Monday, December 19, 2016

Design and the downfall of Darwinism



Jesus and the evidence of material culture

https://www.biblegateway.com/blog/2016/11/jesus-and-the-culture-of-his-day-an-interview-with-craig-a-evans/

Medieval timewarp

On Facebook I've had a few impromptu debates with a homosexual biomed student. Here's one exchange:

Piotr
Not entirely, children are typically not threatened with hellfire for not believing in the latter two fictional characters."

Hays
What makes you think children are typically threatened with hellfire? What's your sample?

What about atheists telling children there's no afterlife. If their mother dies, they will never see her again. Or telling a dying child he will cease to exist. Is that supposed to be comforting to a child who's afraid of death? What if that's what he's afraid of–oblivion?

Piotr
Zounds of innocent people have died gruesome deaths, take unbelievers or LGBT at the hands of medieval Christians for example, so what?

Hays
There were openly transgender people in the Middle Ages?

Piotr 
Raising from the dead would require strong demonstrable evidence as it is biologically impossible, to current knowledge.

Hays
He keeps repeating the same inept objections. Of course raising the dead is naturally impossible. That creates no presumption against God raising the dead.

Piotr
Threat of eternal punishment for not following discrete laws is obviously one of the foundations of Christianity, your no true Scotsmen because you may belong to one of many denominations do not change that.

Hays
Another textbook case of Piotr's constitutional inability to keep track of the argument. The question at issue wasn't the general proposition that Christianity has a doctrine of eternal punishment, but Piotr's specific claim about Christians typically threatening children with hellfire. Once again, where is Piotr's evidence that Christians typically threaten children with hellfire? Where's his evidence that that's typical. Typical everywhere? Typical at all times? Where's his evidence that children are typically subjected to these threats? For instance, many contemporary Christians believe in universal infant salvation. 

Piotr
I also know it from firsthand experience from living in Poland, and a little less so in England (because it's more secular, thankfully).

Hays
So his sample is primarily based on a single traditionally Catholic country, in the 21C. What a ridiculously unrepresentable sample from which to declare something "typical". 

Piotr
Appeal to emotion is irrelevant when we're talking about facts…

Hays
Notice, once again, Piotr's incorrigible inability to keep track of the argument, even when it's his very own argument. He's the one who appealed to emotion by framing the issue in terms of "mental terror". 

Why is Piotr simply incapable of being logically consistent for 30 seconds straight? Because everything he says is driven by his need to rationalize his sex life. 

Piotr
…and there is simply no evidence for an afterlife, regardless of how comforting it may seem to people.

Hays
Sure there is. Take crisis apparitions, including veridical cases of crisis apparitions. Same thing with well-confirmed hauntings. Piotr is simply ignorant of the literature. 

Then, of course, we have evidence for the Resurrection. But Piotr has a closed mind because, by his own admission, his deviant sexual lifestyle runs counter to Christian ethics. So he won't consider evidence for Christianity. 

Piotr
There are secular means of comforting loved ones in said situations…

Hays
What's the secular means of comforting a dying child who fears oblivion? What's the secular means of comfort a child who lost his mother or father? 

Piotr
Same as doctors cannot lie to patients about their condition just to 'spare their feels'.

Hays
Suppose a teenager suffers irreparable injuries in a traffic accident. He will die in a few hours, but he doesn't know it. He assumes he will recover.

But an atheist will rob him of hope by telling him he's going to die. From a secular standpoint, what's wrong with playing along with his belief so that he dies happy? 

Piotr
A little child in Poland has committed suicide not long ago because they were told they'd be reunited with their mother after death - I think I'll pass.

Hays
Atheists commit suicide too. 

Piotr
Of course there were transgender persons across history and the globe, though they will have been interpreted differently. LGBT is an umbrella term for non-heterosexual people…

Hays
Now he's having to backpedal on his original claim. Moreover, he's stuck in the Middle Ages. But that's a diversionary tactic. We're not living in the Middle Ages. So that's irrelevant. 

Piotr
You are NOT allowed to base your argument on a deity and then claim they're outside of natural/physical laws just because it's convenient for you. So unimpressive and a very tired fallacy indeed.

Hays
i) There are many different lines of evidence for God's existence.

ii) However, my argument doesn't require me to begin with God's existence. Piotr said, "Raising from the dead would require strong demonstrable evidence as it is biologically impossible, to current knowledge."

Take a comparison: What are the odds of winning a state lottery? If the lottery is fairly drawn, the odds are astronomical. What are the odds of winning the lottery twice or thrice? Magnitudes of order more astronomical. Virtually impossible.

Does that mean it demands extraordinary evidence to show that somebody won the lottery twice? No. Ordinary evidence will suffice to establish the winner.

If, however, he won the lottery twice or thrice, that would point to a rigged lottery. Since the "natural" odds of winning the lottery twice or thrice are virtually nil, evidence of winning the lottery twice or thrice would in turn constitute evidence that an outside agent intervened to manipulate the results.

By the same token, the existence of God needn't be a starting-point in arguing for the Resurrection, but the end-point.

Powerful love

Some recent exchanges I've had on Facebook with Jerry Walls and his entourage:

Hays
i) I don't object to satire. However, satire is only amusing if it's clever. To be witty, it needs be clever. Jerry's efforts at satirizing Calvinism are too sophomoric to be entertaining. I don't think they're amusing, not because I find them offensive, but because they're witless. 

ii) Satire carries the peril that, in the nature of the case, satire caricatures the target. If people judge a position by the satire, then they are judging a caricature of the position rather than the actual position. This, in turn, fosters uninformed contempt. 

The only people who are inclined to find his satires amusing are freewill theists. So he's playing to the choir. There is, though, a moral and spiritual danger in pandering to prejudice. Playing to an audience that's only to happy to equate a hostile or spiteful parody with the actual position. Indeed, the reaction of Jerry's groupies bears out that point. 

iii) Calvinists have no problem singing joy to the "world". That's only incongruous on Jerry's interpretation of the "world".

Tait 
And to your second post: you can make difficulties out of God's love or God's power (or both, to be sure). For some reason, Calvinists seem to find the former the more reasonable and appealing approach. That seems odd, given our excellent reasons for thinking that our power is even less like God's power than our love is like God's love."

Hays
i) Your comment was directed at a different commenter than me. That said, Calvinism doesn't set God's love in opposition to God's power. Rather, it's Arminian polemicists like Jerry who posit a false dichotomy between God's power and God's love in Calvinism. 

For instance, because God loves the elect, he deploys his power to ensure their salvation. There's no tension between divine love and divine power in that case. To the contrary, God's power facilitates his love in that case.

ii) Jerry harps on the question of whether a Calvinist may consistently say that God loves the reprobate. Suppose he can't? That would only be a damaging statement if one assumes that God morally defective unless he loves each and every sinner. Speaking for myself, I don't think there's anything inherently objectionable about God not loving the reprobate.

iii) That said, it isn't necessarily incongruous to say the Calvinist God loves the reprobate. For one thing, even the Calvinist God can't save every possible person. Although the Calvinist God could create a world in which everyone is saved, that comes at the expense of many people who wouldn't exist in such a world. In principle, the Calvinist God could regret his inability to save every possible person. He could love those he predestined to damn, but damn them anyway, for a world in which everyone is saved has a different history than a world in which some people are saved and some people are damned. Some people go to heaven in a world where some people are damned who wouldn't even exist in an alternate timeline. Not all hypotheticals are compossible. 

iv) Theoretically, the Calvinist God might create a multiverse in which some people who are damned in our world are saved in a parallel universe. If that existed, there's no presumption that God would reveal it to the denizens of our world, or vice versa. 

"through which I read things such as 1 John's affirmation that God is love…"

The statement that God is love is entirely consistent with Calvinism. 

"John 3:16's similar affirmation."

That, too, is entirely consistent with Calvinism. 

"The fatal flaw of Calvinism is the assumption that God's power must look like human power, while God's love doesn't have to."

That's not a Calvinist assumption. Exclusive love is a commonplace of human experience. Indeed, human love has an inextricable element of partiality. Humans always love some people more than others.

Keep in mind that it's typically freewill theists who pose a dichotomy between divine and human love. On the one hand they say God's universal love is necessitated by his nature. It isn't possible for God to refrain from loving everyone, for that's an essential divine attribute. On the other hand, human love, to be real love, must be free either to love or to withhold love.

There's that central tension in freewill theism. Is love libertarian or necessitarian? They say it's necessitarian in reference to God, but libertarian in reference to man, then turn around and tell us that Calvinists have an unrecognizable concept of love. But, of course, it's freewill theists who make divine and human love radically disanalogous.

Walls 
Yes, a libertarian free choice to create others with whom he would share his love.

Hays 
So, Jerry, you're saying that God can either love or not love sinners? His essential nature doesn't mean he must love sinners?

Walls 
No, I am saying he can create or not create other beings with whom to share his love. Like a married couple deciding to have or not to have a baby. But having chosen to create, he will love all he creates. But you already know exactly where I stand on all this.

Hays 
i) Which therefore concedes my original point that there's a drastic dichotomy between the way freewill theists define divine and human love. Thanks for the confirmation.

ii) Presumably, you think parents have the libertarian freedom not to love their kids. So your parallel is disanalogous at the critical point of comparison.

iii) Before the advent of contraception, married couples didn't really choose to have children. Rather, the choice was whether or not to have sex. And, of course, there's not much point to a Platonic marriage.

Tait 
You are going against Paul Helm there. At least he argues that Calvin thinks God has libertarian freedom, and appears to agree with the position he ascribes to Calvin. Actually I think Calvin agrees with you. The traditional view, in contrast, would be that God does have libertarian freedom with regard to creation."

Hays
It's a lot more complicated than that:

1. "Libertarian freedom" is a term of art. The way in which contemporary philosophers explicate the concept can't just be read back into 16C theological discussions. The concept has undergone a lot of development since Calvin. And there are different models of libertarian freedom.

2. To my knowledge, there are two basic models of libertarian freedom in contemporary philosophy:

i) Ultimate sourcehood

On that definition, God has libertarian freedom because God is paradigmatically the source of his own deliberations, choices, and actions. That follows from divine aseity.

ii) Principle of alternate possibilities

On that definition, an agent is free if he could do/choose otherwise given the same antecedent conditions. The past is identical right up to the point where the agent might have chosen differently.

In application to God, however, that's only partially true. Although it's true that God could have chosen otherwise, that can't be defined against the backdrop of antecedent conditions or the past, since God has no past or external antecedent conditions leading up to his choice. Certainly not if God is timeless. And there were no conditions outside of God prior to creation.

iii) Other complications in traditional debates over divine freedom include a range of knotty issues regarding absolute power, ordinate power, nominalism (e.g. Scotus, Ockham), Buridan's Ass, and the principle of sufficient reason (Leibniz).

Responding To The Media's Annual Christmas Coverage

We're now in the last several days of the Christmas season, when we usually get most of the media's coverage of Christmas issues. I'll cite a few of the more significant examples I've come across so far this year, and I'll recommend some resources.

Guy Consolmagno, director of the Vatican Observatory, wrote a piece on the star of Bethlehem for the Evening Standard in England. The Daily Sun in Arizona also has an article on the star. So does Forbes. I've posted a response to the Forbes one, in their comments section, if anybody is interested.

U.S. News & World Report reposted an article on the infancy narratives in general. It repeats some common objections to the accounts:

Sunday, December 18, 2016

Is unconditional election arbitrary?

A staple charge against Calvinism is that unconditional election is "arbitrary". Isn't "unconditional" election arbitrary by definition? If it's "unconditional," then it must be arbitrary, right? Like rolling dice. 

However, that's confused. It's unconditional in the sense that it's not conditional on anything outside of God. But that doesn't mean there can't be differential factors in God's choice. Different human agents, or the same agents making different decisions, will produce different chains of events. God could have reasons for preferring one chain of events over another. And that's still not conditioned on something outside of God, since God is the one who makes different agents different in the first place. The differences derive from God. Likewise, the same agent could choose a different course of action in the way a movie may have an alternate ending. Different plots originate in the mind of God, not the human agent. 

But we also need to examine the notion of "arbitrariness". There are degrees of arbitrariness. There's a distinction between what's reasonably arbitrary and unreasonably arbitrary. 

Consider age of majority, age of consent, drinking age, driving age, voting age, draft age, enlistment age, &c. Suppose, in most cases, that's 18. Now, that's a somewhat artificial threshold. Why not 17 years, 5 months, and 13 days? Why not 19 years, 2 months, and 9 days? In part because lawmakers like round numbers. In part because we've inherited the decimal system. 

Moreover, the age at which individuals are actually competent varies from one person to the next. But, of course, it isn't feasible to have a variable age. It has to be a general policy. Lawmakers can't individualize for millions of people. 

But even though the threshold is somewhat arbitrary, it's reasonable arbitrary. To begin with, the alternative to a somewhat artifical age threshold is to have no minimum age for sex, voting, drinking, driving, military service, &c. But that would be ridiculous. 

It is, therefore, preferable to have an age threshold, even if that's somewhat artifical, if the alternative is to have no age threshold at all for such activities. 

Moreover, 18 is reasonably arbitrary in a way that 8 or 28 would be unreasonably arbitrary. 8 would clearly be too low while 28 would clearly be too high. So the threshold is a rational compromise. A line has to be drawn somewhere, and while there's no ideal place to draw the line–indeed, because there's no ideal place to draw the line–any threshold will be somewhat artificial. Yet drawing the line some places is more reasonable or unreasonable than other places. 

Take the age of consent. Take statutory rape. If an 18-year-old seduces a 17-year-old, that's legally rape. Yet that's a legal technicality. The transaction was consensual. 

What if the seducer (or seductress) was a day shy of 18? Legally, it's rape if it happened a day after he or she turned 18, but not a day before. The fact that the seducer (or seductress) happens to fall on the liable side of that threshold may be arbitrary. And for that reason, I it would be unjust to charge the seducer (or seductress) in cases where it's nothing more than a legal technicality. 

But, presumably, that's not the intended target for age of consent laws. Rather, if you didn't have such laws, you couldn't prosecute someone for bona fide child rape. Or situations like the Roman Polanski case. So you need a certain spread to cover the egregious examples. 

So even if unconditional election were arbitrary in some respect, that doesn't ipso facto make it capricious or unjust. A critic of Calvinism needs to fine-hone his objection, to show that unconditional election is unreasonably arbitrary (even assuming that's is arbitrary in any sense). 

In principle, God could elect one more person or one less person. But even if there's a sense in which that's arbitrary, it doesn't follow that it's unreasonably arbitrary. If you were to take that objection to a logical extreme, a non-arbitrary line would be to damn everyone! 

Moreover, there's a sense in which God can't elect everyone possible person, even if he so desired. For the existence of some people depends on the existence of evil. And in many instances, that evil would be incompatible with the elect status of every ancestor. It's a domino effect. So election necessarily includes some individuals who might have been excluded while excluding some individuals who might have been included. A possible out is of God creates a multiverse. That, however, will entail evil. 

Fatal snapshot

One consequence of being a celebrity is that folks are continually snapping photos of you. There are paparazzi who tail you relentlessly. There's a snapshot of James Dean tanking up at a Sherman Oaks gas station. There he is, in the prime of life, having a blast, on a warm sunny day in Southern California. A picture perfect scene. Or so it seems. 

Now, because he was a movie star, there are many snapshots of Dean. So what, if anything, makes this particular snapshot special–compared to hundreds of others? Thousands of others?  

It's a snapshot of his silver Porsche 550 Spyder. That's the car he died in. And the snapshot was taken September 30, 1955. That's the day he died, at 5:45 pm, in a fatal collision. In other words, it was taken just hours before his untimely demise. 

And that makes the snapshot ominous. The viewer knows something he doesn't. Dean has no inkling that a few hours later, he will be dead. For him, that lies in the unforeseeable future, however near in time–whereas, for the viewer, it lies in the past. We know the trajectory. We're looking back on that. We mentally begin with how it ended, and view the snapshot in light of the denouement. That snapshot, which is nothing special in prospect, takes on haunting significance in retrospect. We know that he's doomed. And it's too late to warn him. Nothing can save him. 

Now, at the moment the snapshot was taken, it wasn't fatalistic. Indeed, if any one of any number of things had happened slightly differently, he'd still be alive, vibrant, and youthful the next day–with a full life ahead of him. Had he arrived at the intersection a few moments sooner or later, they'd miss connections. Had the driver of the other car arrived at the intersection a few moments sooner or later, they'd miss connections. If one of them had a flat tire on the way, they'd miss connections. And so on and so forth. But the past is unalterable. And when we see that snapshot, with the benefit of hindsight, it has a fatalistic vibe. Not fatalistic in advance of the fact–but after the fact, nothing can be done to avert the outcome. 

Incidentally, it's edifying to consider all the near misses in our lives. In the nature of the case, we're often unaware of a near miss because it didn't happen. There's nothing to notice. In some cases we're conscious of a close call, which makes us thankful. But those must be greatly outnumbered by all the close calls that escape our notice. Had the timing or placement been even slightly different, we wouldn't be here. To make it this far, consider how many times we averted disaster by a few meters or moments. Changing just one variable five, ten, twenty, or fifty miles up the road may preempt a chain reaction. 

Now suppose that due to a temporal anomaly, when you check your mail on September 29, 1955, there's a manila envelop containing two snapshots. One snapshot shows Dean at the gas station, and the other snapshot shows the scene of the accident. It that case, is the accident a foregone conclusion? 

Hypothetically, if you knew what you were looking at, and you had a chance to forewarn the actor, the accident would still be preventable. But suppose there's no way to contact him. Is the accident a fait accompli, even though this is a day before the two scenes depicted in the snapshots? In that event, isn't the collision bound to happen?

i) This illustrates the dilemma between freedom and foreknowledge. If God knows the future, can the future turn out contrary to God's knowledge? Suppose God has, in effect, mental snapshots of Dean at the gas station as well as the crash site. 

ii) Some freewill theists might object that it's disanalogous because God doesn't have advance knowledge of the future. Rather, God is outside of time.

However, I didn't frame the question in terms of what God knew before it happened, but the sequence of events. Not God's relation to time, but relations within time. If, moreover, God has timeless mental snapshots of these two scenes, then how can events play out any differently?

To be sure, God has mental snapshots of alternate timelines. The point, though, is that he knows which one of those many timelines maps onto the real world, in contrast to all the counterfactual timelines. And if, in addition, God creates a world with a history corresponding to those mental snapshots, then how can it deviate from his mental snapshots of the past or future? 

iii) A freewill theist might object that if the future were different, then God would have different mental snapshots of the future. If the future were different, the future God knows would be a different future.

But even so, that's not what's going to happen. Only one timeline will happen. If the manila envelop had snapshots depicting a different outcome, then, of course, Dean won't die in the accident. But isn't that beside the point? The envelop doesn't have those snapshots. Rather, it has snapshots of Dean at the gas station, and the crash site. Given those snapshots (of tomorrow), how can events unfold any differently tomorrow? 

iv) Moreover, the question is whether Dean, or the other driver, or some other participant in the chain of events, has the power to change God's knowledge of the future (were they to do something different). It's not a question of our general ability to do one thing or another, but whether that's open-ended in relation to a fact about God's knowledge. This becomes a debate over the fortunes of Ockhamism. But a basic problem with Ockhamism is that it seems to stand in tension with the fixity of the past. As one philosopher put it, 

It seems to me that it is very difficult to give an account of the necessity of the past that preserves the intuition that the past has a special kind of necessity in virtue of being past, but which has the consequence that God's past beliefs do not have that kind of necessity. The problem is that God's past beliefs seem to be as good a candidate for something that is strictly past as almost anything we can think of, such as an explosion last week. If we have counterfactual power over God's past beliefs, but not the past explosion, that must be because of something special about God's past beliefs that is intuitively plausible apart from the attempt to avoid theological fatalism. If it is not independently plausible, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Ockhamist solution is ad hoc. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/#2.3

v) A freewill theist could take the radical step of denying the fixity the past, but if there's a conflict between the fixity of the past and counterfactual power over the past, what gives? Which principle is more plausible and fundamental? When push comes to shove, I think it's arguably the case that the fixity of the past takes precedence. For some detailed analysis:


vi) Another question is whether timeless beliefs are analogous to the past. If even the past is necessary, albeit "accidentally" so, despite the fact that time is continent, then a fortiori, timeless states should be at least as necessary, if not more so. What's timelessness is inherently immutable, whereas temporal events only become immutable when they lie in the past. 

vii) A friend of my noted that a freewill theist might parry the argument by shifting to the question of what grounds God's beliefs, what they metaphysically "depend" on. If they are grounded in the creature's free action, that is if they metaphysically depend on the creature, then this is enough for libertarian freedom (it's argued). So even if we can't do otherwise given God's infallible beliefs, so long as it's us who ground his belief, that's enough for libertarian freedom.

That move concedes that libertarian freedom is inconsistent with God's knowledge of the future if freedom is defined as liberty to do otherwise in the same situation. So the argument is successful against libertarian freedom in that sense. 

If so, the issue shifts to the philosophical prospects for libertarian freedom defined by ultimate sourcehood. That requires different arguments and counterarguments. 

Methinks I See A Heavn'ly Host

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cH3Y6ZmSCgE

Adeste fideles


Rejoice greatly

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ROYSKXiSKpc

Lo, How a Rose E'er Blooming

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qI7hwHaYK_c

We Three Kings of Orient Are

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xM8f5E8FUUA

O Holy Night

The definitive performance:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y_h53wnFq70

Saturday, December 17, 2016

“A civil war is in progress in the [Roman Catholic] Church”

“A civil war is in progress in the Church”:
“A civil war is in progress in the Church” .... The conflict was opened, consciously or not, by Pope Francis himself, most of all after the Exhortation Amoris laetitia, and today the Church is not advancing but sinking, into a ground furrowed by crevices and deep divisions.

Someone compared the failure of Pope Francis’ pontificate to that of Barack Hussein Obama. What Washington took eight years to accomplish has now happened in Rome after 3 years: the passage from the euphoria of the first hour to the final depression, having totally missed the targets that had been pre-established. Yet, it would be a mistake to read Pope Francis’ pontificate in purely political terms. Pope Francis would never have been able to pronounce Obama’s “Yes, we can”. For a Pope, unlike a politician, not everything is possible. The Supreme Pontiff has supreme power, full and immediate over the entire Church, but cannot change the Divine Law that Jesus Christ gave to His Church, nor the natural law that God has impressed in the heart of every man. He is the Vicar of Christ, but not his successor.

Even Roman Catholics see the corrosive, duplicitous, and laughable nature of Pope Bergoglio’s “Amoris Laetitia”

The rhetorical strategy to debunk the dubia:
As you read through these talking points, you might notice some contradictions. We’re saying that it’s all very simple, yet we’re saying that it’s all very complex. We’re insisting that “Rome has spoken,” yet the whole point is that Rome has not spoken, leaving fundamental questions up to individual priests. We’re inveighing against “clericalism,” yet giving priests enormous new powers with no means of accountability. We’re saying that the Pope is a pastor rather than a lawmaker, yet we’re trying to lay down the law. We’re telling people that Amoris Laetitia upholds the traditional Church teaching, yet we’re making fun of that teaching. These are not comfortable arguments to make. That’s why we’re trying to end the debate quickly. When in doubt, remember point #1: Don’t talk about the dubia.

Companion plots

I've said I don't think Christians have a duty to bury their dead. I think the choice between burial and cremation is adiaphorous. Cemeteries are of value to the living, not the dead. If survivors visit the cemetery, then burial is beneficial. But after a generation or two, the grave will be neglected and forgotten.

Traditionally, married couples used to buy companion plots. These were two burial plots side-by-side. Typically, one spouse predeceased the other (unless both happened to die in an accident or plague), and was buried first. The surviving spouse would be buried beside their spouse. The tombstone already had a birthdate, while the date of death would be filled in when the time came. 

I think that arrangement is commendable–for couples who can afford it. Admittedly, this is all about symbolism, but the symbolism is potent. It sends a message about an outlook on life that may be alien to many people with a post-Christian worldview.

Just in general, cemeteries make death a public fact. They don't conceal death. Cemeteries are a visible and enduring reminder of our inevitable mortality. That's something many people avoid thinking about.

In addition, companion plots symbolize ultimate devotion. Where you marry someone with the intention of remaining together for the rest of your life. And even in death, a companion plot is a token of their inseparable bond. Love that's stronger than death (Canticles 8:6). 

Again, it's just an emblem of their devotion. Only God can actually reunite the dead. But it's a powerful witness to the world.

Marriage is sacrificial. Due to our mortality, and the brevity of life, we can only make our life with one person at a time, and we only have one life. Life is a card we can only play once. That deck will not be reshuffled.

Marriage opens up many opportunities within the bonds of matrimony, but by the same token, it forecloses many other opportunities. To make your life with one person, to have children by one person, is to foreclose the opportunity to make your life with someone else, or have children by someone else. 

Even if, due to divorce or premature widowhood, you remarry, you can't really start over again, because you can't make up for the lost years. That's time you will never get back. The hourglass only has so many grains of sand. Time is running out. 

There are forks in the road of life where you must choose to go right or left. You can't do both. Whichever road you take you must take all the way to the end. By going down one road, you deny yourself the chance to explore other roads. That makes certain choices momentous. You give up a lot in the hopes of getting a lot in return. It's a gamble. You bet everything on that particular relationship–for better or worse. 

Friday, December 16, 2016

Blue lagoon

There are well-meaning evangelicals who wish to reach out and minister to professing Christians who experience homosexual attraction. This takes different forms. One form promotes reparative therapy. Another form rejects reparable therapy and promotes celibacy. Both forms rightly reject homosexual activity as a live option, since that's diametrically opposed to Christian ethics. 

I'd like to take a comparison. Suppose a private jet with a half dozen teenagers, plus the pilot, crashes on a tropical island, killing all but two passengers.

The two survivors are male and female. They make a signal fire, arrange rocks on the sandy beach to spell S.O.S, and patiently wait to be rescued. But after a few months it becomes depressingly clear that no one is looking for them. Although there would have been frantic initial efforts to find them, by that time search-and-rescue efforts have been called off. No one has any idea where the plane went down, and they are presumed dead. Hence, our two teenagers can't count on anyone ever discovering them. They may have to live out their lives on the remote island. Thankfully, it has fresh water, fruit trees, wild pigs, high ground, a cave for shelter, a lagoon for fishing, and a leeward side for protection from squalls and gales. Plus some useful tools from the plane. (That's one of the advantages of fiction. I can ensure a well-equipped island!)

Now, if these were normal teenagers, it doesn't take much imagination to figure out how they'd pass time in-between chores. But here's the catch: let's say the guy is homosexual. 

Ordinarily, he'd ignore the girl, but since she's his only human companion, do you really think he'll be remain Platonic? Given the available options, wouldn't he adjust to that situation much like a straight male? Even if that's not his preference–and it's not exactly the girl's first pick–isn't that what he'll fall back on, under the circumstances? After all, he's still designed to have sexual relations with a member of the opposite sex, and find it physically enjoyable. Not only is he perfectly capable of adapting to that role, but he may even take a liking to the girl.

Nowadays, how many homosexual males even give themselves a chance to find out if they have an undeveloped capacity to love a woman? They've been drilled into believing that their condition is immutable, so they jump right into homosexual liaisons. And it probably gels them in that direction. 

This doesn't mean the guy in my hypothetical scenario will necessary turn into 100% straight male. I'm not making any predictions.

I'm just making the point that given the male sex drive, I strongly suspect that if a homosexual male found himself in that situation, he'd opt for a sexual relationship with a female rather than a sexless relationship. But how often does that possibility eve occur to homosexuals–especially in a culture that fanatically steers them away from ever considering it. The purpose of my scenario is for someone in that condition to imagine what he'd do in that situation. Take away the male competition. If what's left is a woman of the same age, won't he choose that over nothing? And having done so, he may find there's more to be found in that relationship than he ever expected. 

In Shantung Compound

Al Mohler relates the following:

[A] professor assigned me to read Shantung Compound by theologian Langdon Gilkey of the University of Chicago Divinity School. Gilkey was in many ways the opposite to Liddell. Gilkey was a theological liberal whose father, famously liberal, had been the first dean of the chapel at the University of Chicago. Langdon Gilkey had gone to China to teach English after graduating from Harvard. He found himself interred with Eric Liddell.

In Shantung Compound, Gilkey analyzed what happens when men and women are put under extraordinary pressure. He argued that the worst moral dilemmas in Weihsien came not from their Japanese captors, but from the prisoners themselves. His point was that, for many if not most of the captured, the experience brought out the worst in them, rather than the best. He changed the names of those inside the camp when he told their stories.

There were a few moral exceptions. Gilkey wrote of one exceptional individual, a missionary he named “Eric Ridley.” Gilkey wrote: “It is rare indeed when a person has the good fortune to meet a saint, but he came as close to it as anyone I have ever known.” Gilkey described how Liddell had largely single-handedly resolved the crisis of a breakout of teenage sexual activity in the camp. In the midst of a moral breakdown, with no societal structures to restrain behavior, few even seemed to want to help.

Gilkey made this observation: “There was a quality seemingly unique to the missionary group, namely, naturally and without pretense to respond to a need which everyone else recognized only to turn aside. Much of this went unnoticed, but our camp could scarcely have survived as well as it did without it. If there were any evidences of the grace of God observable on the surface of our camp existence, they were to be found here.”

Gilkey had renamed individuals as he wrote about them, but he described “Eric Ridley” as having won the 400 meter race at the Olympics for England before going to China as a missionary. Eric Ridley was Eric Liddell, and Langdon Gilkey was writing of a man he has observed so closely as a living saint. I realized that Langdon Gilkey had told the most important part of Eric Liddell’s story long before Chariots of Fire.

Gilkey closed his words about Erid Liddell with these: “Shortly before the camp ended, he was stricken with a brain tumor and died the same day. The entire camp, especially its youth, was stunned for days, so great was the vacuum that Eric’s death had left.”

A difference, to be a difference, must make a difference

Reposting an exchange I recently had with a Catholic church historian on Facebook:

1. In my experience, when Catholic apologists attack the Protestant faith, they stress the certainties afforded by a Magisterium, but when Protestants attack the Catholic faith, Catholic apologists suddenly take refuge in uncertainties. Any evidence that might falsify Catholicism is relegated to something insufficiently authoritative. Certainty, which had been so accessible when attacking the Protestant faith becomes inaccessible when Protestants counterattack. Now you see it, now you don't. When Catholic apologists are on the offensive, they advertise certainty. When Catholic apologists are on the defensive, they play hide and seek.

2. You ask, what constitutes sufficient evidence? It depends. Sufficient for what?

Let's distinguish between reasonable belief and dutiful belief. I have many beliefs for which I have sufficient evidence to be justified or warranted in which I believe. 

That, however, is different from the claim that God requires me to believe certain things. I can and do believe many things without having a divine obligation to believe them. 

Catholicism takes the position that in addition to Biblical revelation, I'm duty-bound to believe Catholic dogmas. It is sinful to disbelieve them. Indeed, it may be a mortal sin. For instance:

We declare, pronounce, and define that the doctrine which holds that the most Blessed Virgin Mary, in the first instance of her conception, by a singular grace and privilege granted by Almighty God, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Savior of the human race, was preserved free from all stain of original sin, is a doctrine revealed by God and therefore to be believed firmly and constantly by all the faithful.

Hence, if anyone shall dare -- which God forbid! -- to think otherwise than as has been defined by us, let him know and understand that he is condemned by his own judgment; that he has suffered shipwreck in the faith; that he has separated from the unity of the Church; and that, furthermore, by his own action he incurs the penalties established by law if he should are to express in words or writing or by any other outward means the errors he think in his heart. "Ineffabilis Deus"

By the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and by our own authority, we pronounce, declare, and define it to be a divinely revealed dogma: that the Immaculate Mother of God, the ever Virgin Mary, having completed the course of her earthly life, was assumed body and soul into heavenly glory.

Hence if anyone, which God forbid, should dare willfully to deny or to call into doubt that which we have defined, let him know that he has fallen away completely from the divine and Catholic Faith. It is forbidden to any man to change this, our declaration, pronouncement, and definition or, by rash attempt, to oppose and counter it. If any man should presume to make such an attempt, let him know that he will incur the wrath of Almighty God and of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul. "Munificentissimus Deus."

What is sufficient evidence to justifiably believe something has a much lower threshold than what is sufficient evidence that I have a sacred duty to believe something, failing which I have sinned (perhaps a damnable sin, no less).

3. You said:

Just as you say that the "church of Rome" is a 'short-sighted, uninspired institution,' so many atheists insist that the Bible is nothing more than a collection of ancient books containing a savage 'Iron Age' (or sometimes, less accurately, 'Bronze Age') view of the world.

i) One problem with that analogy is that unless the evidence for Catholicism is comparable to the evidence for Scripture, it's reasonable to make allowances for Scripture that I wouldn't or shouldn't make for Catholicism. 

ii) Moreover, Another problem with your comparison is that when I interpret the Bible or defend the Bible, original intent is one of my hermeneutical principles. (Prophecy is a partial exception inasmuch as prophecies are forward-looking, so the perspective of the prophet isn't the only salient consideration. There's the timeframe of the prophet as well as the timeframe of the predicted event. So we have to take past and future viewpoints into account.)

By contrast, reinterpreting traditional positions is the opposite of original intent. So your comparison is disanalogous. You compared criticisms of Catholicism to criticisms of the Bible. 

ii) Furthermore, it would be necessary for you to unpack that comparison in detail. Hypothetically speaking, the Bible (indeed, Christianity) is falsifiable. Take Paul's statement about the Resurrection. 

Now, if (ex hypothesi) we discovered the bones of Jesus in the tomb, some theologians would say Christianity is still true. We just need to redefine the Resurrection. But Paul, for one, denies that Christianity is that flexible. Because it's based on ostensible historical events, it can't remain true if the foundational events never happened. 

I keep making this analogy because your complete dismissal of the unbeliever's perspective is one of the most consistent features of your posts. And, alas, even Jerry, who should know better, has been falling into the same error. You keep attacking Catholicism on grounds that logically refute Christianity as a whole.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm guessing that you're a theological moderate. You don't subscribe to the inerrancy of Scripture. You don't think Gen 1-11 is historical. You don't think the Exodus happened, or if it did, it was nothing like Biblical descriptions. I'm guessing you don't think the Gospels are consistently historical. 

If so, your comparison is predicated a flexibility in your own position that's not analogous to my own position. The problem is with an ad hoc plasticity, which we impose on past events or past statements, rather than deriving from past events or past statements, whereby we make these adjustable to the perceived demands of modernity. Interjecting enough fudge factors that you can never say something was wrong or fundamentally wrong. It's an intellectual compromise that works for some people, but a makeshift compromise that lacks any principle other than indefinite adaptability.

I keep making this analogy because your complete dismissal of the unbeliever's perspective is one of the most consistent features of your posts.

I don't simply "dismiss" the unbeliever's perspective. I go out of my way to find the best exponents of atheism, then present a detailed critique of their arguments.

4. I don't always need to reinvent the wheel. When I cite supporting material by, say, Cardinal Dulles, that's a sympathetic source. I'd add that on Facebook it's more convenient to cite online material. That's something readily accessible to readers in a way that print media is not. 

Of course, Dulles isn't going to say the Magisterium falsified its claim to be a divine teaching office. As a Catholic prelate, he's committed to the system. So he and like-minded defenders will invoke escape clauses to show how these radical changes are someone consistent with essential continuity. Escape clauses invented on the spot for just that purpose. 

But in the course of his historical overviews, he lays out evidence for drastic changes in traditional positions. If that's consistent with the divine guidance of the Magisterium, what would be inconsistent with divine guidance? Within Catholicism, with its ace in the hole regarding gradations of authority, what would ever count as evidence against the system? 

5. Another problem is that these reassessments of traditional theology are necessarily retrospective. No one living in the Middle Ages (say) would understand these positions the way they've been domesticated by modern Catholic theologians, popes, and bishops. As a result, everything in Catholic theology is up for grabs, since the standard of comparison is no longer the past or present, but the future. Not what is or has been, but what might be. 

The church of Rome is like Neurath's ship, which undergoes constant remodeling after it leaves dry dock. You can no longer say what Catholicism is or means because that's subject to some unforeseeable future revision or reinterpretation. What is ever truly definitive? What is ever truly authoritative? 

6. Let's begin with a principle. Gertrude Stein famously said "A difference, to be a difference, must make a difference."

One way of testing whether the church of Rome has a divine teaching office is to ask what difference the presence or absence of a divine teaching office would make in Catholic historical theology. There must be a discernible difference. Let's begin one example I cited, from Cardinal Dulles. Among other things, he says:

The views of Augustine and Fulgentius remained dominant in the Christian West throughout the Middle Ages. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) reaffirmed the formula “Outside the Church, no salvation,” as did Pope Boniface VIII in 1302. At the end of the Middle Ages, the Council of Florence (1442) repeated the formulation of Fulgentius to the effect that no pagan, Jew, schismatic, or heretic could be saved.

A major theological development occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The voyages of discovery had by this time disclosed that there were large populations in North and South America, Africa, and Asia who had lived since the time of Christ and had never had access to the preaching of the gospel. The missionaries found no sign that even the most upright among these peoples had learned the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation by interior inspirations or angelic visitations.

Pope Pius IX incorporated some of their ideas in two important statements in 1854 and 1863. In the first, he said that, while no one can be saved outside the Church, God would not punish people for their ignorance of the true faith if their ignorance was invincible. In the second statement, Pius went further. He declared that persons invincibly ignorant of the Christian religion who observed the natural law and were ready to obey God would be able to attain eternal life, thanks to the workings of divine grace within them.


Paul Knitter makes the same point:


i) That's not a development of doctrine, but a retraction of a traditional position that had been reaffirmed by two ecumenical councils and Pope Boniface VIII. That isn't "nuance". That's not a logical development of the principle. Rather, that's a radical departure from the principle. 

ii) If, moreover, you maintain that it's somehow internally consistent, you can only do so be resorting to radical skepticism concerning how official church teaching can be understood. That's not how the principle was understood in the Middle Ages, at the highest levels of the Magisterium. If past Magisterial statements can be that drastically reinterpreted, then there's no presumption that our understanding of modern Magisterial statements is any more stable in light of some future reinterpretation. 

iii) At best, it could be argued that this was an attempt to reconcile the traditional principle of "Extra ecclesiam nulla salus" with the belief of some Medieval theologians regarding God's universal salvific will. Yet that would mean you had a tension in Catholic theology between the traditional position (Extra ecclesiam nulla salus) and a newer, emerging position regarding the scope of God's salvific will. 

But how would this outcome be any different if the Catholic church never had a divine teaching office in the first place? Indeed, isn't this logjam exactly what we'd expect from an organization that can't see ahead, and therefore stakes out untenable positions from which it must later extricate itself? 

Even supposing that's consistent with a divine teaching office, it's equally consistent with no divine teaching office at all. What's your evidence to distinguish the effects of a divine teaching office from its absence? When modern Catholic theologians begin retrofitting Catholic theology in light of unforeseen contingencies like the discovery of pagans in the New World, how is that distinguishable from an organization that made the wrong call the first time around? 

7. Let's take another example: What's the official ecclesiology in Vatican II? Is it the more collegial, conciliarist model that the majority of bishops voted for, or is it the more ultamontane model in the "explanatory note" of Paul VI?

Paul VI was clearly alarmed by what the bishops promulgated, so he overruled it with his explanatory note. Yet these two competing models of ecclesiology bump up against each other in the final edition. Both were codified at the same council. 

If you think that train wreck is consistent with a divine teaching office, that's equally consistent with the absence of a divine teaching office. What appreciable difference did the stipulated divine teaching office make to the results? Indeed, wouldn't we expect a divine teaching office to be able to head off that train wreck in advance, rather than letting the two trains collide, then leaving it to onlookers to decide which has the upper hand?

8. Here's another example:

Before Mary’s bodily Assumption into heaven was defined, all theological faculties in the world were consulted for their opinion. Our teachers’ answer was emphatically negative... ’Tradition’ was identified with what could be proved on the basis of texts. Altaner, the patrologist from Würzburg...had proven in a scientifically persuasive manner that the doctrine of Mary’s bodily Assumption into heaven was unknown before the fifth century; this doctrine, therefore, he argued, could not belong to the ‘apostolic tradition.’ And this was his conclusion, which my teachers at Munich shared. This argument is compelling if you understand ‘tradition’ strictly as the handling down of fixed formulas and texts...But if you conceive of ‘tradition’ as a living process whereby the Holy Spirit introduces us to the fullness of truth and teaches us how to understand what previously we could still not grasp (cf. Jn 16:12-13), then subsequent ‘remembering’ (cf. Jn 16:4, for instance) can come to recognize what it had not caught sight of previously and yet w as handed down in the original Word, Milestones (Ignatius, 1998), 58-59.

Notice that this involves a twofold theological innovation:

i) To begin with, the particular doctrine (Assumption of Mary) is a theological innovation. It was unknown before the 5C. 

ii) In addition, the theory of development is a theological innovation. It represents a fundamental break with how the church of Rome used to define sacred tradition. Notice that the Assumption of Mary was promulgated despite unanimous opposition of Catholic theological faculties at the time. That's not just because the doctrine itself lacks traditional pedigree, but because the justification is yet another theology innovation. 

iii) It will hardly suffice to say "Catholicism allows for theological development" when that, in itself, represents a repeal of the traditional criterion.

9. Or consider how Mark Daviau blew off the question of whether the Leonine-era strictures of the PBC regarding the historicity and traditional authorship of Scripture are still in force. He indicated that the PBC strictures regarding the Pentateuch and Isaiah are passé. He was less clear about the PBC strictures regarding the Gospels. 

So there's another dilemma: were those pronouncements authoritative or not? If Magisterial teaching can become defunct in barely a century, what confidence should Catholics have in Magisterial teaching generally? What's the official status of the anti-modernist policies promulgated under Pius IX and Leo XIII? Has that been "developed" out of existence? If so, the evolution of Catholic theology is moving at light speed.