remains at rest or moves with constant speed in a straight line..

    2. The acceleration of a particle is directly proportional to the resultant external force acting on the particle and is inversely proportional to the mass of the particle.

    3. If two particles interact, the force exerted by the first particle on the second particle (called the action force) is equal in magnitude and opposite in direction to the force exerted by the second particle on the first particle (called the reaction force).
    ---

    Yup, those don't explain anything. At best, it's just "observational evidence." After all, the above doesn't tell us WHY any of that happens. It doesn't explain "anything" specifically.

    Thank God we have Touchstone here to separate the real scientists from those hacks like Isaac Newton.

    ReplyDelete
  27. Peter,

    Let's get you on the record then. Do you believe the theories you proposed:

    T = "Any object that is above ground will, when dropped, fall to the ground."

    and

    F = "'Object X, when dropped, does not fall to the ground' falsifies T."

    Are those scientific theories, in your view, Peter? Please confirm.

    As for your 3 points and Newton, those are some of the most powerful explanations ever offered for physical phenomena in the history of science. Your (2) for example, explains why you observation(T) -- which you suppose is a theory -- happens. Gravity, exerts an accelerating force on the rock in your hand. When you release it, your grip no longer restrains the accelerating force of gravity, and the rock accelerates downward, toward the center of the earth.

    Scientific theories aren't required to be *ultimate* explanations. In, fact, as empirically driven models, they cannot be ultimate, by definition. There are plenty of remaining explanations about gravity that we do not have currently, but Newtons explanations of inertia, acceleration and gravity have stood as an enormous advance in the quest to make sense of physical phenomena. Your example couldn't be more violent in it's rejection of your T and F as scientific theories.

    If I were to pick an example of a theory with extraordinary explanatory power, I can't think of a better case than Newton. Ask your local science professor if Newton's theories had important explanations for physical phenomena.

    -Touchstone

    ReplyDelete
  28. T-Stone is completely missing the point (par for the course for him).

    The point is that my "observation" about gravity (which was used as an illustration, not like I actually believe in "Object X") is identical in structure to the "observations" provided by Newton. That is the point.

    T-Stone's argument of falsification is a structural claim. He is claiming the structure of a theory must include falsification, otherwise it is not scientific.

    I have demonstrated this universalist claim to be the word-shell game that it is, and have given examples that T-Stone disagrees with that have identical structure to examples that T-Stone accepts as scientifically valid.

    Thus, T-Stone's argument is no longer a structural argument, but an ad hoc, willy-nilly argument that he selectively applies.

    By the way, I also note that T-Stone has still not provided us with proof from the fossil record of evolution (proof including, as I stated many times already, the mechanism of evolution, i.e. mutation followed by natural selection). Darwin didn't use the fossil record to come up with his theory (he used living organisms, such as finches). As such, the fossil record is hardly relevant to the subject of evolution, although it's been hijacked by Darwinists.

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  29. Peter,

    If I'm playing a "word-shell game", then are you saying T an F *are* actually valid scientific theories?

    Here's T and F:

    T = "Any object that is above ground will, when dropped, fall to the ground."

    and

    F = "'Object X, when dropped, does not fall to the ground' falsifies T."

    Are those scientific theories, in your view, Peter? Please confirm.

    Note that this should allow to route around any "word-shell games" you identify on my part. These are "theories" offered by you in your own words. Do you believe these to be scientific theories?

    -Touchstone

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  30. Peter,

    As for the fossil evidence for evolution, Darwin relied upon the available fossil evidence available him at the time for his theory, and made his theory liable to falsification based on the subsequent discovery of previously unavailable fossil evidence.

    Here's Darwin in his own words, from Chapter 10 of Origin of the Species:

    On this same theory, it is evident that the fauna of any great period in the earth's history will be intermediate in general character between that which preceded and that which succeeded it. Thus, the species which lived at the sixth great stage of descent in the diagram are the modified offspring of those which lived at the fifth stage, and are the parents of those which became still more modified at the seventh stage; hence they could hardly fail to be nearly intermediate in character between the forms of life above and below. We must, however, allow for the entire extinction of some preceding forms, and for the coming in of quite new forms by immigration, and for a large amount of modification, during the long and blank intervals between the successive formations. Subject to these allowances, the fauna of each geological period undoubtedly is intermediate in character, between the preceding and succeeding faunas. I need give only one instance, namely, the manner in which the fossils of the Devonian system, when this system was first discovered, were at once recognised by palaeontologists as intermediate in character between those of the overlying carboniferous, and underlying Silurian system. But each fauna is not necessarily exactly intermediate, as unequal intervals of time have elapsed between consecutive formations.


    Here he's citing the Devonian fossils as the example of the intermediate forms that are predicted by his theory.

    Or try this, from the same chapter:

    On the theory of descent, the full meaning of the fact of fossil remains from closely consecutive formations, though ranked as distinct species, being closely related, is obvious. As the accumulation of each formation has often been interrupted, and as long blank intervals have intervened between successive formations, we ought not to expect to find, as I attempted to show in the last chapter, in any one or two formations all the intermediate varieties between the species which appeared at the commencement and close of these periods; but we ought to find after intervals, very long as measured by years, but only moderately long as measured geologically, closely allied forms, or, as they have been called by some authors, representative species; and these we assuredly do find. We find, in short, such evidence of the slow and scarcely sensible mutation of specific forms, as we have a just right to expect to find.


    Here he underscores importance of the fossil data that already was in view, as well as the predictions ("we ought to find...") about what future fossil discoveries should look like.

    Chapter 10 of Origin of the Species is particularly dense in its reference and use of fossils, both as evidence that must be currently accounted for by his explanations, as well as predictions that would hold true if his explanations are correct with respect to future fossil discoveries.

    One cannot read this chapter and conclude that Darwin "didn't use the fossil record to come up with his theory".

    As for pasting all the evidence for evolution as supported by the fossil record, it's laughable to expect such to be delivered in a combox of a Google blog. I don't think inline images are even supported here in the comments, but that's really not the problem. There are so many thousands of fossils to look at and sort through, that any such demand is nothing more than "making work". There are thousands of scholarly works available online and offline that chronicle the discovery and analysis of the fossil evidences.

    A Google Scholar search comes up with 35,000+ hits. PubMed returns more than 2,000 hits for "fossil evolution". Not all of those are germane here, but if you take even a minute or two to read some of the abstracts, you will see that there exists a *mountain* of evidence to work through.

    Would you like all that pasted into your combox here? If you expect me to do the work, then I expect you to do the work in analyzing/refuting it, else I will conclude you are simply attempting to hand out idle chores.


    -Touchstone

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