Betting on a closed future

I’ve been preoccupied with other issues, so now I’ll return to an old thread:

http://www.arminianchronicles.com/2009/04/determinism-and-choosing-otherwise.html

“I don't believe I am equivocating; given determinism, a person can’t choose otherwise and if one is a determinist, they can’t consistently think they can choose otherwise. I don't think the epistemic sense of ‘possible’ reconciles determinism with 'the ability to choose otherwise'.”

That condition is irrelevant to my example. I used the example of a card player. Shuffling the deck determines the order of the cards. A card player can do nothing to alter the sequence. The deck is like a closed future.

Depending on the game, the player may have some idea of what cards remain outstanding, and he can lay odds on any particular combination, but he doesn’t know which card is coming next.

Yet that doesn’t prevent a card player from deliberating on the abstract possibilities, resolving on one particular course of action, and acting on his decision.

This is despite the fact that only one of the abstract possibilities represents the actual order of the deck. And a card player knows that when he chooses to call, raise, or fold.

A card player is betting on a closed future (the deck).

“The card player example relates to the outcome of choices not choices (I said choose otherwise, not do otherwise). The epistemic sense of 'possible' relates to the execution of choices, not choices themselves. In fact, the card player example is twice removed from the choice itself. The card player chooses to take another card; his success or failure in that attempt is getting another card or not (i.e. does he have a heart attack while asking for one, or does a ceiling tile fall on the dealer's head...). Steve's example is about the outcome of the draw, not the draw itself. Further, the card player isn't thinking ‘is choosing to draw possible?’ (i.e. can I make the internal mental resolution?), he's thinking about the outcome of drawing another card, so his use of possible relates to outcomes of choices, not choices themselves.”

i) Since Dan has insisted on a very expansive definition of choice, which includes the outcome, Dan’s objection is inconsistent with his own definition: “I generally think of choices at three levels: 1) contemplation, 2) choice and 3) execution of choice.”

What does (3) correspond to if not the outcome of (1)-(2)?

ii) Moreover, libertarian freewill assumes control over the outcome. That’s the point. Unless the decisions of the free agent effect the chosen outcome–he’s hardly free in a libertarian sense. It would be like pushing buttons on a vending machine in which you’re free to push any combination you like, but what you get doesn’t correspond to what you select. You select the Butterfinger Crisp, but you get the 3 Musketeers instead. Is that how Dan now defines “choice”?

“But even if I had said ‘do otherwise’, a determinist card player still shouldn't think he is able to do otherwise.”

Every card player is a determinist card player. He goes into the game knowing full well that he can do nothing to alter the order of the cards (unless he cheats by bribing the dealer).

But it’s his ignorance of the actual sequence, along with his knowledge of abstract possibilities, which creates the conceptual space for him to deliberate, decide, and act on his decision.

“Beyond 'the ability to choose otherwise'; I don't think the epistemic sense of possible could reconcile the determinism with the dictionary definition of 'choose' (i.e. selection between possible alternatives).”

Does a gambler look up the definition of “choice” in Webster’s before he plays poker? Does the dictionary definition of choice tell him what he can and cannot do at the card table?

“This "one possibility at a time" limitation of determinism becomes a problem when it comes to choice, as choosing involves at least two options.”

i) To say “choosing involves at least two options” underscores, once again, why it’s counterproductive to talk with Dan. All he’s done here is to beg the question in favor of libertarianism. And it’s not as if I haven’t responded to this assertion on more than one occasion.

But you can never make any headway in a dialogue with Dan. He uses an argument. You present a counterargument. The next time he responds to you, he reverts to his original argument as if no counterargument was offered. It’s like having a conversation with a man in a nursing home who can’t remember what you said 5 minutes ago.

ii) The other problem is that, instead of beginning with reality, Dan begins with his precommitment to libertarian freedom. He begins with his tendentious definition of choice.

But the “one possibility of a time” limitation is an objective limitation which is imposed on human agents by the nature of time itself–in conjunction with logical (in-)compossibilities. We cannot simultaneously make contrary choices. In some cases we can make successive contrary choices, but because contrary choices are mutually exclusive, you can only make one such choice at a time. That limitation is due to the nature of time itself, as well as what is logically compossible.

It is psychologically possible to simultaneously contemplate contrary choices, but not to simultaneously act on them.

“A determinist can't say (or think or imply) 'I know 20 is possible', if 20 is possible or 21 is possible and he doesn't know which.”

That’s not the point. A determinist doesn’t have to think both A and B are live possibilities. Rather, he doesn’t know in advance which abstract possibility is concretely impossible.

But he can contemplate the abstract possibilities, which is just what a card player does, make decisions on the basis of abstract possibilities, and then act accordingly.

All Dan is doing here, and all that Dan is ever doing here, is to fault determinism because it isn’t libertarianism. He keeps acting as if determinism is deficient since the determinist can’t view “choice” in the same way a libertarian can. But we already know that. That’s a given. That’s a presupposition of the debate. That’s hardly a valid objection to determinism.

What if a determinist were to do the same thing in reverse: fault libertarianism because it isn’t determinism? Act as if libertarianism is deficient because a libertarian can’t view “choice” in the same way a determinist can?

Dan has no capacity for critical detachment. He can’t bring himself to evaluate the opposing position on its own terms. All he does is to apply a libertarian yardstick to determinism, and–voila!–determinism comes up short if you measure it by a libertarian yardstick.

“But before we get into the details, I need to take a brief detour into the difference between causal and logical impossibility.”

As if anyone needs to hear his little tutorial on the subject.

My own position already draws that very distinction. The card play knows what is logically possible. Shuffling the deck causes the cards to be arranged in a certain sequence. The card player can’t change that fact. That’s a given. That’s a presupposition of the game. Indeed, that’s what makes it possible to lay odds. That’s the baseline which makes it possible for a player to engage in rational deliberation.

“This issue is similar to the discussion Steve and I had about God's foreknowledge and future contingents; we must distinguish between truth and the basis of truth. The basis of truth is causal.”

In that case, Dan should be a Calvinist. God knows true future propositions because God causes the future, via primary or secondary causality.

“Causal forces outside the player and the player's causal power will determine the outcome.”

Like shuffling a deck of cards.

“Finally, Steve looks for Greek and Hebrew word studies. I have already pointed out that modern scolorship is unanimously translates bâcha and eklegomai as choose.”

This goes back to Dan’s incorrible dishonesty. Yes, he pointed that out. And I responded to his rejoinder.

When I respond to his rejoinder, what does he do? Does he acknowledge my response? No. He acts as if nothing was every said in response to his rejoinder.

Dan can’t bring himself to argue in good faith. He keeps repeating the same stale arguments as if no one ever interacted with his argument.

“But in Molinism, if we would choose chocolate; God can't choose the possible world in which we choose vanilla.”

There are two fundamental problems with this characterization:

i) Dan is equivocating. A possible agent’s object of choice is not the same object as God’s object of choice. When we say that God chooses a possible world, what we mean is which possible world God choose to instantiate. Which possible world will become the real world.

When we say what a possible agent chooses, that has reference to what a possible agent does in a possible world. It doesn’t mean a possible agent is choosing which possible world will become the real world.

Due to Dan’s equivocation, Molinism continues to fall afoul of my objection: in the actual world, an actual agent isn’t free to choose between either A or B. Rather, the actual world actualizes either A or B. If it actualizes A, then B is no longer in play. If it actualizes B, then A is no longer in play.

In Molinism, libertarian freedom only applies at the level of possible worlds, and not the actual world. An actual world actualizes one possibility to the exclusion of the others. That’s the point. That’s what distinguishes actuality from possibility. These alternatives are only live possibilities in possible worlds. In the real world, they cease to be live possibilities.

ii) The other problem goes to basic contradiction within Molinism. On the one hand, Molinism tries to reconcile predestination with libertarian freedom. Possible agents are free to do otherwise, but God determines which possibility to instantiate.

On the other hand, Molinism says that God can choose from this array of possibilities because he knows what a human agent would do in any given situation. However, the conventional definition of libertarian freedom is the freedom to do otherwise in the very same situation.

So it turns on which side of the Molinist contradiction you want to accentuate. If you accentuate the libertarian side of the Molinist contradiction, then Dan has introduced a false dichotomy: “But in Molinism, if we would choose chocolate; God can't choose the possible world in which we choose vanilla.”

Up to a point, that’s true, but quite deceptive. For if libertarianism is true, then there’s a possible world in which we choose chocolate, and another possible world in which we choose vanilla. If freedom means the freedom to do otherwise, then there’s a possible world which matches each alternative

Therefore, even if we accept libertarianism, God is never confronted with a situation in which our choice restricts his choice.

“Probably a closer analogy would be us hypothesizing what someone we know well would do in a given circumstance, but even that's imperfect. Ultimately, it's a unique ability God has.”

Of course, that’s just a dodge. If you stipulate that freedom means the freedom to do otherwise, then you deny God unique ability to know what we’d do in any given circumstance. If what we will do could go either way, then our choice cannot be a determinate object of knowledge.

“Actualization takes place over time, not from the beginning with God's choice. It's actualized for the reasons and causes (predetermined or free) God saw would be the reasons and causes. God's choice doesn't directly determine contingencies, nor does He start a deterministic sequence of events. Other worlds can, but will not ( and would not) be actualized.”

That’s irrelevant to the issue at hand. Possible agents comprise different sets of serial choices. Different hypothetical timelines. Even if you say that successive choices are successively realized, that’s irrelevant to the fact that God is instantiating one series of possibilities to the exclusion of other series. God makes that call, not the possible agent.

Even in Molinist terms, the real world has a closed future.

“We can choose worlds contrary to God's chosen world, but His foreknowledge and MK cannot be deceived.”

That’s an assertion, not an argument. For reasons already given, libertarian freedom precludes either simple foreknowledge or middle knowledge.

“Because God's choice of ‘chocolate world’ is logically dependent on my future choice of chocolate.”

This overlooks the fact of what makes a possible person a possible person in the first place. A possible person is simply a divine concept. A mental construct.

It’s not something over and above God’s conception, in relation to which God is dependent. To the contrary, a possible person is entirely dependent on divine cogitation.

arminianperspectives said...

“Even if the choice exists solely in our mind, with no external correlation, the choice can only be validly called a choice if the mind is at least free to move in either direction (i.e. choose this cognitive option, or that, etc.). But in a deterministic world the mind can only move in one (predetermined) direction, and therefore there is no choice to be made.”

That’s a completely illogical inference. Determinism doesn’t eliminate mental deliberation. All it means, rather, is that if I deliberate between two or more hypothetical options, then I was predetermined to deliberate between two or ore hypothetical options.